Good Books on, and in refutation of, Atheism

[IWantGod]

And - as I said - it is childishly simple to imagine two possible worlds, which have nothing in common, and thereby refute the concept of “necessary existence”.

There is no reason to think that if you can imagine a world where no being is ontologically necessary that therefore it’s actually possible for there to be a world where only unnecessary beings exist.

You first have to determine that such a reality is actually logically possible before you can coherently define it as a possible world. We have given you every rational reason to think that it is impossible for there to not be an ontologically necessary uncaused-cause of unnecessary beings.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Thomas Aquinas simply used the term necessary for something that did not tend towards corruption and contingent for something that did.

Now have another undefined word: “corruption”. Corruption, entropy, change?

Other philosophical contexts speak of a necessary being as something that could not fail to exist.

Possible world analysis is not required.

Yes it is required. Because God is supposed to be a necessary being, and the concept of necessary being is the one which cannot fail to exist. This is expressed that this being exists in all possible worlds - SSDD (same sh*t, different day). If we can PROVE that there are at least two possible worlds, which have nothing in common (in other words the intersection of which is the “null-world” - mathematically speaking), then we refuted the notion of “necessary existence”.

And to find two such distinct worlds is extremely simple.

You cannot prove that there are two possible worlds, one which has a first cause and one which doesn’t. Imaginable does not mean possible, and you yourself already declared a “null world” is not an actual possibility.

Admittedly, there’s been various positions on the subject and different schools of thought. I maintain, as do many Thomists, that we do not hold that God exists without reason, only without cause.

I really don’t care what you “maintain”, though I care what you can substantiate.

That is, of course, entirely fair. But I don’t go on physics forums and expect professors to substantiate QM from the ground up on demand when I challenge them to prove it. There are plenty of resources out there.

The so-called five ways - if the arguments were solid would establish a deistic god (lowercase!) but never the God of Christianity. Of course that would be a huge step. The trouble is that none of those “five ways” work as intended.

Deist generally refers to a non-interfering God who “stepped back” from his creation. That’s not what the Five Ways argue for. The Five Ways (and subsequent arguments that go further than what you usually find summed up in a handful of lines online) establish a creator who is immutable, eternal, non-composite, Intellectual, perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent who is unique and could not fail to exist, who isn’t a being but Subsistent Being, and who’s creation is actively conserving every moment of reality.

Sure, that’s not strictly speaking proving the Christian revelation, but it certainly makes atheism irrational. That God revealed himself through Christianity is something that could be argued for after that point, but it wouldn’t be established further on natural philosophy alone. Anyway, this last point is usually a desperate non-sequitur, anyway.

 

[Wesrock]

Of course I do. Concepts are not physically existing objects, they are abstractions. There are many entities which are not comprised of atoms (or other particles). These are “attributes”, “relationships” and “actions”. (Examples would be “distance”, “weight”, “heaviness”, “between”, “in front of”, and zillions of others.) Of course these are all dependent upon the physical framework, but they are not physical objects themselves. These entities are all “inert”, they cannot “act” on other objects.

Of course concepts are abstractions. Just curious, are you a nominalist? Maybe conceptualist?

 

[IWantGod]

And to find two such distinct worlds is extremely simple.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

Wesrock:

I didn’t state that God did not choose. I simply intended to disabuse you of a notion thinking that this was temporal or done by human-like processes or making an error conceiving of God as a body.

Ye gods and little fishes. Will you PLEASE stop referring to God. We are nowhere NEAR reaching any point at all where the Abrahamic God can make an appearance.

This is the ultimate problem. One cannot have a discussion about any potential ‘uncaused cause’ without the other person CONSTANTLY referring to any points made AS IF tbey were discussig God. We are NOT.

Semantics, bro. Deal with the argument.

Semantics it ain’t. I told you right from the start that this was what I always get - people bringing their concept of God into the discussion almost at the point where there has barely been agreement on ‘there was uncaused cause’ and associating the two.

 

[IWantGod]

…there was an uncaused cause’

Do you agree that there has to be an uncaused-cause?

 

[Wesrock]

I didn’t use the word God in the first two paragraphs, go with that.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

…there was an uncaused cause’

Do you agree that there has to be an uncaused-cause?

For the purpose of this discussion, yes. Otherwise no, it’s an assumption. It sounds perfectly logical but then so do a lot of things that we don’t fully understand.

