Free Will

[Peter_habeo]

The Church teaches that man has a free will (CCC 1731,1732).

However, I am curious how far the diminished or nullified responsibility would extend (CCC 1735-1737).

The 17th century philosopher Benedict Spinoza, believed that man’s free will was simply a lack of understanding about unconscious causes and appetites. Forgive me for such a long quote, but I am think particularly of this passage:

Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites…

As acknowledged by the Church, our actions have some mitigating circumstances, and I believe these kind of circumstances lead us to all the various habitual sins, and sins of “passion”. I don’t want to overstate this mitigation, and every sin presents it’s own circumstances, and it’s own mitigating factors.

But I believe this also extends to our actions that are not directly sinful - the way we look at ourselves and the world. And it’s only too obvious that our lives are, for the most part, determined by where we were born, who are parents are, and so on.; examples which have an indelible effect on our lives and our personalities.

 

[Tomdstone]

The Church teaches that man has a free will (CCC 1731,1732).

However, I am curious how far the diminished or nullified responsibility would extend (CCC 1735-1737).

The 17th century philosopher Benedict Spinoza, believed that man’s free will was simply a lack of understanding about unconscious causes and appetites. Forgive me for such a long quote, but I am think particularly of this passage:

Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites…

As acknowledged by the Church, our actions have some mitigating circumstances, and I believe these kind of circumstances lead us to all the various habitual sins, and sins of “passion”. I don’t want to overstate this mitigation, and every sin presents it’s own circumstances, and it’s own mitigating factors.

But I believe this also extends to our actions that are not directly sinful - the way we look at ourselves and the world. And it’s only too obvious that our lives are, for the most part, determined by where we were born, who are parents are, and so on.; examples which have an indelible effect on our lives and our personalities.

Our choices are limited to some extent.

 

[Nelka]

Ecclesiasticus 15:14 He himself made human beings in the beginning, and then left them free to make their own decisions.

15 If you choose, you will keep the commandments and so be faithful to his will.

16 He has set fire and water before you; put out your hand to whichever you prefer.

17 A human being has life and death before him; whichever he prefers will be given him.

18 For vast is the wisdom of the Lord; he is almighty and all-seeing.

19 His eyes are on those who fear him, he notes every human action.

20 He never commanded anyone to be godless, he has given no one permission to sin.

 

[dmar198]

The Church teaches that man has a free will (CCC 1731,1732).

However, I am curious how far the diminished or nullified responsibility would extend (CCC 1735-1737).

That is a good question. But I think Spinoza’s explanation of free will leaves our choices unfree.

The 17th century philosopher Benedict Spinoza, believed that man’s free will was simply a lack of understanding about unconscious causes and appetites. Forgive me for such a long quote, but I am think particularly of this passage:

I don’t mind the long passage, but I am going to number some of its clauses to make it easier to cite.

*[1.] Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind,

[2.] when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.

[3.] Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined;

[4.] and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites…*

I have major problems with this explanation of free will. My biggest problem is that he simply asserts to be true the major controversial parts of this passage. Actually, I don’t think that’s quite true. I am confident that if we looked up the context he would point to things which he thinks are evidence of what he is saying in these passages.

Let me explain how I see this passage: in #1 he observes examples of people who say things that most well-adjusted adults would not. I don’t think this should be controversial, except perhaps the part where he says what an infant believes. I don’t think infants necessarily have beliefs about their actions and their causes.

In #2 he says that all the people in his examples are unable to control themselves. In the case of infants, that seems true, because they are incapable of exercising their free will. But I think the other examples he gives are examples of impaired freedom, not destroyed freedom. Thus, I think #2 is mostly a false assertion, because he says these people are unable to control themselves, and I think their self-control is merely diminished.

In #3 he asserts that men believe themselves to be free for a poor reason. But the reason he gives is, in my opinion, something that never occurs to most people. If you asked most people why they think they are free, I think they would respond by giving an example: I can raise my arm right now, or not, and then they would do it. I certainly don’t think they would say that they simply don’t know what causes their actions, therefore they are free.

Also: in #3 he says there are unconscious causes by which our actions are determined. This is a denial of free will, but so far, the only reason he has given to support his position is the assumption that we are like the people in the examples he gave in #1. I think that is problematic because I think he overestimates their lack of self-control, except perhaps the infants, and, moreover, he has no evidence that our self-control is as diminished as theirs.

