God and the argument from contingency

[lelinator]

Sounds very similar to what STT thinks if I’m not mistaken .

Absolutely. I just wanted to clarify my position, because STT and I aren’t always in complete agreement. Case in point, I’m a solipsist and STT has argued that solipsism is impossible.

 

[STT]

Consciousness is noncontingent. Consciousness is the hierarchical first cause. And consciousness is the necessary cause.

What you use as consciousness, I use as mind. Apart from that I agree with the rest. I have an argument for each.

The relationship between my consciousness and my thoughts, experiences, and perceptions is the same as the relationship between the Father and the Son. In both cases the two things are distinct, yet inseparable. And a change in the latter doesn’t constitute a change in the former.

I don’t agree with this part. Mind has ability to experience metal. Mental is a property of matter.

 

[lelinator]

@quaestio45, see STT and I disagree, and that’s fine.

What you use as consciousness, I use as mind. Apart from that I agree with the rest. I have an argument for each.

I distinguish between the two for the sake of clarity. To me the “mind” represents the sum total of my thoughts, experiences, and perceptions. And “consciousness” is that which makes those thoughts, experiences, and perceptions possible. I would argue that consciousness is noncontingent, but the mind, with its specific thoughts, experiences, and perceptions is contingent.

 

[IWantGod]

I’ll ask you the same thing that I asked Wesrock, does the fact that Christ experienced change disprove the claim that He was God?

All i can say here is that Christs human nature experiences change and his divine nature does not.

But you are not Christ in a trinity. You are one human consciousness that experiences change and it’s self-evident.

 

[IWantGod]

No, this is necessarily not true because you can distinguish between the thought and the thinker.

I not going to debate you on what you said other than to say that it is the consciousness that is thinking. Thinking is not a separate operation from conscious activity. This is what i mean when i say that thinking is not a distinct thing from the conscious mind. So if the conscious mind has a procession of thought then it is correct to say that consciousness is changing.

 

[quaestio45]

@quaestio45, see STT and I disagree, and that’s fine.

Oh I never doubted that; its just strange how largely overlapping both you and STT’s view on the mind are. Not that I’m complaining, it is a very interesting view, although I can’t find myself in agreement with it.

I not going to debate you on what you said other than to say that it is the consciousness that is thinking. Thinking is not a separate operation from conscious activity. This is what i mean when i say that thinking is not a distinct thing from the conscious mind. So if the conscious mind has a procession of thought then it is correct to say that consciousness is changing.

If that be so then yes, I absolutely agree. There cannot be an initiator of thoughts that itself is not conscious; in fact, you cannot have the initiator of thoughts be too separate of an entity to the thoughts, for were that to be the case you fall into a number of problems, the first of which being how a nonthinking thing can possibly decide what to think if meaningful decision is an extended act of thinking.

The only problem I had with what you said is that the thinking thing is equivalent to the thoughts in a one for one completely overlapping way (for the reasons I’ve listed to you in my last response). But now that that has been clarified, I have no problem with your positions, I think.

 

[lelinator]

Thinking is not a separate operation from conscious activity

Might I suggest that you’re being inconsistent.

Specifically, it could be argued that existence is an attribute of “things”, and that existence (i.e. God) can’t be a separate thing unto itself. It must always exist in conjunction with things, and therefore it can’t be considered as distinct from the things themselves.

This is essentially the argument that you’re using when you claim that consciousness is inseparable from thinking, and therefore can’t be considered as a separate and distinct thing unto itself.

If you can argue that existence is a being unto itself, and is distinct from the things that it sustains and enables, then why can’t I argue that consciousness is also a being unto itself, and is likewise distinct from the thoughts that it sustains and enables?

You say that existence is noncontingent, but things aren’t.
I say that consciousness is noncontingent, but thoughts aren’t.