How to argue with subjective moralists

[Oreoracle]

What is the percentage of the human population which considers murder to be immoral? 99.9% maybe. A subjectivity which is almost species wide stops looking like subjectivity. Or else you have to stop believing it to be objectively true when you assert the sky to be blue. The idea such a statement is objectively true is, after all, based upon nothing more than the almost universal perception that the sky is blue.

It appears that you’ve been banned. I guess I’ll respond anyway, in case you’re still reading these posts.

This is the typical response I hear, but you fail to recognize that every culture/ideology has a different idea of what “murder” is. To Gandhi and other pacifists, almost any killing of humans and even other animals qualifies as murder (Gandhi was a vegetarian of course). To Catholics, there’s always room to justify killing non-human animals, but the rest is murky. Some Catholics tote the principle of double effect when it comes to abortion and warfare, which attempts to justify killing based on the intentions of the killer (or the purpose of the killing, if you will). Others don’t seem as convinced, and so they always disapprove of abortion. Curiously enough, they don’t seem to be uncomfortable with killing enemy soldiers.

In some societies, the immorality of killing can sometimes be affected by the respective castes of the victim and the killer. Killing a bothersome individual of a lower class would hardly be considered murder. And still others believe that certain deaths are willed by God or are “meant to happen.” There is no consistent idea of what it means to murder, because we all have varying opinions about which killings are justifiable.

As for your “sky is blue” example, we have science for that. The appearance of blue can be explained by how the atmosphere bends light, and it isn’t just based on our perspective at sea level. Regardless, there is certainly a difference between saying that something is blue and that it is evil. The fact that one claim requires sensory perception and the other requires only conception explains a lot.

 

[Leela]

I thought I’ve been pretty clear that morality doesn’t exist.

Woah there!

This is exactly the sort of talk that makes non-belief seem absurd to believers. Some things are obviously better than others. Non-belief doesn’t have to equate to nihilism.

You keep conflating the issue of whether anything is better or worse than anything else with the question of how do we know what is best. I don’t think we disagree about our epistemic situation, but that is a separate issue from whether or not it is possible for an assertion about morality to be true or false.

In this discussion we’d all do well to keep strait the three terms in Plato’s formulation of knowledge as justified true belief. “Belief” stands in for the fact that a person is required for knowledge–somebody must think something. “Justified” stands in for the fact that
the only route we’ve in practice discovered to yield things that are true is by sharing our thoughts with our community, and then by a process of trial-and-error called “justification,” built up good cause for believing such-and-such to be true. “True” stands in for the fact that you cannot reduce “truth” to “justification,” even though justification is the only route we know of to truth.

Best,
Leela

 

[Oreoracle]

You misunderstood what I was saying, I think. When children are told continually that “everyone has a right to their opinion”, with the implication that nobody’s opinion is better than anybody else’s, they reach high school with the pernicious idea that all opinions are equal. I’m not saying that this is how you’ve reached your conclusion, however.

Okay, I’m just saying that talk of rights doesn’t breed relativism. You did present it as a reason for “why there are more and more relativists.” I do agree that it makes people more passive, though.

I don’t see where I said “the evil relativists are intentionally avoiding the truth,” or even implied that. I think you’re reading too much into my statement.

Maybe I am. One of the disadvantages of disputing between ideologies is that each side gathers preconceptions about the other side over time. You become suspicious of others after hearing the same arguments fifty times or more. I’ll try not to be so hasty in my interpretations.

The judgment that a painting is beautiful is a function of my psychology and the painting itself. Obviously, the form and content of the painting matter here. I do believe that there are certain objective qualities that create objective beauty, over and above all our ideas of beauty. Certainly, some ideas of beauty can be culturally defined, which affects people’s psychology: but these ideas are either emphases within the category of “actually beautiful” or (rarely) perverse ideas of beauty detached from form and content.

Okay, but if beauty is grounded in psychology then it is necessarily grounded in subjectivity. One’s consciousness and psyche is about as subjective as it gets, no? Indeed, one’s consciousness/mind/psyche is the subject.

Beethoven is objectively more beautiful than Ozzy Osborne, for example.

Depends on what you mean by “beautiful.” Classical music becomes bothersome after several minutes of hearing it. The emotional pieces lack energy, and the energetic pieces lack emotion. I think rock gives you the best of both worlds, and so I would probably say it’s a more beautiful genre.

