Hell as everlasting and finite?

[Tyrel]

My understanding of GEddie’s reply was the notion held by some (including myself) that our experience of time is presently limited by our dwelling in the universe of matter, energy, time, and space. Freed from all that in the afterlife, our experience of eternity may be timeless, or beyond time. C.S. Lewis, for example, wrote (in my doubtlessly inaccurate paraphrasing) that eternity cannot be understood simply as a never-ending sequence of moments, days, or years, but rather it is one whole thing. This would bear upon our understanding of Heaven and Hell.

I suppose I’m inclined to think that *that *is actually heretical, for the Fathers, the scholastics, the saints, and as far as I can tell the whole Church has always and everywhere maintained that heaven involves everlasting enjoyment of God, and not atemporal enjoyment of God. Indeed, with the general resurrection of the flesh comes our re-instantiation in a spatiotemporal environment, and the damned are said to experience the poena sensus forever (indicating that it is everlasting, rather than merely atemporal).

 

[pacloc]

I suppose I’m inclined to think that *that *is actually heretical, for the Fathers, the scholastics, the saints, and as far as I can tell the whole Church has always and everywhere maintained that heaven involves everlasting enjoyment of God, and not atemporal enjoyment of God. Indeed, with the general resurrection of the flesh comes our re-instantiation in a spatiotemporal environment, and the damned are said to experience the poena sensus forever (indicating that it is everlasting, rather than merely atemporal).

I agree. I find it strange how often I hear Catholics on this forum saying in Heaven, time will cease to exist. Creatures will always exist in time, to not exist in time would make you God it seems, infinite. C S Lewis was a protestant, I don’t think his theology can even be compared to the Fathers of the Church. I would like to see the earliest reference to this concept of timelessness (meaning something other than infinite amount of time) in Heaven for humans.

 

[ffg]

Fair enough. Here is the best I can do at expressing my request/invitation in one sentence:

Give me your best arguments for thinking that the everlasting torments of hell, which objectively persist for an infinite amount of ‘specious presents,’ are not bounded finitely over that infinite period of time in proportion to the temporal punishment corresponding to the desert of the actual committed sin of the damned.

So my thoughts here are similar to a few people.

My first reaction is - time.

A lot of talk about time in a subject that is understood to be ‘outside of time’.

Secondly, I’m curious if the disconnect you think you have in the question / thought to analyze is that you are seeking to stay narrow, when others want to show the whole picture.

For instance, in summary - hell is a place that is chosen by it’s residents. So to talk about ‘punishment’ without consideration of the bigger picture, will lead to an incorrect, or unwise conclusion.

Finally, trying to compare what we can imagine as the most horrible suffering (forever death) to what we think is the punishment for sin (assumingly lighter than hell), is making too light of sin and throwing in an assumption negating my earlier point - the residents of hell choose hell.

The folks in hell are getting what All people deserve due to sin.

However (which is a GREAT However), the Creator chose to light a path toward that which He desires for His creation.

Sticking to the path is not easy. That’s why even with a path, there is an abundance of mercy provided for us. We have to be open to that mercy because…

We ARE sinners. Not were, or was, or might be.

Unfortunately, that is the sticking point to being open to the mercy as well - We are sinners.

Hell residents = sinners not open to the mercy of God.

There is choice involved, not just arbitrary punishment from which to compare.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

I agree. I find it strange how often I hear Catholics on this forum saying in Heaven, time will cease to exist. Creatures will always exist in time, to not exist in time would make you God it seems, infinite. C S Lewis was a protestant, I don’t think his theology can even be compared to the Fathers of the Church. I would like to see the earliest reference to this concept of timelessness (meaning something other than infinite amount of time) in Heaven for humans.

It’s because God is timeless, and we’re trying to make sense of how we finite creatures can experience the infinite reality of God. In Heaven, we lack the physical dimensions which necessitate time. As such, it is possible that Heaven does not have time as we understand it. That is not to say that it doesn’t have some other form of Chronology by which we gauge our experiences. This will all be true until the resurrection, at which point we will again have that physical aspect, and will experience time.

Not existing in time doesn’t make us God, it just means that our perceptions are not governed by the chronological understanding of “moments.” This is an area that’s open to prudential judgment. There are philosophical arguments on both sides of the question.

 

[pacloc]

It’s because God is timeless, and we’re trying to make sense of how we finite creatures can experience the infinite reality of God. In Heaven, we lack the physical dimensions which necessitate time. As such, it is possible that Heaven does not have time as we understand it. That is not to say that it doesn’t have some other form of Chronology by which we gauge our experiences. This will all be true until the resurrection, at which point we will again have that physical aspect, and will experience time.

