How could a human individual not be a human person?

[Ghosty1981]

Since a soul in cases of things that self-move is inferred, no one can prove that the soul is of one kind or another in the absence of additional evidence of sentience (animal) or reason (human). In the absence of proof of human life are we allowed to act as if there is no human life? Can we infer death just as we infer life? If we may then ought we to exercise extreme care before acting in a way that ends a life? Kreeft, the ethicist, asks, “Does the hunter who is uncertain whether the object in the bushes is a deer or a man have the right to shoot?”

I mostly agree with you completely here. If I have any disagreement it comes from my belief that we can infer the presence of a rational soul in the case of sensitive action on the part of a human body. We can’t be certain of the presence of a rational soul unless the individual demonstrates reason, and even then our ability to assess the presence of real reasoning is limited, but if the animal is known to be human and the animal demonstrates sensitivity to the outside world then we can infer a rational soul is present because we know that the rational soul is proper to the human animal, and that the rational soul requires sensation for its proper activity. If a human body has sensation, then I don’t see how we can conclude that there is not a rational soul present, because sensation is the only bodily activity required for the function of a rational soul, all unique activity being immaterial.

Sensation, in this case, can’t be limited to the traditional senses of touch, taste, smell, sight, and sound, because we now understand that sensation takes a myriad of forms, including forms not possessed by humans, and that it fundamentally means that the organism in question experiences the outside world and reacts to it actively and adaptively. Aristotle realized this when he said that touch is the most fundamental of the senses. All living cells, including those of plants (sorry, Aristotle), have a sense of touch and react to their environments, so all cells can be said to be “animal” in the classic definition. We also know that no cells except human cells are associated with rational thought; human cells aren’t obviously rational per se, but we don’t know of any rational, animal life except that of human. Since we know that living human cells are sensitive, and that sensitive human cells are the proper matter for rational life, we can infer that sensitive human cells are animated by a rational soul. After all, we don’t demand demonstration of rational thought from a sleeping man to determine whether or not he is animated by a rational soul, so we can’t demand rational thought of any human organism. This goes beyond your example of the hunter shooting at the bush, because in this case the bush looks like a man and has the shape of a man; while we should assume that a moving bush might hide a man for the sake of safety, we can only assume that something that looks like a man and acts like a man is a man until proven otherwise.

continued…

 

[Ghosty1981]

I think the church teaches in the case of the beginnings of human life that science’s tentative (as are all scientific) conclusions never justify taking that life. But in the case of the end of human life the church allows medical science greater latitude. My understanding is that the teaching remains that death occurs when the soul departs. While the church does not allow science to apply its findings to determine the beginning of life as ever subsequent to conception, she does allow science to determine the end of life prior to the absence of the normal palpable signs of life.

This is where I start to wonder myself about the practical definition of the end of life. A clump of tissue that still has vital action is alive, but is the entity that it belonged to alive? After all, we aren’t ultimately concerned about the sensitive functions of the cells of a human body, but of the active bodily life of the human person. I believe that the answer is that the person is still alive, and also that they can be ethically treated as dead in the absence of any ability to resuscitate them. When a body ceases to work towards the life of the organism, the organism has become disordered, and unless an intervention is made to reverse this disorder then the organism is dissolving. We can look at this dissolution as the soul and the body parting from eachother, or as the organs coming apart and ceasing to function together. In the case of the soul and the body parting we have true death, as the matter loses all vital signs. In the cases of the organs ceasing to function together we have disease, in some cases fatal and in some cases reversible. In cases where the disease is fatal we have no means yet to reverse the course of total dissolution of the body and soul, but we may develop better medical techniques in the course of time. In reversible cases we have tissues ceasing to function together, but the tissues can be returned to their normal function through interventions. The clearest example of this is when a heart is shocked and medicated back into a rhythmic beat after cardiac arrest. We used to use the term “cardiac death” because when a heart ceased to beat we could not reverse the dissolution of the person, but now we tend to rely on neurological death because we haven’t yet found a way to reverse the dissolution of the person after the death of the whole brain. This may change as medicine advances.

continued…

 

[Ghosty1981]

With regards to ethics I believe we can safely say that when the dissolution of the human person is irreversible, except through extraordinary means, the person in question can rightly will their body towards the life and well-being of another. This isn’t a wish for death, but rather a wish for the life of another. The organs removed from the body are still animated by the same soul that animated them when they were obviously part of the original body, but these organs are “diseased” in that they no longer work towards the health of the whole organism.

