How far should hypotheticals figure in moral thought?

[fakename]

say that you think a candidate will both end abortion and possibly fight a war with china. Are you to not vote for him/her based on hypotheticals?

Even so, a lot of human action is action in a world of uncertainty -I might know that putting my fingers to the keyboard would produce writing but I don’t know if a meteor might cut my existence short yet I still go on typing -hypotheticals can’t stop our action. Yet things that probably might happen often stop our actions (I’ll stop typing since it is likely that I’ll be called to wash the car) -so at the same time hypothetical considerations could stop our actions.

Now that my initial thoughts have been put down, I also want to ask, in connection w/the above, for the principle of double effect -should we worry whether the immediate consequences, and/or far-off consequences of the action we will take is good? That is, if a isn’t intrinsically evil and it causes b and b is an evil not disproportionate to the reason for doing a, but b further causes c which is disproportionate to the reasons of a, then should we reject a?

Thanks a bunch

 

[LeafByNiggle]

I think these are not so much hypothetical considerations as probabilistic ones. Whether we realize it or not, we are always evaluating probabilities. And we give more weight and consideration to outcomes that are more likely and less consideration to those that very unlikely. In addition to probabilities, we are also evaluating costs or benefits of various outcomes. The combination of probabilities and costs/benefits (in a moral sense) is what guides our decisions.

Catholic theology in several places acknowledges the role of probability in moral decision making. For example, we are permitted to use lethal force to protect our life only if there is a reasonable chance of success. “Reasonable chance of success” means the probability of the desired outcome is high enough. Exactly what that probability threshold is numerically is not given. But the implication is that probability should be taken into account.

The principles that guide our moral decision making may be absolute, but the application of those principles often involves considerations of uncertainty and probability.

 

[fakename]

any further replies?

 

[fakename]

Anything else?

 

[JAW642]

say that you think a candidate will both end abortion and possibly fight a war with china. Are you to not vote for him/her based on hypotheticals?

Even so, a lot of human action is action in a world of uncertainty -I might know that putting my fingers to the keyboard would produce writing but I don’t know if a meteor might cut my existence short yet I still go on typing -hypotheticals can’t stop our action. Yet things that probably might happen often stop our actions (I’ll stop typing since it is likely that I’ll be called to wash the car) -so at the same time hypothetical considerations could stop our actions.

Now that my initial thoughts have been put down, I also want to ask, in connection w/the above, for the principle of double effect -should we worry whether the immediate consequences, and/or far-off consequences of the action we will take is good? That is, if a isn’t intrinsically evil and it causes b and b is an evil not disproportionate to the reason for doing a, but b further causes c which is disproportionate to the reasons of a, then should we reject a?

Thanks a bunch

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TO: fakename – Original Poster ( OP ),

From JAW642 on 03/23/2011

Reply # 02 by LeafByNiggle is a very good answer.

We are morally responsible for the PROBABLE consequences of the actions we take. And not for the POSSIBLE consequences.

PROBABLE consequences meaning what most likely or very likely, will immediately result from Action A.

There could be thousands of different POSSIBLE consequences which could or might result from Action A, but only a few that are PROBABLE ( or very likely ) to occur.

If Action A is not intrinsically evil, in and of itself, and you know that it will PROBABLY ( or very likely ) cause Result B to occur, which if done separately and deliberately normally could be considered bad or not very good, then you are still morally allowed to perform Action A, as long as it is not your INTENTION that Result B will probably occur, but rather Result B happens pretty much automatically, which you do not have full control over.

You certainly do not need to worry about Result C and D and E etc., which Could be remote POSSIBLE consequences of Action A and Result B.

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Example 1.

Pretty unlikely, but still possible. A young male is wrestling an opponent in a regional wrestling competition in front of a large audience. Perhaps the male has not masturbated in 3 or 4 days, or even a week. Even though the guy is not gay, he starts getting a full erection during the competition, simply due to the physical bodily contact between himself and his opponent. Or maybe the opponent, in a legal and legitimate maneuver, either unintentionally or deliberately to win the match, rests his hand or arm right over the guy’s erecting penis. The guy then realizes that he is about to cum, and so it happens. Hopefully, the guy is wearing a thick jock strap ! ] Because he lacked full control and full consent of his will, he is not guilty of masturbation, even though the ejaculation is every bit as pleasurable as when he ejaculates at night on his own. He does not need to stop in the middle of the match. He can knowingly and deliberately continue with the wrestling match, and he is allowed to permit his penis to ejaculate without any sin being committed on his part.

Here is what Father Farraher has written when he was talking about the application of the principle of the twofold effect.

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Father Farraher also points out that sexual stimulation by a married couple is morally licit if it leads to natural vaginal intercourse or completes the marital act.'2 Farraher is very exact about what constitutes grave malice in masturbation when he writes: "for a person to be formally guilty of a mortal sin of masturbation his act must be a fully deliberate choice of what he fully realizes is seriously sinful."13 If such an act is done with only partial realization, or partial consent of the will, it is a venial sin; and “if there is no free choice of the will there is no guilt of sin at all even if the person is aware of what he is doing.”'4 Farraher goes on to point out that there is no sin even when a person foresees that sexual stimulation and orgasm will result from some action that the person is freely performing, provided that he does not intend such stimulation, but merely permits it, and that he has a sufficiently good reason for doing it. (This is simply an application of the principle of the twofold effect.)'5

Farraher corrects the misunderstanding that many Catholics have that if they experience sexual stimulation, however unwillingly, they have committed mortal sin.16

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From JAW642 on 03/23/2011

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[valentino]

say that you think a candidate will both end abortion and possibly fight a war with china. Are you to not vote for him/her based on hypotheticals?

