Free Will

[Amandil]

I did not include the possibly endless options Adam had to act at that point in time. I was just making a very simple statement that he could either choose to or to not do a specific act.

I am still trying to point out that because the will does not move itself but is moved by external factors, and God puts those factors in place, God is responsible for whatever Adam wills. Adam cannot be held responsible for his actions unless he is somehow the ultimate mover of his own actions, which contradicts God’s being the ultimate mover.
To go off of that, assuming that God always wills toward the good, then Adam cannot will other than real good, because his will is moved by God. Any sin Adam committed would then be reduced to a mere mistake in God’s creation, but we do not believe that God is fallible. So unless Adam is another “god” with the ability to create that which God does not, he is not the cause of his own actions.
Full responsibility cannot exist without autonomy.

There comes a point when repeating things which refuse to be understood apart from a particular ideology becomes an exercise in futility.

 

[blase6]

There comes a point when repeating things which refuse to be understood apart from a particular ideology becomes an exercise in futility.

You admit that you cannot understand. I accept that and will give up. If you deny that some degree of autonomy is necessary for free action, then I can’t argue any more.

 

[fhansen]

You admit that you cannot understand. I accept that and will give up. If you deny that some degree of autonomy is necessary for free action, then I can’t argue any more.

I’d admit that it’d be naive to regard human beings as morally irresponsible.

 

[Amandil]

You admit that you can’t understand. I accept that and I will give up. If you deny that some degree of autonomy is necessary for free action, then I can’t argue any more.

Oh, brother…

I understand your position perfectly since it’s one that as a nihilistic atheist I used to hold. Its absurd and holds to a ridiculous and false anthropology.

“Autonomy” is not necessary for actions to be freely chosen and freely acted. What you are patently denying is the fact of the internal action and appetites of the human will, which indeed directs our choices to either act in accordance with freedom or to abuse it.

You’d do well to stop feeding yourself with “enlightenment” garbage and instead read Aquinas.

 

[blase6]

Oh, brother…

I understand your position perfectly since it’s one that as a nihilistic atheist I used to hold. Its absurd and holds to a ridiculous and false anthropology.

“Autonomy” is not necessary for actions to be freely chosen and freely acted. What you are patently denying is the fact of the internal action and appetites of the human will, which indeed directs our choices to either act in accordance with freedom or to abuse it.

You’d do well to stop feeding yourself with “enlightenment” garbage and instead read Aquinas.

I don’t think you understand my position perfectly. It is simple: if God creates wills, those wills are dependent on God’s will and creation. A will independent from God’s will is another God, and also a contradiction.

I don’t read “enlightenment garbage”. I go entirely off of my own experiences and observations.

 

[Amandil]

"This point on knowledge is the fundamental foundation for the wills freedom. In the present life, no one object can be considered by our reason as totally good and so does not move the will necessarily to will it in particular. The will must necessarily be moved by the good or apprehended good thing, no one thing so exhausts goodness that the will is moved to it necessarily.(STIa, 105, 4) Many things possess goodness to varying degrees and with various aspects, such that several particular goods may be contrary or, in their various aspects, even contradictory. Therefore no one thing is sufficient to move the will necessarily. Not even the consideration of the goodness of things is completely good, so that people are free to judge or not judge particular objects. Hence, the will is free both in its exercise and in its specification, ie. choosing one good over the other.

On the other side, in the way the will acts, freedom is also preserved, since every act of the will is particular. The specific act of the will cannot encompass the entirety of universal goodness be cause of its specificity. So even choosing to act over not acting does not fulfill the will’s necessity toward goodness.(STIa-IIae, 13, 6)Also, because no particular means is necessary for the attainment of goodness or happiness, there is freedom. The will might not choose any particular means to its end because it is not bound by the necessity of utility.(DV24.2.) The will is free to specify its acts after it chooses to act at all."

A summary of Aquinas and free will.

 

[davidv]

I don’t think you understand my position perfectly. It is simple: if God creates wills, those wills are dependent on God’s will and creation. A will independent from God’s will is another God, and also a contradiction.

I don’t read “enlightenment garbage”. I go entirely off of my own experiences and observations.

Why does dependence require the absence of free will? When my children were young, they were completely dependent on my wife and I. Yet they freely chose to disobey us.

 

[blase6]

Why does dependence require the absence of free will? When my children were young, they were completely dependent on my wife and I. Yet they freely chose to disobey us.

That is not a valid comparison. Your children’s wills are independent from yours’ because you are not God. Your will comes from and is ultimately moved by God. If you cannot move independently from what God puts in your life, then you cannot have full responsibility for your actions.