This is where we get into the subject of the organism, or the “whole person”, in the case of organ transplants. Is the transplanted heart alive by the act of the donor’s soul, or the recipient’s soul? This is a question I’m interested in exploring, as I think it might help us clear up some of our earlier difficulties.

 

[Benadam]

his is where I start to wonder myself about the practical definition of the end of life. A clump of tissue that still has vital action is alive, but is the entity that it belonged to alive? After all, we aren’t ultimately concerned about the sensitive functions of the cells of a human body, but of the active bodily life of the human person. I believe that the answer is that the person is still alive,

The Body gives the soul location. Without the body the soul is no longer located in a place. Is the soul located in the tissue that is still alive or is it located in the body as a whole because the lump of tissue is alive? I think if that is determined the question below is answered?

This is where we get into the subject of the organism, or the “whole person”, in the case of organ transplants. Is the transplanted heart alive by the act of the donor’s soul, or the recipient’s soul?

If the lump of living tissue that is part of a body that is no longer living is the location of the soul then I would think that the recipient’s body is the location of two souls. The donor’s soul would be located in the heart with only the sensitive powers of the heart informing it’s intellect.

 

[o_mlly]

Assuming that there is such a thing as “inertia of the soul” that is distinct from the action of the soul, which I’m not granting, how do we distinguish between the inertia of the soul and the continuing action of the soul? I argue that the soul continues to act in any body that is still living, because inertia is a kind of action of a certain form. Vital actions in the body are actions of the soul, and are signs that the soul is still informing the body. A ball that loses its form and becomes a block does not roll, even by inertia, because it has lost the rolling form. A body that has lost the soul does not live, even by inertia, because it has lost the living form.

I see your point. I poorly worded the phrase “inertia of the soul.” The better phrase would be the “inertia in the matter (caused by the now departed soul).” I assign the inertia to the observable matter, not the form, as in “a body in motion tends to …”.

 

[o_mlly]

In short, I would say that this is all evidence of the process of dissolution of the organism, but not evidence of actual death per se. The reason that I am not willing to say that this is evidence of actual death per se is that vital action continues in the body on an organized level, tissues cooperating with tissues, and not merely on the level of individual cells, and even if the cells continued living we would still have evidence of life. A dissolving organism is not yet dissolved, and the process can be reversed. We see this every time a heart stops beating and a the person is resuscitated. They were “dead” in that their vital organs ceased working together, and some ceased working altogether, and yet the same person wakes up and goes on living. I’ll assume we can all agree that the same soul animates a person after cardiac arrest as before, so I won’t argue that point here.

I offered the distinction of rhythmic and arhythmic beats to distinguish between organized and disorganized movements. The former necessarily the product (but not necessarily the presence) of an organizing principle and the latter its absence. To maintain the point, substitute “uncoordinated movement” as the special kind o arhythmic beat I intended to make the point.

If a beating heart is “not evidence of actual death per se” then I think the heart-in-the-box should never have been harvested. We are certain that a human soul was present in the donor prior to some disease or traumatic event. The donor is in crisis but we know that the body responds to crises and often stabilizes itself in due course. Our donor is on life support equipment. We cannot know that the vital functions would end without the intervention of the life support machinery. As long as palpable unaided signs of life are present – beating heart, respiration, body heat – then how can we with moral certitude call that person dead? Ought we not first pull the plugs and observe? If we cannot infer the absence of a human soul then how could we make the even riskier inference that of the cause of the animation we observe is evidence of the presence of a non-human soul?

 

[o_mlly]

We used to use the term “cardiac death” because when a heart ceased to beat we could not reverse the dissolution of the person, but now we tend to rely on neurological death because we haven’t yet found a way to reverse the dissolution of the person after the death of the whole brain.

I do not think you mean to write that those persons impaired by a disease or condition for which medical science has no cure or remedy may be called dead. The invention of the “brain dead” protocol as evidence of death relies on the truth of the claim that lack of evidence of brain function is certain evidence of death. The experience of TK, diagnosed brain dead at 4 years of age, shows otherwise. A philosophical assessment of TK's autopsy report: Implications for the debate over the brain death criteria

TK contracted meningitis at 4 years of age but his mother in her basement with a ventilator and feeding tubes sustained TK to age 24. TK autopsy revealed the “brain dead” diagnosis was quite accurate (inside his head only clotted material with no brain like structures). But in the intervening 20 years, TK grew uniformly, maintained his blood pressure (homeostasis) and fought off infections – all signs of the presence of an organizing principle. TK was surely a person from birth to his natural death.