Even so, a lot of human action is action in a world of uncertainty -I might know that putting my fingers to the keyboard would produce writing but I don’t know if a meteor might cut my existence short yet I still go on typing -hypotheticals can’t stop our action. Yet things that probably might happen often stop our actions (I’ll stop typing since it is likely that I’ll be called to wash the car) -so at the same time hypothetical considerations could stop our actions.

Now that my initial thoughts have been put down, I also want to ask, in connection w/the above, for the principle of double effect -should we worry whether the immediate consequences, and/or far-off consequences of the action we will take is good? That is, if a isn’t intrinsically evil and it causes b and b is an evil not disproportionate to the reason for doing a, but b further causes c which is disproportionate to the reasons of a, then should we reject a?

Thanks a bunch

it sounds to me that your asking whats worse abortion or starting a war.In this particular case IMO you’d hve to vote for the candidate whose against abortion even if he’s likely to favor for going tjo war.

 

[valentino]

say that you think a candidate will both end abortion and possibly fight a war with china. Are you to not vote for him/her based on hypotheticals?

Even so, a lot of human action is action in a world of uncertainty -I might know that putting my fingers to the keyboard would produce writing but I don’t know if a meteor might cut my existence short yet I still go on typing -hypotheticals can’t stop our action. Yet things that probably might happen often stop our actions (I’ll stop typing since it is likely that I’ll be called to wash the car) -so at the same time hypothetical considerations could stop our actions.

Now that my initial thoughts have been put down, I also want to ask, in connection w/the above, for the principle of double effect -should we worry whether the immediate consequences, and/or far-off consequences of the action we will take is good? That is, if a isn’t intrinsically evil and it causes b and b is an evil not disproportionate to the reason for doing a, but b further causes c which is disproportionate to the reasons of a, then should we reject a?

Thanks a bunch

Cant do that.If abortion say can be defeated but your not positive that were going to have to start a war(or go to war)against China,you cant say for instance I think going to war against China is worse than abortion therefore since the possibility of going to war is likely i will vote for abortion(or really any other issue)

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Cant do that.If abortion say can be defeated but your not positive that were going to have to start a war(or go to war)against China,you cant say for instance I think going to war against China is worse than abortion therefore since the possibility of going to war is likely i will vote for abortion(or really any other issue)

This kind of thinking seems to ignore the role of probability as discussed earlier in this thread. Your analysis might apply if you really were voting for or against abortion. But in fact you are voting for a person. That person may or may not carry out his or her campaign promises. And even if that person does follow through, the result may not be any change in the law. Consider the case if an outspoken pro-abortion canididate running for local drain commissioner. His opinion about abortion is not likely to find any expression in the performance of his duties as drain commissioner. Is it required to vote for his opponent who is pro-life but who may have some very undesirable ideas on how the drains ought to be managed? One of the biggest dangers in setting up unthinking rules like “pro-life over pro-abortion no matter what else” is that politicians will (and may have already) adapt to this potential block of voters and state a position that will guarantee them a vote from this block without having to follow through, since the rule is unthinking and does not allow for checking up on follow through, and maybe withholding that vote the next time around.

 

[valentino]

Leafbynage: Yes,but who isable to tell if this politicain will adapt to the blockand do such andsuch and such?In thinking this way ones saying I cant be sure of anything so I’ll vot e for the good drain comm.because 1 things for sure he’s the best drain comm.But since we cont knowthe eventuallity of the position one will ultimately take dont we have to votefor the comm.who atleast said he was .pro-life(or pro-abortion whichever view you take)?

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Leafbynage: Yes,but who isable to tell if this politicain will adapt to the blockand do such andsuch and such?In thinking this way ones saying I cant be sure of anything so I’ll vot e for the good drain comm.because 1 things for sure he’s the best drain comm.

I don’t think you are understanding what probablility means here. There are some things we know for sure. Then there are some things we have no idea about. But the vast majority of things are in-between - things we are not absolutely sure about, but we have some idea of the probability. We work with probability all the time. Any time I drive a car, I know that I could be killed in an accident. But I also know that the probability of that event is low, so I do it anyway. I eat fresh spinach from the grocery store, even thought there is a small probability it could be contaminated. And I invest some money in the stock market, even though I know there is a small probability I will lose most of my money in a market crash. There is no reason to think that we should disregard probability when it comes to moral decision making.

For those of you who do not have a county Drain Commissioner, the duties involve planning, developing, and maintaining surface water drainage systems facilitated by natural or artificial creeks or a massive pipe for carrying storm water. I picked that office because it is as far from having an effect on abortion as I could imagine. So even if a person who happens be pro-abortion gets that job, there is nothing having that job is likely to do to further the cause of abortions. And since he would probably not mention abortion in his campaign, we would have to assume that I found out about his position from unrelated personal conversations. It would be unreasonable to deny that job to someone who is well-qualified for the required duties just because of an opinion that person holds on a subject that has nothing to do with their duties. On the other hand, giving that job to an incompetent person just because that person happens to have a pro-life view of abortion is likely to lead to poorly managed wetlands, pollution in our creeks, and destructive flooding. The fact that the candidate happens to oppose abortion will not save a single baby.

But since we cont knowthe eventuallity of the position one will ultimately take dont we have to votefor the comm.who atleast said he was .pro-life?

No, that was my whole point. In that particular contest, abortion was not the issue. If you think otherwise, then put forth an explanation of why that should be so.