There is another natural law argument against homosexual acts, one that I’m not sure I’ve heard anyone but myself give. It heralds back to the first dawn of natural law theory, with Aristotle. Here it is:
- Human beings have a distinctive telos, or purpose.
- Any type of action that tends toward the thwarting of one’s telos (or other people’s telos) is wrong.
- The telos of a human being is happiness.
- Homosexual actions tend to lead to unhappiness in oneself or others.
- Therefore, homosexual actions are wrong.
Now, let me right off the bat respond to a few objections:
Objection 1: Premise #4 is false, or questionable.
I have sympathy with this objection. The jury’s still out on whether homosexual actions tend to lead to unhappiness. But if you read through histories about this stuff, even in pre-Christian cultures, authors generally connect homosexual activity (at least among men) with hedonism, and the modern link between homosexual activity and promiscuity suggests a similar connection.
Now, you might say “different people have different ideas of happiness”. But what does that matter? Happiness is a real thing. It is possible to thrive as a human being. And quite honestly, if I saw all the sexually active gay people I know thriving, I wouldn’t oppose homosexual activity at all. But I don’t see them thriving.
Objection 2: This argument is utilitarian.
It’s not, though. The argument does not evaluate individual actions on the basis of their actual or expected results. The argument evaluates action types on the basis of one result: happiness. The argument is consequentialist, in some broad sense, but not utilitarian. I follow Aristotle and Aquinas in believing that good actions tend to have good consequences, and bad actions tend to have bad consequences. (Thus, I reject Kant entirely).