Free Will in Heaven

[ProdglArchitect]

Here is something from Jimmy Akin on the topic:
ewtn.com/library/ANSWERS/TULIP.HTM

Unconditional election

The doctrine of unconditional election means God does not base his choice (election) of certain individuals on anything other than his own good will [13]. God chooses whomever he pleases and passes over the rest. The ones God chooses will desire to come to him, will accept his offer of salvation, and will do so precisely because he has chosen them.

To show that God positively chooses, rather than merely foresees, those who will come to him, Calvinists cite passages such as Romans 9:15-18, which says, “[The Lord] says to Moses, ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.’ So it depends not upon man’s will or exertion, but upon God’s mercy… So then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills [14].”

What would a Catholic say about this? He certainly is free to disagree with the Calvinist interpretation, but he also is free to agree. All Thomists and even some Molinists (such as Robert Bellarmine and Francisco Suarez) taught unconditional election.

Thomas Aquinas wrote, “God wills to manifest his goodness in men: in respect to those whom he predestines, by means of his mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of his justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others… Yet why he chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will. Hence Augustine says, ‘Why he draws one, and another he draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.’” [15]

Although a Catholic may agree with unconditional election, he may not affirm “double-predestination,” a doctrine Calvinists often infer from it. This teaching claims that in addition to electing some people to salvation God also sends others to damnation.

The alternative to double-predestination is to say that while God predestines some people, he simply passes over the remainder. They will not come to God, but it is because of their inherent sin, not because God damns them. This is the doctrine of passive reprobation, which Aquinas taught [16].

The Council of Trent stated, “If anyone says that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God produces the evil as well as the good works, not only by permission, but also properly and of himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is no less his own proper work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema… If anyone shall say that the grace of justification is attained by those only who are predestined unto life, but that all others, who are called, are called indeed, but do not receive grace, as if they are by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema.” [17]

I agree that, given double predestination as Jimmy Akin has explained it, you would be correct in that it only relates to damnation, but that’s not how I’ve heard it explained by several people who actually believe in it. That is not to say that Akin is wrong, I’m quite sure he isn’t; but that doesn’t mean that my argument is incorrect either. I’ve heard several people say that it doesn’t matter what they do, because God will either save them, or he won’t. That is their understanding of double-predestination. It may be a flawed understanding of a flawed concept, but it’s still what I’ve had the most exposure to on the subject, and what I’m basing my argument on.

Either way, we agree that double-predestination is a falsehood and that, while God certainly "predestines’ some people for eternal glory in Heaven, that predestination is still dependent on their own wills.

 

[Wesrock]

Alright, we all seem to be on the same page now. Sorry for being stickler for details.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

Alright, we all seem to be on the same page now. Sorry for being stickler for details.

No problem. Exactness is important when it comes to these topics.

 

[Aloysium]

Sin within us resists the good.

 

[Tarsier]

Either way, we agree that double-predestination is a falsehood and that, while God certainly "predestines’ some people for eternal glory in Heaven, that predestination is still dependent on their own wills.

Yes, but what are their own wills dependent on? Free will? Sure, but we all agree that nobody will choose Heaven without any grace to move them to do so, right?

Following that, we all surely agree that God wills that all go to Heaven and gives us sufficient grace to do so, but we are able to resist that sufficient grace.

Now we get into tricky area. Let’s look at just the Thomistic viewpoint. It isn’t defined dogma and we are welcome to disagree with some elements of it. At the same time, the Church maintains that the Thomistic articulation of predestination is in line with Catholic doctrine, and we aren’t able to reject it as heretical. So, here’s where I’m not sure we are all in agreement.

Would anyone in this discussion condemn this point: God does not base his choice (election) of certain individuals on anything other than his own good will. God chooses whomever he pleases and passes over the rest. The ones God chooses will desire to come to him, will accept his offer of salvation, and will do so precisely because he has chosen them.

Or this one: Election is unconditional and depends not upon man’s will or exertion, but upon God’s mercy. So then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills

Or this: Why Yet God chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will.

Or this: God only intended for atonement to be efficacious for the elect (although he intended it to be sufficient for all).

Or, finally, this: Above and beyond sufficient grace, God can give the elect an enabling grace that is is intrinsically efficacious; by its very nature, because of the kind of grace it is, it always produces the effect of salvation.

I took these lines almost word-for-word out of Akin’s TULIP article as beliefs that a Catholic can affirm. Not asking if everyone agrees with them (a Molinist might not), but if anyone would say that they are in such error that no Catholic can believe them and be in accord with the Church’s teachings?

