How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

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‘… Maker of Heaven and Earth …’ or ‘… Creator of Heaven and Earth …’ - whatever, God is OF it, involved in it, directly or indirectly. Without God there is nothing. With God there is ALL that He wills/wishes/permits.
 
Linus,

It is difficult to interact with you. I wouldn’t speak to my 15 year old daughter the way you have done here, with a series of trite rhetorical questions - most of which I’ve already addressed. I obviously understand the issue.
I apologize for the tone of my statement, I didn’t realize it would be offensive.

How does God give existence to his creatures as their own? Nobody really cares about your conclusions or Gilson’s, they care about the “how” this happens. Please feel free to cite to my quotes from Aquinas, as apparently you did in response to Linux. You are welcome for those, by the way.

And I apologize for this too.

Linus2nd
 
Linus
I have done some really silly things in my life, but none as silly as arguing with a guy that admits not understanding mathematics but is dogmatically certain that what I’ve written about a mathematical description of creatio ex nihilo is not only wrong but is in fact a danger to the simpletons in the pews. I can forgive your misinterpretations because the volume of posts that you contribute to this forum cannot leave any time for insightful thought. On the other hand, your sanctimonious attitude that you are absolutely right and know without doubt the “Defined Dogma of the Catholic Church” better than anyone else has finally tired me out. Goodbye.
Yppop
I apologize if I have misrepresented any of your statements or opinions or for being condenscending, or sanctimonious. That was not my intention.Apparantly I need to be more careful in in the way I phrase my comments and I will try to do better in the future.

Thank you for bringing this to my attention.

Linus2nd .
 
So why did you present it like he did?

Esse is esse. The act of existing is the act of existing regardless of whether you want to call it finite or infinite. To create a finite existing is to create a different “kind” of “the act of existing”, which means that existence becomes a genus comprised of species. Simply saying that its “finite” doesn’t solve the problem or make it something different to esse; it just means that you are trying to avoid recognising a very obvious problem for anybody who fully grasps what is meant for a thing to have an act of existing.

The only opposite to existing is not existing. There are no other distinctions.
Linux, I wish to apologize for my belittling attitude toward you and for the condenscending, sanctimonious, and harshness of my comments to you for some time now. This was certainly wrong and I hope you will be big enough to forgive my offenses. I still maintain you are profoundly wrong but that is a separate issue.

Linus2nd
 
I think Linus is being treated unfairly here. If Yppop and tdgesq don’t like Linus’ comments, or his tone, they could have just passed it over and focused on other posters comments.

Linus is obviously committed to orthodoxy. He may be wrong in his objections to Linux, but we can’t fault him for being primarily motivated for the spiritual well being of others.

Lets keep the discussion going.

God bless,
Ut
 
Our existence is a pale reflection of the Divine Existence. In God is also Good, which is identical with His Essence. In the same sense, we have a create goodness, which is a pale reflection of the Divine Goodness.
Only Gods being is good. God cannot create a distinct goodness any more than he can create a distinct esse. We are good by analogy; we are esse by analogy. There is no ontological essences or esse that is literally a piece of good. If what i am saying is correct, than surely our essences are not literally these things in themselves; and if so than surely we have the goodness of being only insofar as our essence is conjoined to God.
S.T. Ques 45 , art 5 " Reply…Among all effects the most universal is existence itself…which should accordingly be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God…Now God’s Proper effect in creating is that which is presupposed to any other , namely existence tout court ( or simply ). "
Now you may say that Thomas is wrong, but you cannot say that he did not teach that God bestows on creatures their own act of being or existence…
I agree that God bestows actuality on to potency, but whether esse is a distinct expression of their essence is a different Question.
More fun than listening to the ball game !
I often lose my self for hours in these forums.
 
I happen to agree with this statement.
Do you?
God can create something out of his power where there had been nothing before.
Since God’s esse is identical to his will, that would translate to,

“God creates out of his esse.”

Now of course, this is a heresy but only if we assume that their is no real distinction between the esse of God and the essence of creatures.
The source of all created perfections
Ut
I don’t believe that God can create distinct finite acts of perfection. Its meaningless when taken literally as a distinct expression of a things essence. An essence is either perfect or it is not at all. Perfection is not genus. That term can only function as an analogous expression of an essences relationship with esse and the degree to which it participates in esse. And since esse is the measure of all things; it is the degree to which we are conjoined to God. For example angels have a higher degree of actuality because they have less potency in their act and so they are more conjoined to esse than a being that is physical.
 
Another non sequitur. Created esses are not existence itself because they are created in conjunction with an essence.
You can’t just call something a non-sequiter and than assert that esse are created.

