How does God create "the act of existing" out of nothing?

[Linux]

I appreciate your thoughts. Given the statement above, how is God able to love his own Being, then?

And yet it is interesting that we cannot truly love God without God’s grace.

 

[Linux]

I automatically classify Linus as representing western views of God and Linux as representing an eastern view of the transcendant. That’s how I see it.

This is merely apparent. My view’s are thoroughly Thomistic in nature. Linus’s view actually contradicts Aquinas’ concept of esse.

 

[Linux]

The other perspective is that the underlying Being is the same: the Truth, the ultimate reality is God. All else is transient and, compared to the reality of His existence, illusion. My self within the Beatific Vision, along with all the angels and all the saints, would lose this sense of separateness and individuality, merging with the Oneness that is God. Referring to myself, I would be speaking only of an ego, a sense of self, a perceptual and cognitive organization, but, not a real person; I would have no soul. Likewise God would not be a person (three persons), but rather an eternal divine Energy or Supreme Identity.

In Existential Thomism, the esse/essence distinction applies objectively and so what you have written here cannot possibly represent my views as I have argued them on this thread.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You clearly have not made a solid case, but instead you have avoided and evaded the prospect of answering the obvious contradictions that keep getting pointed out to you that are found in your interpretation of Aquinas.

He said, he said, he said. That pretty well sums up your answer to my arguments. Yours, on the other hand begin with unproven assumptions, and illogical conclusions. The readers can judge for themselves, you can protest all you want.

The fact is I have given you references from Thomas which you never address, and I have given you a logical argument showing that created beings cannot have God as their act of existence. It is a dilemma you cannot answer. For if God is their act of existence, then either creatures and God are the same thing or creatures have no real existence but exist only as ideas in the Divine Intellect. I think all reasonable people would recognize this as a true dilemma.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

This is merely apparent. My view’s are thoroughly Thomistic in nature. Linus’s view actually contradicts Aquinas’ concept of esse.

I think your errors stem from your conviction that God’s esse is the only esse. Thomas teaches that the esse of creatures and that of God are only similar. Esse is said of each by the principle known as analogy of proper attribution of proper proportionality. Being is attributed to each in the proportion proper to each. So it is clear that the esse of each is a different esse, as I have always maintained.

And as I have shown, if God is the esse of creatures, there is really no difference between the two. God and the creature would be the same. And if not that, then creatures would be nothing but Ideas in the mind of God and would have no actual existence at all. And since there can be no true dilemma in reality, the esse of creatures must be their own created esse and not that of God.

The fact that there is a real distinction between ess and essence is perfectly compatable with my explanation. As Thomas says, the esse of creatures is distinct from essence but permeates throughout the created substance, including its essence, making it a real being.

Linus2nd

 

[utunumsint]

I think your errors stem from your conviction that God’s esse is the only esse. Thomas teaches that the esse of creatures and that of God are only similar. Esse is said of each by the principle known as analogy of proper attribution of proper proportionality. Being is attributed to each in the proportion proper to each. So it is clear that the esse of each is a different esse, as I have always maintained.

And as I have shown, if God is the esse of creatures, there is really no difference between the two. God and the creature would be the same. And if not that, then creatures would be nothing but Ideas in the mind of God and would have no actual existence at all. And since there can be no true dilemma in reality, the esse of creatures must be their own created esse and not that of God.

The fact that there is a real distinction between esse and essence is perfectly compatable with my explanation. As Thomas says, the esse of creatures is distinct from essence but permeates throughout the created substance, including its essence, making it a real being.

Linus2nd

I think this is spot on. You can’t separate a discussion on esse/essence as it relates to finite beings and the infinite God from the discussion of analogy as it relates to the real distinction (and similarity) between God and his creation.

As Mary T. Clark says:

In studying Thomistic metaphysics it is far to easy to get bogged down in a dead-end dispute about the real distinction between essence and existence. Taken of itself, this distinction does not interest Thomas Aquinas and should not be isolated from his total teaching. Like his medieval colleagues, Thomas was primarily concerned with the real distinction between God and man. Man’s metaphysical composition of essence/existence radically distinguishes him from God, whose simplicity is rooted in his unlimited act of existing, which is his very essence.

