How can people "freely choose" Hell if they are *mistaken* on what their highest Good is?

  • Thread starter Thread starter RealisticCatholic
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
R

RealisticCatholic

Guest
Someone only goes to hell by free choice.

However, especially with the Thomistic Catholic theory of human action, people act – even commit sin – based on a perceived good.

So someone who goes to hell is still choosing what they perceive to be their highest good. God is the highest, ultimate Good. This is what humans were created for. But various human passions and appetites can lead one to consider other things as their ultimate good.

But in that case, the person is mistaken. So why should anyone justly deserve hell if they are ignorant about what their Highest Good is?

(And this is to say nothing about the traditional doctrine of the pain of sense, like literal hellfire, which is positive inflicted punishment).
 
Last edited:
I might know that helping at the soup kitchen is a higher moral good than sitting at home playing video games, but I may sometimes still chose video games. People don’t always choose the lesser out of ignorance, but because it’s the particular good they want more. By people always choosing the “highest good” in Thomism, highest means the good they’re making their highest priority, what they want most… not the objectively highest moral good. At least in this context.
 
Last edited:
It still seems there is ignorance, here, though. For only in Heaven with God will we be truly happy. Humans were meant to be fulfilled by God alone. It seems that if anyone truly understood this as their source of happiness — again, considering humans are wired for happiness and act towards what they perceive to be good — then they wouldn’t choose otherwise. No?

Ed Feser says in his article: “In any event, the strength of the passions and appetites is one reason why the sins attached to them are so dangerous, even when they are not as such the worst of sins.”

But that doesn’t seem fair. Sensual drives, to continue the example, is a strong human appetite. We want sex precisely because it is such a strong desire. That’s why it’s addictive. But it doesn’t seem right that this would “damn oneself,” because it is precisely the appealing nature of the thing that makes someone mistake it to be the highest good.
 
Last edited:
It still seems there is ignorance, here, though. For only in Heaven with God will we be truly happy. Humans were meant to be fulfilled by God alone. It seems that if anyone truly understood this as their source of happiness — again, considering humans are wired for happiness and act towards what they perceive to be good — then they wouldn’t choose otherwise. No?

Ed Feser says in his article: “In any event, the strength of the passions and appetites is one reason why the sins attached to them are so dangerous, even when they are not as such the worst of sins.”

But that doesn’t seem fair. Sensual drives, to continue the example, is a strong human appetite. We want sex precisely because it is such a strong desire. That’s why it’s addictive. But it doesn’t seem right that this would “damn oneself,” because it is precisely the appealing nature of the thing that makes someone mistake it to be the highest good.
Catechism
1746 The imputability or responsibility for an action can be diminished or nullified by ignorance, duress, fear, and other psychological or social factors.
St. Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologiae > First Part of the Second Part > Question 78. That cause of sin which is malice > Article 1. Whether anyone sins through certain malice?
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
 
Catechism
1746 The imputability or responsibility for an action can be diminished or nullified by ignorance, duress, fear, and other psychological or social factors.
HOWEVER

The CCC also says

1791 This ignorance can often be imputed to personal responsibility. This is the case when a man "takes little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the habit of committing sin." In such cases, the person is culpable for the evil he commits.
 
The Almighty God is fully aware that we aren’t all born into the same situation or raised the same way or taught the same things.
We do, however, have a responsibility to learn what the truth is, and then align ourselves and our actions to the truth.
But He knows that things can go awry along the way that we have no control over.
At the same time, He will not be mocked. A person who deliberately avoids learning the truth because they’re selfishly attached to their own sin won’t get to plead ignorance.
 
40.png
Vico:
Catechism
1746 The imputability or responsibility for an action can be diminished or nullified by ignorance, duress, fear, and other psychological or social factors.
HOWEVER