I think #3 is the worst sentence in his explanation.

In #4 he says something that ends with a “…” which I am guessing means he goes on to give reasons to support his assertions. But I haven’t read his full remarks, so I don’t know what those reasons might be. As it stands, though, I think his analysis falls far short of an intellectually compelling denial of free will.

 

[Peter_habeo]

Thank you all for your responses.

The parallelism of Hebrew poetry is evident in the passages quoted. In the final analysis, there are two ways - the way of life and the way of death, as in the Didache.

I also do not agree with Spinoza, but I used him as an example of those influences we are often unaware of, parents being the most important, in forming our personalities.

The church teaches that humans are free to choose; it also teaches that circumstances can mitigate the responsibility for the choices, at least to some extent. I was trying to think about the processes which bring about these circumstances.

 

[Vico]

The Church teaches that man has a free will (CCC 1731,1732).

However, I am curious how far the diminished or nullified responsibility would extend (CCC 1735-1737).

The 17th century philosopher Benedict Spinoza, believed that man’s free will was simply a lack of understanding about unconscious causes and appetites. Forgive me for such a long quote, but I am think particularly of this passage:

Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites…

As acknowledged by the Church, our actions have some mitigating circumstances, and I believe these kind of circumstances lead us to all the various habitual sins, and sins of “passion”. I don’t want to overstate this mitigation, and every sin presents it’s own circumstances, and it’s own mitigating factors.

But I believe this also extends to our actions that are not directly sinful - the way we look at ourselves and the world. And it’s only too obvious that our lives are, for the most part, determined by where we were born, who are parents are, and so on.; examples which have an indelible effect on our lives and our personalities.

The sources of sin are ignorance, passion, and malice. Through the grace of God, we have the power to overcome temptation to sin. Due to wrong use of our free will we commit sin. Through repeated venial sin mortal sin may take root, partly through not avoiding the occasions of sin. Once a *habit of sin *is acquired the will may no longer be free in that regard. The habit is acquired through free will however.

Catechism:1863 Venial sin weakens charity; it manifests a disordered affection for created goods; it impedes the soul’s progress in the exercise of the virtues and the practice of the moral good; it merits temporal punishment. Deliberate and unrepented venial sin disposes us little by little to commit mortal sin. However venial sin does not break the covenant with God. With God’s grace it is humanly reparable. "Venial sin does not deprive the sinner of sanctifying grace, friendship with God, charity, and consequently eternal happiness."134

While he is in the flesh, man cannot help but have at least some light sins. But do not despise these sins which we call “light”: if you take them for light when you weigh them, tremble when you count them. A number of light objects makes a great mass; a number of drops fills a river; a number of grains makes a heap. What then is our hope? Above all, confession.135

2848 “Lead us not into temptation” implies a decision of the heart: "For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. . . . No one can serve two masters."156 "If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit."157 In this assent to the Holy Spirit the Father gives us strength. "No testing has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, so that you may be able to endure it."158
​

 

[pete_bowes]

Free will is the freedom to decide to do good, or evil. That’s how a child would understand it, that’s how I see it. Why complicate what is so simple.

 

[fhansen]

The Church teaches that man has a free will (CCC 1731,1732).

However, I am curious how far the diminished or nullified responsibility would extend (CCC 1735-1737).

The 17th century philosopher Benedict Spinoza, believed that man’s free will was simply a lack of understanding about unconscious causes and appetites. Forgive me for such a long quote, but I am think particularly of this passage:

Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites…

As acknowledged by the Church, our actions have some mitigating circumstances, and I believe these kind of circumstances lead us to all the various habitual sins, and sins of “passion”. I don’t want to overstate this mitigation, and every sin presents it’s own circumstances, and it’s own mitigating factors.

But I believe this also extends to our actions that are not directly sinful - the way we look at ourselves and the world. And it’s only too obvious that our lives are, for the most part, determined by where we were born, who are parents are, and so on.; examples which have an indelible effect on our lives and our personalities.

Our free will isn’t perfect, rather its of a relative nature, and ignorance is involved in all sin to one degree or another. And yet man is sufficiently free to be a morally responsible being, accountable for his actions. This should not be denied,

 

[blase6]

I think there is a serious lack of understanding between those who argue for free will and those who argue against it. I am not sure if “free will” means the same thing for everyone discussing it.

