Unfortunately, you have no epistemological warrant to establish what constitutes inscrutable evil and unjustified evil. That was purpose of my rhetorical questions. Further, your argument doesn’t necessarily establish inscrutable evil is evidence for atheism. It could be construed as evidence for other positions. The syllogism you propose appears to be tautological. Additionally, a hypothesis is not a proof or even evidence. Without an epistemological basis for various evils, your argument is simply a declaration rather than evidence.
You’ve established observations of inscrutable evil from an anthropological standpoint but attempted to apply it to a universal. This seems to be a form of a negative argument, which isn’t very compelling.
I’m very confused by your responses. It seems your objections are based on misunderstandings of (i) definitions, (ii) Bayes’ theorem, and (iii) logic. For now, let me just address the first two:
(i) definitions:
All my definitions do is give arbitrary names to things. You clearly have the
idea of an evil obtaining for which we know of no moral justification for. It doesn’t matter whether one actually exists, or whether either of us believe one does. All I’m doing is saying let’s call
that inscrutable evil. We don’t have to, we can call it any name we like. I’ve chosen inscrutable evil since it kind of makes sense to do so. Neither of us are thereby committed to that evil’s existence. Inscrutable evil is widely discussed in philosophy of religion, it’s very strange to me that you’re questioning this part of the argument.
(ii) Bayes’ theorem:
What does it mean to say something is evidence for a hypothesis? As I (and tons of others) understand it, it just means the following: E is evidence for H if H is more probable given E than it would otherwise be. This is formalized as: P(H|E&K) > P(H|K), which translates as ‘The probability of H given E and our background knowledge is greater than the probability of H given our background knowledge.’
So, inscrutable evil is evidence for atheism if atheism is more probable given inscrutable evil than it would otherwise be.
In Bayesianism, there’s something known as the relevance condition/criterion. It tells that we can know that P(H|E&K) > P(H|K) if we know that P(E|H&K) > P(E|~H&K).
So, all I need to do to
prove that inscrutable evil is evidence for atheism is show that inscrutable evil is more probable on atheism than on theism.
If hypothesis 1 entails E, and hypothesis 2 doesn’t, then P(E|H1&K) > P(E|H2&K). This is because an
entailing relation results in the highest degree of probability, whereas the failure to entail results in a weaker degree of probability.
Since my argument proves that atheism entails inscrutable evil, but theism doesn’t, it follows
necessarily that inscrutable evil is evidence for atheism. Again, this doesn’t mean there is any inscrutable evil. But, if there is, it’s evidence for atheism.
Now, you might say my argument fails to show that atheism entails inscrutable evil, but I hope you’ll concede that if my hypothetical syllogism is sound, then inscrutable evil would be evidence for atheism.