If I ask you what was/is on the other side of the Big Bang then the only honest answer you can give is: ‘I don’t know’. Which then admits to an infinite number of explanations.

 

[Wozza]

I didn’t use the word God in the first two paragraphs, go with that.

So leaving God out of it, all we have at the moment is an agreed uncaused cause (agreed for the purpose of the discussion) and an ability to make decisions (we assume it wasn’t compelled). And that uncaused cause could have decided to create any type of universe at all or indeed no universe.

With what has been brought to the table so far, there is nothing whatsoever at this point that would contradict that. If there is, then point it out.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

I didn’t use the word God in the first two paragraphs, go with that.

So leaving God out of it, all we have at the moment is an agreed uncaused cause (agreed for the purpose of the discussion) and an ability to make decisions (we assume it wasn’t compelled). And that uncaused cause could have decided to create any type of universe at all or indeed no universe.

With what has been brought to the table so far, there is nothing whatsoever at this point that would contradict that. If there is, then point it out.

Other than the part in brackets that we’re “assuming” it wasn’t compelled, yes, that sounds correct.

You did not mention unchanging/immutable. Still not agreed on that point?

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

You cannot prove that there are two possible worlds, one which has a first cause and one which doesn’t.

That is not what I was talking about. I only talked about possible worlds. A simple approach, which can be refined: World “A” is the Milky Way. World “B” is everything else. Obviously they are disjointed, so there is no “being” that would exist in both of them. Think about it as Venn-diagram with two, disjointed circles.

The first cause is omnipresent and so is present in both though not contained by either.

Imaginable does not mean possible.

In a thought experiment everything is permitted, except a logically contradictory state of affairs. And that is what the idea of “possible world” is all about. Alvin Plantinga based his proposition for God’s existence, except that his line of reasoning is erroneous. He played fast and loose with the colloquial and the philosophical usage of “necessary” existence.

It has little bearing then on what’s actually possible or necessary.

Deist generally refers to a non-interfering God who “stepped back” from his creation.

And from that - even if it COULD be substantiated there would be no way to the Christian God

There is no way strictly by natural philosophy. That doesn’t mean there’s no way at all.

 

[IWantGod]

except a logically contradictory state of affairs.

And if only that which is actualized potential existed, then that would be logically contradictory.

 

[IWantGod]

You need to substantiate this “first cause”,

An uncaused-cause has been proven to exist insomuch as it would lead to a reductio ad absurdum if it did not exist.You are just ignoring the arguments.

If you agree that it is impossible for there to be absolutely nothing, then it follows logically that there must be an absolutely necessary act of reality insomuch that it cannot fail to exist; otherwise there could be absolutely nothing, which you agree to be impossible. If only unnecessary beings exist, then it is possible for there to be absolutely nothing, which is impossible.

Thus to assert that it is possible for there to be a state of affairs were only unnecessary beings existed and nothing else, and at the same time state that it is impossible for there to be absolutely nothing, is the same thing as asserting that it is possible for there to be a square triangle insomuch as you would be committing to a metaphysical impossibility; and no amount of straw-men, possible world fantasies, or willful ignorance is going to change that.

 

[IWantGod]

The concept of causation is only applicable WITHIN the universe

Physical cause and effect applies to the physical universe. I’m talking about what is existentially required for the existence of unnecessary beings, and again you are ignoring the glaring problem in your reasoning.

But if you are not going to address the argument, i can only assume that you are being dishonest and we can end the discussion here. I’m not interested in wasting my time.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

Wesrock:

I didn’t use the word God in the first two paragraphs, go with that.

So leaving God out of it, all we have at the moment is an agreed uncaused cause (agreed for the purpose of the discussion) and an ability to make decisions (we assume it wasn’t compelled). And that uncaused cause could have decided to create any type of universe at all or indeed no universe.

With what has been brought to the table so far, there is nothing whatsoever at this point that would contradict that. If there is, then point it out.

Other than the part in brackets that we’re “assuming” it wasn’t compelled, yes, that sounds correct.

You did not mention unchanging/immutable. Still not agreed on that point?

If we can’t assume then we need to agree on whether it was compelled or not. If it was then it had no more choice in the matter than do two hydrogen atoms combining with one oxygen. Else it chose to create a specific universe.