Esse is what makes a thing actual. An act of existing is an act of existing regardless of whether you say its finite or infinite.

It makes no rational sense to say that God creates a distinct species of esse (esse is not a genus) in order to make an essence actual, and at the same time say that esse is not a distinct act in itself even after being conjoined to an essence (as that would make esse and essence identical in creatures).

Esse is distinct from essence even after being conjoined and that only makes sense if God (his essence is his esse) is the esse of contingent essences.

It makes no rational sense to speak of a finite esse. This is your own invention which you use because you feel it allows God to be distinct from its creatures. This is fine, but I still think that it is an erroneous concept.
 
S.T. Ques 8, art 3, an to obj 1 " Reply to Objection 1. God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence;because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being ( essendi, or of [their] existing] ). "

I could site many such instances but this is good enough.

Linus2nd

This proves my argument. For if essences have their own esse they do not need God as the actus essendi.
 
Yes.
Since God’s esse is identical to his will, that would translate to,
“God creates out of his esse.”
Now of course, this is a heresy but only if we assume that their is no real distinction between the esse of God and the essence of creatures.
We need to make an absolute distinction between God’s inner life and what he causes to be. When you talk about God’s Esse, I think of this as belonging to God’s inner life. Intrinsic to him.

Using material terms, I am thinking of
  • The sun as like God’s inner life (including his esse). That which exists.
  • Then sun, generates light.
  • But light is not the sun.
  • Now I imagine essences as a massive film reel circling the sun.
  • The light passes through the film.
  • In the nothingness beyond the film, you see images. The light takes on form by combining with the film (the essence).
  • The images these two creations of God create are real.
  • But both the light (created esse), and the essences are required.
If we both agree that creation itself is not necessary, then we have to agree that the light (created esse) are also not necesary. Otherwise, created esse would always exist. And if they always existed, they would also always exist with their essences.
I don’t believe that God can create distinct finite acts of perfection. Its meaningless when taken literally as a distinct expression of a things essence. An essence is either perfect or it is not at all.
I don’t understand this statement. Everywhere around us, we see things coming into being and coming out of being. A being can take on a form to a greater or lesser degree. For example, a crippled man take on a physical form to a less perfect degree than, say, an athlete. In the physical realm, this has no great relevance, because, for human beings at least, what truly distinguishes us from the animal world is our spiritual existence and our conformity with truth, goodness, and reality. Here we see where perfections really do start to matter. Here we can chose to conform with the demands of perfection that God places in us, which has a moral dimension, but also a spiritual religious dimension in our yearning for the ultimate perfection, the ultimate good, the ultimate truth, which is God.
Perfection is not genus. That term can only function as an analogous expression of an essences relationship with esse and the degree to which it participates in esse. And since esse is the measure of all things; it is the degree to which we are conjoined to God. For example angels have a higher degree of actuality because they have less potency in their act and so they are more conjoined to esse than a being that is physical.
What, to you, does it mean that an angel has a higher degree of actuality and has more esse? Do you understand this in some physical terms?

God Bless,
Ut
 
If the Esse of God is the esse of creatures, then their esse is God, period. There is no way to get out of that. Creatures either have their own existence given to them by God as their own, or their act of existence is God Himself. And that seems to say that they are God.

Linus2nd

Ending summary:
  1. Their act of existing is God, but their essence is not God and is wholly distinct since even Aquinas holds up the real distinction between esse and essence after being conjoined.
So what ever you have to say about my argument, my argument at all time has always made it clear that Gods essence is not the essence of creation and even after being conjoined to God as esse this is the case. This I think is that which is of single importance in Catholic Theology. Whether essences have their own esse or the esse of god is not something that necessarily comes in to conflict with defined dogma since when dogma speaks of creation as a being they are referring particular to the nature or essence (the whatness) of thing and are not referring to being in light of the esse and essence distinction or the metaphysical concept of being in general.
  1. The act of existing, existence, esse, is not a genus and so its logically impossible that God can create a species of esse, act of existing, existence. There can be distinction or differentiation in essences precisely because their essence is not identical to esse.
  2. Out of nothing comes nothing. Nothing is the antithesis of being, and so it makes no logical sense to speak of existence as that which begins or ceases to exist since that would contradict the absolute distinction between existence and nothing as it would imply that a negation of reality becomes a reality which makes no sense. Also It contradicts existence for it to become that which it is the antithesis of. The act of existing is absolute or it is nothing at all.
I therefore conclude, for very good reasons, that God is the esse of contingent essences, and I do not for one moment think that I am contradicting the defined dogma of the Catholic church.
 