 

[blase6]

"This point on knowledge is the fundamental foundation for the wills freedom. In the present life, no one object can be considered by our reason as totally good and so does not move the will necessarily to will it in particular. The will must necessarily be moved by the good or apprehended good thing, no one thing so exhausts goodness that the will is moved to it necessarily.(STIa, 105, 4) Many things possess goodness to varying degrees and with various aspects, such that several particular goods may be contrary or, in their various aspects, even contradictory. Therefore no one thing is sufficient to move the will necessarily. Not even the consideration of the goodness of things is completely good, so that people are free to judge or not judge particular objects. Hence, the will is free both in its exercise and in its specification, ie. choosing one good over the other.

On the other side, in the way the will acts, freedom is also preserved, since every act of the will is particular. The specific act of the will cannot encompass the entirety of universal goodness be cause of its specificity. So even choosing to act over not acting does not fulfill the will’s necessity toward goodness.(STIa-IIae, 13, 6)Also, because no particular means is necessary for the attainment of goodness or happiness, there is freedom. The will might not choose any particular means to its end because it is not bound by the necessity of utility.(DV24.2.) The will is free to specify its acts after it chooses to act at all."

A summary of Aquinas and free will.

In that quote, it sounds like Aquinas is simply explaining that the will moves toward what appears most good at the moment. He is not explaining the contradiction of something being created by God, without autonomy, coming into conflict with the will of God.

 

[davidv]

That is not a valid comparison. Your children’s wills are independent from yours’ because you are not God.

What is it about not being God, makes their wills independent? This does not explain why this is not a valid comparison.

Your will comes from and is ultimately moved by God. If you cannot move independently from what God puts in your life, then you cannot have full responsibility for your actions.

You have repeatedly made this claim, where the logical support for it?

 

[blase6]

What is it about not being God, makes their wills independent? This does not explain why this is not a valid comparison.

You have repeatedly made this claim, where the logical support for it?

The will always moves toward what appears most good. Therefore, God determines the actions of all persons by creating all of the motives that the will will experience. If God creates the world in a certain way, a certain person will will a certain object. This action cannot be called free if a free action is defined as not being necessary. It should be clear that all of the things persons other than God will are necessary, because they do not exist any other way. They are only voluntarily chosen, either by God, autonomously choosing to create one world over another, or by an autonomous will other than God, which appears to be a contradiction.

 

[Vico]

In that quote, it sounds like Aquinas is simply explaining that the will moves toward what appears most good at the moment. He is not explaining the contradiction of something being created by God, without autonomy, coming into conflict with the will of God.

Try Summa Theologica, I, Q19, A8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?:
Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.

 

[blase6]

Try Summa Theologica, I, Q19, A8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?:
Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.

If God wills something “contingent”, then any result of that is necessary because God willed for any of its possibilities to happen. This is not a perfect comparison, but if an employer does not assign a necessary job to one of his employees, but instead lets them choose what they will do, he is still responsible for what they do, because he allowed them to do it. He didn’t have to.
The statement can be simplified to saying, “God willed things to happen apart from his will.” That is a contradiction.

 

[Vico]

If God wills something “contingent”, then any result of that is necessary because God willed for any of its possibilities to happen. This is not a perfect comparison, but if an employer does not assign a necessary job to one of his employees, but instead lets them choose what they will do, he is still responsible for what they do, because he allowed them to do it. He didn’t have to.
The statement can be simplified to saying, “God willed things to happen apart from his will.” That is a contradiction.

God willed that some of his creatures could freely choose from among some available options.

 

[blase6]

God willed that some of his creatures could freely choose from among some available options.

The possibility of choosing between actions is meaningless. The will always moves towards what appears most desirable.

 

[Vico]

The possibility of choosing between actions is meaningless. The will always moves towards what appears most desirable.

It is not a possibility of choice but a certainty of choice. The meaning is charity or malice.

 

[Tomdstone]

The possibility of choosing between actions is meaningless. The will always moves towards what appears most desirable.

Not always. Sometimes a decision is made by tossing a coin.

 

[blase6]

It is not a possibility of choice but a certainty of choice. The meaning is charity or malice.

And that is with the assumption that the will can move itself, which requires autonomy.

 

[blase6]

Not always. Sometimes a decision is made by tossing a coin.

Did you read what I already said to that?

 

[Amandil]

And that is the with the assumption that the will can move itself, which requires autonomy.

An autonomous will neither cannot nor will not will anything. It’s no different than a rock which is never moved, the same laws of inertia apply.

Autonomy necessarily includes being autnonmous from that which the will desires. But the will necessarily is ordered towards things, both sensible and rational, therefore your assertion about autonomy doesn’t follow.

You can seek autonomy and emancipation from God all you like, the problem is that that is not what you were made for, you’re acting contrary to your nature.

“…for you have made us for Yourself, Oh Lord. And our hearts are restless until they rest on You.”