To me, this places the will as dominant over the (superior angelic) intellect, in the purely spiritual beings, the angels become demons. Fundamentally, Aquinas places intellect over will, Duns Scotus, will over intellect:Isa 14:12 "How you are fallen from heaven, O Day Star, son of Dawn! How you are cut down to the ground, you who laid the nations low!
Isa 14:13 You said in your heart, ‘I will ascend to heaven; above the stars of God I will set my throne on high; I will sit on the mount of assembly in the far north;
Isa 14:14 I will ascend above the heights of the clouds, I will make myself like the Most High.’
Isa 14:15 But you are brought down to Sheol, to the depths of the Pit.
(the above lifted from HERE)IN THE MATTER OF PRIMACY of the will or intellect, there is a huge divide between the Thomists and Scotists. St. Thomas, who advocates what is generally characterized as the “Dominican” or “intellectualist” position, puts the intellect ahead of the will, whereas Blessed Duns Scotus, who may be represents what may be called the “voluntarist,” “Augustinian” or “Franciscan” position, teaches the primacy of the will. A good, succinct summary of this dispute may be obtained by referring to Alexander Broadie’s Gifford Lectures, The Shadow of Scotus:*
Voluntarists and intellectualists are in dispute with each other on a wide range of matters, with voluntarists emphasising the role of will and of our freedom in our relations with the world, in contradistinction to the intellectualists who emphasise the role of intellect and of our theoretical knowledge. The dispute is clearly articulated in the diverse responses to the question whether it is will or intellect that has primacy. Voluntarists say will has primacy and intellectualists ascribe primacy to intellect.
I sure hope they don’t…but only God can make that call. I feel like some want “sexual sinners”, even those who are ignorant of divine law, to burn for all eternity because “well I suffered during my single years of purity, and they got to enjoy themselves, so time for them to burn!”.So… they wont go to hell because they think what they are doing is right?
If I had to boil it down…maybe you are making a false assumption here.Someone only goes to hell by free choice.
However, especially with the Thomistic Catholic theory of human action, people act – even commit sin – based on a perceived good.
So someone who goes to hell is still choosing what they perceive to be their highest good.
There is an objective truth, since one choice is the good choice the other is evil. Sometimes a choice is made through extrinsic factors (such as passion) however is may also be made from intrinsic factor.
Summa Theologiae > First Part of the Second Part > Question 78. That cause of sin which is malice > Article 1. Whether anyone sins through certain malice
I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
Summa Theologiae > First Part of the Second Part > Question 78. That cause of sin which is malice > Article 4. Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?
Reply to Objection 3. It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (Articles 2 and 3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin “through” choosing.
Uh. No.However, I would ask, to those who believe in eternal hell, if people freely choose it and it is just, why shouldn’t people go there? Why should we feel sad for them? If Hell is just and free, than it must be a good thing. We should feel happy when we think of the fate of the damned. Since each person who commits mortal sin deserves Hell, than it is unclear why we should be care for their salvation. They deserve Hell, let them go there. Since God plans to send people who reject Catholicism to Hell (or as some would say they choose ) why try to save them either?
" 1033 We cannot be united with God unless we freely choose to love him. But we cannot love God if we sin gravely against him, against our neighbor or against ourselves: "He who does not love remains in death. Anyone who hates his brother is a murderer, and you know that no murderer has eternal life abiding in him.“610 Our Lord warns us that we shall be separated from him if we fail to meet the serious needs of the poor and the little ones who are his brethren.611 To die in mortal sin without repenting and accepting God’s merciful love means remaining separated from him for ever by our own free choice. This state of definitive self-exclusion from communion with God and the blessed is called “hell.””
" 1035 The teaching of the Church affirms the existence of hell and its eternity. Immediately after death the souls of those who die in a state of mortal sin descend into hell, where they suffer the punishments of hell, "eternal fire.“615 The chief punishment of hell is eternal separation from God, in whom alone man can possess the life and happiness for which he was created and for which he longs.”
This makes no sense. Shall I reduce your position as denying the existence of prison? I could just as easily say that people who don’t believe in a eternal Hell (or Hell at all) reject it because it doesn’t sound nice.Who here would stand in the way of the just punishment of a criminal accused of homicide?
But I think the issue here @goout is that it doesn’t seem to make sense that someone would indeed choose a lesser good over a higher good, unless their decision making was indeed faulty. And so this second option seems to collapse into your first one — that someone does not, actually, perceive the highest good correctly.one might perceive the highest good correctly and still choose a lesser good. We all do this, all the time. St Paul expresses this continual failure to do what we ought .
I think the issue for me is precisely WHY would someone prefer a temporal good (“riches or pleasure”) in preference to the “Divine law” (or to God, man’s ultimate end)?Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good.
[The] appeal to creaturely freedom and to God’s respect for its dignity… invariably fails. It might not do, if one could construct a metaphysics or phenomenology of the will’s liberty that was purely voluntarist, purely spontaneous; though, even then, one would have to explain how an absolutely libertarian act, obedient to no ultimate prior rationale whatsoever, would be distinguishable from sheer chance, or a mindless organic or mechanical impulse, and so any more “free” than an earthquake or embolism. But, on any cogent account, free will is a power inherently purposive, teleological, primordially oriented toward the good, and shaped by that transcendental appetite to the degree that a soul can recognize the good for what it is. No one can freely will the evil as evil; one can take the evil for the good. (p. 10)
So according to Hart, it doesn’t make sense to say anyone chooses hell because no one makes an absolutely pure choice — because we actually ordered to the good, like Aquinas says. So even on Aquinas’ own account of human action, hell seems to be nonsensical.and the argument becomes quite insufferable when one considers the personal conditions – ignorance, mortality, defectibility of intellect and will – under which each soul enters the world, and the circumstances – the suffering of all creatures, even the most innocent and delightful of them – with which that world confronts the soul . (p. 10)
I’m a committed follower of Christ. I want nothing more than to conform my will to his. I know that is the highest good. I perceive it in my life, it is ingrained in me.one might perceive the highest good correctly and still choose a lesser good. We all do this, all the time. St Paul expresses this continual failure to do what we ought .
And I still make bad choices, inflamed by my various members (as we translate Paul) I do not choose the good I know I should do.
In the gap between God’s will and our will, with our incomplete knowledge and sometimes faulty reason, we live a life of chosen responsibility.
@vico thanks for quoting Aquinas. This is one of the sections I keep coming back to in his Summa. Now when Aquinas says:
Not that sin it is presented as good, but it actually has some natural good that the will chooses. The intellect and will are soul faculties. The will is the faculty that chooses, and sometimes is moved to evil intrinsically, that is, of its own accord, not impelled extrinsically, such as when a sin is committed through passion. (See Article 4 of Question 78).Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good.
St. Thomas did address that in the same Question 78:
- Article 1(excerpt) “the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good.”
- Article 1, Reply to Objection 2. (excerpt) “Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good, … but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God’s anger, to being deprived of the pleasure.”
- Article 3, Reply to Objection 3. (excerpt) “That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect without the evil of fault.”
- Article 4 (excerpt) “he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion”.