How can people "freely choose" Hell if they are *mistaken* on what their highest Good is?

[RealisticCatholic]

The will moves intrinsically, but only in the sense if the intellect presents something as good. The two go hand-in-hand.

Article 4 (excerpt) “he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion”.

The issue at hand is how does the person become “ill-disposed in respect of the end itself”? Besides ignorance and passion, I cannot gather how it is possible to choose a lesser good over a greater good.

In which case, it still seems — as I understand Aquinas — that someone is not truly free to choose a lesser good over God to the extent that he would be fully culpable for that action. And, ultimately, it seems absurd that anyone could go to hell in that case.

 

[RealisticCatholic]

But even here, I believe Aquinas would say that someone who turns a “blind eye and deaf ear on purpose” does so because the intellect presents this as good — or else the will wouldn’t be doing it “on purpose” at all.

So you just end up with a regress. When it comes down to it, there are two things we know from Aquinas: (1) EVERY human being is built for the good. People act based on what they perceive to be good. And/so (2) Every choice of a lesser good over a greater good — sin — must be due to improper decision making. For the will yields to what the intellect provides as the better option.

In other words, no one is going to choose a lesser good over a higher good if they perfectly knew, in that specific circumstance, that the lesser good were truly lesser. You might know this abstractly or “universally” as I believe Aquinas would say, as when one perceives faithfulness to God over an act of fornication. But in a specific circumstance, if one indeed commits fornication, it is because the intellect presents it as offering a better good.

 

[0Scarlett_nidiyilii]

, if one indeed commits fornication, it is because the intellect presents it as offering a better good.

LOL I doubt it’s the intellect perceiving it as the higher good

But I’m not sure you’re giving a correct interpretation of St Thomas Aquinas

 

[RealisticCatholic]

If it’s not passion full-thrust (which of course would reduce culpability, both in Aquinas and official Catholic teaching), then yes it must be the intellect. The will proceeds from what the intellect offers as good.

Again, if the intellect in a specific moment considered fornication bad in every respect, it wouldn’t even choose to do it!

But I’m not sure you’re giving a correct interpretation of St Thomas Aquinas

This could be the case. Thomas obviously believed in mortal sin and eternal hell. But based on what I know, I’m finding it hard myself to make all of this consistent from Aquinas’ own thought.

 

[Vico]

The will moves intrinsically, but only in the sense if the intellect presents something as good. The two go hand-in-hand.

Article 4 (excerpt) “he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion”.

I don’t understand what you mean by “not truly free to choose a lesser good over God to the extent that he would be fully culpable for that action”. Man has free will to choose the lesser good. Consider the Fall which was not a mortal sin of passion but of irascible appetite. It means a general good not a passion, as you may recall they had control of sensuous passions, they had on concupiscence having the preternatural gift of integrity.

For Adam, “his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power” referring to attaining to God’s likeness by his own power. And for Eve, “her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God’s will” and Eve “suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor” and also “the women believed in the serpent’s persuasive words”.
– S.T. II, II, Q163 A4

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3163.htm

 

[RealisticCatholic]

It’s worth noting that Aquinas does think the will can direct the intellect, as an efficient cause. However, he goes on to say that this can only be if the intellect perceives it good to do so. So for example, my will can direct my intellect to stop contemplating angry thoughts. But… This is only because the intellect also first perceives it as good to stop contemplating angry thoughts.

 

[RealisticCatholic]

I don’t understand what you mean by “not truly free to choose a lesser good over God to the extent that he would be fully culpable for that action”. Man has free will to choose the lesser good.

Man is free to choose the lesser good, but not while also knowing in that same moment that he is choosing the lesser good. He may know it “universally,” but if he also knew it “particularly,” in the specific circumstance, then he wouldn’t be choosing the lesser good.

In other words, sure, man is free to choose the lesser good. But only if, in a particular act, his intellect is presenting it to him as better. In which case, this is an erroneous judgment, and so it is hard to see how the act is free in the sense that the person would be fully responsible (culpable) for it.

 

[RealisticCatholic]

@Vico Maybe if I could specify the question better, let me quote Aquinas here:

Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more.

So Aquinas lists three causes of sin, based on internal human principles:

1. Intellect: by Ignorance
2. Sensitive Appetite: by Passion
3. Will: by “disorder of the will”

This is in the context of Aquinas’ discussion on whether some can sin through certain malice (Question 78 still).

I think to get to the point of what is troubling me: This third cause of sin, “disorder of the will,” when the will loves a lesser good over a higher good.

I want to ask Aquinas: But how is this possible? Based on what I know from Aquinas elsewhere, and perhaps even through common sense experience, it seems that the will can only love based on what the intellect or sensible appetite present to it as good. In other words, “disorder of the will” seems to collapse into one or both of the first causes of sin: Ignorance or passion.

In which case, it actually seems sinning purely by “certain malice” is impossible

Does that help clarify?