 

[Ghosty1981]

TK contracted meningitis at 4 years of age but his mother in her basement with a ventilator and feeding tubes sustained TK to age 24. TK autopsy revealed the “brain dead” diagnosis was quite accurate (inside his head only clotted material with no brain like structures). But in the intervening 20 years, TK grew uniformly, maintained his blood pressure (homeostasis) and fought off infections – all signs of the presence of an organizing principle. TK was surely a person from birth to his natural death.

In the absence of brain-stem activity the body certainly will die if the ventilator is removed. There is no need to pull the tube and see what happens, because the necessary neural structures for maintaining the breathing are gone. I agree that this person is alive, and that “brain dead” is merely a convenient term used to mark the point at which no interventions can reverse the dying process. In the past we confidently used “cardiac death”, but we can now routinely revive people when their hearts stop. One day we may reach the point that we can do the same for “brain death”, and our moral obligations to such people will obviously change.

If a beating heart is “not evidence of actual death per se” then I think the heart-in-the-box should never have been harvested. We are certain that a human soul was present in the donor prior to some disease or traumatic event. The donor is in crisis but we know that the body responds to crises and often stabilizes itself in due course. Our donor is on life support equipment. We cannot know that the vital functions would end without the intervention of the life support machinery.

In the case of organ donation the person must be brain dead, at least in the U.S. In these cases the body will not survive without extraordinary intervention; a “brain dead” person will not stabilize without a ventilator, and their respiration has ceased. Lungs are permeable to gases, so as long as the ventilator continues pumping air in and out of the lungs the body will absorb oxygen and expel CO2. The actual vital activity of moving air into and out of the lungs spontaneously has ended in a brain dead person, and at our current level of medicine such a person will never recover.

I agree with you that the person is alive in the absolute sense, but I believe that they fall under the moral category where “Discontinuing medical procedures that are burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be legitimate; it is the refusal of “over-zealous” treatment. Here one does not will to cause death; one’s inability to impede it is merely accepted.” (Catechism, paragraph 2278). I believe that their death can be delayed, and certain life functions will continue with extraordinary aid, but the dissolution of the human organism is currently irreversible in these cases, even if the total dissolution of absolute death hasn’t occurred just yet.

 

[JimG]

I agree with you that the person is alive in the absolute sense, but I believe that they fall under the moral category where “Discontinuing medical procedures that are burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be legitimate; it is the refusal of “over-zealous” treatment. Here one does not will to cause death; one’s inability to impede it is merely accepted.” (Catechism, paragraph 2278). I believe that their death can be delayed, and certain life functions will continue with extraordinary aid, but the dissolution of the human organism is currently irreversible in these cases, even if the total dissolution of absolute death hasn’t occurred just yet.

I confess that I do not trust the medical profession to reliably identify “brain death.” I understand that some patients have been disconnected from a respirator, and subsequently recovered. But disconnecting the respirator is a good test. If breathing stops and heartbeat stops, the patient is dying.

Discontinuing a medical procedure may indeed be an instance of extraordinary treatment which can be licitly done. Extraordinary treatment is not required.

But cutting a beating heart out of a still living patient is indeed extraordinary, and always lethal.

 

[Ghosty1981]

I confess that I do not trust the medical profession to reliably identify “brain death.” I understand that some patients have been disconnected from a respirator, and subsequently recovered. But disconnecting the respirator is a good test. If breathing stops and heartbeat stops, the patient is dying.

I think your skepticism in this area is healthy. Even those working in the medical field are taught to reevaluate our assumptions and look carefully at the evidence. Medical professionals are just as capable of letting bias and utilitarian thinking cloud our judgement. It’s also worth remembering that the ethical standards of the medical community do not completely line up with Catholic teaching.

Discontinuing a medical procedure may indeed be an instance of extraordinary treatment which can be licitly done. Extraordinary treatment is not required.

But cutting a beating heart out of a still living patient is indeed extraordinary, and always lethal.

Yet the Catholic Church stands in favor of organ donation in these circumstances, and has generally accepted the medical definition of “brain death” as it once accepted the definition of “cardiac death”. I’m not saying that this can’t change, and I’m not even absolutely certain that it is morally correct, but I believe I understand the reasoning and I can accept it with moral certainty. As always, however, I must keep my conscience informed and let it guide me in decision making.

I bring things like the heart-in-a-box up because they represent very real medical advances that tread into the philosophical territory we’re exploring. I definitely don’t have any firm answers on the matter, and it continues to be an area of exploration and reflection for me.