 

[Wesrock]

I would not disagree with any of those. God’s election is precisely because He knows what an individual’s free response to His grace will be, whether that individual will cooperate or not. It is not a forced election, but in tandem with man’s free response.

The tricky part is God’s eternity. If we put God in time as making this election “in advance”, it doesn’t seem to jive well. But if we remember that God is eternal, that His knowledge is directed to all points in time, it’s perfectly alright to fit in man’s voluntary movement of the will. He chose to create you knowing precisely what your free response would be. His choice in going ahead and making you as opposed to someone else, and presuming you do end up saved, is Him electing you for salvation. Not as something separate from Him creating you, but in Him willing your existence to begin with. All of creation is one great act of God.

 

[Aloysium]

I would not disagree with any of those. God’s election is precisely because He knows what an individual’s free response to His grace will be, whether that individual will cooperate or not. It is not a forced election, but in tandem with man’s free response.

The tricky part is God’s eternity. If we put God in time as making this election “in advance”, it doesn’t seem to jive well. But if we remember that God is eternal, that His knowledge is directed to all points in time, it’s perfectly alright to fit in man’s voluntary movement of the will. He chose to create you knowing precisely what your free response would be. His choice in going ahead and making you as opposed to someone else, and presuming you do end up saved, is Him electing you for salvation. Not as something separate from Him creating you, but in Him willing your existence to begin with. All of creation is one great act of God.

God being one, everywhere and in every moment as its Creator, outside time, does not know what we will do in some future for Him, but in the very moment that we do it.
As the earth revolves around the sun, we here now “revolve” around His eternity; His existence does not “revolve” around us in our time.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

Yes, but what are their own wills dependent on? Free will? Sure, but we all agree that nobody will choose Heaven without any grace to move them to do so, right?

Following that, we all surely agree that God wills that all go to Heaven and gives us sufficient grace to do so, but we are able to resist that sufficient grace.

Correct.

Now we get into tricky area. Let’s look at just the Thomistic viewpoint. It isn’t defined dogma and we are welcome to disagree with some elements of it. At the same time, the Church maintains that the Thomistic articulation of predestination is in line with Catholic doctrine, and we aren’t able to reject it as heretical. So, here’s where I’m not sure we are all in agreement.

Would anyone in this discussion condemn this point: God does not base his choice (election) of certain individuals on anything other than his own good will. God chooses whomever he pleases and passes over the rest. The ones God chooses will desire to come to him, will accept his offer of salvation, and will do so precisely because he has chosen them.

Except for that we know from the Bible that God has “chosen” everyone. That’s the whole point of saying that He wills salvation for all. Those who go to Heaven are the ones that willingly cooperate with His graces, but that doesn’t mean that God has actively chosen one person over another. I think, in order for this position to make sense, we have to distinguish between God’s active will and His passive will.

God’s active will is that all people will be saved and spend eternity in Heaven with Him.

However, God’s passive will allows that certain people chose to reject Him and spend eternity separated from Him in Hell.

The other problem is the use of the word “choice.” Choice implies change, and we know (from Aquinas’ proofs) that there is no change in God. As such, what we think of when we use the word choice is not technically appropriate in these contexts. We use the word because it is the only way we can make sense of the reality of what occurs, but in practice there is no “choice” as we understand it.

The ones whom God has “chosen” are those that cooperated with His will. The one’s whom God has “passed over” are the ones who rejected God’s will. We can only consider these things in terms of cause and effect, because that is all we know, but that is not accurate to the reality of what occurs…

Or this one: Election is unconditional and depends not upon man’s will or exertion, but upon God’s mercy. So then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills

This is essentially double predestination, that God ignores a person’s will when it comes to their salvation. This is contrary to Church teaching.

Or this: Why Yet God chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will.

This is true. We can’t know this side of Heaven why some individuals seem to receive an abundance of God’s graces, while others seem to receive very little.

Or this: God only intended for atonement to be efficacious for the elect (although he intended it to be sufficient for all).

Jesus died for all, so that the sins of the world may be forgiven. We still have to enact our wills to be forgiven though. A gift cannot be given to someone unwilling to accept it. As such, while the atonement is sufficient for the salvation of all, only the elect (those who’s wills are aligned with God’s) would receive the benefit of it…

Or, finally, this: Above and beyond sufficient grace, God can give the elect an enabling grace that is is intrinsically efficacious; by its very nature, because of the kind of grace it is, it always produces the effect of salvation.