If it’s objectively beautiful, how did you chance upon that knowledge?

The same way that we learn to make scientific inferences: by being taught. Surely, my education in aesthetics is imperfect, but hopefully not irreparably so. Just as a scientist teaches the amateur what sorts of inferences are valid and invalid in a given discipline, an English teacher (for example) educates about what sorts of inferences a person can make about objective beauty from evidence – although we don’t make it sound as dull as all that.

Oh come now. My teacher and I have dramatically different ideas of what constitutes beautiful writing, or even which styles are more flowing and clear. For example, he says that my writing is uneconomical, that I add too many parenthetical remarks, and so on. I tell him that the lengthy phrases and complex sentences allow me to provide emphasis where it is needed and to elaborate my ideas. My vocabulary allows me to describe objects in relatively few words, though he sees me as bombastic.

Beautiful writing, to myself and most others, is effective writing. What is effective and what is ineffective is determined by the end that is sought, and the mindset of the readers. This sounds overwhelmingly subjective to me.

How did you chance upon the knowledge that the earth revolves around the sun? You surely don’t claim that you would have come to it without other people to help?

Correct. That conclusion was not determined by psychology.

I will give you this much, as a difference: science is self-corrective, to a degree, at least after we have found the scientific method. Aesthetics are not self-corrective, but they rely upon people having insight. Insight proceeds from our inherent capacities, which are unequally possessed by different people. The problem is that we have this idea that “nobody is a better evaluater of beauty than anybody else” – we realize how perfectly bizarre it would be to say this about science.

Fair enough, but how do you determine who perceives beauty better than others? Is there an empirical method for determining the beauty of an object?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Prodigal_Son: Well, here’s the problem with your position. You think that moral judgments are directly intuited from observations – but we have examples of different people intuiting different moral judgments about the same exact situations. You claim that some of these people have a defect in their perceptive faculties (that they are “moralblind”) – but how do you know that your intuition is the correct one? How do you then know that you yourself are not “moralblind”? Apparently, a moralblind person doesn’t know that he’s moralblind. So how do we go about distinguishing a “correct” moral intuition from an “incorrect” moral intuition? There must be a standard that we use to distinguish correct perceptions from incorrect perceptions. I’m curious what it is.

I *don’t *know that I’m not moralblind. I cannot be certain, at any time, that my conscience is well formed; all I can do is try, with all my mind and my spirit, to educate my conscience. I assume that my mind has the capacity to latch onto moral truths, just as we all assume that the senses portray reality accurately. But I don’t “know that I know” moral truths, nor is such second-order knowledge possible about sensory perception.

As Leela said, “You keep conflating the issue of whether anything is better or worse than anything else with the question of how do we know what is best.” You want there to be a science to determining value, but there isn’t. It does not follow that objective value does not exist.

I’m going to let Oreoracle continue this particular subthread discussion, but I’ll just point out that I know some metal fans who would seriously disagree (To be fair, I think that most of them would cite Led Zepp before Ozzy or Black Sabbath, but either way…). How do you propose to tell whose perceptions are “right” in this instance?

I don’t. Perhaps metal music, in some contexts, can work as a purgative, and be psychologically beneficial. But, by and large, its beauty does not compare to Beethoven. (Although I admit I do like “Stairway”). People will differ in tastes, but there are objective qualities of beauty, timeless qualities that create aspiration, catharsis, and tranquility in the soul. The humanities educator ought to tap into these qualities. As Flannery O’Connor says:

In other ages the attention of children was held by Homer and Virgil, among others, but, by the reverse evolutionary process, that is no longer possible; our children are too stupid now to enter the past imaginatively. No one asks the student if algebra pleases him or if he finds it satisfactory that some French verbs are irregular, but if he prefers Hersey to Hawthorne, his taste must prevail. …

And if the student finds that this is not to his taste? Well, that is regrettable. Most regrettable. His taste should not be consulted; it is being formed.

Consider human beauty, for example: doubtless, ideals of beauty change somewhat over time, but certain traits remain common. To say there is no objectively beautiful song is equivalent to saying there is no objectively beautiful woman, and that is plainly false. How do we know which woman is objectively beautiful? By meeting her, knowing her mannerisms, seeing who she is “when the makeup is off”. Beauty is a matter of familiarity with the good – and, in people, the good is always bound up in bodies and souls.