 

[0Scarlett_nidiyilii]

I won’t pretend to understand all the ins and outs of people’s decision making process, but the fact is that people can be taught right from wrong, from good and trustworthy sources and then rationalize their way to sinful decisions.
For an example, look at the doctors and nurses who participated in Hitlers final solution, or who assisted with immoral medical experiments.

What’s so scary is they weren’t beasts, with pitchforks and horns. They were regular folks, like you and me. And they chose to do things that reasonable people were appalled at.

Rationalizing evil, or even just because you think you can make a case for it, doesn’t take away your guilt. And if you went and systematically chipped away at the Christian value system you were taught, that in no way excuses you.

 

[RealisticCatholic]

I think something can be said here. But try fitting that into Thomas’ definitions.

Again, I’m Catholic, and so I accept the possibility of hell. But I also find Aquinas’ treatment sensible enough. And I’m just having trouble connecting the dots.

Utilizing Aquinas, I could respond to you and, once more say that is indeed a sin — to rationalize evil. For the will is choosing to wreck the intellect. But, I think on Aquinas’ view, he would still insist that it is never just the will acting alone: the intellect must first insist that something is good. So someone who rationalizes could be said to only do so because the intellect presents this (the act of rationalization) as good, in the first place.

So would rationalizing just be another case of an ignorant act? I mean, in Heaven we won’t be rationalizing because we will have the highest Good at our disposal. We won’t want a lesser good.

In our case, on Earth, it seems we only sin through ignorance then. (Or Passion, which affects the decision making process and so essentially causes ignorant choices).

 

[steve-b]

I think I’m beginning to agree with the Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart’s critique of hell, one in which I think Ed Feser fails to respond to in his post here.

Hart says:

[The] appeal to creaturely freedom and to God’s respect for its dignity… invariably fails. It might not do, if one could construct a metaphysics or phenomenology of the will’s liberty that was purely voluntarist, purely spontaneous; though, even then, one would have to explain how an absolutely libertarian act, obedient to no ultimate prior rationale whatsoever, would be distinguishable from sheer chance, or a mindless organic or mechanical impulse, and so any more “free” than an earthquake or embolism. But, on any cogent account, free will is a power inherently purposive, teleological, primordially oriented toward the good, and shaped by that transcendental appetite to the degree that a soul can recognize the good for what it is. No one can freely will the evil as evil; one can take the evil for the good. (p. 10)

Re: mortal sin,

What more can Paul say in the following instructions? He says in effect don’t commit these sins or else one won’t go to heaven, i.e. they go to hell. So the choice is there for one to make each and every time. If One chooses that sin mentioned, what are they also choosing??. Hell …correct?

Picking one sin as an example

Scripture says this about fornication (links are operational)

Ephesians 5:3-5 lists some deadly sins. Those that keep one from heaven. The first sin mentioned, Immorality in that passage, (the Greek word from the Greek study bible, is πορνεία = porneia = fornication, ) … 5 Be sure of this, that no fornicator πόρνος or impure man, or one who is covetous (that is, an idolater), has any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God.

We don’t live in a consequence free existence. Choices matter.

 

[RealisticCatholic]

OK, but going off my post you replied to, I would say: But does anyone actually commit Mortal Sin? That’s the issue that I’m bringing up with Aquinas, where I say it doesn’t seem that anyone can sin through malice alone.

It is always through disorder of intellect or sensible appetite — so through ignorance, or passion, or both.

In which case, fornication, for example, might be gravely wrong in the abstract. But sin is only ever due to factors that diminish both knowledge and free consent.

If possible, please go over the last few posts discussing Thomas in particular. This thread is not so much about Biblical language or even official church teaching as it is understanding Aquinas’ thought (which has influenced Catholic moral teaching).

 

[RealisticCatholic]

(Please Note: This uploaded content is no longer available.)

I think this part in bold may hold the key, except that I am having trouble with what it is saying.

 

[steve-b]

OK, but going off my post you replied to, I would say: But does anyone actually commit Mortal Sin? That’s the issue that I’m bringing up with Aquinas, where I say it doesn’t seem that anyone can sin through malice alone.

It is always through disorder of intellect or sensible appetite — so through ignorance, or passion, or both.

In which case, fornication, for example, might be gravely wrong in the abstract. But sin is only ever due to factors that diminish both knowledge and free consent.

If possible, please go over the last few posts discussing Thomas in particular. This thread is not so much about Biblical language or even official church teaching as it is understanding Aquinas’ thought (which has influenced Catholic moral teaching).

I saw where the following Questions from the Summa were linked to ( 8, 78, 163)

How about

Q: 88​

from the Summa http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2088.htm on mortal sin

 

[RealisticCatholic]

Reading Aquinas on angels and pride has helped somewhat. He acknowledges the angels couldn’t sin except by pride, and for similar reasons, neither could Adam. So that suggests there is something in pride that is not of itself caused by ignorance or passion.

 

[Latin]

…

In fact, God designed/ planned the original sin, predestined from all eternity and God caused their “fall” and they are freely chosen their “fall.”

Catholic Encyclopedia : Evil
“But we cannot say without denying the Divine omnipotence, that another equally perfect universe could not be created in which evil would have no place.”