We need to make an absolute distinction between God’s inner life and what he causes to be. When you talk about God’s Esse, I think of this as belonging to God’s inner life. Intrinsic to him.

Using material terms, I am thinking of

  1. *]The sun as like God’s inner life (including his esse). That which exists.
    *]**Then sun, generates light. **
    *]But light is not the sun.
    *]Now I imagine essences as a massive film reel circling the sun.
    *]The light passes through the film.
    *]In the nothingness beyond the film, you see images. The light takes on form by combining with the film (the essence).
    *]The images these two creations of God create are real.
    *]But both the light (created esse), and the essences are required.

    If we both agree that creation itself is not necessary, then we have to agree that the light (created esse) are also not necesary. Otherwise, created esse would always exist. And if they always existed, they would also always exist with their essences.

  1. This is a great visual, but there is one internal inconsistency with it.

    In #2, you say the sun generates light, but in #8 you say the light is created esse which you further add is “not necessary.” In what sense, though, is light that emanates “essentially” from the sun “created.” Surely, this is not the same sense of “created” that implies God’s intentional will and accomplished ex nihilo? The light streams from the sun of necessity and as a natural result of what the sun is. These are not the same senses of “created.” The light is, it would seem, generated by or emanates from the sun in the same sense that the Word is begotten from the Father; as the Creed says:
    We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ,
    the only Son of God,
    eternally begotten of the Father,
    God from God, Light from Light,
    true God from true God,
    begotten, not made,
    of one Being with the Father.
    This would argue against your characterizing light as “created esse” and more as the “actualizing power” that emanates from God, which is, according to the Creed, “of one Being” with the Father.

    I would agree with created essences being like “a massive film reel” created from nothing “ex nihilo” by God. But it is in the nature of light emanating essentially from the sun that produces the images on the reel, even though the reel is “created,” the light that brings them into being is not.

    Aquinas seems to admit that creation “emanates” in some respect from God while at the same time holding stringently to the claim that creation comes “from nothing.”
    Objection 3. Further, the preposition “from” [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.
    On the contrary, On the text of Genesis 1, “In the beginning God created,” etc., the gloss has, “To create is to make something from nothing.”
    I answer that, As said above (Question 44, Article 2), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from “not-man,” and white from "not-white." Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,” so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the “not-being” which is "nothing." ST 1, 45
    As to the question of whether creation participates in the esse or being of God, it would seem that Aquinas is very nuanced about what he admits or does not admit.

    I am still looking into this question, but Aquinas speaks about different senses of being. He claims God is not the “formal being” of creation, but he does speak of at least one other sense of being, that of “proper being.”

    Feser makes the case that being, for Aquinas, is a transcendental, like truth or goodness (applied analogically to different existents) and, in fact, that being is transposable with goodness and truth - that they are essentially one and the same.

    This point has implications for this discussion because to say that creation participates in the being of God is to say that creation participates in goodness (in God, in fact) to the extent that its essential or created nature allows. Would that claim be problematic?
 
This is a great visual, but there is one internal inconsistency with it.

In #2, you say the sun generates light, but in #8 you say the light is created esse which you further add is “not necessary.” In what sense, though, is light that emanates “essentially” from the sun “created.” Surely, this is not the same sense of “created” that implies God’s intentional will and accomplished ex nihilo? The light streams from the sun of necessity and as a natural result of what the sun is. These are not the same senses of “created.” The light is, it would seem, generated by or emanates from the sun in the same sense that the Word is begotten from the Father; as the Creed says:

This would argue against your characterizing light as “created esse” and more as the “actualizing power” that emanates from God, which is, according to the Creed, “of one Being” with the Father.
Good point. I should have used a better word than generate, which is a word typically used to describe the the procession from the Father to the Son.

But, just to complete the quote:
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of the Father before all worlds (æons), Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father;
By whom all things were made [both in heaven and on earth];
by whom all things were made;
Notice the words, by whom. Not from whom. If we agree that esse is necessary for a being to exist, and that esse is God’s esse, then the creed would seem to be incorrect. (That’s not something I’m prepared to argue for… unless you can think of a way around the problem.)
I would agree with created essences being like “a massive film reel” created from nothing “ex nihilo” by God. But it is in the nature of light emanating essentially from the sun that produces the images on the reel, even though the reel is “created,” the light that brings them into being is not.
Unless we distinguish between the metaphors of light used in the creed to describe the procession of Father to Son as uncreated light, and some other unnecessary light.
Aquinas seems to admit that creation “emanates” in some respect from God while at the same time holding stringently to the claim that creation comes “from nothing.”
Agreed. I have looked at his usage of this concept. Here is what I found with regard to the procession within the Trinity.
As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.
And also this further clarification:
Reply to Objection 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is “begotten wisdom;” for it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called “begotten knowledge.” Thus can also be explained how “to speak” is in God “to see by thought,” forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought. Still the term “thought” does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): “Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless.” For thought consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes “thought” in an improper sense for “contemplation.”
Continued:
 