The CCC also says

1791 This ignorance can often be imputed to personal responsibility. This is the case when a man "takes little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the habit of committing sin." In such cases, the person is culpable for the evil he commits.
Yes. Catholic Encyclopedia has a good summary of it:
So far as fixing human responsibility, the most important division of ignorance is that designated by the terms invincible and vincible. Ignorance is said to be invincible when a person is unable to rid himself of it notwithstanding the employment of moral diligence, that is, such as under the circumstances is, morally speaking, possible and obligatory. This manifestly includes the states of inadvertence, forgetfulness, etc. Such ignorance is obviously involuntary and therefore not imputable. On the other hand, ignorance is termed vincible if it can be dispelled by the use of “moral diligence”. This certainly does not mean all possible effort; otherwise, as Ballerini naively says, we should have to have recourse to the pope in every instance. We may say, however, that the diligence requisite must be commensurate with the importance of the affair in hand, and with the capacity of the agent, in a word such as a really sensible and prudent person would use under the circumstances. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the obligation mentioned above is to be interpreted strictly and exclusively as the duty incumbent on a man to do something, the precise object of which is the acquisition of the needed knowledge. In other words the mere fact that one is bound by some extrinsic title to do something the performance of which would have actually, though not necessarily, given the required information, is negligible. When ignorance is deliberately aimed at and fostered, it is said to be affected, not because it is pretended, but rather because it is sought for by the agent so that he may not have to relinquish his purpose. Ignorance which practically no effort is made to dispel is termed crass or supine.
Delany, J. (1910). Ignorance. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. : http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07648a.htm
 
40.png
steve-b:
40.png
Vico:
Catechism
1746 The imputability or responsibility for an action can be diminished or nullified by ignorance, duress, fear, and other psychological or social factors.
HOWEVER

The CCC also says

1791 This ignorance can often be imputed to personal responsibility. This is the case when a man "takes little trouble to find out what is true and good, or when conscience is by degrees almost blinded through the habit of committing sin." In such cases, the person is culpable for the evil he commits.
Yes. Catholic Encyclopedia has a good summary of it:
So far as fixing human responsibility, the most important division of ignorance is that designated by the terms invincible and vincible. Ignorance is said to be invincible when a person is unable to rid himself of it notwithstanding the employment of moral diligence, that is, such as under the circumstances is, morally speaking, possible and obligatory. This manifestly includes the states of inadvertence, forgetfulness, etc. Such ignorance is obviously involuntary and therefore not imputable. On the other hand, ignorance is termed vincible if it can be dispelled by the use of “moral diligence”. This certainly does not mean all possible effort; otherwise, as Ballerini naively says, we should have to have recourse to the pope in every instance. We may say, however, that the diligence requisite must be commensurate with the importance of the affair in hand, and with the capacity of the agent, in a word such as a really sensible and prudent person would use under the circumstances. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the obligation mentioned above is to be interpreted strictly and exclusively as the duty incumbent on a man to do something, the precise object of which is the acquisition of the needed knowledge. In other words the mere fact that one is bound by some extrinsic title to do something the performance of which would have actually, though not necessarily, given the required information, is negligible. When ignorance is deliberately aimed at and fostered, it is said to be affected, not because it is pretended, but rather because it is sought for by the agent so that he may not have to relinquish his purpose. Ignorance which practically no effort is made to dispel is termed crass or supine.
Delany, J. (1910). Ignorance. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. : http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07648a.htm
In extension,

God knows perfectly who does and doesn’t game or tries to game the system.
 
These are all good further details, and I appreciate the selections from Aquinas.

But I still think the fundamental issue is, for me, how anyone could culpably choose hell when God is the ultimate Good that every human is meant for.

In other words, according to Catholicism, even someone who chooses a temporal good over higher spiritual good is not really fulfilling his human nature at all. That is why he will be miserable in hell.

But if someone truly comprehended his purpose and his fulfillment in God, how could he ever reasonably choose hell instead (or rather, something that would lead to hell)?
 
Were satan and those angels with him, who chose rebellion against God, being “irrational”? Or acting in ignorance due to inadequate education? No, their intellects were fine - it was the will in them that wanted autonomy at any cost. This is disordered self-love in the extreme, because it was irrevocable: their decision was total and final. So it is with men who want what they want because they want it. Not because of the good of it, or the evil of it, but because they want it. They want no part of divine love, which requires self-gift. Self-gift, self-sacrifice, is anathema to them. They hate love, they are their own god, thus their delight is destruction of the good.
 
Last edited:
This doesn’t seem true from what I have gathered:
If an angel goes wrong at all, it is not (as we are) merely moving in an erroneous direction but where this trajectory might be reversed. It simply is wrong and stays wrong.

