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prodigalson2011
Guest
How am I evading a post that wasn’t even directed at me?If your interpretation of Aquinas is wrong, then it is not with Aquinas that i have a problem, but rather iit is your interpretation. One way i can deal with that is by refuting the reasoning of your interpretation by exposing its logical flaws and its failure to produce a meaningful conception of esse and essence. I have done this especially in post 515 which you have yet again evaded by producing yet another red herring.
I offered a rather intelligible analogy in my last series of posts, to which you did not bother to respond. So I offer it again:
*As regards the creation of contingent esses, we start from an observable fact of the principle of causation. Namely, it can be readily observed that a cause effects its like. We can take as an example, again, the case of fire. Let us imagine, specifically, the act of fire upon, say, a leaf. The effect is that the leaf is now also on fire. But it is not that the flame that touched the leaf has transferred itself to the leaf, but rather, it has ignited the potential of fire within the leaf (that is, those properties of the leaf that make it flammable.) In a similar way, God ignites the potential existence of an essence. Let us further imagine that the flame which imparted fire unto the leaf is not itself contingent upon any fuel for its subsistence. Thus we see that the leaf has received its own act of fire from perfect fire.
Now, we know that any fire will keep burning so long as it has the necessary fuel (oxygen). In other words, it is necessary to the subsistence of fire that it exist in an oxygenated atmosphere. Similarly, since outside of existence is nothingness, a particular act of existence must exist within the atmosphere of existence itself, for God is not only the flame (existence-giver), he is also the fuel (existence-sustainer). In other words, as a flame will be extinguished if deprived of oxygen, so will contingent existence cease to be if deprived of God’s sustaining power.*
In other words, an essence has potential to exist, but that existence must be given to it by something which has the power to cause existence. And as a thing effects its like, God has such power. But like the flame, the existence he bestows is not His existence.
I don’t think you have as sufficient an understanding as you think you do. If your interpretation is correct, then not only myself, but the overwhelming majority, if not the totality, of Thomistic scholars over the past several hundred years don’t understand him properly either.If they have being in their own right then they don’t need God to actualize them. But i think we can both agree that’s not what Aquinas intended to mean, but it sure looks like it. This again illustrates my point that we should not take Aquinas’ wording for granted as he can be confusing at times. The only way to get a sufficient understanding of Aquinas is to first understand the underlying metaphysical principles on which Aquinas bases his Arguments and then interpret his words in light of those principles. I don’t think that you do have a sufficient understanding.
A thing that has being in its own right is a thing that has its own act of existence. As is thoroughly expressed in my argument above, the possession of an individual act does not mean that the thing does not itself need to be actualized by a causal agent, nor that it does not need the sustenance of something outside of itself. These are all distinct things.
This has become your mantra, but it’s an evasion. As I have repeatedly said: esse and essence are distinct, but they are nevertheless both parts of the creature.I can see how one could think that Aquinas is saying here that a created essence is identical with esse; but like i said…
But that’s besides the point in this case, because the quoted passage has nothing to do with whether or not esse and essence are distinct; it has to do with what part of the creature has operative power. That whereby an agent acts is its act means that an essence has no causal power; the act whereby a thing exists gives the creature its operative power. The essence is the vehicle, the esse is the driver. A car and a driver are not identical, but cars neither build nor operate themselves. If your argument is correct, then the human will is God.
What substantial objections? I have not seen any from you. All i have seen is a lot of assertions and assumptions about what Aquinas did or did not mean that do not tally up with the logical consequences of his esse/essence distinction.