There is a diligence necessary to distinguish worth from worthlessness. But, with the wrong aesthetic sensibilities, even that diligence won’t pay off.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Okay, but if beauty is grounded in psychology then it is necessarily grounded in subjectivity. One’s consciousness and psyche is about as subjective as it gets, no? Indeed, one’s consciousness/mind/psyche is the subject.

Whoa, whoa, whoa. I didn’t say beauty was grounded solely in psychology, but *partially *in psychology. Beauty is a dynamic. The content and form of a work of art impress themselves upon the observer, much like the meaning of a mathematical equation impresses itself on the student. The question is: does the student know what to do with that equation? Does the observer know what to make of the artwork?

This is where psychology comes in, in the subject’s ability to “decode” the aesthetic. Is it evocative? Is it rich in meaning, or is it tawdry? Is it sentimental and vulgar or elegant and serene? Judgments of these things have clear answers, but some people do not know the answers. Likewise, “is it beautiful?” has an answer, but not all people will be attuned to the particular kind of (objective) beauty captured by the artist.

Depends on what you mean by “beautiful.” Classical music becomes bothersome after several minutes of hearing it. The emotional pieces lack energy, and the energetic pieces lack emotion. I think rock gives you the best of both worlds, and so I would probably say it’s a more beautiful genre.

Comparing genres is impossible, because both abound in good and bad examples. But your comment on classical music misses the mark. (Listen to Ennio Morricone’s soundtrack to The Mission, if you want a taste of classical energy and emotion).

If it’s objectively beautiful, how did you chance upon that knowledge?

By perceiving it. (As I said above, though, I admit I could be wrong).

Oh come now. My teacher and I have dramatically different ideas of what constitutes beautiful writing, or even which styles are more flowing and clear. For example, he says that my writing is uneconomical, that I add too many parenthetical remarks, and so on. I tell him that the lengthy phrases and complex sentences allow me to provide emphasis where it is needed and to elaborate my ideas. My vocabulary allows me to describe objects in relatively few words, though he sees me as bombastic.

Beautiful writing, to myself and most others, is effective writing. What is effective and what is ineffective is determined by the end that is sought, and the mindset of the readers. This sounds overwhelmingly subjective to me.

Well, of course, there is room for rhetoric: using language as a means to an end. But there is good rhetoric and bad rhetoric. Good rhetoric can include multiple different styles – long, flowing 19th century sentences; short, crisp “Hemingwayian” sentences; meandering prose filled with parenthetical asides. The aesthetic questions, among others: does the author commit to the style? Does the author use variation? Is the writing clear, or (if opaque) purposefully opaque? Does form reflect content?

There is obviously bad writing and good writing. To say it’s just a matter of opinion is absurd.

Correct. That conclusion was not determined by psychology.

Neither is the perception of beauty *determined *by psychology, as explained above.

Fair enough, but how do you determine who perceives beauty better than others? Is there an empirical method for determining the beauty of an object?

No. Refer back to my quotation from Pascal, on the intuitive mind. You can’t make this into a math problem, even though there is a right answer.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

This is exactly the sort of talk that makes non-belief seem absurd to believers.

You got that right.

 

[AntiTheist]

I *don’t *know that I’m not moralblind. I cannot be certain, at any time, that my conscience is well formed; all I can do is try, with all my mind and my spirit, to educate my conscience. I assume that my mind has the capacity to latch onto moral truths, just as we all assume that the senses portray reality accurately. But I don’t “know that I know” moral truths, nor is such second-order knowledge possible about sensory perception.

But a 19th century slave owner could make exactly the same argument to justify his perception that slavery is moral. In fact, 19th century slave owners did make the argument that they perceived slavery as moral. And some 19th century educated slaves made the same arguments about slavery (there were at least a handful of slave poets who wrote poems praising their masters and the institution of slavery).

If you’re saying that you have no way of knowing whether your perception of morality is accurate, you’re making the same exact argument as I am, except that I go the extra step of noting that there’s no reason to think that there are “moral realities” apart from our judgments.

As Leela said, “You keep conflating the issue of whether anything is better or worse than anything else with the question of how do we know what is best.”