Not existing in time doesn’t make us God, it just means that our perceptions are not governed by the chronological understanding of “moments.” This is an area that’s open to prudential judgment. There are philosophical arguments on both sides of the question.

We are talking about Hell, not the short period between the separation of the of the soul from the body and Christ’s second coming and Resurrection. The experience of the damned in this intermediary state is technically not Hell, but a foretaste of Hell, as is Heaven not fully experienced but various levels of foretastes of Heaven. To think that somehow in this state of being you are timeless and that in the resurrection you go back into time makes no sense. That would be a step backward since you define timeless as Godly, and it is a fact that the body still exists in the intermediary state, even if it is decayed and separated to the ends of the earth.

Edit:

Further, Angels and demons do not have physical properties, but are still subject to space and time in a way. They are not infinite.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

We are talking about Hell, not the short period between the separation of the of the soul from the body and Christ’s second coming and Resurrection. The experience of the damned in this intermediary state is technically not Hell, but a foretaste of Hell, as is Heaven not fully experienced but various levels of foretastes of Heaven.

I’d ask you to please support this position.

Heaven is the Beatific Vision, and Hell is the lack of the beatific vision (and the lack of God entirely). While it’s true that we won’t be whole until after the resurrection, the key qualifiers that make Heaven Heaven and Hell Hell are still there regardless of the lack of physical form.

To think that somehow in this state of being you are timeless and that in the resurrection you go back into time makes no sense. That would be a step backward since you define timeless as Godly, and it is a fact that the body still exists in the intermediary state, even if it is decayed and separated to the ends of the earth.

I didn’t define timelessness as Godly. God IS timeless. We are created to experience time, period. However, when the body is separated from the soul we do not necessarily take that sense of time with us into God’s presence. Again, this is an effort to make sense og how we, timed creatures, can experience the timeless reality of God’s presence.

I’d also like to make clear, I do believe that we experience time in Heaven, or at least some form of chronology. The same is true for Hell. In fact, I think that an acute, absolute knowledge of time is one of Hell’s punishments. (i.e. - The experience of knowing that you are suffering at this given moment, and that you will be suffering in the next moment, and each successive moment, without end.) I just also think that it’s not something we can arrive at an absolute conclusion about in this life, and that the question of if/how we experience time in Heaven/Hell prior to the Resurrection is one that is still open for discussion and debate.

Further, Angels and demons do not have physical properties, but are still subject to space and time in a way. They are not infinite.

The experience of time isn’t necessary for something to be finite. Timelessness does not equate to eternal. They could be made finite by limitations in their intellect, or in their capacity to act, or in the simple lack of omniscience.

 

[pacloc]

I’d ask you to please support this position.

Heaven is the Beatific Vision, and Hell is the lack of the beatific vision (and the lack of God entirely). While it’s true that we won’t be whole until after the resurrection, the key qualifiers that make Heaven Heaven and Hell Hell are still there regardless of the lack of physical form.

I didn’t define timelessness as Godly. God IS timeless. We are created to experience time, period. However, when the body is separated from the soul we do not necessarily take that sense of time with us into God’s presence. Again, this is an effort to make sense og how we, timed creatures, can experience the timeless reality of God’s presence.

I’d also like to make clear, I do believe that we experience time in Heaven, or at least some form of chronology. The same is true for Hell. In fact, I think that an acute, absolute knowledge of time is one of Hell’s punishments. (i.e. - The experience of knowing that you are suffering at this given moment, and that you will be suffering in the next moment, and each successive moment, without end.) I just also think that it’s not something we can arrive at an absolute conclusion about in this life, and that the question of if/how we experience time in Heaven/Hell prior to the Resurrection is one that is still open for discussion and debate.

The experience of time isn’t necessary for something to be finite. Timelessness does not equate to eternal. They could be made finite by limitations in their intellect, or in their capacity to act, or in the simple lack of omniscience.

I’m glad you do believe in a sense of time or chronology as you say in Heaven and Hell. As for the intermediate state, I don’t see the point in speculating what it means to not have your body fully functioning and how that affects your sense of time. I thought we were mainly talking about eternity after the resurrection. And I would personally bet on the idea that it would be similar to the two experiences that sandwich it, this life on earth with time, and Heaven and Hell with time.

As for the understanding that Heaven and Hell are not fully experienced until the second coming and final judgment, I think it would be more beneficial for you to show a source from a Father of the Church from the first millennium that didn’t teach this.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

I thought we were mainly talking about eternity after the resurrection.

Ah… this is where a lot of the discrepancy was coming from. I’ve specifically only been talking about Heaven/Hell prior to the Resurrection.

As for the completeness of Heaven/Hell, I’m not denying that our experience prior to the Resurrection is incomplete. It won’t be complete until we have our bodies back. What I’m saying is that, despite it being incomplete, it’s still Heaven/Hell.

