God and the argument from contingency

[quaestio45]

It seems to me that a noncontingent being - to whom most would call God - must exist on the basis of my contingency. For the definition of a contingent being is that whose essence does not wholly explain their existence, and as such, must be explained rather from an externality. It is in accordance with common sense to say that those variables which brought about my existence are themeselves contingent beings. Now, the chain of contingency must ultimately have a beginning or at the very least a final explanation. That ultimate explanation cannot itself be a contingent being, otherwise their existence must depend on another ontoligically prior to it, to which none can be found. It cannot be nonbeing, for something cannot arise from nothing without some actualized efficient cause. As such, the only alternative left would be a noncontingent, pure act being whose existence is fully explained by his essence and whom holds no potentiality left. Given this argument for God, what objection may be rightfully leveled unto it that might invalidate the conclusion?

P1) I am a contingent being
P2) A contingent beings existence depends on externalities
C1) Therefore I am a product of externalities
P3) These externalities themselves are contingent
C2) Therefore they too are the product of externalities
P4) The chain of contingent beings must begin somewhere
P5) That beginning itself cannot be a contingent being, lest its existence depend on another and therefore the chain must continue
C3) Therefore the beginning must not be a contingent being
P6) The only alternative to a contingent being that can enact change is a noncontingent being
C4) Therefore, the beginning of all contingent beings must necessarily be a noncontingent, and thus necessary being.
P7) A necessary being can only be a being of pure existence or actuality
C5) Therefore a noncontingent being may only be a being of pure act
P8) A being of actus purus is the exact definition of the Thomistic/Aristotlean God
P9) That which falls under the direct definition of a term can rightfully be associated with that term
C6) Therefore, the being of actus purus is who we identify as the Thomistic/Aristotlean God

 

[lelinator]

C5) This is who we identify as God

This is WHAT YOU identify as God, which is fine, you can call this noncontingent being whatever you like, but nowhere in your argument is there any indication that this noncontingent being is in fact your God.

Thus your conclusion would appear to be a non sequitur.

 

[Wesrock]

quaestio45:

C5) This is who we identify as God

This is WHAT YOU identify as God, which is fine, you can call this noncontingent being whatever you like, but nowhere in your argument is there any indication that this noncontingent being is in fact your God.

Thus your conclusion would appear to be a non sequitur.

Well no matter what it would be God, regardless of whether it conforms to specific claimed revelation.

 

[lelinator]

Well no matter what it would be God, regardless of whether it conforms to specific claimed revelation.

Are you sure that you want to go there?

Because as a solipsist I would submit that I may in fact be a noncontingent being. Which if you’re correct, would make me God.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Well no matter what it would be God, regardless of whether it conforms to specific claimed revelation.

Are you sure that you want to go there?

Because as a solipsist I would submit that I may in fact be a noncontingent being. Which if you’re correct, would make me God.

And me not real so why are you arguing with me?

Your thoughts change, they move from concept to concept, your perceptions change, your experience is in motion. All of which necessarily entails that you and I are contingent beings.

 

[lelinator]

And me not real so why are you arguing with me?

Entertainment

Your thoughts change, they move from concept to concept, your perceptions change, your experience is in motion. All of which necessarily entails that you and I are contingent beings.

Ah, but within this constantly changing setting there’s one constant…me. The fact that those things are contingent doesn’t by default mean that I too am contingent.

 

[JerryZ]

Nah! You are just a figment of your imagination!

Peace!

 

[lelinator]

Peace!

Ditto…

 

[quaestio45]

This is WHAT YOU identify as God, which is fine, you can call this noncontingent being whatever you like, but nowhere in your argument is there any indication that this noncontingent being is in fact your God.

Thus your conclusion would appear to be a non sequitur.

Thats a fair objection. Here, what if I added a premise after conclusion 4 which states that “a being of actus purus is the exact definition of the Thomistic/Aristotlean God” then after that, another premise which states “that which falls under the direct definition of a term can rightfully be associated with that term”. With both of these adjustments, you can fall smoothly to conclusion 5.

Because as a solipsist I would submit that I may in fact be a noncontingent being. Which if you’re correct, would make me God.

Unfortunately, this logic is flawed. For although the individual may be a constant in a solipsist worldview, the state of that entity is irrefutablly in a state of constant fluctuation, going from one state of existence to another (this is known because what we think and feel changes; all that changes must be in a state of potentiality to some other thought or emotion. Therefore, you cannot be noncontingent).

 

[Dan_Defender]

Yes. Leibniz says that the body and soul are fitted to each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony established by the noncontingent being.

