How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[Linux]

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Its been a pleasure.

 

[prodigalson2011]

His essence is esse. There is no dancing around that fact.

No one has tried to dance around that fact. The point is that the His esse (which is His essence) is His alone.

So you are now saying essence is not objectively distinct from the act of existence and instead essence is identical to actuality in creatures.

Whats it going to be Linus?

No, if there can be any such thing as a “created essence” (your term), then it is nothing less than a substance (an essence which has been given esse). Neither an essence or an esse considered apart from the another is an actuality. If an essence has been “created” it has been given esse. Otherwise it is merely an intellectual construct. You continue to conflate and misappropriate the terms of the argument.

Anyway, what I am saying is that a substance is actual. And actuality is the fact of a substance’s being actual (in act).

 

[Peter_Plato]

I can’t see it my self. What does this have to do with the arguments on this thread?

I imagined the connection was self-evident. Perhaps I was delusional. I appreciate your forthrightness.

FWIW you have made some very compelling points over the course of this thread.

My current position is that I lack the capacity to decide where and how ProdigalSon’s points mesh with or contradict your proposed understanding of Aquinas. I am striving to get a better sense of what Aquinas means by esse as it pertains to God and to creation and how that impacts your overall case and the points made by others in reply. I have nothing new to add so I will remain silent for the time being.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Just want to make a correction or two to my last series of posts, as well as answer utunuminst’s question.

So to start, in post # 761, I mistakenly said the following:

These effects are still reducible to God, who is the primary act of all else…

I meant to say that God is the first cause of all else, but since I had just been talking about primary and secondary act, I guess it was still on the tip of my mind’s tongue.

Also, in the first of my quotes/commentaries on Aquinas’ “Summa contra Gentiles” in post # 757, I wanted to emphasize certain statements, but I missed a few tags. So here it is again, with the proper emphases. Pardon my anal-retentiveness:

[3] Furthermore, things are not distinguished from one another in having being, for in this they agree. If, then, things differ from one another, either their being must be specified through certain added differences, so that diverse things have a diverse being according to their species, or things must differ in that the being itself is appropriate to natures that are diverse in species. The first of these alternatives is impossible, since, as we have said, no addition can be made to a being in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus. It remains, then, that things differ because they have diverse natures, to which being accrues in a diverse way. Now, the divine being does not accrue to a nature that is other than it; it is the nature itself, as we have said. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one.

Here Thomas affirms what I have said before: The divine esse cannot accrue to another nature because it is its own nature.

Now, onto utunumsint’s question:

Hi Prodigalson2011,

I’m reading through your posts.

Quick question: what is yliatim?

God bless,
Ut

“Yliatim” is roughly equivalent to “essence.” Thomas never uses the term in his own work; it only appears here as the passage in question was discussing Thomas’ commentary on the “Liber de Causis,” an anonymous work that was originally attributed to Aristotle. Aquinas himself noted, though, that most of its content (including the term yliatim) was taken from Proclus’ “Elements of Theology”. Proclus’ understanding of essence, particularly as relates to God, is very different than Aquinas’, which is the point being addressed here. Does that help?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God is Ipsum Esse Subsistens becuase esse is his essence.

God is not 2 things. Esse and essence is identical in God, and therefore we are talking about one thing. God’s “isnesss” is his “whatness”. Essence is esse in God. Thus it is not wrong to speak of God as being simply esse as that is speaking of his essence.

I agree.

But at the same time in creatures they cannot be spoken of as identical or equally contingent upon each other for their distinct actuality because then potency would be perfecting actuality (bringing actuality into actuality), which is a contradiction.

Not clear about what you are saying here.

His essence is esse, his isness is simply his whatness. I agree.

I agree.

I agree.

Unfortunately i am devoid of emotion.

Jean paul satre was an existentialist, what does he have to do with this in your opinion.

Nothing, I was just curious about your opinion.

