Free Will

[blase6]

Yes, so I suppose that, based on this “if”, we should free all the rapists, murderers, thieves, etc. After all, God made them do it. I’d submit that regardless of some superior being’s foreknowledge, or the lack of such a being, humans are simply morally responsible beings.

No, because we are going to keep these people away from the general public motivated by a desire to keep peace and order, regardless of whether they have free will or not.

 

[fhansen]

No, because we are going to keep these people away from the general public motivated by a desire to keep peace and order, regardless of whether they have free will or not.

OK, so we imprison and generally, universally, oppose such people and their behavior for purely practical reasons? Moral outrage or righteous indignation are just silly emotional responses to genocide, torture, child abuse, greed, envy social crimes, injustice in general? I don’t think so. We react to such evils because they’re objectively unjust to begin with, i.e. man is a moral animal, accountable for his actions-and we know it.

 

[blase6]

OK, so we imprison and generally, universally, oppose such people and their behavior for purely practical reasons? Moral outrage or righteous indignation are just silly emotional responses to genocide, torture, child abuse, greed, envy social crimes, injustice in general? I don’t think so. We react to such evils because they’re objectively unjust to begin with, i.e. man is a moral animal, accountable for his actions-and we know it.

Please go back and read all my posts. It is obvious that most people have a sense of responsibility for their actions. People see that they are the immediate cause of their actions and thus feel responsible for what they do.

People are the immediate cause of their actions, just as the engine is the immediate cause of the movement of the car. That is obvious. But I cannot see how it can be said that people are the ultimate cause of their own actions, in a way that is not contradictory.

 

[fhansen]

Please go back and read all my posts. It is obvious that most people have a sense of responsibility for their actions. People see that they are the immediate cause of their actions and thus feel responsible for what they do.

People are the immediate cause of their actions, just as the engine is the immediate cause of the movement of the car. That is obvious. But I cannot see how it can be said that people are the ultimate cause of their own actions, in a way that is not contradictory.

So long as people are responsible for their actions then free will is involved. We can’t have it both ways. People are limited to one degree or another, culpability may be mitigated by ignorance and other circumstances, but in any case people are quite radically free to behave any way they want-or can get away with-and many often deliberately make very poor-and evil-choices. So while God is an indirect cause by virtue of creating a world where freedom is abused, with all the harm that causes, this does not mean He directly determines, wills, or otherwise causes the evil. We’re perfectly capable of that.

 

[blase6]

So long as people are responsible for their actions then free will is involved. We can’t have it both ways. People are limited to one degree or another, culpability may be mitigated by ignorance and other circumstances, but in any case people are quite radically free to behave any way they want-or can get away with-and many often deliberately make very poor-and evil-choices. So while God is an indirect cause by virtue of creating a world where freedom is abused, with all the harm that causes, this does not mean He directly determines, wills, or otherwise causes the evil. We’re perfectly capable of that.

But the will is not the ulterior determinant of a person’s actions. The will is moved by forces external to itself. Thus, the will is not self-motivated. The choice of the will is dependent upon what appears most good to it. Thus full responsibility cannot exist. I should have already made that clear to you.

 

[oldcelt]

But the will is not the ulterior determinant of a person’s actions. The will is moved by forces external to itself. Thus, the will is not self-motivated. The choice of the will is dependent upon what appears most good to it. Thus full responsibility cannot exist. I should have already made that clear to you.

Agreed, and I have made the point repeatedly that there can be no true free will under an omniscient creator. Foreknowledge + Creation = Responsibility…which would mean that the omniscient creator is responsible for a wide variety of offenses.

 

[Vico]

This still doesn’t show me how the will freely moves itself.

First, you did not answer my question.

Second, using concepts in St. Thomas Aquinas commentary is important because the Church has based so much teaching on it.

In Scholastic terminology a distinction does not always mean separation nor its possibility. Of the supernatural soul the intellect and will are not separate. Freedom is a property of the whole human being rather than a component part and the will is not independent of the intellect. (Calvin, against Catholic teaching, separates the soul into two parts – intellect and will.)

Below, St. Thomas shows that the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

Summa Theologica Q83. newadvent.org/summa/1083.htmI answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Question 64, Article 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of “understanding” implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to “reason,” properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to “will” implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to “choose” is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Question 79, Article 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

 

[blase6]

First, you did not answer my question.

Second, using concepts in St. Thomas Aquinas commentary is important because the Church has based so much teaching on it.

In Scholastic terminology a distinction does not always mean separation nor its possibility. Of the supernatural soul the intellect and will are not separate. Freedom is a property of the whole human being rather than a component part and the will is not independent of the intellect. (Calvin, against Catholic teaching, separates the soul into two parts – intellect and will.)

Below, St. Thomas shows that the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

Summa Theologica Q83. newadvent.org/summa/1083.htmI answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Question 64, Article 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of “understanding” implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to “reason,” properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to “will” implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to “choose” is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Question 79, Article 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

It does not matter whether the intellect and will are separate or not. Since the intellect receives knowledge from external forces, and the will always moves toward what appears most good, then the movement of the will is dependent upon external force.

If free will is defined to be simply “the power of choice”, it is meaningless. If the will moves towards what appears most good to it, then saying it has a choice is meaningless. The “choice” is determined by what appears most good.

 

[blase6]

Agreed, and I have made the point repeatedly that there can be no true free will under an omniscient creator. Foreknowledge + Creation = Responsibility…which would mean that the omniscient creator is responsible for a wide variety of offenses.