Not sure on this one. God can definitely give someone superabundant grace which would generally have the affect of ensuring their salvation, but that does not mean that the person’s will is not involved. A gift cannot be given to someone unwilling to accept it, so a person who receives this superabundant grace would have to be someone who is already working to align their will with God’s.

I took these lines almost word-for-word out of Akin’s TULIP article as beliefs that a Catholic can affirm. Not asking if everyone agrees with them (a Molinist might not), but if anyone would say that they are in such error that no Catholic can believe them and be in accord with the Church’s teachings?

Well, I’m out for the night. This has been fun. It has been a long time since I’d given these things any real thought, so I thank you for starting this topic. Hopefully someone will be able to pick up where I’m leaving off to continue the discussion.

 

[Wesrock]

I would not disagree with any of those. God’s election is precisely because He knows what an individual’s free response to His grace will be, whether that individual will cooperate or not. It is not a forced election, but in tandem with man’s free response.

The tricky part is God’s eternity. If we put God in time as making this election “in advance”, it doesn’t seem to jive well. But if we remember that God is eternal, that His knowledge is directed to all points in time, it’s perfectly alright to fit in man’s voluntary movement of the will. He chose to create you knowing precisely what your free response would be. His choice in going ahead and making you as opposed to someone else, and presuming you do end up saved, is Him electing you for salvation. Not as something separate from Him creating you, but in Him willing your existence to begin with. All of creation is one great act of God.

Hmm… I’m rethinking some points here, as I don’t think I sufficiently delved into God’s providence and distribution of grace here. Maybe nothing I stated needs to be retracted, But some parts need expansion, at least.

 

[Tarsier]

I would not disagree with any of those.

That seems fine to say, but then you go on to expand in a way that seems to totally disagree with at least a couple of these points.

You wrote:

God’s election is precisely because He knows what an individual’s free response to His grace will be, whether that individual will cooperate or not.

So, God’s election is “because of” (aka conditioned upon) an individual’s free response. Our free response reflects our will (what else would it reflect?). Ergo, God’s election is conditioned upon man’s will.

Yet one of the points which you said you agreed with was:

Election is unconditional and depends not upon man’s will or exertion, but upon God’s mercy. So then he has mercy upon whomever he wills, and he hardens the heart of whomever he wills

If God’s election is because of man’s will, then it seems the opposite of this statement:

Why Yet God chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will.

I feel like I’m beating a dead horse here and will probably move on, but the point is that, while it is fine for you to believe whatever you choose about predestination, the Thomistic approach is not that God foresees (or actively sees, to refer back to your comments about God’s existence outside of time) man’s free response and acts accordingly, but that he offers the efficacious grace to “whomever he wills” for no reason other than his will.

 

[Wesrock]

I feel like I’m beating a dead horse here and will probably move on, but the point is that, while it is fine for you to believe whatever you choose about predestination, the Thomistic approach is not that God foresees (or actively sees, to refer back to your comments about God’s existence outside of time) man’s free response and acts accordingly, but that he offers the efficacious grace to “whomever he wills” for no reason other than his will.

I feel like you misunderstood what I was saying. Nothing I said is based on merit for initial justification, and I think you are falling into the trap of taking God out of His eternity. God’s act is prior to man’s free response always. God premoves some men to election and provides them with efficacious grace only because it is His will to do so, but this is not apart from His knowledge of what their free response to His grace will be, and it is not apart from His creation of each man and each man’s will. We can’t view God as some outside observer arbitrarily moving men to grace [key point in this line is the “outside observer” part]. He is each man’s moment to moment creator. If I of my own free will cooperate with God’s freely given grace, that is only because God elected that this should happen when He created me with a voluntary will. He moves the will that freely and voluntarily elects Him. Again, it’s not as if I just happen to exist, He foresees how I will live my life, and acts accordingly. He chose to create me (He might not have), knowing precisely what ends He would set my will for me for, and He sent me grace, not because I’d live a certain way, but simply because He willed to do so. He might very well not have even if I did all kinds of “good” things. It’s an intricate web, though. It must allow for man’s free response and cooperation.

We cannot forget that man’s free cooperation with grace is a doctrine of the Church, and even Saint Thomas argued that after initial justification men could merit further eternal rewards of salvation according to their cooperation, and that a man who received initial justification could lose salvation and return to it (or not) SCG, V: 70, 71, 72. See also ST Prima Secundae on merit.

 

[Tarsier]

Correct.