 

[Tyrel]

We have not rushed to answer without reading; we have tried to make sense of a fairly long, looping, and grammatically… difficult… set of passages and arguments that you have presented. The way you’ve presented your argument does not flow well, it is not easy to read. Not due to difficulty in the material, but rather to manner of presentation. That’s not to knock you for your effort, it takes time and practice to really learn how to succinctly present your points in a way that does them justice but makes them accessible for people who are not inside your brain.

That’s fair. After all, the topic is difficult and probably involves some familiarity with set theory (in a subtle way).

Then please, explain how the suffering of Hell could be finite in nature without decreasing from [its] initial level, or without being practically null from the onset.

The point is that the subjective suffering in Hell is never decreased experientially.

If there is a finite amount of suffering, stretched out over an infinite time, then there are only two possibles:

1: A set amount of suffering is doled out over an infinite amount of time. In effect, this would reduce the suffering of Hell to nothing, because any amount, no matter how large, will approach zero when divided over infinity.

No, that’s not quite right, I think. Not that it particularly matters, but the amount of suffering here would be infinitesimal rather than zero. It would be an infinitely small non-zero quantity. This quantity is used in non-standard analysis, but that’s relatively unheard of outside of pure mathematics. In any case, it is, as I’m sure you know, not what I’m suggesting is the case.

2: A soul in Hell experiences a definite severity of suffering relative to their sinfulness in life. If this is the case, then once they’ve experienced the amount of poena sensus (pain of the sense or the physical pain of the fires of Hell) due for their transgressions, the amount of pain would decrease. I’ve already given a perfectly reasonable argument for why this cannot be the case.

Whether through my fault or not, there is clearly a fundamental misunderstanding here. The point is that if the subject experiences her first year as though it were a year, and then another year as though it were a month, then another year as though it were a day, then another year as though it were an hour (and so on), then the subjective torment would be the same at any given time, but the objective limit of suffering towards which the damned is endlessly approaching throughout an actually infinite set of non-infinitesimal times remains infinite. There are, as far as I can see, infinitely many specious presents at which the suffering will be equally intense in subjective experience.

Your argument about the planets doesn’t actually work. “Infinity” is not a number, it is a concept. If two moons are rotating around a planet, one moving twice as fast as the other, then the only point in time their number of rotations would be equal is when it is zero. From that point forward it would work like this:

Moon 1 | Moon 2​

 0       |       0
 .5      |       1
 1       |       2
 2       |       4
 4       |       8
 8       |       16

.
…
…

While it’s true that, given an infinite amount of times, planet one will always wind up rotating the same number of times that planet 2 has rotated at a given point in time, the number of their rotations will never be equal at any given point of time. There are also not multiple amounts of infinity.

Ok, so there are several (what to my mind are) mistakes here, but they are very informative ones (I think they may, once cleared up, actually illuminate the issue). First, as to whether there are different amounts of infinity, there clearly are. Although it is true that the cardinal Aleph-null (ℵ0) is the same size as the ordinal ω0, and the set of all even numbers is equivalent to the set of all prime numbers, yet, the set of all natural numbers is not equivalent to the set of Reals between 0 and 1. You can prove this set theoretically, for you cannot biject the sets of the natural numbers and the Reals between 0 and 1. These are actually, literally, sets of different sizes, even though they are both infinitely large (this holds at least where we measure size set-theoretically, which, post-Cantor, we routinely do). So, in the case of the rotations of the moons, it will be the case that at a time actually infinitely removed from whenever we’ve arbitrarily started counting the rotations, the number of their rotations will be mathematically equivalent.

Again, infinity is not a number, it’s a concept.

We’re not talking, here, about that sideways 8, the ‘∞’ which is used to indicate a limit rather than a quantity. We are talking about the quantity ℵ0.

 

[Tyrel]

Now, you would be perfectly well within your rights to argue that actual infinities are absurd. The Mathematician David Hilbert intended his “paradox of the Great Hotel” to demonstrate this, and similar paradoxes have been raised by mathematicians and philosophers for centuries. I actually agree, in a qualified sense, with this position; I think it is absurd to posit an actually infinite set of causes, for instance. However, I am not an A-theorist about the nature of time (mostly because I see that as incompatible with the doctrine of God’s omniscience and simplicity), and I do not believe that there are chronons (that is to say, objective fundamental indivisible finite units of time). I do believe that God is atemporally eternal, that the events to which we refer as ‘future’ are actually infinite in number, and that they are, each of them, actual. I do not believe that heaven involves an objective present, a ‘now’, and that the flow of time tends towards infinity merely as a limit (i.e., a potential infinite rather than an actual infinite). For, in that case, God would (I think) have to be both omniscient and constantly changing his mind, for as facts would objectively go from being future-tense true to present-tense true, and present-tense true to past-tense true, God would have to be keeping track of that rollover of propositional truths. I find that unconscionable because it seems incompatible with God’s immutability and divine simplicity. So, instead, all the events in heaven are actual, and there are infinitely many of them, so I do accept that there can be an actually infinite number of events. I think you should too, if you’re a Catholic, unless you find a way out of the troubles I just briefly outlined.