Your other posts are rather large, so i will have to deal with them on the weekend.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

No one has tried to dance around that fact. The point is that the His esse (which is His essence) is His alone.

I have not denied that God’s esse is his alone. I have denied that Having esse makes it our own distinct esse. It is someone elses esse; in other-words God.

Neither an essence or an esse considered apart from the another is an actuality.

Then you are not truly talking about the act of existence when you speak of esse, you are speaking about a potency which becomes real when a substance is made real. But in that case it makes no meaningful sense to speak of esse as that which perfects potency (makes it actual) when it to is a potency, as that would mean more is coming from less, perfection coming from imperfection. If esse is not a real nature in and of it self, how does it bring potency to act? It does not make any sense. In fact if esse is not a thing in itself then when you say “Neither an essence or an esse considered apart from the another is an actuality”, how are you not saying that the two are objectively identical in substances?

Such would amount to a mere abstract distinction between nature and act, and not a real distinction, which leads to contradictions. I know you will say that is not what you are saying but that is in fact the conclusion your argument leads to.

If an essence has been “created” it has been given esse.

That depends on what you mean by given.

Otherwise it is merely an intellectual construct.

I don’t see how that follows. To me it is you that wants to turn esse into something that is essentially no different from an intellectual construct while asserting that it has the power to perfect potency.

You continue to conflate and misappropriate the terms of the argument.

I don’t see that i am. I just take the act of existence (esse as distinct from essence) for what it logically is, that which is actuality itself. Otherwise we are not talking about that which is objectively the act of existing and we certainly are not talking about something that can meaningfully perfect potency.

Anyway, what I am saying is that a substance is actual. And actuality is the fact of a substance’s being actual (in act).

A substance having actuality does not make it actuality itself. Otherwise the two would be identical, and therefore the substance in question would eternally exist like God.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Re: How does God create “the act of existing” out of nothing?

---

:
Originally Posted by prodigalson2011

No, he refers to God as a being whose essence is His existence. Aquinas never refers to God as simply “esse”, or vice versa.

His essence is esse. There is no dancing around that fact.

Quote:
Actuality is the state of being actual. How can something be actual yet distinct from actuality? That is absurd. And it’s not what Aquinas is talking about, as evidenced above.

(continued…)

So you are now saying essence is not objectively distinct from the act of existence and instead essence is identical to actuality in creatures.

Whats it going to be Linus?

In God there is no distinction between essence and existence. His Essence is His Existence. His " what-ness " is His " is-ness, " His " is-ness " is His existence, His existence is His " act of existence, " and each of the preceding is His Act.

But in creatures essence is distinct from existence. I have mentioned this many times.

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

Originally Posted by utunumsint View Post
Done. Thanks for these posts prodigalson2011. I have to say, Aquinas is very clear.

Let me try again.

Common esse is different than divine esse because it can receive the addition of a genus. Divine esse cannot. All things share this common esse. It is the first effect caused by God in creation.

It does not change by that addition in the same way that animal does not change with the addition of rational or irrational. The words rational or irrational just further specify animal. In the same way animal just specifies (contracts) common esse.

Common esse has no part in the definition of an essence because no esse but God’s is his own essence. It must be received from something else.

Creation is a manifestation of God’s causal power to produce the effect of existence.

Aquinas traces the evolution of this idea up to Plato and Aristotle. Now Aristotle was a realist. He started with the external world. He saw real beings all around him and understood that they had an essence and an act of existence. These two things were common to every substance. One defined it, so that it could fall under a genus and a species. The other brought it into actuality and made it real.

In no way, for Aristotle, were these things separate from a substance. They could be abstracted from a substance in the mind, but they were always part of things. Part of reality.

Aquinas describes how these two things are imperfect, however, because esse never exists on its own - it must always be found with an essence. It is always conjoined to a genus or species. And a genus or species is also imperfect because it requires common being to be actualized, to move from potentiality to actuality because being is not part of its essence.

