If by that you mean there cannot be different kinds of esse, I agree and that is why i reject your understanding of esse in regards to creatures.
Yes, I mean there cannot be different kinds of esse because esse is an active or operative principle. Esse provides the “is” of a given thing; that is all it ever does.
God is esse, he is the act of existence, and that is why he exists neccesarily; and that is why i reject the idea that he creates a different kind of esse.
God is not simply esse, and nowhere else will you find him referred to as such. Esse alone is not a thing but an act, like a push. God is a being whose essence is that act, and who thus requires nothing else to perfect that act in Him.
If it is not identical to a thing then it is a thing in itself, and therefore esse is an essence identically speaking; otherwise it is logically meaningless to speak of an esse that is distinct from the essence it actualises and at the same time is not a distinct essence itself and thus not an actual thing. It is nothing at all if it is not itself an essence. A finite esse as you present it is an ontologically meaningless concept.
Is a push an “essence” or a “thing in itself”? No, it is an act initiated by one thing and received by another. It has no existence outside the relationship between its producer and its receiver. So long as a hand pushes a book along a table, that book is in the act of motion. So long as God, in his infinite power, sustains a creature in existence, that creature is in “the act of existing,” an act by which it
has, not
is, being, since its act is received by external causation.
Potency must be actualised by that which is **not potency **but is in fact actual, and that happens by conjoining act to potency.
Act and potency are not conjoined; things are
moved from potency to act. The esse of creation is moved from potency to act by God’s infinite power and in turn moves the essence which receives it from potency to act; just as the hand is moved from potency to act and in turn moves the book from potency to act.
Otherwise it makes no sense, since more would be coming from less.
No, if “esse” is the effect of God, it is an effect of infinite power, and thus is certainly greater than that which receives it.
If you put **esse **on the same level as a potency then esse itself needs to be conjoined to esse inorder to exist since it is a potency.
Esse is
not an existent thing like a substance. It is an act received by an essence
in posse which is in turn moved to being
in esse.
But the whole point of esse being conjoined to essence is to show logically how all potency is actualised. Thus it cannot be reasonably concluded that esse is actualised from potency, if the principe of esse in the first place is precisley the basis by which we explain the actualisation of all potency.
“Esse is to essence as act is to potency.” Essence (potency) and esse (act) are principles
within substances; so clearly acts and substances are different things. Esse, for instance, is an act, not a substance. God is a substance whose essence is that act. Therefore, having existence in and of Himself, he can effect existence upon created things, just as fire effects fire.
No it does not. Esse actualises all instances of change
It’s a little strange to me that, given that you are arguing that He is the only esse, you constantly seem to leave God out of the argument. Since God is self-subsistent esse, he does indeed actualize all things, including the
esse of other things.
(which it cannot do if it two needs to be constantly actualised along with a particular essence to which it is not identical).
I think you’ve really kind of shot yourself in the foot here. Here you are saying that if esse is as I describe it, it would have to be constantly actualized (sustained), whereas before you said if esse were as I describe it, it would
not have to be sustained. Which is it?
In any case, so long as it is being sustained it has the power to actualize change.
The actualisation of potency, from nothing to something, is not cuased by an essence. It is purey a function of esse, which is how change is made possible in the first place.
The actualization of potency is not caused by an essence, yet you contend that esse is an essence.
Secondary cuases speak about the kinds of change that are proper to a things particular essence; the kind of cuase and effect spoken of by science.
Though I think I may have mistermed it is such, the esse of a thing is an effect of
the Primary Cause: God. Creatures themselves are secondary causes. This, however, does not affect my argument.
Thats irattional, if by effect you mean an esse that proceeds from God as a distinct thing, since God cannot create an essence that is identical to esse and niether can he create kinds of esse.
It is not a
distinct thing in terms of being an existent substance; it is a distinct
effective action which proceeds
naturally from God’s being (
an agent effects its like).
Esse has to be an actual thing in itself inorder to actualise something distinct.
God is an actual thing whose creative power actualizes distinct things through the imparting of
an act of existence.
Then insofar as ontology is concerened it is a meaningless thing that you are talking about.
No, it is not. I think you are just looking at this from a very narrow ontological perspective.