You cannot measure infinity, because it is literally “without end.” If you measure something, then you have reached its end, otherwise you wouldn’t be able to measure it.

Set theory gives us the mathematical technology required to measure transfinite quantities and talk meaningfully about transfinite arithmetic. This is in part what Cantor did for mathematics and set theory; it is why he is to set-theory what Einstein is to physics.

I think part of the trouble comes from trying to quantify something which is not quantifiable. We can provide subjective interpretations of the severity of our pain, but we cannot actually compare that pain with someone else’s. One person’s ten might be another person’s two.

This is a great point. To it I can only say that even if we have no way to measure the difference in subjective experiences of pain with any meaningful precision, we all know that some pain is more intense than other pain. We can proceed, therefore, to talk analogously about finite measures of pain even if such measures are strictly inscrutable to us (especially when considering the poena damni.

No matter what, we know that the souls in Hell will experience “perfect suffering,” just as each soul in Heaven will experience “perfect happiness.” This suffering will be the full amount of suffering their soul is capable of experiencing.

This is not quite so. Consider, for instance, the following from the sixth session of the Council of Florence, (July 6, 1439):

“Also, the souls of those who have incurred no stain of sin whatsoever after baptism, as well as souls who after incurring the stain of sin have been cleansed whether in their bodies or outside their bodies, as was stated above, are straightaway received into heaven and clearly behold the triune God as he is, yet one person more perfectly than another according to the difference of their merits. But the souls of those who depart this life in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, go down straightaway to hell to be punished, but with unequal pains.”

So, the council literally affirms poenis disparibus, even in hell, not to mention that one person more or less perfectly than another beholds the triune God according to the difference of their merits.

I am a little insulted that you don’t think we’re giving your question due consideration. Just because you don’t like our responses doesn’t mean we’re being lazy in considering your proposition.

Mea culpa, this is doubtless due to my impatience. I appreciate the sincerity and the effort (and the intelligence, and the charity) of the responses. However, I was honestly hoping to be impressed; I was hoping that a fellow Catholic on here might be able to come up with some obscure canon (or something) which I’ve missed, something which might undermine the view I’m proposing. On the upside, if I can find no principled opposition even after having sincerely sought it, that raises the likelihood that there just is no principled Catholic case to be made against the view.

Since so much of this relies upon a technical understanding of infinities and set theory (which is becoming increasingly obvious to me now), perhaps I can be permitted to direct those of you interested to this really great video: youtube.com/watch?v=SrU9YDoXE88

Maybe it’ll help us all to better frame the our inquisitions (so to speak).

 

[pacloc]

Ah… this is where a lot of the discrepancy was coming from. I’ve specifically only been talking about Heaven/Hell prior to the Resurrection.

As for the completeness of Heaven/Hell, I’m not denying that our experience prior to the Resurrection is incomplete. It won’t be complete until we have our bodies back. What I’m saying is that, despite it being incomplete, it’s still Heaven/Hell.

I’ll look for some quotes from the fathers. I know I have only seen them state this, even almost making it sound as if the intermediate state is not really a state of life. They do not really mean to say that there is soul sleep, but they emphasize the Heavenly reward at the time of the resurrection so strongly, it feels as if they teach soul sleep. I know the Catholic and Orthodox Churches have kind of moved toward the idea that Heaven and Hell are immediately experienced after death, but I’m not so sure there is any patristic backing for this.

Either way, I’m glad we are mostly in agreement.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

That’s fair. After all, the topic is difficult and probably involves some familiarity with set theory (in a subtle way).

I’ll be perfectly frank, I think attempting to apply set theory to eternity is pointless. Heaven and Hell are so far beyond our comprehension that using math to talk about eternity is like trying to measure the distance from the Sun to the Pluto with individual grains of sand.

The point is that the subjective suffering in Hell is never decreased experientially.

I don’t disagree with this, and I don’t think anyone here does.

No, that’s not quite right, I think. Not that it particularly matters, but the amount of suffering here would be infinitesimal rather than zero. It would be an infinitely small non-zero quantity. This quantity is used in non-standard analysis, but that’s relatively unheard of outside of pure mathematics. In any case, it is, as I’m sure you know, not what I’m suggesting is the case.

That’s why I said effectively zero. But yeah, I know this isn’t what you mean.