So Aquinas makes this move - he ascribes to God the only esse that is its essence. Therefore the only eternal being, strictly speaking.

He draws this conclusion from his reflections on creation. There is no way in which this contingent reality is in any way a part of God! Everything in our experience, falls into the category of effect. We only know others by their effects. Still more so for God. And God’s effect is the the entire universe, including common being, common esse. God is entirely his act of being and there is no place in creation where esse and essence are one in this way. And it is completely inappropriate to believe that common esse is God’s esse because common esse is always conjoined to and separable from essences.

Aquinas explains how it is an error to ascribe common being to God. I have quoted this passage in its entirety. So has ProdigalSon2011. You have not responded to these posts at all.

God bless,
Ut

 

[prodigalson2011]

I have not denied that God’s esse is his alone. I have denied that Having esse makes it our own distinct esse. It is someone elses esse; in other-words God.

Let’s review the content of the above: “God’s esse is His alone.” “We have God’s esse.”

So God’s esse is His alone, but it is also our esse. The illogic of this statement is baffling.

Then you are not truly talking about the act of existence when you speak of esse, you are speaking about a potency which becomes real when a substance is made real. But in that case it makes no meaningful sense to speak of esse as that which perfects potency (makes it actual) when it to is a potency, as that would mean more is coming from less, perfection coming from imperfection.

Esse is not potency because it is the immediate effect of God. An effect is precisely a potency that has been reduced to act. This reduction takes place in the form of a substance. That is why it is said that God creates things according to their whole substance (essence and esse all at once) and also why the form, or essence, is said to be a principle of the esse: the act of singing cannot be reduced from potency without a voice in which it may be so actualized, just as an act of existence may not be reduced from potency without some form in which it may be actualized.

If esse is not a real nature in and of it self, how does it bring potency to act?

Because esse itself is reduced from potency to act in the form upon which it is effected. This statement may be hard to grasp on its own, but keep reading and I will elaborate presently.

It does not make any sense. In fact if esse is not a thing in itself then when you say “Neither an essence or an esse considered apart from the another is an actuality”, how are you not saying that the two are objectively identical in substances?

Because one (esse) is effected within the other (essence).

Such would amount to a mere abstract distinction between nature and act, and not a real distinction, which leads to contradictions. I know you will say that is not what you are saying but that is in fact the conclusion your argument leads to.

As the above sentence clearly demonstrates, it is not an abstract distinction. Cause-and-effect relationships are real, and cause and effect are necessarily distinct from one another.

That depends on what you mean by given.

Well, if we take your definition, “created” becomes meaningless.

I don’t see how that follows. To me it is you that wants to turn esse into something that is essentially no different from an intellectual construct while asserting that it has the power to perfect potency.

“The act of running” perfects the “potency of running” in a person, yet it does not exist apart from the person running except as an intellectual construct.

I don’t believe any rational person would deny that the preceding sentence is true. Now replace “running” with “existing” and “person” with “thing”. The same logic applies.

I don’t see that i am. I just take the act of existence (esse as distinct from essence) for what it logically is, that which is actuality itself. Otherwise we are not talking about that which is objectively the act of existing and we certainly are not talking about something that can meaningfully perfect potency.

An actuality is that which is produced by an act. “The act of rolling” effects the actuality of rolling in an object. The causal relationship goes as such: A man’s activity moves the object from the potential to roll to the act of rolling; by that act, “rolling” is made an actuality in the object. And so “the act of rolling” is effected upon the object; it is not of the essence of the object to roll, otherwise it would do so without being acted upon. Thus “the act of rolling” in an object is really distinct from its essence.

Again, no rational person would deny the truth of the preceding sentence. This time we replace “man” with “God”, “object” with “form” or “essence”, “roll” with “exist” and “rolling” with “existing”.

A substance having actuality does not make it actuality itself.

Otherwise the two would be identical, and therefore the substance in question would eternally exist like God.