 

[o_mlly]

In the case of organ donation the person must be brain dead, at least in the U.S. In these cases the body will not survive without extraordinary intervention; a “brain dead” person will not stabilize without a ventilator, and their respiration has ceased.

Lungs are permeable to gases, so as long as the ventilator continues pumping air in and out of the lungs the body will absorb oxygen and expel CO2. The actual vital activity of moving air into and out of the lungs spontaneously has ended in a brain dead person, and at our current level of medicine such a person will never recover.

I understand the current legal requirements. And our health care workers are to be praised, not criticized, for acting in conformance with the law. The issue is whether or not the law is moral.

The demand for organs created the impulse to change the criteria for the pronouncement of death and the introduction of the “dead donor rule.” It is not the health care worker but the law which I think needs criticism.

First, examine the “will not survive” determination. This finding, sometimes called the “irreversible” determination, is not empirical but evaluative. Irreversibility of any kind is a property about which we can learn only by inference from prior experience. It is not an observable condition.

Next, examine the statement a “person will not stabilize without a ventilator, and their respiration has ceased.” I submit the person’s respiration has not ceased. The ventilator merely introduces oxygen. Respiration is the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide, and the machine does not do that, the patient does. This vital faculty (augmentation) is, in fact, evidence of the presence of the patient’s soul.

 

[o_mlly]

I agree with you that the person is alive in the absolute sense, but I believe that they fall under the moral category where “Discontinuing medical procedures that are burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be legitimate; it is the refusal of “over-zealous” treatment. Here one does not will to cause death; one’s inability to impede it is merely accepted.” (Catechism, paragraph 2278). I believe that their death can be delayed, and certain life functions will continue with extraordinary aid, but the dissolution of the human organism is currently irreversible in these cases, even if the total dissolution of absolute death hasn’t occurred just yet.

I do not fully understand the qualification of alive vs. absolutely alive and dead vs. absolutely dead. I believe one is either dead or alive. Introducing a grey area of “absoluteness” I think only serves to cloud what is clear.

Evidence of a vital faculty is evidence of the soul. The teaching that one may cease extraordinary measures to support life is certainly true but that is not the case under question. In the actions that follow a “brain dead” patient prior to harvesting organs, extraordinary measures are taken to support the patient’s life. Think about the phrase “life support.” The predicate is that the patient is alive.

The papal allocutions of Pius XII and St. JP II confirm that death is the separation of body and soul and the degree of knowing remain that of moral certitude. The church yields to the medical community the material determinations necessary to arrive at that moral certitude.

No one organ, i.e. the brain, is the organizing principle of the human being. The medical community has configured tests to determine the presence or absence of brain activity. But is it sufficient to the level of moral certainty to call a person dead who only lacks brain activity? Brain death determines that the immaterial faculties (intellective) are not evidenced. But if the other material vital faculties of the soul (nutritive, augmentative, appetitive) are evidenced then the person is alive as these faculties, just as the intellective faculties, cannot operate without the presence of the soul.

 

[Ghosty1981]

First, examine the “will not survive” determination. This finding, sometimes called the “irreversible” determination, is not empirical but evaluative. Irreversibility of any kind is a property about which we can learn only by inference from prior experience. It is not an observable condition.

I would add that “will not survive” is dependent on outside factors as well, and changes depending on the resources available. Like the viability of a fetus it is not an inherent property of the subject.

Next, examine the statement a “person will not stabilize without a ventilator, and their respiration has ceased.” I submit the person’s respiration has not ceased. The ventilator merely introduces oxygen. Respiration is the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide, and the machine does not do that, the patient does. This vital faculty (augmentation) is, in fact, evidence of the presence of the patient’s soul.

I actually disagree with you here. What you’re describing is the passage of oxygen and carbon dioxide through the tissue of the lungs, and this is a passive process involving simple diffusion of gas molecules. In short, oxygen travels from where it is more concentrated to where it is less concentrated, and carbon dioxide does the same. No vital activity is involved in this process. In physiological respiration the vital activity is in the muscles drawing the air into the lungs, but after that it is simple, passive chemistry.

I do not fully understand the qualification of alive vs. absolutely alive and dead vs. absolutely dead. I believe one is either dead or alive. Introducing a grey area of “absoluteness” I think only serves to cloud what is clear.