God bless,
Ut

 

[prodigalson2011]

I would like to return to the question as formed in the title of this thread, before examining further my own objections to Linux’s suppositions.

As regards the creation of contingent esses, we start from an observable fact of the principle of causation. Namely, it can be readily observed that a cause effects its like. We can take as an example, again, the case of fire. Let us imagine, specifically, the act of fire upon, say, a leaf. The effect is that the leaf is now also on fire. But it is not that the flame that touched the leaf has transferred itself to the leaf, but rather, it has ignited the potential of fire within the leaf (that is, those properties of the leaf that make it flammable.) In a similar way, God ignites the potential existence of an essence. Let us further imagine that the flame which imparted fire unto the leaf is not itself contingent upon any fuel for its subsistence. Thus we see that the leaf has received its own act of fire from perfect fire.

Now, we know that any fire will keep burning so long as it has the necessary fuel (oxygen). In other words, it is necessary to the subsistence of fire that it exist in an oxygenated atmosphere. Similarly, since outside of existence is nothingness, a particular act of existence must exist within the atmosphere of existence itself, for God is not only the flame (existence-giver), he is also the fuel (existence-sustainer). In other words, as a flame will be extinguished if deprived of oxygen, so will contingent existence cease to be if deprived of God’s sustaining power.

Now, Linux, I would like to turn back to your recent claim that your arguments are “perfectly Thomistic.” In fact, you seemed to indicate in one post that your particular arguments fall under the heading of Existential Thomism. This is perplexing, as the key proponent of Existential Thomism was Etienne Gilson, who, as Linusthe2nd has well shown, stands in stark disagreement with you.

In any case, I just this week began reading Aquinas’ “Compendium of Theology” and would like to share a few passages with you. Several of them, I must confess I was pleased to find, echo precisely some of my earlier statements:

Since God is eternal and immutable in His being, those things are lowest in the scale of being, as possessing less likeness to God, which are subject to generation and corruption. Such beings exist for a time, and then cease to be. Since existence follows the form of a thing, beings of this kind exist while they have their form, but cease to exist when deprived of their form. (74)

Compare this to one of my previous posts: *It is, of course, meaningless to speak of an independent act of existence without an essence. In such a case, yes, it is a logical absurdity. God is pure existence (having no parts or potency or limitations) and thus any other pure existence would be indistinguishable from God. But an act of existence that is limited (shaped) by an essence is not pure existence. It exists, but only to the degree that its essence permits. This does not mean that it is one and the same with God; it does mean that if stripped of its essence it would cease to exist. * As Aquinas says above, once stripped of its form, a thing ceases to exist.

I continue: I believe the mistake being made here is to imagine the conjunction of essence and esse in created things to be a temporal act, as though there is at one time this esse and this act of existence independent of one another which are then conjoined. But that is not the case. The essence is prior, not temporally but ontologically, to the esse. Aquinas states this in the inverse: Existence follows the form of a thing. The form is what allows a substance to receive its own being.

But the same numerical form cannot belong to numerically different individuals, for numerically different individuals do not possess the same existence; and yet everything has existence by reason of its form. (85)

This should remove any trace of doubt as to whether Aquinas believed that God was the only esse.

Moreover, a thing that has new existence must also have a new becoming; for that which is, must first become, since a thing becomes in order that it may be. Thus things which have being in their own right must have becoming in their own right; such are subsistent beings. But things that do not possess being in their own right do not properly have a becoming; such are accidents and material forms. The rational soul has being in its own right because it has its own operation, as is clear from our previous discussion… (93)

“The rational soul has being in its own right because it has its own operation…” Here Thomas affirms my earlier objection to your argument: that which does not have its own act of existence cannot have its own operation. Indeed, as he says in Ch. 85:

That whereby an agent acts, is its act.

God’s esse is already God’s will; another will cannot be added to it.

Another point is brought forth in this same passage from Ch. 93; namely, that of the definition of a substance. To reiterate, as Robert Pasnau writes in “Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature”:

[Aquinas] holds that for something to be a substance it must (a) subsist and (b) be the underlying subject of accidents … Aquinas is not very explicit about this notion [of subsistence] in the Traetise, but earlier in S.T. he offers this criterion: "we say that things subsist that have existence not in others, but in themselves."