“Actuality”, like “esse”, is something that may be predicated of diverse things, and thus “actuality itself” is nothing but the principle of actuality considered apart from anything of which it may be predicated. While actuality may be considered apart from actual things, actual things may not be considered apart from actuality itself.

What you mean to say is that a substance having actuality does not make it “a substance having actuality of itself.” You are trying to equivocate between these two concepts (“actuality itself” and “that which has its actuality of itself”).

 

[prodigalson2011]

Again, no rational person would deny the truth of the preceding sentence. This time we replace “man” with “God”, “object” with “form” or “essence”, “roll” with “exist” and “rolling” with “existing”.

To avoid redundancy, “object” should rather be replaced with “thing”.

 

[Linux]

Let’s review the content of the above: “God’s esse is His alone.” “We have God’s esse.”

So God’s esse is His alone, but it is also our esse. The illogic of this statement is baffling.

It is not illogical. There is a real objective distinction between esse and essence in creatures, so it cannot be illogical for an essence to have existence and yet not be the existence it has. God is esse, so it cannot be illogical that we have Gods esse and yet at the same time not be God’s esse.

If you reject the real objective distinction between existence and essence in creation, then just come out and say it, rather than pretend that you support it and present it as something entirely different to what Aquinas intended it to be.

.

 

[Linux]

Esse is not potency because it is the immediate effect of God.

What does that mean? Either he is creating a distinct esse (that was only potentially real) or he is not. If he is not, then what is esse a principle of if it is not a principle intrinsic to the nature of God himself? Principles in creatures, in an ontological context, are describing the potential activities of a nature which exists (what a nature can do or what it can become once it is real) and this is to talk about principles that are intrinsic to a things nature. To speak of principles that are intrinsic to nothing and yet has the power to cause something, makes no sense at all. Much less sense is made by the idea that this esse, which is supposedly not actuality itself, actualizes potency. In that case more is coming from less.

What does it mean to speak of esse as a principle that is not itself actuality and is not intrinsic to nature? Esse and essence cannot be objectively distinct in a substance** if neither are things in themselves and both are intrinsic to what a substance is**. You are basically saying that actuality is identical to a created substance. You cannot turn around an say, oh well but a creature is created so they are not, since that does not resolve the illogic of what you are saying. Your argument contradicts the fact that is was created and the fact that there is a real objective distinction between actuality and substance even after a substance is actual.

 

[Linux]

Because esse itself is reduced from potency to act in the form upon which it is effected.

So now you’re saying that esse is a potency that is brought to act by a potential form…

 

[prodigalson2011]

It is not illogical. There is a real objective distinction between esse and essence in creatures, so it cannot be illogical for an essence to have existence and yet not be the existence it has. God is esse, so it cannot be illogical that we have Gods esse and yet at the same time not be God’s esse.

If you reject the real objective distinction between existence and essence in creation, then just come out and say it, rather than pretend that you support it and present it as something entirely different to what Aquinas intended it to be…

When it is said that “God’s esse is His alone”, that means it is not predicated of anything else: i.e. nothing else has it.

I do not reject the real distinction between essence and existence, as is evidenced later in that very post where I explain that distinction very clearly. You just persistently ignore those parts of my posts to which you cannot reply.

 

[prodigalson2011]

What does that mean? Either he is creating a distinct esse (that was only potentially real) or he is not. If he is not, then what is esse a principle of if it is not a principle intrinsic to the nature of God himself?

I did not say that “esse” is not an intrinsic principle in the nature of God Himself. In fact I have consistently affirmed the opposite. I have maintained that since that principle is intrinsic to God, he can effect its like in other forms.

Principles in creatures, in an ontological context, are describing the potential activities of a nature which exists (what a nature can do or what it can become once it is real) and this is to talk about principles that are intrinsic to a things nature. To speak of principles that are intrinsic to nothing and yet has the power to cause something, makes no sense at all. Much less sense is made by the idea that this esse, which is supposedly not actuality itself, actualizes potency. In that case more is coming from less.