Because the two issues are inseparable: in order to know that something is “better” than something else, objectively, then there needs to be some way to tell which things are “better” – and you can’t use people’s “perceptions” because obviously different people “perceive” different moral realities.

I attribute those differences to people’s values, and I see no reason to posit some “objective moral reality” that people are perceiving. You, however, do posit objective moral realities, though you have no way of determining that such realities exist and no clear way of distinguishing between value judgments that are “objectively” correct or not.

Leela:

This is exactly the sort of talk that makes non-belief seem absurd to believers. Some things are obviously better than others. Non-belief doesn’t have to equate to nihilism.

I’m not extrapolating on my non-belief in god; I’m extrapolating on my moral nihilism here, something that – I’ve been very careful to point out – not all non-believers share (in fact, I think my position is in the minority among non-believers).

For someone to come to the conclusion that “non-belief is absurd” from hearing me talk about a tangential (at best) philosophical position, that person would have to be not paying attention at all, really.

Things are “better” than others only within a specific context of values, subjectve value judgments. “Better” doesn’t exist apart from human value judgments.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

AntiTheist,

I’ll respond more later, but I’d like to clarify one thing you said first.

Because the two issues are inseparable: in order to know that something is “better” than something else, objectively, then there needs to be some way to tell which things are “better”

This seems to be a logical fallacy. Consider: in order to know *that *there is a winning lottery ticket, do we need to be able to tell which ticket that is? Or better yet: in order to know *that *there is a certain spin and location of a given electron, need we be able to tell what that spin and location is?

You seem to be subscribing to a brand of extreme rationalism, and I’m not sure how such a philosophical position could be justified.

 

[AntiTheist]

Consider: in order to know *that *there is a winning lottery ticket, do we need to be able to tell which ticket that is?

In order to know that a lottery ticket is better than all other lottery tickets, there needs to be a way to determine which lottery ticket is better.

If you don’t have a way of determining which one is better, then you have no grounds for saying that one ticket is better than another. It’s just an empty assertion.

Or suppose you told me that the way to determine which one is better is to simply perceive it intuitively, and suppose also that there were a bunch of people who perceived different lottery tickets as the best one. And when I point that out, you say, “well, some of them are lotteryblind; there’s still only one best ticket, and I can intuitively perceive it, even though I admit I have no way of knowing whether I’m the one who’s lotteryblind or not.”

In that situation, how could you possibly know that one ticket is “better” than the others? You would have no way of determining that until you produced a way of determining which one is better – other than your own fallible perceptions.

That’s what I’m pressing you for. A way to determine which moral judgments are the “better” ones. If you can’t do that, you can’t be sure that one is “better” than another because “better” is meaningless.

 

[Oreoracle]

The question is: does the student know what to do with that equation? Does the observer know what to make of the artwork?

You’re right that impression is involved in both evaluations, but I have no clue where you derive your rules for interpreting artwork, nor do I have any particular reason to adhere to them. Maybe my interpretation is better than yours. If there’s no empirical way to determine which is better, then we’re at a stalemate, and the objectivity of these qualities becomes questionable. (Indeed, the things that aren’t objects are the things that can’t be observed.)

Perhaps you mean that we should try to guess at the artist’s intentions in the painting, but that has nothing to do with aesthetics–that’s just psychoanalysis. Maybe he intended to arouse his viewers by painting a scantily dressed woman, but so what? Maybe he wanted to humble the audience by painting a young child praying, but so what? The paintings may be objectively arousing and humbling in that they inspire those feelings in the audience, but this isn’t the same as being objectively attractive or humble. The reaction is caused in the individual’s mind, not on the canvas on which the painting rests.

This is where psychology comes in, in the subject’s ability to “decode” the aesthetic. Is it evocative? Is it rich in meaning, or is it tawdry? Is it sentimental and vulgar or elegant and serene?

So if someone said that pornography (ya know, the worst kind…) was beautiful, elegant, inspiring, pure, rich in meaning, etc., I trust that you would deem him delusional. How do you prove he is wrong?

And about the “decoding” thing: Have you ever seen the styles of painting where people just splash colors on canvas at random and people call it “artistic?” How many times do you think someone has tried to make random splotches of paint seem meaningful in their minds when no meaning was intended by the author? In fact, after my friend and I read Catcher in the Rye we would joke about writing books with no underlying moral, no flowing plot, no consistent characters or tone of narration, and so on. We would laugh and wager that people would give themselves headaches to see some sort of meaning, when the only meaning that would be intended by us would be to see them struggle.