Whether through my fault or not, there is clearly a fundamental misunderstanding here. The point is that if the subject experiences her first year as though it were a year, and then another year as though it were a month, then another year as though it were a day, then another year as though it were an hour (and so on), then the subjective torment would be the same at any given time, but the objective limit of suffering towards which the damned is endlessly approaching throughout an actually infinite set of non-infinitesimal times remains infinite. There are, as far as I can see, infinitely many specious presents at which the suffering will be equally intense in subjective experience.

IF that is how they experienced it, then you could be correct. However, there’s no basis for thinking that this is how eternity will be experienced. I’d again argue the opposite. In Heaven, this sort of loose experience of time may be possible, since time is inconsequential in Heavenly bliss. In Hell, however, this sort of subjective decrease in the experience of time would mean that there are moments for which the soul cannot recollect their suffering, or their suffering would not seem to have lasted the full extent of the time that has actually passed. Either way, this would be a form of relief for them, which is a good. As such, given that there is no good in Hell, this would not be possible.

Ok, so there are several (what to my mind are) mistakes here, but they are very informative ones (I think they may, once cleared up, actually illuminate the issue). First, as to whether there are different amounts of infinity, there clearly are. Although it is true that the cardinal Aleph-null (ℵ0) is the same size as the ordinal ω0, and the set of all even numbers is equivalent to the set of all prime numbers, yet, the set of all natural numbers is not equivalent to the set of Reals between 0 and 1. You can prove this set theoretically, for you cannot biject the sets of the natural numbers and the Reals between 0 and 1. These are actually, literally, sets of different sizes, even though they are both infinitely large (this holds at least where we measure size set-theoretically, which, post-Cantor, we routinely do). So, in the case of the rotations of the moons, it will be the case that at a time actually infinitely removed from whenever we’ve arbitrarily started counting the rotations, the number of their rotations will be mathematically equivalent.

We’re not talking, here, about that sideways 8, the ‘∞’ which is used to indicate a limit rather than a quantity. We are talking about the quantity ℵ0.

See, this is a major difference in our outlook on this. You are attempting to quantify a subset of eternity. Namely, the point of time from which I enter into eternity, forward. The reality of eternity is different from the numerical infinity discussed in Set Theory. You can’t really use one to inform the other, it’s apples an oranges. We may use similar terms from the two things, but the reality those terms represent are altogether different.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

Now, you would be perfectly well within your rights to argue that actual infinities are absurd.

I would say that mathematical infinities are actually non-existant due to the limited nature of reality, but that eternal infinities (those dealing with the supernatural and timeless God,) are not.

I do not believe that heaven involves an objective present, a ‘now’, and that the flow of time tends towards infinity merely as a limit (i.e., a potential infinite rather than an actual infinite).

God experiences all of time as an infinite now. I don’t have time to get into this though. St. Thomas Aquinas deals with this position in great detail.

For, in that case, God would (I think) have to be both omniscient and constantly changing his mind, for as facts would objectively go from being future-tense true to present-tense true, and present-tense true to past-tense true, God would have to be keeping track of that rollover of propositional truths. I find that unconscionable because it seems incompatible with God’s immutability and divine simplicity. So, instead, all the events in heaven are actual, and there are infinitely many of them, so I do accept that there can be an actually infinite number of events. I think you should too, if you’re a Catholic, unless you find a way out of the troubles I just briefly outlined.

God does not have to change His mind. If all of eternity is equally present to God, then He is able to incorporate all willed action from all eternity. In effect, He knows my choice because, from His perspective, I have already made it, am making it, and will make it in the future. If you do not share this understanding of God, then I honestly don’t think we’ll be able to achieve a common ground in this discussion, nor convince the other of our position. God’s experience of reality is paramount to the discussion of the temporal natures of Heaven and Hell.

Set theory gives us the mathematical technology required to measure transfinite quantities and talk meaningfully about transfinite arithmetic. This is in part what Cantor did for mathematics and set theory; it is why he is to set-theory what Einstein is to physics.

Again, it is not accurate to apply mathematical propositions to the literal eternity of God. Similar language does not make the subjects interchangeable.

This is not quite so. Consider, for instance, the following from the sixth session of the Council of Florence, (July 6, 1439):

“Also, the souls of those who have incurred no stain of sin whatsoever after baptism, as well as souls who after incurring the stain of sin have been cleansed whether in their bodies or outside their bodies, as was stated above, are straightaway received into heaven and clearly behold the triune God as he is, yet one person more perfectly than another according to the difference of their merits. But the souls of those who depart this life in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, go down straightaway to hell to be punished, but with unequal pains.”
So, the council literally affirms poenis disparibus, even in hell, not to mention that one person more or less perfectly than another beholds the triune God according to the difference of their merits.