By absolute death I’m referring to the cessation of all life functions, and this is indeed distinct from clinical definitions of death such as cardiac and neurologic death. The Church has accepted this distinction, even if it hasn’t used this terminology.

continued…

 

[Ghosty1981]

Evidence of a vital faculty is evidence of the soul. The teaching that one may cease extraordinary measures to support life is certainly true but that is not the case under question. In the actions that follow a “brain dead” patient prior to harvesting organs, extraordinary measures are taken to support the patient’s life. Think about the phrase “life support.” The predicate is that the patient is alive.

We are not required to keep such a person alive, that is the point. We are also not supposed to intentionally cause their death. We are permitted, however, to supply treatments that are known or believed to hasten death if the death is not the goal of said treatments. The question is whether or not the removal of organs necessary to save the life of another is morally warranted in such circumstances where the donor’s soul is present but the person is (according to all available medical knowledge and technical skill) irreversibly dying. I personally believe that removing the organs of a willing donor is morally warranted in such cases, but I admit that I haven’t put the fullest thought into the subject; I am also an organ donor and would will my organs to go to someone else if I am “brain dead”. I’m curious about what others think is warranted in such circumstances.

No one organ, i.e. the brain, is the organizing principle of the human being. The medical community has configured tests to determine the presence or absence of brain activity. But is it sufficient to the level of moral certainty to call a person dead who only lacks brain activity? Brain death determines that the immaterial faculties (intellective) are not evidenced. But if the other material vital faculties of the soul (nutritive, augmentative, appetitive) are evidenced then the person is alive as these faculties, just as the intellective faculties, cannot operate without the presence of the soul.

I agree. I think it’s absurd to say that the soul is gone while vital activities remain; this seems a contradiction in terms to me. Perhaps we could come up with new definitions of soul, body, and person, but this begins to tread into Christology as well as moral theology. On the other hand I’m struck by the fact that the Church does not require us to continue medically treating those who are irreversibly dying, and by medical treatment I’m referring to treatment to cure the disease, not palliative care to treat the symptoms. We can even knowingly hasten the death of such an individual through palliative treatments if the hastening death is not the intention. Does life saving treatment for another fall under a similar allowance in the case of the dying?

 

[Reajoyk]

One in the same. Ha. You know it and I know it. Just a way for the devil to confuse and continue the murders, legally, of course. Life is life, the human soul is there at the beginning, where you and I can’t see. Just like love, life is life, love is love and you can’t stop it. Ha. Some will die trying though. Pray for them…Just like Jesus. What’s done is done. “It is finished.” “Forgive them Father, for they know not what they do.” You and I both know they wouldn’t do it if they knew.

 

[o_mlly]

No vital activity is involved in this process. In physiological respiration the vital activity is in the muscles drawing the air into the lungs, but after that it is simple, passive chemistry.

I understand cellular respiration is a series of metabolic processes which all living cells use to produce energy in the form of adenosine triphosphate. As such, respiration is evidence of life and, therefore, the soul.

By absolute death I’m referring to the cessation of all life functions, and this is indeed distinct from clinical definitions of death such as cardiac and neurologic death. The Church has accepted this distinction, even if it hasn’t used this terminology.

I do not believe the Church has changed her teaching regarding the definition of death or has added adjectives such as “clinical” or “absolute” as distinctions. The teaching is simply that the donor must certainly be dead. The Church allows scientists to determine the material signs indicative of that death. On the issue of “brain dead” I believe St. JPII wrote in his allocution that that method “seemed” satisfactory but did not endorse it definitively.

The question is whether or not the removal of organs necessary to save the life of another is morally warranted in such circumstances where the donor’s soul is present but the person is (according to all available medical knowledge and skill) irreversibly dying.

The question is whether or not the removal of organs necessary to save the life of another is morally warranted in such circumstances where the donor’s soul is present but the person is (according to all available medical knowledge and technical skill) irreversibly dying.

If the donor’s soul is present then the Church teaches that the donor’s organs may not be taken as the harvesting act itself is the killing act. One may not do evil that good may come of it.

 

[Ghosty1981]

I understand cellular respiration is a series of metabolic processes which all living cells use to produce energy in the form of adenosine triphosphate. As such, respiration is evidence of life and, therefore, the soul.

Cellular respiration is a different process from physiological respiration. Physiological respiration, or breathing, is what is used determine brain death. Cellular respiration continues after brain death, and it is indicative of life, but it is not used in the clinical definition of brain death; cellular respiration continues long after brain death, as in the case of bodies kept on ventilators.