 

[prodigalson2011]

…Since all bodies are found to be mobile, whatever is present in a body must be moved, at least per accidens or concomitantly, if the body itself is moved. The first mover, however, cannot be moved either per se or per accidens, for it must be absolutely immobile as has been shown. Therefore God cannot be a body or a force in a body…

And again, as I have already objected, God cannot be changed. Therefore, God cannot be present in his creatures as part of their being.

…that which is the very first among all movers, must predominate supremely over all the things moved. But this would be impossible if the mover were in any way attached to the mobile object…

This ties in well with another of my objections: as esse conforms to essence, God would become subordinate to His creatures in such a conjunction. Now to this you have repeatedly retorted that this doesn’t follow because esse and essence remain distinct even after conjunction, which misses the point. Though they remain distinct, the esse nevertheless conforms to the description of the essence. If it did not, then there would be no discernable form. In fact, the conjunction would be ineffectual: it would not produce anything.

The first effect wrought by God in things is existence itself… Anything that exists in any way must necessarily have its origin from God… God is the first and most perfect Being. Therefore He must be the cause of being in all things that have being.

Aquinas here refers to being and existence in terms of cause and effect rather than union or conjunction.

Created things obtain to the divine likeness by their operations in different ways, as they also represent it in different ways conformably to their being. For each of them acts in a manner that corresponds to its being. Therefore, as all creatures in common represent the divine goodness to the extent that they exist, so by their actions they all in common attain to the divine likeness in the conservation of their being and in the communication of their being to others. For every creature endeavors, first of all, by its activity to keep itself in perfect being, so far as this is possible. In such endeavor it tends, in its own way, to an imitation of the divine permanence. Secondly, every creature strives, by its activity, to communicate its own perfect being, in its own fashion, to another; and in this it tends toward an imitation of the divine causality.

Note well the second point and recall the passage originally quoted by Peter Plato which you read as supporting your argument, to which I replied that you were taking it out of context. Specifically, the phrase “communicating of His perfect being,” which was read as your Esse/essence conjunction in different words. But here he uses the activity of creatures as an analogy, which doesn’t jive with such an interpretation. Indeed, in the Summa Theologiae he addresses this point more fully and leaves no doubt as to the meaning of “the communication of being.” As you might have guessed, it’s exactly what I said it was:

Thus, we see that every agent insofar as it exists in act and possesses some perfection, produces something similar to itself. It, therefore pertains to the nature of the will to communicate to others as far as this is possible the good possessed; and this pertains especially to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Thus, if natural things insofar as they are perfect communicate their goodness to others, much more does it pertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own goodness to others insofar as this is possible.

Or, again, int eh Summa contra Gentiles (II, 6):

…God wills to communicate his being to other things by way of likeness. But it belongs to the will’s perfection to be the principle of action and of movement, as was said in De Anima III. Therefore, since God’s will is perfect, he does not lack the power of communicating his being to a thing by way of likeness.

So, since you asserted that what was meant in that original passage was abundantly clear, here you have it, straight from the ox’s mouth.

God communicates his being to us in this way in so much as these properties tell us something about God.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

And again, as I have already objected, God cannot be changed. Therefore, God cannot be present in his creatures as part of their being.

This ties in well with another of my objections: as esse conforms to essence, God would become subordinate to His creatures in such a conjunction. Now to this you have repeatedly retorted that this doesn’t follow because esse and essence remain distinct even after conjunction, which misses the point. Though they remain distinct, the esse nevertheless conforms to the description of the essence. If it did not, then there would be no discernable form. In fact, the conjunction would be ineffectual: it would not produce anything.

Aquinas here refers to being and existence in terms of cause and effect rather than union or conjunction.

Note well the second point and recall the passage originally quoted by Peter Plato which you read as supporting your argument, to which I replied that you were taking it out of context. Specifically, the phrase “communicating of His perfect being,” which was read as your Esse/essence conjunction in different words. But here he uses the activity of creatures as an analogy, which doesn’t jive with such an interpretation. Indeed, in the Summa Theologiae he addresses this point more fully and leaves no doubt as to the meaning of “the communication of being.” As you might have guessed, it’s exactly what I said it was:

Or, again, int eh Summa contra Gentiles (II, 6):

So, since you asserted that what was meant in that original passage was abundantly clear, here you have it, straight from the ox’s mouth.