From my reading, this supports my position. “Perfect Happiness” is the happiness experienced “according to their merits;” and “Perfect Suffering” is the suffering of “unequal pains.” I think you and I mean the same thing here, but are saying it differently. Perfect suffering is the suffering due a soul by their wickedness, not the absolute greatest amount of suffering possible.

Maybe it’ll help us all to better frame the our inquisitions (so to speak).

I think this will help us frame our positions better, but I do not think we can speak in similar terms. You’re talking about mathematical infinities. Numbers, sets, groups of things. I am talking of non-quantifiable infinity, born of God’s eternal nature. The reality of the two things don’t really overlap. You and I are discussing two entirely different things.

 

[Tyrel]

I’ll be perfectly frank, I think attempting to apply set theory to eternity is pointless. Heaven and Hell are so far beyond our comprehension that using math to talk about eternity is like trying to measure the distance from the Sun to the Pluto with individual grains of sand.

That can obviously be done.

See, this is a major difference in our outlook on this. You are attempting to quantify a subset of eternity. Namely, the point of time from which I enter into eternity, forward. The reality of eternity is different from the numerical infinity discussed in Set Theory. You can’t really use one to inform the other, it’s apples an oranges. We may use similar terms from the two things, but the reality those terms represent are altogether different.

Eternity and infinity shouldn’t be conflated, I think. Eternity comes in at least two modalities (atemporality and sempiternality). Infinity has absolutely nothing to do with the former, and bears no relevant (for our purposes) relation to the latter. All I’m arguing is that it is logically (and theologically) possible for God to actualize a hell like the one I’m envisioning. If it is possible and entirely theologically viable, then it seems preferable to its alternatives by reason of the intuitions which incline us to the belief that the punishment must fit the crime, and only a finite amount of temporal punishment for sin can be accrued over a finite amount of time (at least unless we are capable of moral supertasks). This view allows us to say that damnation in hell is categorical, eternal, everlasting, objectively infinite, and subjectively bounded by a finite amount of torment proportional to the temporal punishment incurred by sin. That seems really attractive to me. Doesn’t that seem attractive to you?

IF that is how they experienced it, then you could be correct. However, there’s no basis for thinking that this is how eternity will be experienced. I’d again argue the opposite. In Heaven, this sort of loose experience of time may be possible, since time is inconsequential in Heavenly bliss. In Hell, however, this sort of subjective decrease in the experience of time would mean that there are moments for which the soul cannot recollect their suffering, or their suffering would not seem to have lasted the full extent of the time that has actually passed. Either way, this would be a form of relief for them, which is a good. As such, given that there is no good in Hell, this would not be possible.

Alright!! Ok, now this is at least starting to look like what I was hunting for; namely, some semblance of a principled argument against the viability of the view. The argument here, best I can make out, is that the suffering of the damned would not be maximally great, and therefore there would be, for the damned, a good in hell insofar as greater suffering was avoided. However, there can be no good enjoyed in hell. Ergo, et cetera. This is good - but I have some challenges to raise.

The problem I have with this argument is not its structure, but its content. The passage from the council of Florence very clearly undermines (indeed, makes entirely heretical) the view that there can be no good of any kind in hell in your sense, for it literally says that not all of those in hell suffer from equally severe torments. Moreover, and as an aside, I’m not sure I see how it logically follows from the view I’ve outlined that there is any agent S for whom at some specious present t, S at t would be literally unable to recollect their suffering. In fact, I’m sure I don’t see how that logically follows. I’d really appreciate any elaboration you’d like to offer on this point.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

That can obviously be done.

See… you say that, but that doesn’t actually make it true.

Eternity and infinity shouldn’t be conflated, I think.

I wasn’t conflating them. Sorry if it seemed like I was. I was seeking to do the literal opposite.

Eternity comes in at least two modalities (atemporality and sempiternality).

Eternity is eternity… it is that which has no beginning, nor an end. Only God is eternal.

Infinity has absolutely nothing to do with the former, and bears no relevant (for our purposes) relation to the latter. All I’m arguing is that it is logically (and theologically) possible for God to actualize a hell like the one I’m envisioning. If it is possible and entirely theologically viable, then it seems preferable to its alternatives by reason of the intuitions which incline us to the** belief that the punishment must fit the crime**, and only a finite amount of temporal punishment for sin can be accrued over a finite amount of time (at least unless we are capable of moral supertasks). This view allows us to say that damnation in hell is categorical, eternal, everlasting, objectively infinite, and subjectively bounded by a finite amount of torment proportional to the temporal punishment incurred by sin. That seems really attractive to me. Doesn’t that seem attractive to you?

