Part 1 of 2
There are three main problems if you consider thought, feeling and consciousness as non-physical: (1) How a non-physical phenomena could interact with matter, (2) How thought and feeling interact with consciousness and (3) The problem of non-locality which states that a conscious being should experience everything because all points in space are equivalent.
There are 3 relevant facts on this matter:
- The mind is nonphysical.
- The brain is physical.
- The mind and the brain interact with each other.
I try not to go beyond these facts without adding more
facts. To the contrary, you go beyond these facts by adding
speculation, unverified theories,
redefined terms, etc. To rebut my points, you need to add facts, like empirical facts that disproves any of the 3 facts that I stated.
As for your objections, I can say that I have not come across any good responses to the interaction problem; however, this alone does not make dualism false. It could mean that the interaction occurs, but we just don’t know how it occurs. I believe though that self-directed neuroplasticity research is a promising area of research that will help explain the interaction problem, since the research provides empirical, testable, and predictable evidence for mental entities (thoughts, desires, mental imagery) causing changes in physical entities (the brain). A lot can be learned from observing this process.
As for your third objection, I don’t agree with your claim that nonphysicality implies omnipresence. Only matter can occupy space, and this is true for one location or all locations.
What evidence do you have that mind is an emergent phenomena?
There are 2 lines of evidence: irreducibility and downward causation (in the form of mental causation)
Irreducibility. The evidence is the trend in research. If you study the history of scientific research on consciousness, you’ll notice it started by positing that consciousness was generated by a particular brain region (local theories) and then research shifted towards more global theories. As a result of the evidence, few scientists today accept that a particular brain region generates consciousness. The notable theories these days involve ‘global’ theories where there are different areas of the brain involved in collaborative interactions that give rise to conscious experience. Eventually, this trend may lead to scientists considering factors outside of the brain, such as electromagnetic fields, nonlocality, etc. The more global you go with these theories, then the more you’re moving away from finding the cause rooted in neurons. This shows that consciousness, is an emergent property since it is not a feature that the lower level (ie neurons) functions of the brain can account for.
Downward causation. Downward causation in a system involves higher level entities or parts (e.g. the mind) being able to cause/change lower level parts (the physical parts of the brain). It’s like the whole determining the behavior of the parts. The materialist view is that the parts (of the brain) give rise to the consciousness, and they use that to claim that the mind is physical. This is why materialist rely on reductionism because it presumes an upward causation (the parts leading to functions of the whole), so that reducing consciousness to its physical constituents would shed light on its cause. However, there is also evidence that the mind can also determine (downward causation) the behavior of these parts. The best evidence for this can be found in self-directed neuroplasticity studies that show mental causation. Reductionism, as the materialists conceive of it, does not work here.
I’ll wrap it up with a good definition of ‘emergence’ (from
here… ““emergent properties” or “emergence” refer to those properties that arise from the collaborative functioning of a system, but do not belong to any one part of that system. In other words, emergent properties are properties of a group that are not possible when any of the individual elements of that group act alone.””
The 2 lines of evidence that I brought up explains how the mind fits into the scientific concept of ‘emergent properties’. The mind can not be accounted for at the basic level of the brain but instead involves the “collaborating functioning of a system”. And if we factor in Dr. David Chalmers definition, the mind can be said to be an example of ‘
strong emergence’ since it has causative powers.
No, this is example of two type of matters experiencing each other. They are of course in two different physical states and that define which type of interaction we should expect from them, in simple word how do they respond to an external stimuli.
In
post #37, you said that “thought” was a physical state. If experience just involves interaction or reaction (by your standards), then thoughts are an example in that thoughts can be a reaction to other thoughts, feelings, and experiences. If this would not suffice then you will have to give me an example of what I’d have to show. Lets also not lose track of the bigger picture here. Your argument about “physical
states” does not apply to my argument that’s about “properties”. My view is simply that mental phenomena are properties (features, abilities, etc) of the brain.
Continued…