God communicates his being to us in this way in so much as these properties tell us something about God.

Very well done! That too you about eight hours?

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

I think your errors stem from your conviction that God’s esse is the only esse.

My conviction that God as esse (the act of existence) is the only esse has never been asserted on this thread. My philosophy stems from the following…

1. God cannot contradict the absolute distinction between existence and nothing and therefore cannot manifest that which is by definition a negation or privation of reality as a distinct act of reality.
2. The act of existence is not a genus and therefore there cannot be species of existence; thus there cannot be finite acts of existence or esse.

Also, It is simply senseless to speak of God creating an esse and conjoining it to an essence only to defeat the point of that objective by being required to sustain both an esse and its essence in existence; in which case rendering the act of conjoining esse and essence existentially useless and meaningless. It doesn’t make any functional sense unless by “esse” one does not mean existence, and I don’t believe that Aquinas ever intended his readers to think that. And if esse is not actual existence, then it makes no sense to say that something non-actual can make something actual. In which case esse is just a meaningless concept arbitrarily introduced into the process of actualising a substance. But I don’t think Aquinas agrees at all with linus or prodigalson2011 about the nature of esse as conjoined to essences. More likely He would be spinning in his grave if God permitted it.

Also, since esse and potency is being continuously conjoined, if one says that essence has its own esse, it would seem that each contingent essence would have billions of distinct esse conjoined to it throughout its existence, which does not make any sense.
It makes more sense to say that God actualises all potency with his esse; in other-words essence comes “into” existence and is sustained “in” existence as opposed to having its own finite bubble of esse.

And yet another issue arises if we take what Linus and prodigalson2011 seriously. If all beings have there own distinct finite esse outside of God, then what is it exactly that exists in-between each finite substance? The absence of reality? Are we really to think that there are finite composites of esse and essence bouncing around in the absence of reality? Ridiculous!! Better to say we exist in the mind of God!!!

It seems to me that Aquinas speaks of “Being” in different senses depending on the context; for example, when he speaks of the being of creatures, he simply means the essence of creatures as they exist, and not in the sense that they have their own esse.

 

[Mount_Carmel]

IMHO, God is OF everything, either directly or indirectly - even indirectly His awareness and ‘allowance’/‘assent’ must be there, because without God even Hell’s perverse powers and being could not exist.

God is ultimately the power and being behind ALL that is - the ultimate and eternal ‘esse’. Before anything was, He IS.

 

[utunumsint]

1. The act of existence is not a genus and therefore there cannot be species of existence; thus there cannot be finite acts of existence or esse.

On the contrary, Aquinas speaks of three kinds of esses, differentiated by how they are measured. Eternal, aeviternal, and those subject to time.

• God’s esse has no beginning.
• Aeviternal being’s esse has a beginning, but no end.
• Temporal being’s esse is subject to time.

Each type of existence requires the first, but their mode of receiving esse from the first is different. And therefore, you can’t simply collapse the other two into the first. They are not the same. Therefore it is impossible that God’s esse, being infinite, can be the esse of aeviternal beings since such an esse has a beginning, and God’s esse has no beginning. The same thing goes for temporal beings.

Also, since esse and potency is being continuously conjoined, if one says that essence has its own esse, it would seem that each contingent essence would have billions of distinct esse conjoined to it throughout its existence, which does not make any sense.

Yeah, that is as crazy as saying there are individual members of a species that have their own essence and esse! - note the sarcasm. But seriously, how does that not make sense?

It makes more sense to say that God actualises all potency with his esse; in other-words essence comes “into” existence and is sustained “in” existence as opposed to having its own finite bubble of esse.

No, I think it makes more sense to say this:

God actualises all potency with his power; in other-words the created esses conjoined with essences are acts of God’s power and manifest created beings that image his eternal esse with Aeviternal and temporal esses.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linusthe2nd]

My conviction that God as esse (the act of existence) is the only esse has never been asserted on this thread. My philosophy stems from the following…

You have asserted it elsewhere. Your philosophy is of a piece.