We like to think that everything has meaning, but we sidestep the sources of that meaning in our understandings constantly–our own emotions and biases.

Judgments of these things have clear answers, but some people do not know the answers.

It is possible for one to correctly surmise the intentions of an author in writing his piece. However, it’s impossible to determine that one artwork is objectively better than another. Again, you’ve failed to provide an empirical method of detecting value.

Comparing genres is impossible, because both abound in good and bad examples.

And each musical piece has good and bad traits, but you don’t hesitate to compare them.

Well, of course, there is room for rhetoric: using language as a means to an end.

What other sort of language is there? We always communicate to achieve some end, however insignificant it might be.

But there is good rhetoric and bad rhetoric…The aesthetic questions, among others: does the author commit to the style? Does the author use variation? Is the writing clear, or (if opaque) purposefully opaque? Does form reflect content?

This reminds me of a discussion I recently had with my teacher from last year. I asked her if a rule existed saying that we couldn’t use two prepositions in a row (my Spanish teacher had referenced such a rule). I gave her an example of a sentence that still maintains its meaning despite the consecutive prepositions: “He went in around the back.” (Another: “I stepped in beside the man.”) In fact, the more I thought about it, the more examples came to mind, and the rule began to sound ridiculous. My teacher said that the sentences may be meaningful, but they aren’t formal. I asked what the point of dividing “formal” and “informal” writing was if both styles established meaning equally well. She sort of laughed and shrugged off the question.

I also asked why we used “were” instead of “was” when referring to singular nouns in sentences that begin with “If that were the case…” She said that the rule for plural nouns had become more flexible in regard to conditionals because of how they were used by people. Rules aren’t truly rules it seems, only guidelines.

My experience in philosophy and language has only reinforced my belief that there are no clear boundaries between genres/styles and that one can’t truly interpret a sentence incorrectly. One can miss the author’s intended meaning or misuse a definition, but there is no such thing as objective misinterpretation. It requires a great deal of ignorance to say that there’s only one correct way to read or view anything artistic.

There is obviously bad writing and good writing. To say it’s just a matter of opinion is absurd.

(crickets chirping)

I think you’re on your own there buddy. Could you give me an example of “objectively bad” writing? Maybe you could read some of my poetry for class sometime and tell me whether it’s objectively beautiful too. Then when my teacher disagrees I can say he’s objectively wrong! :whacky:

Neither is the perception of beauty *determined *by psychology, as explained above.

The fact that it plays a part is sufficient. It is objectively true, insofar as the terms are defined, that 2 + 2 = 4 because psychology plays no part in that evaluation whatsoever. If it played a part, all of mathematics would collapse as an objective system of deduction.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

In order to know that a lottery ticket is better than all other lottery tickets, there needs to be a way to determine which lottery ticket is better.

If you don’t have a way of determining which one is better, then you have no grounds for saying that one ticket is better than another. It’s just an empty assertion.

This is the verificationist principle, and it is flawed. A1: “If you don’t have a way of determining some fact about P’s essential character, then you have no grounds for claiming P.” But you have no way of determining some fact about A1, namely, whether A1 is true or not. You are positing it as an a priori principle, so it ought to be self-evident, or at least clearly truth conducive. But it is not.

You avoided the example about electrons. I’m no expert on electrons, but good ol’ wiki tells me:

In quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that certain pairs of physical properties, like position and momentum, cannot both be known to arbitrary precision. That is, the more precisely one property is known, the less precisely the other can be known.

Let “position and momentum” be some fact about P. Then we cannot know some fact about electrons, which leads us to the bizarre conclusion that we have no grounds for claiming that electrons possess both position and momentum at the same time. This is a counterexample to your a priori principle.

Or suppose you told me that the way to determine which one is better is to simply perceive it intuitively, and suppose also that there were a bunch of people who perceived different lottery tickets as the best one. And when I point that out, you say, “well, some of them are lotteryblind; there’s still only one best ticket, and I can intuitively perceive it, even though I admit I have no way of knowing whether I’m the one who’s lotteryblind or not.”

