With respect, I’m afraid I’m pretty dissatisfied (nay, perhaps even disappointed) with the responses here thus far. Look, it is obviously true that, as the Catholic Encyclopedia notes: “Not long ago Mivart (The Nineteenth Century, Dec., 1892, Febr. and Apr., 1893) advocated the opinion that the pains of the damned would decrease with time and that in the end their lot would not be so extremely sad; that they would finally reach a certain kind of happiness and would prefer existence to annihilation; and although they would still continue to suffer a punishment symbolically described as a fire by the Bible, yet they would hate God no longer, and the most unfortunate among them be happier than many a pauper in this life. It is quite obvious that all this is opposed to Scripture and the teaching of the Church. The articles cited were condemned by the Congregation of the Index and the Holy Office on 14 and 19 July, 1893 (cf. “Civiltà Cattolica”, I, 1893, 672).” However, the view I am now proposing has, to the best of my knowledge, nothing relevantly in common with the elements of that theory which were condemned. The view I hold maintains that hell is eternal, that the
poena damni and the
poena sensus are both everlasting afflictions with no temporary alleviations, that the torments of those in hell are experienced at all times with intensity, but that the torments are finitely bounded over an infinite amount of time.
Frankly, all of you seem to have eagerly rushed to answer the question without actually really thinking about the question.
Nowhere did I say or insinuate that the subjective experience of suffering ever decreases in intensity. In no way am I suggesting that the damned grow accustomed to the torments of hell. The view I’m proposing is much more subtle than that!
Actually, in one sense it is, or it seems to be; for, consider that any finite quantity multiplied by an infinite quantity yields an infinite quantity. Even if sufferings are at all times finite, but there are infinitely many times at which the suffering continues, then there is an infinite quantity of suffering in the end. If two different planets each have moons, the first rotating around its planet at twice the rate of the second rotating around its planet, but you allow for them to continue to rotate around their respective planets for an actually infinite amount of measurable times, then each of them will have rotated around their respective planets an equal number of times (namely, because they have rotated an infinite number of times - and although there are different sizes of infinity, it is not hard to prove that the set of rotations in each case could be bijected with the other, implying their equivalence). Similarly, then, even if the torments of one denizen of hell are, at any time, more intense than another denizen of hell, if hell consists in an everlasting eternity of times at which the damned experience suffering, and their suffering isn’t finitely bounded in the way I’m proposing, then the sufferings accrued ultimately will be equivalent by being quantitatively infinite (and, again, we can prove by analogy that these infinite quantities would be strictly equivalent infinities).
The issue I’m raising requires a little more attention than I think you’re giving it based on your comments. Hopefully you can now see why I feel that way, and, hopefully, you can offer a more engaging rejoinder as this discussion progresses.