1. God cannot contradict the absolute distinction between existence and nothing and therefore cannot manifest that which is by definition a negation or privation of reality as a distinct act of reality.

Your meaning here is not clear. But creation ex nihilo does not contradict anything. It is in perfect accord with the power of God, whose power is Infinite.

1. The act of existence is not a genus and therefore there cannot be species of existence; thus there cannot be finite acts of existence or esse.

A limited act of existence, which is what God creates ex nihilo for each created substance, is not a new species. It is a reflection of the Perfect Esse of God. It is being but limited being. Your argument does not hold, for, in fact, God has done it, he has created limited acts of existence…

Also, It is simply senseless to speak of God creating an esse and conjoining it to an essence only to defeat the point of that objective by being required to sustain both an esse and its essence in existence; in which case rendering the act of conjoining esse and essence existentially useless and meaningless. It doesn’t make any functional sense unless by “esse” one does not mean existence, and I don’t believe that Aquinas ever intended his readers to think that.

Wrong, existence is not an act " superadded " to essences. It is created along with the entire substance as an interior principle giving existence to all aspects of its essence. It is what gives reality to each created being and is absolutely essential - unless we are to slip into Idealism. And I have shown you many times that my view is what Thomas held. Otherwise the whole idea of creation becomes meaningless - as I and others have shown you.

And if esse is not actual existence, then it makes no sense to say that something non-actual can make something actual. In which case esse is just a meaningless concept arbitrarily introduced into the process of actualising a substance.

You are quite incoherent here. What are you saying?

But I don’t think Aquinas agrees at all with linus or prodigalson2011 about the nature of esse as conjoined to essences. More likely He would be spinning in his grave if God permitted it.

Sorry you disagree. Your default position can only be some form of Idealism

Also, since esse and potency is being continuously conjoined, if one says that essence has its own esse, it would seem that each contingent essence would have billions of distinct esse conjoined to it throughout its existence, which does not make any sense.

No. The esse of each being or substance is one act limited by the form or essence. It is the esse of one nature. You are raising a red herring that doesn’t exist.

It makes more sense to say that God actualises all potency with his esse; in other-words essence comes “into” existence and is sustained “in” existence as opposed to having its own finite bubble of esse.

That is what many other Idealists have mistakenly thought. I have already pointed out the delimma you have created for yourself. For God to create means for Him to create something that is absolutely other than Himself. If what you say is true, then God is creating Himself, which is silly. We have been over this before.

And yet another issue arises if we take what Linus and prodigalson2011 seriously. If all beings have there own distinct finite esse outside of God, then what is it exactly that exists in-between each finite substance? The absence of reality? Are we really to think that there are finite composites of esse and essence bouncing around in the absence of reality? Ridiculous!! Better to say we exist in the mind of God!!!

Obviously, between you and me, there exists an incalculable number of beings. Seems more like a scientific question than one of philosophy. I think, philosophically, we can say that in the created universe there is no place where there exists no created being. But really, you are just trying to create another red herring to distract the reader from the certral issue which is this. God and His creation are absolutley separate in their essence, existence, and operation.

It seems to me that Aquinas speaks of “Being” in different senses depending on the context; for example, when he speaks of the being of creatures, he simply means the essence of creatures as they exist, and not in the sense that they have their own esse.

I have shown you many times in this thread and others that this is not the case. If beings do not have their own esse then they are either equivalent to God or they are pure forms. So you are stuck on the horns of Idealism or God is all things or all things are God ( you put a name to that, I would call it some form of Pantheism.)

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

IMHO, God is OF everything, either directly or indirectly - even indirectly His awareness and ‘allowance’/‘assent’ must be there, because without God even Hell’s perverse powers and being could not exist.

God is ultimately the power and being behind ALL that is - the ultimate and eternal ‘esse’. Before anything was, He IS.

Agreed but that is not what the issue is. The issue is whether or not God actually is all things or visa versa. Linux would say he is not suggesting that but actually that is the end result of his philosophy. Though God operates in all things as our Catholic faith teaches, we must maintain that God and things or creatures are absolutely distinct in every way.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

Agreed but that is not what the issue is. The issue is whether or not God actually is all things or visa versa. Linux would say he is not suggesting that but actually that is the end result of his philosophy. Though God operates in all things as our Catholic faith teaches, we must maintain that God and things or creatures are absolutely distinct in every way.