This is strictly an either/or question. There aren’t any other options. Which do you do with?

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

The first cause is omnipresent and so is present in both though not contained by either.

You need to substantiate this “first cause”, you cannot just assume it. In the stipulated two worlds there is nothing in common between them. The whole question is not about some “first cause”, rather about the “necessary existence”. Without “necessary existence” there is no “god”, much less “God”.

You can’t just stipulate that there is nothing common between the two worlds and assume that stipulation is true. If one can’t define God into existence, one can’t define him out of it, either. If there is no first cause in one of the two worlds, that world isn’t possible, the world itself becomes contradictory (which is a conclusion of the cosmological arguments, not starting premise).

As for substantiation, please refer to The Existence of God: The Argument From Motion for one such argument.

In his introduction to Atheism: The Case Against God, Smith writes, “It is also impossible,within the scope of one book, to consider every argument ever presented in favor of theistic belief, or to answer every objection that might be raised against atheism, so I have necessarily restricted this discussion to those issues which I consider most important.”

Smith wrote this about a novel length book. It’s similarly true when discussing arguments in favor of theism. I cannot cover every argument for God, nor provide every background detail, especially in a handful of forum posts. Still, the post is there for discussion and criticism. I feel I could do it better now, but I spent days writing it up.

There is no way strictly by natural philosophy. That doesn’t mean there’s no way at all.

That means some extra assumptions, which cannot be substantiated without even more assumptions. Based upon the actual, physical reality you cannot even arrive at the “faceless first cause”.

Based upon actual, physical reality we can arrive at a First Cause. The only assumption I’m making here is that you can use that brain of yours.

 

[Wesrock]

If we can’t assume then we need to agree on whether it was compelled or not. If it was then it had no more choice in the matter than do two hydrogen atoms combining with one oxygen. Else it chose to create a specific universe.

This is strictly an either/or question. There aren’t any other options. Which do you do with?

The First Cause was not compelled to create this world or any other world. This is evident by demonstration. There are two ways the First Cause may have been compelled: (1) It was compelled by something external to itself, or (2) it was compelled by its own nature to create this exact world and no other, lacking intelligence in itself.

(1) It should be fairly straight forward to see why (1) cannot be true. The First Cause is that which has no other cause. If the First Cause is caused in any way by another, it is both uncaused and caused. That is absurd, therefore the First Cause cannot have been caused to create by another.

(2) This is a bit more abstract, and I would borrow from Aquinas’ Fifth Way here, and perhaps the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but in my own words and only briefly. (2) supposes that the First Cause has always been directed towards this exact, one-and-only end, but it also supposes that the First Cause did not direct itself towards this end. There is insufficient explanation, no reason available, about why the First Cause is directed to this end and not any other end or any other world given that this world is not otherwise logically or metaphysically necessary (even if only differing by one sub-atomic particle and nothing more). The First Cause could not have inanimately determined its own nature, for that would require pre-existing itself to do so. The only other explanation is that it was caused to do so by another, which was shown as absurd in our reply to (1).

I hope that works, at least temporarily, but if that doesn’t satisfy, I am going to request we defer the question of whether the First Cause was “compelled,” as you put it. There is more to discuss on whether the First Cause has a will, but it’s more easily demonstrable after establishing the other attributes, like Intellect/Omniscience. Off the top of my head, the following order to take the attributes of the First Cause would be simpler.

(1) Immutability
(2) Eternal
(3) Simplicity
(3) Oneness (i.e. There can only be one)
(4) Omnipotent
(5) Omnipresence
(6) Omniscient/Intellect
(7) Perfect Goodness
(8) Will

There may be others, and I may realize it’d be better to swap somewhere or another, but in general some things more easily follow from others, and trying to do the Will first may be like trying to take a shortcut through a dense woods.

P.S. I intended to write this without the word God substituted for First Cause, and I believe I accomplished that. I have already read the demonstrations, been convinced of the arguments, and so the interchangeability is natural to me, but I do understand where you’re coming from here.

 

[Wesrock]

One last thing, I am going to try to avoid posting here for most of the day. It is during work hours, a few comments here or there I can usually manage throughout the day, but this topic has admittedly been more distracting than I should allow myself. Wish me luck.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

If we can’t assume then we need to agree on whether it was compelled or not. If it was then it had no more choice in the matter than do two hydrogen atoms combining with one oxygen. Else it chose to create a specific universe.

