The reason I borrowed your spectrum term rather than using the terms supernatural and subnatural was to avoid the social conditioning that makes us think the supernatural means undefined, whimsical, and fantastical. Few would deny that there are real waves at frequencies we cannot see. If you are convinced that there is nothing above natural knowledge then you should not not use the spectrum terms as analogs. There are real non-whimsical frequencies above and below those that we can see.
I’m comfortable with that idea, and per Dawkins’ example which I mentioned, I think that’s an apt analogy for intellectual discovery, and epistemic progress. But the spectrum, so long as we are holding close to the metaphors here, is a continuum. It’s wavelengths and amplitudes up and down the scale. Infrared “sight” is just a rendering below the processing limits of our cones and rods in our eyes. It’s not different in kind, but just a border condition.
That’s where I think revelation goes shooting off into the blue if we apply this idea. It’s not “sight at higher wavelengths”, manifestly. It’s a whole different
type of knowing, and that’s a charitable way to put it, I think, as it’s so starkly different, it seems misleading to me to call it “knowing” at all. It’s not instrumental, or analog, or digital, it’s not delivered and realized through the processing of percepts. It’s just something… wholly other.
The Dawkins example shows the kind of “expanded knowledge” revelation is NOT. We’ve made good headway now into “expanding our spectrum”, and there’s more to come. But it’s the same process – percepts, integration, interpretation, review and deliberation, subject to review and critique by one’s peers. And measurable, quantifiable, reducible o maths, fundamentally. I’d be surprised to hear a pitch claiming that revelation
fit that expansion model.
I may have misunderstood, but from your response it seems that you agree that if God did enter the natural universe in an intelligible way, this would eliminate the naturalist objection to the possibility of ultranatural knowledge.
No, that objection cannot be removed. If we stipulate a God who is naturally immanent, available, even obvious to us all, in some physical form, God is here, communicating with us
inside our universe, not
outside it, or more precisely the part(s) that are interacting with us are
inside, by definition. God may say “I created all this”, and I can imagine awesome feats of wonder that demonstrate master over physical law that would make such claims much more plausible and rational for skeptical thinkers.
But even then, it’s taking God’s (or anybody’s) word for it. If God was just pulling your leg, you’d be just as perfectly unable to determine that with a physically present God who spells out your name in stars in the night sky, just to show you he’s in charge. Any evidence given to you would necessarily come from
inside this universe. It’s only the evidence
outside that provides the epistemic grounds for testing and evaluating the claim.
So yes, it becomes much easier to believe than it is now in such a scenario, but no matter what, the evidence that matters will remain beyond the wall of experience for us. We are utterly unable to put such a claim to the test in a rigorous, objective way.
The life of Christ is known to us from testimony and as you pointed out testimony can be a tricky thing. For example, I dismiss the testimony of Joseph Smith, yet accept the testimony of the scientists that proved that light is bent by gravity. I reject alien abduction, but accept everything Herodotus has to say. I accept the gospels, but for some reason you do not. Could you shed some light on why you find this particular testimony (which you have apparently studied) unreliable?
If I tell you I own a car, and provide no evidence but a line in this post, you might reasonably believe me; lots of people own cars these days, so the claim really doesn’t demand much by of evidence to fit with your model of reality.
If I tell you I own a Ferrari Enzo, and provide no evidence, you might still beiieve me, but only with some unease. Those are very rare and very expensive cars. Very few people own an Enzo. Still it’s plausible, and perhaps if I sent you some pictures of an Enzo that I claimed was mine which matched pictures of me on Facebook page, etc. you would accept the claim, inclined to think that if I’m lying, I’ve at least gone out of my way to prepare collateral in support of the lie.
If I told you I had a rocket car that could fly me to the moon in less than 10 minutes, you’d likely not believe me. And well you shouldn’t, at least without some very extraordinary evidence. Such a vehicle has never been seen or used, so far as we know, and it presents a number of physics challenges that make it highly implausible. Even if I claimed to have 500 witnesses who say me drive this thing to the moon and back on my lunch break, you’d reasonably reject what I say. Such a claim, especially when the witnesses are somehow not available for cross-examination, would be foolish to accept.
The gospel testimony is like the unreachable witnesses I might call upon for support of rocket-car-to-the-moon claim. Only, and I’m quite serious when I say this, the Gospel claims are way,
way more implausible than such a claim as I might make about my rocket car. The Christian Gospels are
way out of ratio between the plausibility of its claims, and the strength of the available evidence. It’s not that I don’t or can’t assign value to testimonial witness; I can and do. But what is there isn’t even a
beginning toward the claims that get made in the story.
I don’t have a revelatory/alternate form of knowledge to rely on, so I rely on what I have, and that just isn’t even close to sufficient.
-TS