Linus2nd

We need only maintain that the nature of God and the nature of creatures is absolutely and objectively distinct. In metaphysics we must maintain that existence and nature in respect of creation is absolutely and objectively distinct despite being conjoined.

 

[Linux]

On the contrary, Aquinas speaks of three kinds of esses, differentiated by how they are measured. Eternal, aeviternal, and those subject to time.

• God’s esse has no beginning.
• Aeviternal being’s esse has a beginning, but no end.
• Temporal being’s esse is subject to time.

When Aquinas speaks of the being of creatures as beginning to exist, he is speaking of the essence of a thing as it is actual and not as identical to the act of existence. An Aeviternal essence begins to be actual. A nature is finite only because its essence is not the act of existing. It has absolutely nothing to do with its “esse” beginning to exist and Aquinas has never said that esse begins to exist as a distinct thing from an essence. In the context of creatures, he is using the term “Being” only in an analogous sense since he himself recognizes that the essence of creatures and the act of existence is not the same thing, and so when he says that the being of a dog begins to exist he does not mean that existence and the nature which is a Dog begin to exist together. What he means is that the essence of a dog has become actual. “Natures”, wholly distinct from esse, begin to exist. Existence does not begin to exist.

In any respect, what Aquinas said or didn’t say is irrelevant in terms of refuting the logic of my argument. Arguments from authority are useless within this particular context. Also merely quoting an argument from Aquinas is also useless unless you can explain and demonstrate how his syllogism logically refutes my argument.

 

[utunumsint]

When Aquinas speaks of the being of creatures as beginning to exist, he is speaking of the essence of a thing as it is actual and not as identical to the act of existence. An Aeviternal essence begins to be actual. A nature is finite only because its essence is not the act of existing. It has absolutely nothing to do with its “esse” beginning to exist and Aquinas has never said that esse begins to exist as a distinct thing from an essence. In the context of creatures, he is using the term “Being” only in an analogous sense since he himself recognizes that the essence of creatures and the act of existence is not the same thing, and so when he says that the being of a dog begins to exist he does not mean that existence and the nature which is a Dog begin to exist together. What he means is that the essence of a dog has become actual. “Natures”, wholly distinct from esse, begin to exist. Existence does not begin to exist.

Essences - real things - do begin to exist - to have esse. That existence has a beginning in time caused by God, or have a beginning absolutely, as is the case with Angels, caused by God. We participate in God through causality. God, in his infinite esse, causes other beings to exist. Now in that very causality, there is a relation established. A fundamental relation. The effect (creation) participates in its cause (God) to a certain extent, but in a limited way. Limited by essence, I agree with that, but also limiting esse by its very essence. You can’t limit God’s esse. God’s esse is without limit. Therefore we have to use the language of causality because in no way do our essences constrain God’s act of being in the sense that we can see our act of being as being identical to God’s act of being. As Aquinas says very clearly here in the Summa contra Gentiles:

Things do not differ from one another by having existence, since they all agree in that. If things do differ from one another, therefore, this must come from the fact that the act of existence is possessed by specifically different natures. Things differ, therefore, by reason of their different natures receiving existence diversely in proportion to each nature. Now, the divine act of existence is possessed by no other nature but is itself the vary nature or essence of God. And so if the divine act of existence could be identified with the act of existence of all things, all things would coalesce together into the absolute unity of one single being…

So, at the very least, you can’t use say Aquinas supports your argument, although I will admit, it is hard to tell in some places.

In any respect, what Aquinas said or didn’t say is irrelevant in terms of refuting the logic of my argument. Arguments from authority are useless within this particular context. Also merely quoting an argument from Aquinas is also useless unless you can explain and demonstrate how his syllogism logically refutes my argument.

Fair enough. But I would appreciate it if you would acknowledged that Aquinas differs from you in this regard. Orthodoxy is important to me and I want people to realize that if they reject Aquinas, they are rejecting orthodoxy.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Linux]

… Limited by essence, I agree with that, but also limiting esse by its very essence.