Except for that we know from the Bible that God has “chosen” everyone.

Well, he chose us all in one sense, but he certainly didn’t chose all of us for election, which was the context of the statement.

That’s the whole point of saying that He wills salvation for all.

Yes, but doesn’t effect salvation for all.

Those who go to Heaven are the ones that willingly cooperate with His graces, but that doesn’t mean that God has actively chosen one person over another.

While it is true that those who go to Heaven are those who willingly cooperate with his grace, Akin’s article seems to be suggesting just exactly that God has actively chosen one person over another and that some people are given the type of grace that always achieves its intended end (which he calls efficacious grace). The Molinist position relies on God’s reaction to his foresight of whether man will cooperate with his grace (though a bit more complex than that), but not the Thomistic.

The other problem is the use of the word “choice.” Choice implies change, and we know (from Aquinas’ proofs) that there is no change in God. As such, what we think of when we use the word choice is not technically appropriate in these contexts. We use the word because it is the only way we can make sense of the reality of what occurs, but in practice there is no “choice” as we understand it.

How does it imply change necessarily? For instance, if I like vanilla ice cream, and you place vanilla ice cream and chocolate in front of me, I’ll choose vanilla. I made a choice, but nothing changed about me. Before, during and after my opportunity to choose, vanilla is consistently my favorite. Nothing about me changed other than that I might now have vanilla ice cream in my belly. But since God isn’t eating us (at least not THIS god), that shouldn’t be a concern.

The ones whom God has “chosen” are those that cooperated with His will. The one’s whom God has “passed over” are the ones who rejected God’s will. We can only consider these things in terms of cause and effect, because that is all we know, but that is not accurate to the reality of what occurs…

But cause and effect are important here, and Thomas clarifies this. In an earlier point, I quoted where he pointed out that the cause of something cannot also be the effect of that same thing. So, with regard to election, it seems that either God chooses us because we cooperate with his will or we cooperate with his will because he chooses us.

This is essentially double predestination, that God ignores a person’s will when it comes to their salvation. This is contrary to Church teaching.

The problem here is that the second line is almost straight from Scripture (Romans 9:18) and the other problem (I suppose for them, right?) is that I didn’t make the point, but Jimmy Akin did, as I quoted him almost word-for-word. And he was making this point as a summation of what “all Thomists and even some Molinists” believe.

It seems a very bold step to say that Akin, Aquinas and some Molinists like Robert Bellarmine believe something that is contrary to Church teaching.

Not sure on this one. God can definitely give someone superabundant grace which would generally have the affect of ensuring their salvation, but that does not mean that the person’s will is not involved.

Right, and that isn’t what Akin’s article or Thomists are saying. A person’s will is involved, according to the Thomist understanding, but not as an agent upon which God’s election is predicated.

My apologies in advance if I appear contrary or argumentative. It isn’t my intent, but this poster and some others seem to be insisting that the correct or orthodox understanding of predestination is “only” (to use the operative word from when this was articulated earlier) such that the elect are those who God foresees or knows will cooperate with his grace and that, consequently, election is conditional upon this.

I am supportive that others would have different views, but am confused as to the rejection of view I’m asking about (and the one that Akin appears to uphold in his column) and that Thomists hold (that of unconditional election).

 

[Wesrock]

WellMy apologies in advance if I appear contrary or argumentative. It isn’t my intent, but this poster and some others seem to be insisting that the correct or orthodox understanding of predestination is “only” (to use the operative word from when this was articulated earlier)** such that the elect are those who God foresees or knows will cooperate with his grace and that, consequently, election is conditional upon this.**

To be clear and concise: no, I was not stating the bolded part.

 

[Tarsier]

I feel like you misunderstood what I was saying. Nothing I said is based on merit for initial justification, and I think you are falling into the trap of taking God out of His eternity. God’s act is prior to man’s free response always. God premoves some men to election and provides them with efficacious grace only because it is His will to do so, but this is not apart from His knowledge of what their free response to His grace will be, and it is not apart from His creation of each man and each man’s will. We can’t view God as some outside observer arbitrarily moving men to grace. He is each man’s moment to moment creator. If I of my own free will cooperate with God’s freely given grace, that is only because God elected that this should happen when He created me with a voluntary will. He moves the will that freely and voluntarily elects Him. Again, it’s not as if I just happen to exist, He foresees how I will live my life, and acts accordingly. He chose to create me (he might not have), knowing precisely what ends He would propose me for, and He sent me grace, not because I’d live a certain way, but simply because He willed to do so. It’s an intricate web, though. It must allow for man’s free response and cooperation.

