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Samuel_Monosov
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Unfortunately, no, I don’t. But I do know how to google things, at least. From Stanford’s philosophy page, I find:I assume you are familiar with at least basic modal logic, Kripke semantics, and possible world semantics, or you’ll not be able to understand any analytic philosophy of the last century
From Stanford:
Then consider the following argument:
- There is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
- (Hence) There is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: from it is possible that it is necessary that p, one can infer that it is necessary that p. Setting aside the possibility that one might challenge this widely accepted modal principle, it seems that opponents of the argument are bound to challenge the acceptability of the premise.
And, of course, they do. Let’s just run the argument in reverse.
- There is no entity which possesses maximal greatness.
- (Hence) There is no possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.
Plainly enough, if you do not already accept the claim that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, then you won’t agree that the first of these arguments is more acceptable than the second. So, as a proof of the existence of a being which posseses maximal greatness, Plantinga’s argument seems to be a non-starter.
So Plantinga himself says that this isn’t a proof. It just shows that belief in God is rational. It doesn’t show that not believing in God is irrational.Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Plantinga himself agrees: the “victorious” modal ontological argument is not a proof of the existence of a being which possesses maximal greatness. But how, then, is it “victorious”? Plantinga writes: “Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm’s argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” (Plantinga 1974, 221).
Now, since I don’t really understand the machinery, I can’t argue it. Since I don’t care to understand the machinery, it might be best to move on to classical arguments for God.
But I’m just pointing out that, from what little I do understand about the argument, as it’s communicated in a probably over-simple way, it’s not “100% Certainty”, or at least its author doesn’t think it is. The author of the argument doesn’t think the conclusion is established at all; rather the reasonableness of the conclusion is established.
But I already know that! I am well aware that belief in God can be a rational belief. It is simply a belief I do not share.