With regard to either humans or God, why is a relationship considered as something, as an entity, separate from simply the father and son as persons?
In reference to God, relationship is not “considered as something, as an entity, separate from simply the father and son as persons?” Rather “a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting” and “paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost”.
The Catechism states:
252 The Church usesINDENT the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity,
(II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and
(III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.
[/INDENT]S.T. Q28, A1.But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (27, 2, 4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.
S.T. Q29. A4.Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above (28, 2, 3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name “person” signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the word “person” was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word “person” was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word “person” means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
S.T. Q40, A1.For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above explained (30, 2).