And this:
I answer that, “Word,” said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Q[27], A[2]). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.
And further:
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of “becoming” in particular—that is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.
And here on the question of creation from nothing:
I answer that, As said above (Q[44], A[2]), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from “not-man,” and white from “not-white.” Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,” so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the “not-being” which is "nothing.
"

I am trying to digest how this concept might apply to the current discussion. Hopefully this material can help us better understand what Aquinas is saying about esse. But if anything applies, I think the term “intelligible emanation” is where we should start.

God bless,
Ut
 
It is important to ask what exactly Aquinas means by formal being?

Here is one definition of the word formal…

a. Relating to or involving outward form or structure.
b. Being or relating to essential form or constitution: a formal principle.

Now is Aquinas saying That God is not the esse of created essences, or rather is he saying like I am saying that he is not the essential form or constitution of a things “essence”, like matter is to form?

When Aquinas speaks of the being of creatures he speaks in analogous terms, and thus he is merely speaking of essences as existing things and not as that which is identical to esse.

So would it not be reasonable to interpret Aquinas as saying that God is not the essence of created things?
 
It is important to ask what exactly Aquinas means by formal being?
It is important to those who want to move people away from the Judeo-Christian God and use impossible-to-define-terms-to-everybody’s-satisfaction terms to stir up endless confusion.
 
It is important to those who want to move people away from the Judeo-Christian God and use impossible-to-define-terms-to-everybody’s-satisfaction terms to stir up endless confusion.
But what do you gain by asserting that I am deceiving people?

Your uncharitable attitude is not justified.
 
More info along the lines of emanation:
Reply to Objection 1: In the proposition “the first of created things is being,” the word “being” does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is “this” being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above (A[1]). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that “the first visible thing is color,” although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
Hmmmmm… the distinction here that he is making, saying that a thing is created because it is a being, as opposed to This being seems to suggest a difference between esse and essence…

God bless,
Ut
 
"

I am trying to digest how this concept might apply to the current discussion. Hopefully this material can help us better understand what Aquinas is saying about esse. But if anything applies, I think the term “intelligible emanation” is where we should start.

God bless,
Ut
Do you notice that when Aquinas speaks of being in reference to creatures he is speaking specifically of their essences. He speaks of them as existing, but he does not say anything about their relationship with esse insofar as whether esse begins to exist in conjunction with their essences. He merely speaks of “no-man” becoming a “real man”, a no-horse becoming an actual horse. He speaks of essences becoming actual.

One things for certain, Aquinas does not view esse as being identical with essence even after being conjoined, and thus anything else he says has to be viewed and interpreted in light of that fact. He speaks of essences coming into existence; he does not speak of esse coming into esse.

I think this is a very important point to consider when trying to determine whether my argument is consistent with the metaphysics of Aquinas and Aristotle.
 
In post 396 Linux says, " One things for certain, Aquinas does not view esse as being identical with essence even after being conjoined, and thus anything else he says has to be viewed and interpreted in light of that fact. He speaks of essences coming into existence; he does not speak of esse coming into esse. "

This is very difficult to square with what Thomas says below, he certainly does speak of essences and esse coming into existence altogether in the created substance. So while essence and esse are distinct, the created substance or being would not exist without the two composing principles of essence and esse. And together, they compose the created substance or being.

".T. Ques 45 , art 5 " Reply…Among all effects the most universal is existence itself…which should accordingly be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God…Now God’s Proper effect in creating is that which is presupposed to any other , namely existence tout court ( or simply ). "

If existence is the proper effect of creation, then God is creating an existence which He gives to creatures as their very own, an existence which is not a certain amount of His own existence ( and, indeed, how can God divide Himself so as to dole out bits and pieces of Himself to creatures as their act of existence? )

And this view is firmly held by Etienne Gilson. For he says, " And Etienne Gilson has this to say on pg 177 of " Elements of Christian Philosophy. " He says in part, “…The only things that can properly be created are those of which it has previously been said that they are capable of having an act of being of their own. These are substances…” Obviously, Gilson is convinced that the esse of creatures is their own and that God creates it along with the entire substance. It is an effect of God’s creative act to give created beings an act of existence of their very own. "

One can get a fuller flavor by reading pg 176 and all of 177. But his position is clear. Creatures have their own esse which is not God’s Esse or a part thereof.

Sorry for interrupting. It seemed important.

Linus2nd
 
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