Thank you for the clarification. The line I underlined is probably typical of what I’m still struggling with in this conversation. Let me think about it. I understand that this is what one might believe, but it seems to imply a condition in a conversation about unconditional election.

We cannot forget that man’s free cooperation with grace is a doctrine of the Church, and even Saint Thomas argued that after initial justification men could merit further eternal rewards of salvation according to their cooperation, and that a man who received initial justification could lose salvation and return to it (or not) SCG, V: 70, 71, 72. See also ST Prima Secundae on merit.

I agree. Man does freely cooperate with grace and I don’t think I’ve said otherwise. Even the idea of efficacious grace - that which always has the intended effect - does not deny this. That’s why I started this thread with an exploration of how, while we do not sin in heaven, our free cooperation is still in effect.

 

[Tarsier]

To be clear and concise: no, I was not stating the bolder part.

Apologies, then. I may be misreading what you are saying with a bias created by what another poster or two has written.

 

[Wesrock]

The part you underlined in my post, the clause immediately before it states “It’s not as if…” I got the impression you took the underlined part as my position.

 

[Tarsier]

The part you underlined in my post, the clause immediately before it states “It’s not as if…” I got the impression you took the underlined part as my position.

Whoa, you’re right! The capitalization of “He” tricked me into thinking it was the start of a new sentence (even though I see it was preceded by a comma). Totally my bad. Again, I am being nit-picky to make sure I’m fleshing this out fully. It seems we are in pretty good agreement.

Great - at a moving forward point. We’re doing family movie night right now, but I’ll post later tonight or tomorrow morning with my actual question. Until then, hope everyone has a great evening!

 

[Tarsier]

Thanks again to everyone for working through this so far. Wesrock, I appreciate your patience after I misread you and kept thinking you were arguing a point that was keeping me from moving forward. The impending bad weather coming to our area today causes my professional life to become very busy in preparation, so I might not have focused as much as I should. Apologies. As mentioned, it wasn’t that I was trying to be argumentative, but that my last point is an area I’m trying to sort out and it hinges upon an understanding of and appreciation for a couple of fundamental points.

A) As best illustrated by the discussion of Heaven, our free cooperation with God’s grace isn’t diminished (but rather purified) by the exposure to the beatific vision. Or, to put it as I did in one of the early posts, we don’t give up our free will (a will that is free from the distraction of sin - free to choose the good that God created us to choose). At least one poster had a different opinion, but the key thing here is that this is a valid and orthodox position for me to hold. If not - if I’m wrong - it changes the framework under which I’m struggling.

B) The discussion on predestination was intended to emphasize that the “elect” are more than just those who God foresees as accepting his grace. I suppose we should have explored the Molinist perspective more fully, as it puts greater emphasis on free will. However, my own understanding of Middle Knowledge (while it is one I have trouble with) and God’s orchestration of the situations that complement the positive response of the elect at least removes the Molinist perspective from the more passive role of God that is portrayed in the idea that he simply foresees our choices. To me, that was sufficient to leave the discussion with the Thomistic viewpoint. After all, the Thomistic is accepted as an understanding that is compatible with Catholic doctrine and it better isolates (for discussion) God’s sovereign agency. As mentioned earlier, I like starting discussions with extremes for the purpose of isolating principles.

We all seem to agree that God is able to provide individuals (Mary being the anecdotal) with such a powerful grace that, while free will remains, God’s will is so efficacious that Mary doesn’t sin even once. For others (from the Thomistic perspective), God is capable of providing grace that efficaciously effects his intent that they enter Heaven, all in full cooperation with their free will.

C) One last point that is important is one that I made earlier, but I made it very briefly in a larger discussion, which is that God’s will is “free” because he is not bound by anything. While this is true that God is omnipotent, he is also not free to contradict himself (e.g. a rock so heavy he can’t lift it), which is a reason why God can’t sin since he can’t act contrary to his own will.

So the actual question I’ve been struggling with is an apologetic response to the challenge of evil in the world. When an atheist questions God on the basis of evil (the evil of human actions, as opposed to natural disasters and falling pianos), often Catholic apologists (as I have, myself, done) will approach the conversation with a response something like this:

“God created us with free will, which allows us to choose good and evil. He does this because he wants us to freely choose and love him. He saw this as a good thing that we have this free will. It might be that God create the type of world where we are all bound to love him, like some race of automatons, but our free will would be gone. What husband wants a wife who doesn’t freely love him, as if she were hypnotized or drugged? Because we have free will, this means that we can choose sin, but God allows this because through the evil of sin, he brings about the greater good of our free response to his offer of love. While God can do anything, he cannot contradict himself, so it might be that a world that allows sin is a necessary thing if we are to be gifted with the free will to allow us to cooperate in accepting God’s grace.”