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05649a.htm
.
310 But why did God not create a world so perfect that no evil could exist in it?
God freely willed to create a world in a state of journeying towards its ultimate perfection, 314 through the dramas of evil and sin .

For the benefit of the human race. At the point, God made the above decision: He had no other choice, He must create the dramas of evil and sin and this is what He created at His CAUSE of the “fall.”

.
THE MYSTERY OF PREDESTINATION by John Salza
Page 113: “God, however, willed to permit Adam to reject His grace and to sin.” – He ordered the events of the “fall.”

CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA Divine Providence explains;

“His wisdom He so orders all events within the universe that the end for which it was created may be realized.

He directs all, even evil and sin itself, to the final end for which the universe was created.”

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12510a.htm

.
The TECHNICALITY the way God step by step made the events happened at the “fall,” the way God step by step made the “fallen” man/ old creation, 2 Cor.5:17 referring back to.

2 Cor.5:17; Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation: The old has gone, the new is here!

.
The Scripture explains in great detail the way God makes from the “fallen” man/ old creation the new creation.

Ez.36:26-27; I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit in you; I will remove from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh.
And I will put my Spirit in you and cause you to follow my decrees and be careful to keep my laws.

From the above light, we have good information the way at the “fall” God step by step made/ created the “fallen” man/ old creation. – The reverse of Ez.36:26-27, etc.

At the “fall,” God removed the heart of flesh and put a heart of stone instead.
.
God made the “fallen” man/ old creation carnally minded, God also made him unable to subject to His law, (Rom.8:6-7).
.
God hardwired/ infused the “fallen” man/ old creation with the law of sin/ God enslaved man to sin, to all manner of evil desire, pride, the inclinations for all kinds of sins, (Rom.7:8-23). etc.

At the events described above, at the “fall” God created the dramas of evil and sin.
.
324 Faith gives us the certainty that God would not permit an evil if he did not cause a good to come from that very evil, by ways that we shall fully know only in eternal life.
.
God bless

 

[Vico]

I don’t understand what you mean by “not truly free to choose a lesser good over God to the extent that he would be fully culpable for that action”. Man has free will to choose the lesser good.

St. Thomas used the term electio rather than libera voluntas. With the potentialities in the intellect and the determination of the choice (the electio) in the will. Intellect (the cognitive power) ascertains if an achievement is useful for the circumstances and the ability and means of achievement. The will (the appetitive power) directs the intellect to provide competing goods and makes the choice for the final good – choice itself is a judgment – in the will. In De Malo St. Thomas denies that the will is necessitated for that would deny moral responsibility. (And see S.T. I, Q83 http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm)

 

[Vico]

… “disorder of the will” seems to collapse into one or both of the first causes of sin: Ignorance or passion. …

Note that appetites may be competing such as for example .
Iracible appetite (asceticism) examples: hope, despair, anger, courage, fear.
Concupiscible Appetite (concrete goals) examples: love, joy, desire, hatred, sadness, aversion.

S.T. I, Q81, A2. “sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles”

The wounds are:

• ignorance: “the reason is deprived of its order to the true”,
• malice: “the will is deprived of its order of good”,
• weakness: “the irascible [appetite] is deprived of its order to the arduous”,
• concupiesence: “the concupiscible [appetite] is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason”.

Summa Theologiae > First Part of the Second Part > Question 85

I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (I-II:81:2; so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.

Again, there are four of the soul’s powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above (I-II:61:2), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent’s sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (I-II:1:2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.

Reply to Objection 5. The “difficulty” which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz. “malice,” “weakness” and “concupiscence,” for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. “Error” and “vexation” are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2085.htm

 

[Vico]

OK, but going off my post you replied to, I would say: But does anyone actually commit Mortal Sin? That’s the issue that I’m bringing up with Aquinas, where I say it doesn’t seem that anyone can sin through malice alone.

It is always through disorder of intellect or sensible appetite — so through ignorance, or passion, or both.

In which case, fornication, for example, might be gravely wrong in the abstract. But sin is only ever due to factors that diminish both knowledge and free consent.

If possible, please go over the last few posts discussing Thomas in particular. This thread is not so much about Biblical language or even official church teaching as it is understanding Aquinas’ thought (which has influenced Catholic moral teaching).

Regarding sin committed through passion: “wherefore if it [the deliberating reason] does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin;”.

Summa Theologiae I, II, Q77, A8 Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?

I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above (I-II:72:5), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed through passion.

 

[RealisticCatholic]

@Vico I’m unsure as to what any of those selections are supposed to be responding to.

For example when you list these:

The wounds are:

ignorance: “the reason is deprived of its order to the true”,
malice: “the will is deprived of its order of good”,
weakness: “the irascible [appetite] is deprived of its order to the arduous”,
concupiesence: “the concupiscible [appetite] is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason”.

I think I understand these already. But sin always seems to fall back to the intellect for Aquinas, because the intellect must present something as good before the will concedes to it.

Hence the reason I say any sin is a kind of ignorance, if it is the intellect that in fact leads the will to sin.