 

[Freddy]

lelinator:

This is WHAT YOU identify as God, which is fine, you can call this noncontingent being whatever you like, but nowhere in your argument is there any indication that this noncontingent being is in fact your God.

Thus your conclusion would appear to be a non sequitur.

Thats a fair objection. Here, what if I added a premise after conclusion 4 which states that “a being of actus purus is the exact definition of the Thomistic/Aristotlean God…”

Why not use another definition?

 

[quaestio45]

Why not use another definition?

Because I’m arguing for the Thomistic God and not any other.

 

[IWantGod]

Because as a solipsist I would submit that I may in fact be a noncontingent being.

The problem is you have no rational justification for that claim. You are changing. Your mind consists of actualized potentiality, and the fact that it is not pure-actuality should be self-evident to you.

 

[STT]

It seems to me that a noncontingent being - to whom most would call God - must exist on the basis of my contingency. For the definition of a contingent being is that whose essence does not wholly explain their existence, and as such, must be explained rather from an externality. It is in accordance with common sense to say that those variables which brought about my existence are themeselves contingent beings. Now, the chain of contingency must ultimately have a beginning or at the very least a final explanation. That ultimate explanation cannot itself be a contingent being, otherwise their existence must depend on another ontoligically prior to it, to which none can be found. It cannot be nonbeing, for something cannot arise from nothing without some actualized efficient cause. As such, the only alternative left would be a noncontingent, pure act being whose existence is fully explained by his essence and whom holds no potentiality left. Given this argument for God, what objection may be rightfully leveled unto it that might invalidate the conclusion?

P1) I am a contingent being
P2) A contingent beings existence depends on externalities
C1) Therefore I am a product of externalities
P3) These externalities themselves are contingent
C2) Therefore they too are the product of externalities
P4) The chain of contingent beings must begin somewhere
P5) That beginning itself cannot be a contingent being, lest its existence depend on another and therefore the chain must continue
C3) Therefore the beginning must not be a contingent being
P6) The only alternative to a contingent being that can enact change is a noncontingent being
C4) Therefore, the beginning of all contingent beings must necessarily be a noncontingent, and thus necessary being.
P7) A necessary being can only be a being of pure existence or actuality
C5) Therefore a noncontingent being may only be a being of pure act
P8) A being of actus purus is the exact definition of the Thomistic/Aristotlean God
P9) That which falls under the direct definition of a term can rightfully be associated with that term
C6) Therefore, the being of actus purus is who we identify as the Thomistic/Aristotlean God

I think we discussed this. This is basically serial causation which requires creation of time.

 

[quaestio45]

I think we discussed this. This is basically serial causation which requires creation of time.

It doesn’t necessarily require that time be created temporally, like what you argue against. It only requires that the explanation for contigency cannot itself be contingent.

 

[STT]

It doesn’t necessarily require that time be created temporally, like what you argue against. It only requires that the explanation for contigency cannot itself be contingent.

So you are discussing vertical causation.

 

[quaestio45]

So you are discussing vertical causation.

Its unfortunate that I must display my ignorance and ask what the phrase “vertical causation” is to mean .

 

[STT]

Its unfortunate that I must display my ignorance and ask what the phrase “vertical causation” is to mean .

By vertical I mean that mind non-contingent thing holds contingent thing, material, in existence.

 

[quaestio45]

By vertical I mean that mind non-contingent thing holds contingent thing, material, in existence.

That be so, yes, I would say that. Because a contingent existence cannot be the explanation for contingent existence itself, then it must be a noncontingent existence. Now, as you’ve argued (successfully, I’d say) it could not have been that a temporal framework was nonexistent then existent, for that itself would require a temporal framework. The way in which time begins within said temporal framework I would say is nonetheless independent of that fact, however (as this is where my opinion coincides with Gorgias). But, in anycase, all things, regardless of whether or not the universe is eternal (which I strongly believe so, just as a whole and from the outside and not on the inside) follows in the argument, I’d say.

 

[lelinator]

lelinator:

Because as a solipsist I would submit that I may in fact be a noncontingent being.

The problem is you have no rational justification for that claim.

I have just as much justification for claiming that I’m a noncontingent being as you have in claiming that God is a noncontingent being. And I have all the attributes that metaphysicists claim a noncontingent being should have. So if I have all of the attributes of God, then how am I not God?

Your mind consists of actualized potentiality, and the fact that it is not pure-actuality should be self-evident to you.

You’re conflating the conscious mind’s thoughts and experiences with consciousness itself. It’s consciousness that’s the hierarchical first cause. It’s consciousness that’s noncontingent. It’s consciousness that’s necessary. It’s everything else that’s contingent.