I do not believe the Church has changed her teaching regarding the definition of death or has added adjectives such as “clinical” or “absolute” as distinctions. The teaching is simply that the donor must certainly be dead. The Church allows scientists to determine the material signs indicative of that death. On the issue of “brain dead” I believe St. JPII wrote in his allocution that that method “seemed” satisfactory but did not endorse it definitively.

This is why a distinction must be made between absolute death, namely the cessation of all life, and clinical death, which is determined by certain diagnostic criteria such as the absence of brain activity. Life on a tissue-level continues after clinical death, and if it didn’t we wouldn’t even be talking about things like heart donation. A heart that is dead on the cellular level can’t be transplanted. The Church accepts the practice of transplanting living organs, and therefore implicitly accepts the distinction between absolute death (cessation of all life activity) and clinical death.

If the donor’s soul is present then the Church teaches that the donor’s organs may not be taken as the harvesting act itself is the killing act. One may not do evil that good may come of it.

If a donor’s soul is truly required to keep tissue alive then the Church does not agree with you. All organs are alive when harvested, otherwise they would be useless. Either they are alive by virtue of a material soul, as some have argued (I don’t agree with this view personally, but I’m not absolutely certain on the matter), or they are alive by virtue of the rational soul of the donor. Regardless, the Church certainly allows for the harvesting of living organs.

The teaching that living organs may be harvested isn’t infallible, at least so far as I know and understand, but it is what the Church currently proposes.

 

[o_mlly]

If a donor’s soul is truly required to keep tissue alive then the Church does not agree with you. All organs are alive when harvested, otherwise they would be useless. Either they are alive by virtue of a material soul, as some have argued (I don’t agree with this view personally, but I’m not absolutely certain on the matter), or they are alive by virtue of the rational soul of the donor. Regardless, the Church certainly allows for the harvesting of living organs.

The teaching that living organs may be harvested isn’t infallible, at least so far as I know and understand, but it is what the Church currently proposes.

I do not agree with your understanding of Church teaching. In his Address to International Congress on Transplants, Pope JPII said the Church does not determine the material signs of death:

With regard to the parameters used today for ascertaining death – whether the “encephalic” signs or the more traditional cardio-respiratory signs – the Church does not make technical decisions.

However, the donor of vital organs must be dead and whatever means are used to determine death must be of a moral certainty. I assert that brain death does not reach the required level of moral certainty.

The teaching that living organs may be transplanted is limited to twinned or non-vital organs in which the procedure does not kill the donor. If the science has not developed the technique to take organs from dead donors for transplant then to do so is morally unacceptable as shown below.

CCC#2296 “Organ transplants are in conformity with the moral law if the physical and psychological dangers and risks to the donor are proportionate to the good sought for the recipient. Organ donation after death is a noble and meritorious act … Moreover, it is not morally admissible to bring about the disabling mutilation or death of a human being, even in order to delay the death of other persons” (emphases mine).

 

[JimG]

However, the donor of vital organs must be dead and whatever means are used to determine death must be of a moral certainty. I assert that brain death does not reach the required level of moral certainty.

I think that moral theologians are going to have to re-examine this matter closely. The Catechism says that organ donation after death is a noble and meritorious act. But then it apparently simply accepts implicitly the medical definition of “brain death” as actual death.

In fact “brain death” donors are not dead. If vital organs are removed on the basis of “brain death,” then it is the organ donation that is the cause of death.

I wonder if potential organ donors who have given consent to organ donation have been fully informed that the organs will actually be harvested before they are dead.

 

[Ghosty1981]

However, the donor of vital organs must be dead and whatever means are used to determine death must be of a moral certainty. I assert that brain death does not reach the required level of moral certainty.

Pope John Paul II stated otherwise, however, in the very speech you referred to:

Here it can be said that the criterion adopted in more recent times for ascertaining the fact of death, namely the complete and irreversible cessation of all brain activity, if rigorously applied, does not seem to conflict with the essential elements of a sound anthropology. Therefore a health-worker professionally responsible for ascertaining death can use these criteria in each individual case as the basis for arriving at that degree of assurance in ethical judgement which moral teaching describes as “moral certainty”. This moral certainty is considered the necessary and sufficient basis for an ethically correct course of action. Only where such certainty exists, and where informed consent has already been given by the donor or the donor’s legitimate representatives, is it morally right to initiate the technical procedures required for the removal of organs for transplant.

Now this isn’t some kind of dogmatic proclamation, and it may indeed be incorrect, but it remains the most explicit articulation of Church teaching on the matter.