This… the bolded above. This is exactly why a temporal diminishing of the experience of Hell’s suffering cannot be possible. I thought I addressed this in an earlier post, but I’ll say it again here. ANY offense against God, no matter how small, is an infinitely grave offense deserving of infinite (and supreme) punishment. This is because God is infinitely good, and infinitely deserving of our love. If the suffering is diminished in any way, even in so simple a way as making it seem like time is passing faster than it is, then justice would not be being served.

Alright!! Ok, now this is at least starting to look like what I was hunting for; namely, some semblance of a principled argument against the viability of the view. The argument here, best I can make out, is that the suffering of the damned would not be maximally great, and therefore there would be, for the damned, a good in hell insofar as greater suffering was avoided. However, there can be no good enjoyed in hell. Ergo, et cetera. This is good - but I have some challenges to raise.

That sounds about right.

The problem I have with this argument is not its structure, but its content. The passage from the council of Florence very clearly undermines (indeed, makes entirely heretical) the view that there can be no good of any kind in hell in your sense, for it literally says that not all of those in hell suffer from equally severe torments. Moreover, and as an aside, I’m not sure I see how it logically follows from the view I’ve outlined that there is any agent S for whom at some specious present t, S at t would be literally unable to recollect their suffering. In fact, I’m sure I don’t see how that logically follows. I’d really appreciate any elaboration you’d like to offer on this point.

It is an aspect of God’s justice and mercy that people suffer according to their sins, rather than experiencing the full weight of the sufferings we are due. If we got what we truly deserved, even the smallest of sins would result in suffering of literally-infinite measure. Instead, due to the same love He has for us which lead Him to sacrifice His son for us, and due to the mercy He has on us, He allows our suffering to be limited based on the nature of our offenses. This last act of mercy on God’s part occurs at our judgment, and so could not be considered to occurring once a souls has entered Hell.

I also think this can be resolved by the fact that another aspect of Hell is isolation, in rejection of the community of Heaven. It is being completely turned in on yourself. Even if you are in the presence of other people, you do not interact with them, yuo do not commiserate with them. I believe that many of the mystics who’ve been given visions of Hell have spoken to this. There is no comparing your suffering with another’s, so there’s no sense of “well, at least I’m not that guy…” While your objective degree of suffering may be less than another person’s, your subjective experience of it is such that you can conceive of no greater suffering.

Please, keep in mind that this is mostly conjecture on my part. I don’t think the Church has spoken this specifically on the subject.

I have to drop out of this debate now. It’s been a lot of fun, I’ve really enjoyed it; but I need to focus on some stuff at work. Good luck in your search. You might consider calling in to Catholic Answers Live some day.

 

[Tyrel]

I would say that mathematical infinities are actually non-existant due to the limited nature of reality, but that eternal infinities (those dealing with the supernatural and timeless God,) are not.

I don’t know what an eternal infinity is. It must be either a quantitative infinity, or a qualitative infinity. If qualitative, then it indicates some complete lack of restriction (in some respect). If quantitative, then if actual it is an actual infinite, and if merely used as the limit towards which something forever tends, then it is a potential infinite. It’s got to be one of those. If you mean it qualitatively, then the phrasing is, I think, unnecessarily misleading or contrived - there is no such (conventionally defined) thing, in philosophy, mathematics or theology, as an eternal infinity.

God experiences all of time as an infinite now. I don’t have time to get into this though. St. Thomas Aquinas deals with this position in great detail.

Right, ok, to my reading that is simply a rejection of the A-theory of time. That is perfectly fine by me. Also, while I’m familiar with Aquinas philosophy of time (and Boethius’, and Augustine’s), and my affection for St. Thomas notwithstanding, almost all analytic theologians today agree that St. Thomas’ view suffers from a subtle but fatal antinomy which neither he, nor any Thomist since, has been able to resolve. Aquinas seems ambivalent in his view of time, sometimes indicating that he prefers what we now call the B-theory, but at other times indicating that he prefers what we now call the A-theory, even though these are strictly logically irreconcilable.

God does not have to change His mind. If all of eternity is equally present to God, then He is able to incorporate all willed action from all eternity. In effect, He knows my choice because, from His perspective, I have already made it, am making it, and will make it in the future. If you do not share this understanding of God, then I honestly don’t think we’ll be able to achieve a common ground in this discussion, nor convince the other of our position. God’s experience of reality is paramount to the discussion of the temporal natures of Heaven and Hell.

Ok, yes, again - that’s if the A-theory is false. I agree that the A-theory is false. I do not agree (unfortunately for me), that what you just said could be true even if the A-theory were true. That’s the point.

Again, it is not accurate to apply mathematical propositions to the literal eternity of God. Similar language does not make the subjects interchangeable.

This is right only because God’s eternity is not infinite in any quantitative sense (unless, of course, the A-theory is true and God is Sempiternal rather than atemporally eternal - a question on which, by the way, the Church has never declared anything).