I will assume that free will means “involving the power of ultimately determining an event relative to the actor”.

It should be obvious that most of our actions are at least highly influenced by external factors in pretty much everything. The problem I have with free will is that it contradicts the assumption/belief that God is the sole Creator. When God creates the world, He determines all events. That would include “free” actions by persons. I see the explanation made all the time on every free will thread:
“God knows our actions but does not cause our actions.”
As if this is a valid argument and not just a statement of belief.
I think I will make an analogy:
You are a robot programmer/manufacturer. You design a robot to perform action “X” in situation “Y”. (Or the robot randomly chooses between actions “W” and “X” in situation “Y”.) When the robot performs X in situation Y, did the robot cause its action? The robot is the immediate cause of action X, but you, its creator, are the ultimate cause of action X. Even if you made it in such a way that you couldn’t know exactly what it would do, you would still be the cause of the robot performing that action.

Of course, no analogy is perfect, but this still should suggest that no creature can be the ultimate cause of its own actions, only its Creator is the ultimate cause. Thus there are two possible conclusions:

1. Created persons are not the ultimate cause of their actions, and therefore, not free;
2. Created persons are their own “gods” and have the power to ultimately cause their own actions, apart from God.

I hope I make myself understood.

 

[fhansen]

I think there is a serious lack of understanding between those who argue for free will and those who argue against it. I am not sure if “free will” means the same thing for everyone discussing it.

I will assume that free will means “involving the power of ultimately determining an event relative to the actor”.

It should be obvious that most of our actions are at least highly influenced by external factors in pretty much everything. The problem I have with free will is that it contradicts the assumption/belief that God is the sole Creator. When God creates the world, He determines all events. That would include “free” actions by persons. I see the explanation made all the time on every free will thread:
“God knows our actions but does not cause our actions.”
As if this is a valid argument and not just a statement of belief.
I think I will make an analogy:
You are a robot programmer/manufacturer. You design a robot to perform action “X” in situation “Y”. (Or the robot randomly chooses between actions “W” and “X” in situation “Y”.) When the robot performs X in situation Y, did the robot cause its action? The robot is the immediate cause of action X, but you, its creator, are the ultimate cause of action X. Even if you made it in such a way that you couldn’t know exactly what it would do, you would still be the cause of the robot performing that action.

Of course, no analogy is perfect, but this still should suggest that no creature can be the ultimate cause of its own actions, only its Creator is the ultimate cause. Thus there are two possible conclusions:

1. Created persons are not the ultimate cause of their actions, and therefore, not free;
2. Created persons are their own “gods” and have the power to ultimately cause their own actions, apart from God.

I hope I make myself understood.

Conclusion #2 reflects the course Adam took, to be his own god, apart from his Creator. And, yes, God allowed that very freedom. And , yes, the Church teaches that God is the indirect cause of all human actions. But this is similar to saying that the inventor of automobiles is the cause of auto fatalities. Presumably the best of all possible actions for God was to create, even as He knew the evil that men would do. Creation is still good, and worth it all in the end, God having made His universe in a “state of journeying to perfection”, as the catechism puts it, aided by His grace while never being forced.

 

[blase6]

Conclusion #2 reflects the course Adam took, to be his own god, apart from his Creator. And, yes, God allowed that very freedom. And , yes, the Church teaches that God is the indirect cause of all human actions. But this is similar to saying that the inventor of automobiles is the cause of auto fatalities. Presumably the best of all possible actions for God was to create, even as He knew the evil that men would do. Creation is still good, and worth it all in the end, God having made His universe in a “state of journeying to perfection”, as the catechism puts it, aided by His grace while never being forced.

But you forget that free will (under my definition) is involving being the ultimate cause of an action. You say that God is the indirect cause of all personal actions, does that not agree with my definition? My point was that “free will” under this definition contradicts God’s being the ultimate cause. If my action is not entirely resulting from my power, but is indirectly caused by an external force, it is not “free”.

 

[Amandil]

I think there is a serious lack of understanding between those who argue for free will and those who argue against it. I am not sure if “free will” means the same thing for everyone discussing it.