You are ignoring the fact that “created esse” comes from God, to whom “esse” is an intrinsic principle. Again, the principle of “an agent effects its like, such as fire effects fire.” Esse is coming from God, and God is not less than created things.

What does it mean to speak of esse as a principle that is not itself actuality and is not intrinsic to nature? Esse and essence cannot be objectively distinct in a substance** if neither are things in themselves and both are intrinsic to what a substance is**. You are basically saying that actuality is identical to a created substance.

No, I am not. That does not follow from my argument at all. You completely ignored the vast majority of my post in which I addressed the relation between act and actuality, etc.

You cannot turn around an say, oh well but a creature is created so they are not, since that does not resolve the illogic of what you are saying. Your argument contradicts the fact that is was created and the fact that there is a real objective distinction between actuality and substance even after a substance is actual.

I really wish you would take the time to actually read and consider my arguments instead of rummaging through them and picking out variations on the same few statements with which to take issue and beyond which I have already elaborated.

If you’re going to consistently ignore my arguments and keep running in circles, I’m done with this discussion. It’s pointless. I have taken the time to make a very detailed case for my argument and you constantly choose to ignore the majority of it and repeat the same questions I have already answered instead of replying to my answers. You do this by consistently picking out identical statements from my posts, even when I later elaborate on them. I find that very dishonest and discourteous.

 

[prodigalson2011]

So now you’re saying that esse is a potency that is brought to act by a potential form…

No, I said it is brought to act in a potential form. It is brought to act by God. This is a blatant misrepresentation of what I said and yet another example of your failure to actually try to understand and engage the other side of the argument.

 

[JamesCaruso]

Inocente:

I can’t say I disagree.

God bless,
jd

Then you reject transubstantiation? Just saying…

 

[Linux]

“The act of running” perfects the “potency of running” in a person, yet it does not exist apart from the person running except as an intellectual construct.

Perfection in this sense is only **analogous **and is passive. A person cannot run unless running is reduced from potency to act by that which is esse. Esse is not the person. It is not the persons nature itself that perfects the potential of running (secondary causes do not themselves reduce potency to act). If that were the case, then more would be coming from less, potency would be perfecting potency.

I don’t believe any rational person would deny that the preceding sentence is true. Now replace “running” with “existing” and “person” with “thing”. The same logic applies.

Well no it doesn’t since the potential of running does not by itself actualize running, and neither is the person who decides to run identical with that which primarily actualizes the act of running. If that were the case more would be coming from less which is a contradiction.

Your understanding of secondary causation is flawed.

The principles intrinsic to the nature of a thing is not the same thing as esse. Running is simply what a person can do if and when that potential is actualized by God.

What you mean to say is that a substance having actuality does not make it “a substance having actuality of itself.”

Well a creature that is not actuality can only participate in that which is actuality itself; otherwise there is no possibility of it becoming actual if the act of existence is not already a thing in-itself. If it is not existence that it has as distinct from itself, then it does not have existence. It is you who is equivocating substance and actuality by making them co-dependent upon on each-other for existence which simply destroys the concept of esse as that which actualizes or perfects potential. Its incoherent since esse would be dependent on the actualization of potency in-order to be real and so what sense does it make to speak of it as that which brings potency to act?

What you are saying is obviously nonsense.

 

[JamesCaruso]

It’s a miracle.

 

[Linux]

No, I said it is brought to act in a potential form.

What is brought to act in a potential form? That which form itself is dependent upon for existence in the first place? What do you mean?

It is brought to act by God.

So now potency is reduced to act by God and not this mythical esse you keep speaking about.

This is a blatant misrepresentation of what I said

I don’t think it is personally, since you are either saying that form reduces potency to act, or you are saying that esse reduces potency to act; which is it?