From my reading, this supports my position. “Perfect Happiness” is the happiness experienced “according to their merits;” and “Perfect Suffering” is the suffering of “unequal pains.” I think you and I mean the same thing here, but are saying it differently. Perfect suffering is the suffering due a soul by their wickedness, not the absolute greatest amount of suffering possible.

Sure, but the suffering of the damned who have committed no mortal sin (having merely original sin) is clearly not equal to the suffering of the damned who have committed mortal sin. It plausibly follows, by analogy, that among those damned who have committed mortal sins, the punishments and afflictions are not equal, but are apportioned according to demerit.

I think this will help us frame our positions better, but I do not think we can speak in similar terms. You’re talking about mathematical infinities. Numbers, sets, groups of things. I am talking of non-quantifiable infinity, born of God’s eternal nature. The reality of the two things don’t really overlap. You and I are discussing two entirely different things.

Well, I think this is true only because we’re veering off topic a little (though I’m responsible for encouraging that by talking about the philosophy of time). What we were talking about was the quantitative (in)finity of torment in hell. That is clearly quantitative, not qualitative. So it is entirely legitimate to talk about that in terms with which we are familiar through the study of mathematics.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

Well, I think this is true only because we’re veering off topic a little (though I’m responsible for encouraging that by talking about the philosophy of time). What we were talking about was the quantitative (in)finity of torment in hell. That is clearly quantitative, not qualitative. So it is entirely legitimate to talk about that in terms with which we are familiar through the study of mathematics.

Sorry, I really can’t respond to the rest, but I wanted to address this. I was not talking about the quantitative suffering of Hell because I do not think that the sufferings of Hell can be quantified. I believe that it is an absolute quality of damnation that a soul must suffer the full extent due for their sins. It is not a separate quantity imposed on damnation, but rather the result of the nature of an individual’s damnation itself, and the result of separation from God. We can discuss it in quantitative terms, but I don’t actually think it’s something with quantity, just as eternity has no quantity, it simply is.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

Right, ok, to my reading that is simply a rejection of the A-theory of time. That is perfectly fine by me. Also, while I’m familiar with Aquinas philosophy of time (and Boethius’, and Augustine’s), and my affection for St. Thomas notwithstanding, almost all analytic theologians today agree that St. Thomas’ view suffers from a subtle but fatal antinomy which neither he, nor any Thomist since, has been able to resolve. Aquinas seems ambivalent in his view of time, sometimes indicating that he prefers what we now call the B-theory, but at other times indicating that he prefers what we now call the A-theory, even though these are strictly logically irreconcilable.

It is not a rejection merely of a-theory, but rather of time itself. There is no time in God, and He is not subject to either A-theory or B-theory.

 

[Tyrel]

See… you say that, but that doesn’t actually make it true.

So, grains of sand range from being about 2mm in width to being 64 mm in width. At the Perihilion Pluto gets within 4.44 Billion km from the sun, and at the aphelion Pluto gets as far as 7.38 Billion km from the sun. Now, my math isn’t actually that great (which is why I try to stick to philosophical theology, rather than venture too far into pure mathematics), but unless I’m mistaken that should come to the distance between Pluto and the sun, in units of grains of sand, coming out to: (4.44e+18)/(6.4e-5), (7.38e+18)/( 2e-6)]

I have to drop out of this debate now. It’s been a lot of fun, I’ve really enjoyed it; but I need to focus on some stuff at work. Good luck in your search. You might consider calling in to Catholic Answers Live some day.

Well thank you for offering up some of your time and your thoughts. They are appreciated.

I would consider calling in to Catholic Answers Live only if they were hosting one of the few apologists they have on staff who has enough basic philosophical background to answer the question, and that’s not all of them (Trent Horn maybe, possibly Jimmy Akin?). I was actually trying to get in touch with Mark Bonocore (of the Catholic Legate), but his contact information seems impossible to find online. I feel pretty sure he would know. I was wondering if Tim Staples would know - although I like him for a lot of things (I think he’s the all-around best apologist Catholic Answers has on staff), he doesn’t seem to keep up with any philosophical developments which aren’t pretty strictly Thomistic. In any case, my hope is that somebody perusing this thread might just give me what I’m looking for. In the meantime, I’ll keep at it.

 

[Tyrel]

It is not a rejection merely of a-theory, but rather of time itself. There is no time in God, and He is not subject to either A-theory or B-theory.

This is flatly incoherent. If the A-theory is true, and God is omniscient, then it seems like God’s mind must be changing from time to time. If the B-theory is true then all of time, from beginning through to an actually infinite future of events, exists in God’s sight (and not merely potentially, but actually) because it exists simpliciter.