I will assume that free will means “involving the power of ultimately determining an event relative to the actor”.

It should be obvious that most of our actions are at least highly influenced by external factors in pretty much everything. The problem I have with free will is that it contradicts the assumption/belief that God is the sole Creator. When God creates the world, He determines all events. That would include “free” actions by persons. I see the explanation made all the time on every free will thread:
“God knows our actions but does not cause our actions.”
As if this is a valid argument and not just a statement of belief.
I think I will make an analogy:
You are a robot programmer/manufacturer. You design a robot to perform action “X” in situation “Y”. (Or the robot randomly chooses between actions “W” and “X” in situation “Y”.) When the robot performs X in situation Y, did the robot cause its action? The robot is the immediate cause of action X, but you, its creator, are the ultimate cause of action X. Even if you made it in such a way that you couldn’t know exactly what it would do, you would still be the cause of the robot performing that action.

Of course, no analogy is perfect, but this still should suggest that no creature can be the ultimate cause of its own actions, only its Creator is the ultimate cause. Thus there are two possible conclusions:

1. Created persons are not the ultimate cause of their actions, and therefore, not free;
2. Created persons are their own “gods” and have the power to ultimately cause their own actions, apart from God.

I hope I make myself understood.

The problem here Blase6 is that is not how Aquinas nor the Church understands free will, or freedom at all. The common concept of “freedom” is a product of the “enlightenment”(which is really license, not freedom or liberty), not the freedom used in the term “free will” as understood by the Sacred Tradition of the Church.

 

[blase6]

If that is the case, then you must give the “correct” definition of freedom. For me personally, it is a depressing thought that I would not be able to ultimately determine my own actions, and be instead drifting according to external influences.

 

[fhansen]

But you forget that free will (under my definition) is involving being the ultimate cause of an action. You say that God is the indirect cause of all personal actions, does that not agree with my definition? My point was that “free will” under this definition contradicts God’s being the ultimate cause. If my action is not entirely resulting from my power, but is indirectly caused by an external force, it is not “free”.

Free will, by definition, would involve God purposefully having a “hands off” position in relation to our actions. He never forces our wills to align with His, which is why Adams sin was possible.

 

[Amandil]

Free will, by definition, would involve God purposefully having a “hands off” position in relation to our actions. He never forces our wills to align with His, which is why Adams sin was possible.

No, this is false. God is the cause of our willing, but even then our willing, when it is conformed to His will, is free. The more conformed to God’s will we are, the more free we are.

 

[Amandil]

If that is the case, then you must give the “correct” definition of freedom.

Proper freedom, if I were to try and put it in my own simple terms, is to act according to the nature or purpose for which the subject was created.

Therefore a will which is free is one that operates according to the way it was intended by God.

For me personally, it is a depressing thought that I would not be able to ultimately determine my own actions, and be instead drifting according to external influences.

Why would love, which is an external influence, be depressing?

 

[blase6]

Under your definition of freedom, you believe in a God who would decide to create a world where not all of his persons will his goodness. You are excluding real freedom of action(or should I use the word “autonomy”) by defining freedom as being aligned with God’s will. Sure, our actions may or may not be in accordance with God’s will, but you are basically confirming that God causes our actions. And that is depressing.

 

[fhansen]

No, this is false. God is the cause of our willing, but even then our willing, when it is conformed to His will, is free. The more conformed to God’s will we are, the more free we are.

No, this is false. God does not cause our willing, or else He’d be the direct cause of all sin/evil. It would be ridiculous to pray, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven" if not for the possibility of His will not being done.

 

[oldcelt]

Free Will is an impossibility under an omniscient creator…He knows every action his created will take before they do so…in fact, before he even creates them. That foreknowledge makes Free Will an illusion.

 

[fhansen]

Free Will is an impossibility under an omniscient creator…He knows every action his created will take before they do so…in fact, before he even creates them. That foreknowledge makes Free Will an illusion.

Foreknowledge simply doesn’t render choices unfree… With or without the foreknowledge/omniscience of some outside observer, the players in this game are still faced with the same moral choices, still responsible for their actions. If you were somehow given the foreknowledge of some particular person’s choice to rob a bank or eat a banana cream pie 3 years, 2 days and 14 minutes from now would that knowledge change anything in their choice for some reason?