Note that, in the above example, I think it is important to apply the initial dialogue to our present condition, but also to Eden, as it is where free choice led to sin, but before the corruption of the world through concupiscence.

So, it seems to me that, with our understanding that our wills are “perfectly” free in Heaven (where sin does not exist) and that God is able to efficaciously move individuals to a positive response to his will without removing their free will (and to do so with the total elimination of sin in the case of Mary, but at least to do so in a way that all of us could achieve Heaven), that this argument loses its footing. It seems to suggest that God could have created a world where we freely love him, but where evil acts don’t exist and we all persevere to enjoy the beatific vision (or where we are created in the beatific vision to begin with, having always had the existence of sinlessness combined with free will that we will have in Heaven).

This doesn’t mean that there aren’t other good explanations for sin and human discord (and I would appreciate thoughts on this). As well, I might be making logical missteps. But I thought that the philosophy forum here was the best place to get feedback that is in line with Catholic thought and helpful for me in my own struggles.

Please let me know if I can clarify or expand on anything, and thanks in advance for your thoughts.

 

[tonyrey]

…So, it seems to me that, with our understanding that our wills are “perfectly” free in Heaven (where sin does not exist) and that God is able to efficaciously move individuals to a positive response to his will without removing their free will (and to do so with the total elimination of sin in the case of Mary, but at least to do so in a way that all of us could achieve Heaven), that this argument loses its footing. It seems to suggest that God could have created a world where we freely love him, but where evil acts don’t exist and we all persevere to enjoy the beatific vision (or where we are created in the beatific vision to begin with, having always had the existence of sinlessness combined with free will that we will have in Heaven).

That argument plays into the hands of atheists who claim God could have created us with free will without anyone committing evil acts. If it is true why has He permitted so much diabolical evil and needless suffering that can be avoided? Surely it is because we are made in His image and share in His power to such an extent that we can choose to reject Him for all eternity. There are at least two solutions:

1. It is impossible for God to know all our decisions because free will is a divine attribute and intrinsically mysterious. Like God’s existence it is an ultimate element of reality which cannot be analysed or explained.
2. God knows all our decisions but has relinquished His omnipotence to such an extent that we can reject His love and defy His will for all eternity. He has shared His power with us not just temporarily but forever. The price may seem too high but divine love is not restricted by human values or opinions. Just as Jesus on earth surrendered everything for our sake so God in Heaven does likewise. Satan is a symbol of eternal revolt and of failure on the part of the Creator but it is failure that is self-inflicted. There was no need for Christ to be mocked, scourged and crucified but He chose to accept His suffering and humiliation out of love which knows no bounds. The folly of the Cross is the greatest proof we can have of God’s perfect selflessness which is prepared to accept the eternal existence of rivals. Free will in Heaven has its counterpart in Hell and is evidence of divine perfection that no one could have invented or imagined.

 

[Aloysium]

That argument plays into the hands of atheists who claim God could have created us with free will without anyone committing evil acts. If it is true why has He permitted so much diabolical evil and needless suffering that can be avoided? Surely it is because we are made in His image and share in His power to such an extent that we can choose to reject Him for all eternity. There are at least two solutions:

1. It is impossible for God to know all our decisions because free will is a divine attribute and intrinsically mysterious. Like God’s existence it is an ultimate element of reality which cannot be analysed or explained. . . .

Mother Mary was not some automaton; although created like Eve, free from original sin, she willingly gave herself to God.

As to God’s knowledge of us, Pope Francis at the Yad Vashem Memorial in Jerusalem:
“‘Adam, where are you?’ (cf. Gen 3:9). Where are you, o man? What have you come to? In this place, this memorial of the Shoah, we hear God’s question echo once more: “Adam, where are you?” This question is charged with all the sorrow of a Father who has lost his child. The Father knew the risk of freedom; he knew that his children could be lost. yet perhaps not even the Father could imagine so great a fall, so profound an abyss! Here, before the boundless tragedy of the Holocaust, That cry - “Where are you?” - echoes like a faint voice in an unfathomable abyss. Adam, who are you? I no longer recognize you. Who are you, o man? What have you become? Of what horror have you been capable? What made you fall to such depths?”