If God gives you the ultimate power to determine your own actions, then it is your ultimate responsibility. But I fail to see how that is possible.

 

[Bahman]

The Church teaches that man has a free will (CCC 1731,1732).

However, I am curious how far the diminished or nullified responsibility would extend (CCC 1735-1737).

The 17th century philosopher Benedict Spinoza, believed that man’s free will was simply a lack of understanding about unconscious causes and appetites. Forgive me for such a long quote, but I am think particularly of this passage:

Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk. Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites…

As acknowledged by the Church, our actions have some mitigating circumstances, and I believe these kind of circumstances lead us to all the various habitual sins, and sins of “passion”. I don’t want to overstate this mitigation, and every sin presents it’s own circumstances, and it’s own mitigating factors.

But I believe this also extends to our actions that are not directly sinful - the way we look at ourselves and the world. And it’s only too obvious that our lives are, for the most part, determined by where we were born, who are parents are, and so on.; examples which have an indelible effect on our lives and our personalities.

The key thing in this puzzle is consciousness which we can decide and become aware of our options.

 

[blase6]

The key thing in this puzzle is consciousness which we can decide and become aware of our options.

It doesn’t matter if you are aware of your options or not. What matters is whether you determine your choice or not.

 

[Bahman]

It doesn’t matter if you are aware of your options or not. What matters is whether you determine your choice or not.

You determine in another word decide using consciousness and you are aware of your options using consciousness as well.

 

[blase6]

You determine in another word decide using consciousness and you are aware of your options using consciousness as well.

Please go back and read my older posts in this topic. Consciousness is irrelevant.

 

[Vico]

It does not matter whether the intellect and will are separate or not. Since the intellect receives knowledge from external forces, and the will always moves toward what appears most good, then the movement of the will is dependent upon external force.

If free will is defined to be simply “the power of choice”, it is meaningless. If the will moves towards what appears most good to it, then saying it has a choice is meaningless. The “choice” is determined by what appears most good.

The meaning is merit or sin in that man may act with or against reason. It is not predetermined that a man will exercise prudence.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Q83, A1:Objection 1. It would seem that man has not free choice. For whoever has free choice does what he wills. But man does not what he wills, for it is written (Rom. vii. 19): For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do. Therefore man has not free choice.
Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above, the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes — namely, not to desire against reason, as Augustine says.
Obj. 3. Further, he is free who is his own master, as the Philosopher says. Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. xxi. I): The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it; and (Phil. ii. 13): It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. Therefore man has not free choice.
Reply Obj. 3. Free choice is the cause of its own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their actions from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them, for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

 

[blase6]

The meaning is merit or sin in that man may act with or against reason. It is not predetermined that a man will exercise prudence.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Q83, A1:Objection 1. It would seem that man has not free choice. For whoever has free choice does what he wills. But man does not what he wills, for it is written (Rom. vii. 19): For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do. Therefore man has not free choice.
Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above, the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes — namely, not to desire against reason, as Augustine says.
Obj. 3. Further, he is free who is his own master, as the Philosopher says. Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. xxi. I): The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it; and (Phil. ii. 13): It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. Therefore man has not free choice.
Reply Obj. 3. Free choice is the cause of its own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their actions from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them, for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

The first objection contradicts the assumption that the will always moves towards what appears most good. If this is not always the case for the will, then the will can be said to be only random. Nor is this free will. In addition, assuming that the will can move contrary to reason does not mean it does not always choose what appears most good. A viceful person can have a sinful act appear most good to their will. Thus they act on that movement.

In response to the second objection, since the will does not move itself as a first cause, but is moved by external forces, whether it is “voluntary” or “involuntary” means nothing. It still depends on how God creates the will for it to move.

 

[Bahman]

Please go back and read my older posts in this topic. Consciousness is irrelevant.

Such a nonsense. Could you tell us please whether you are a machine or a conscious being?

 

[Vico]

The first objection contradicts the assumption that the will always moves towards what appears most good. If this is not always the case for the will, then the will can be said to be only random. Nor is this free will. In addition, assuming that the will can move contrary to reason does not mean it does not always choose what appears most good. A viceful person can have a sinful act appear most good to their will. Thus they act on that movement.

In response to the second objection, since the will does not move itself as a first cause, but is moved by external forces, whether it is “voluntary” or “involuntary” means nothing. It still depends on how God creates the will for it to move.

Free-will is the translation of liberum arbitrium, i.e. free judgment, and it is a power. St. Thomas Aquinas states in Q83, A2:“Although free-will in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely.”

Dependent is not the same as predetermined. This power is not created by God such that the acts are predetermined. As stated by Aquinas “man moves himself to act”.

 

[blase6]

Free-will is the translation of liberum arbitrium, i.e. free judgment, and it is a power. St. Thomas Aquinas states in Q83, A2:“Although free-will in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely.”

Dependent is not the same as predetermined. This power is not created by God such that the acts are predetermined. As stated by Aquinas “man moves himself to act”.

The first cause is necessarily the determinant cause. If you can’t see how this is obvious, then I don’t know how to make it simpler. If God is the first cause of every thing, then God is the determinant cause of every event. The decision of the will is determined by its motives. No explanation of free will so far is convincing me.

 

[blase6]

Such a nonsense. Could you tell us please whether you are a machine or a conscious being?

I could be said to be both, in a number of senses.
But I’m not sure what you mean.

 

[Bahman]

I could be said to be both, in a number of senses.
But I’m not sure what you mean.

I meant consciousness is not irrelevant. We are partially machine and partially conscious but the important thing is that nothing in this world could work without these two.