For Aquinas, then, an angel’s basic orientation is set immediately after its creation. It either rightly takes God for its ultimate end, or wrongly takes something less than God for its ultimate end. If the former, then it is forever “locked on” to beatitude, and if the latter, it is forever “locked on” to unhappiness.
From Ed Feser.
 
@Wesrock and @IWantGod

After read more of the Summa, Aquinas has helped clarify some notions for me. Indeed, out of the three interior causes of sin – intellectual ignorance, passion, and malice, the former two (ignorance and passion) can indeed diminish culpability for sin.

However, when it comes to malice, the conscious and voluntary choice to do evil, it seems hard to understand how the will could so choose without some defect in ignorance or passion. For if we are wired for the good, how can we choose evil for the sake of evil? And if, indeed, we only sin by choosing a lesser good over a greater good, then is this not due to some factor like ignorance or passion?

In other words, it’s hard to understand how any sin could be purely out of malice or purely voluntary.
 
But I still think the fundamental issue is, for me, how anyone could culpably choose hell when God is the ultimate Good that every human is meant for.
Why was Christ crucified?
Miracle worker.
Kind to everyone, even outcasts.
Message of love and forgiveness and offer of salvation.

The people who saw him and knew him and lived with him abandoned him, and the establishment of the time crucified him.

We are created free to love. The freedom of love carries the responsibility of choosing well.
Choices matter. Consequences result from choices.
The radical goodness of love is what makes the consequences of bad choices bad. The absolute goodness of God’s love makes even one step below it hell.
 
The issue at hand is why we make the choices we do, though.

What I’m saying, especially as I’m trying to understand Aquinas, is that we sin because of ignorance, passion, and/or malice.

The former two can render our sins less culpable – even excuse them altogether in some cases. This is according to Aquinas.

That leaves malice, which is apparently due to the will alone (the other two factors relating to intellect and sensual appetite).

However, again, it is hard to see how the will could ever sin without first being affected by the other two – ignorance and passion. Even Aquinas says:
“…since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason…”
This is under Article 2 here.

So again, my problem remains: It seems hard to understand how anyone could sin without ignorance and passion of some sort, a defect in decision making. So it hardly makes sense how someone could ever sin fully voluntary.

It makes even less sense how an angel (demon) would choose a lesser good over God, the higher good, if it’s supposed to have adequate knowledge. If it didn’t have correct knowledge, then whose fault would that be? Surely not the angel!

@Wesrock @IWantGod I will try to stop responding until you guys can perhaps help. Thank you!
 
Last edited:
So you are making the case for minimalist morality.
“What are the factors that reduce my culpability…”
Why?

Your proper end in life is the highest good, not to establish a wall to crawl under.
 
Last edited:
Now you’re asserting bad motives on my part?

Maybe I’m just having a hard time at understanding Aquinas?

I’m not so sure what “minimalist morality is.” But the point of this thread is that it seems Aquinas is asserting whatever it is you want to call I am arguing/trying to understand. If you would like to enlighten me on Aquinas and the points above, please do. I am trying to learn.

You have not seemed to address any of my points so far.
 
Last edited:
Now you’re asserting bad motives on my part?

Maybe I’m just having a hard time at understanding Aquinas?

I’m not so sure what “minimalist morality is.” But the point of this thread is that it seems Aquinas is asserting whatever it is you want to call I am arguing/trying to understand. If you would like to enlighten me on Aquinas and the points above, please do. I am trying to learn.

You have not seemed to address any of my points so far.
No I’m not assuming your motivations.
I’m observing that you are making a case for minimalist morality by asking for standards of evasion of responsibility. Whether that’s your particular motivation I have no idea.

Our call as Christian is to aim for sainthood, not to establish a wall of minimal culpability to crawl under.
 
@RealisticCatholic, good luck! Although I have probably not asked the question as clearly and eloquently as you have, I have been raising this same question myself in every thread in these forums on hell for the past two or three months. I have yet to get an adequate response…

You should know that the way you have asked this question is a common one for universalists. For example, David Bentley Hart who has an upcoming book on universalism, gave a recent lecture (which is available on YouTube) in which he raises the same Question that you have here to people who want to believe in an eternal hell. He thinks of it as a major objection to Hell. I tend to agree with him.
 
Last edited:
For exemple, porn stars usually do not think what they do is wrong.
Also, most young people seem to be ignorant that sex before marriage is wrong.

So… they wont go to hell because they think what they are doing is right?
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top