This is strictly an either/or question. There aren’t any other options. Which do you do with?

The First Cause was not compelled to create this world or any other world. This is evident by demonstration. There are two ways the First Cause may have been compelled: (1) It was compelled by something external to itself, or (2) it was compelled by its own nature to create this exact world and no other, lacking intelligence in itself.

(1) It should be fairly straight forward to see why (1) cannot be true. The First Cause is that which has no other cause. If the First Cause is caused in any way by another, it is both uncaused and caused. That is absurd, therefore the First Cause cannot have been caused to create by another.

(2) This is a bit more abstract, and I would borrow from Aquinas’ Fifth Way here, and perhaps the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but in my own words and only briefly. (2) supposes that the First Cause has always been directed towards this exact, one-and-only end, but it also supposes that the First Cause did not direct itself towards this end. There is insufficient explanation, no reason available, about why the First Cause is directed to this end and not any other end or any other world given that this world is not otherwise logically or metaphysically necessary (even if only differing by one sub-atomic particle and nothing more). The First Cause could not have inanimately determined its own nature, for that would require pre-existing itself to do so. The only other explanation is that it was caused to do so by another, which was shown as absurd in our reply to (1).

The first sentence would have done quite nicely.

So we agree it wasn’t compelled. It might have wanted to anyway but if there is no compulsion then we have choice. The uncaused cause (uc) could have decided not to create anything or to create any number of universes. It decided to create this one.

Now that indicates a change.

And before you head off with claims such as ‘the uc is outside time and everything is in the eternal present and we can’t anthropomorphise’ etc, these are arguments used for God which are not valid. Saying such about the uc is an assumption. It may exist/have existed on the other side of the Big Bang within time.

And a flag in the sand here. If anyone suggests that terms like ‘compelled’ and ‘decide’ etc cannot be used to describe any attribute of the uc then I’m off for a beer. If we cannot discuss this with terms that we understand and use them in terms as they are understood then this is a complete waste of everyone’s time.

So the uc made a decision. Which indicates a point of change. Either from not deciding to deciding or deciding one thing as opposed to another. So it cannot be immutable.

 

[Wesrock]

Now that indicates a change.

And before you head off with claims such as ‘the uc is outside time and everything is in the eternal present and we can’t anthropomorphise’ etc, these are arguments used for God which are not valid. Saying such about the uc is an assumption. It may exist/have existed on the other side of the Big Bang within time.

First, it does not necessarily follow that the First Cause’s act, being voluntary and based upon its knowledge (I did say it would be easier to discuss the Will if we delegate that to the end), implies a change between not acting and acting, or any change at all, or that there is any such thing as temporal succession at all in the First Cause. To declare it so is to make unsubstantiated anthropomorphic assumptions. You will need to demonstrate that this is so.

Now, we cannot rule out the possibility by assumption, either. However, if we are able to separately demonstrate that the First Cause is immutable and eternal, then we have eliminated the possibility that there is any temporal succession in the First Cause. It is demonstrable, which is why I believe it.

The First Cause can be demonstrated as immutable by a simple reductio argument. The argument for the First Cause proceeds from the a posteriori observation that any potential which is actualized (change) is actualized by another. The course of the argument, demonstrated in the The Existence of God: The Argument From Motion, shows that reality is unintelligible and contradictory if there is not some thing which itself is just Actual, that is not and has not a potency that has been reduced to act by something else. Since a potency being reduced to act simply is what change is, and since there is no passive potency in the First Cause, and since the First Cause has never been potency reduced to act, that simply is what it means to be unchanging, or immutable. If we hypothetically assume that there is potency in the First Cause or that it has in any way been actualized by something else, it is by definition not the First Cause which was demonstrated is necessary. And if we insist on exploring this further, then the First Cause (here’s the conclusion of our reductio) is both Pure Actuality and a mix of Actuality and Potency, which is a contradiction, therefore (passive) Potency (or any change at all) is logically eliminated as belonging to the First Cause.

The demonstration of the First Cause’s eternity simply follows upon the First Cause’s immutability. For if the First Cause had a beginning, it could not have pre-existed itself to cause itself to begin, and if it was caused to exist by another, it would not be the First Cause.