On the contrary,

1. A nature begins to exist because it is conjoined to the “act” of existing, which cannot happen unless esse is already actual and distinct (the only esse that is itself a distinct nature is God; which is an important point for no other esse can meaningfully exist as a distinct thing in itself without it also being synonymously an essence). Otherwise it amounts to saying that God has taken two things that are not actual (esse and essence) and put them together to make them both actual, which doesn’t make any rational sense since that which is not actual has no power to make another thing actual. Linus’s interpretation of Aquinas renders the idea of esse arbitrary and functionally useless as it relates to actualizing substances. In which case, why does God need an “esse” when it is his power alone that actualizes and sustains things in existence? Obviously the idea, although it may appear legitimate on the service, is very problematic and does more harm to God’s intelligence than anything else. Therefore for good reason i reject Linus’s interpretation as erroneous and short sighted.
2. Essences cannot cause esse, for an essence has no existential power by itself or as distinct from esse, so it is meaningless to speak of an essence limiting an esse unless created essences are not really distinct from the act of existence (If they are not objectively distinct, even after being conjoined, this leads to ontological contradictions). I don’t believe Aquinas made such a mistake, and if he is to remain logically consistent with the esse and essence distinction - including the absolute subordination of essences to esse for their actuality or the exercise of their natural power - then Aquinas would have to say that what he really means by essences limiting esse is that the degree to which a thing is actual is limited by the kind of nature it has. In other words he is not saying that an essence is literally limiting the existence of the act of existence, but rather he is saying that things are actual only to the degree to which they participate in the act of existing.

So, at the very least, you can’t say Aquinas supports your argument, although I will admit, it is hard to tell in some places.

Actually Aquinas does support my argument. Your interpretation of Aquinas does not.

Fair enough. But I would appreciate it if you would acknowledged that Aquinas differs from you in this regard.

It is not clear that he does. You yourself admit that such is not clear sometimes. So it really comes down to whether or not Aquinas contradicted himself on a number of occasions or had the misfortune of wording things in a confusing manner.

Orthodoxy is important to me and I want people to realize that if they reject Aquinas, they are rejecting orthodoxy.

God bless,
Ut

The metaphysics of Aquinas does not equal infallible dogma; otherwise Aquinas in terms if his metaphysics would be taught dogmatically by the church.

Save the tricks for somebody more gullible.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Actually Aquinas does support my argument. Your interpretation of Aquinas does not.

If this is so, why have you consistently either failed or refused to engage the majority of my rebuttals, particularly those which have made reference to Aquinas?

For instance, the one in which Aquinas specifically says that rational souls have being in their own right, or that that whereby a thing acts, is its act.

Your debate tactic seems to have become a system of repeating yourself while ignoring any substantial objections.

 

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If this is so, why have you consistently either failed or refused to engage the majority of my rebuttals, particularly those which have made reference to Aquinas?

If your interpretation of Aquinas is wrong, then it is not with Aquinas that i have a problem, but rather iit is your interpretation. One way i can deal with that is by refuting the reasoning of your interpretation by exposing its logical flaws and its failure to produce a meaningful conception of esse and essence. I have done this especially in post 515 which you have yet again evaded by producing yet another red herring.

For instance, the one in which Aquinas specifically says that rational souls have being in their own right,

If they have being in their own right then they don’t need God to actualize them. But i think we can both agree that’s not what Aquinas intended to mean, but it sure looks like it. This again illustrates my point that we should not take Aquinas’ wording for granted as he can be confusing at times. The only way to get a sufficient understanding of Aquinas is to first understand the underlying metaphysical principles on which Aquinas bases his Arguments and then interpret his words in light of those principles. I don’t think that you do have a sufficient understanding.

or that that whereby a thing acts, is its act.

I can see how one could think that Aquinas is saying here that a created essence is identical with esse; but like i said…

Your debate tactic seems to have become a system of repeating yourself while ignoring any substantial objections.

What substantial objections? I have not seen any from you. All i have seen is a lot of assertions and assumptions about what Aquinas did or did not mean that do not tally up with the logical consequences of his esse/essence distinction.