But the best way to know the winning ticket is not to perceive it intuitively. At a given point in time, prior to the drawing, you **cannot possibly **know the winning ticket. Still, you can know **that **there is a winning ticket. All you have to perceive is the rules of the game, to know that.

That’s what I’m pressing you for. A way to determine which moral judgments are the “better” ones. If you can’t do that, you can’t be sure that one is “better” than another because “better” is meaningless.

But I don’t need to be *sure *that one is better than another. If certainty were required for knowledge, then we would all know nothing. As Leela keeps saying, it’s *justification *that’s required for knowledge, and if something we’re justified in believing happens to also be true, why, then we know it.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

You’re right that impression is involved in both evaluations, but I have no clue where you derive your rules for interpreting artwork, nor do I have any particular reason to adhere to them. Maybe my interpretation is better than yours. If there’s no empirical way to determine which is better, then we’re at a stalemate, and the objectivity of these qualities becomes questionable. (Indeed, the things that aren’t objects are the things that can’t be observed.)

Prodigal: Some things are objectively better than others.
Oreo: Prove it.
P: It’s not the type of thing you can prove. But I can describe it to you.
O: OK, give me some examples.
P: [Lists examples].
O: But maybe you’re wrong about what you think is best, and other people are right? How do you know?
P: I don’t.
O: Then how can you empirically discover what is best?
P: You can’t.
O: Aha! You can’t prove that some things are objectively better than others.
P: But I already told you that I couldn’t prove it! That doesn’t make it untrue.

To clarify my goals, here: You and AntiTheist seem to think that my position is incoherent. I am defending its coherence. I am not trying to convince you that you are wrong, although I would be happy if you changed your mind. If you will admit that my position is coherent, then I will happily consider the conversation amicably concluded.

Perhaps you mean that we should try to guess at the artist’s intentions in the painting, but that has nothing to do with aesthetics–that’s just psychoanalysis. Maybe he intended to arouse his viewers by painting a scantily dressed woman, but so what? Maybe he wanted to humble the audience by painting a young child praying, but so what? The paintings may be objectively arousing and humbling in that they inspire those feelings in the audience, but this isn’t the same as being objectively attractive or humble. The reaction is caused in the individual’s mind, not on the canvas on which the painting rests.

Well, of course, the objectivity lies in the mind. Where else would it be? I’m saying that the object created by a human being to have certain affective properties is perceived by another human being through the medium of object, in order to transmit those affective properties. The “form and content” I’m talking about pass from artist to observer; the “work of art” itself is merely a means of transportation. As a shorthand, I say that “the painting is beautiful”, but the beauty is actually contained in the vision and execution of the artist.

So if someone said that pornography (ya know, the worst kind…) was beautiful, elegant, inspiring, pure, rich in meaning, etc., I trust that you would deem him delusional. How do you prove he is wrong?

I don’t. Such a thing is not subject to proof. Aristotle would say, in essence, that such a man should be beaten until he changes his mind – this is the only “argument” that will touch him. But I wouldn’t go that far.

And about the “decoding” thing: Have you ever seen the styles of painting where people just splash colors on canvas at random and people call it “artistic?” How many times do you think someone has tried to make random splotches of paint seem meaningful in their minds when no meaning was intended by the author? In fact, after my friend and I read Catcher in the Rye we would joke about writing books with no underlying moral, no flowing plot, no consistent characters or tone of narration, and so on. We would laugh and wager that people would give themselves headaches to see some sort of meaning, when the only meaning that would be intended by us would be to see them struggle.

We like to think that everything has meaning, but we sidestep the sources of that meaning in our understandings constantly–our own emotions and biases.

This kind of art demonstrates purpose on the part of the artist – purposed randomness, perhaps. It does have meaning, although the meaning is not contained within the blotches themselves, but in the explanation for the blotches.

It is possible for one to correctly surmise the intentions of an author in writing his piece. However, it’s impossible to determine that one artwork is objectively better than another. Again, you’ve failed to provide an empirical method of detecting value.

Precisely!

And each musical piece has good and bad traits

That is an empirical claim. Care to justify it?

What other sort of language is there? We always communicate to achieve some end, however insignificant it might be.

You’re quite right. But, if the end of language is knowledge or understanding, then the language is not *merely *rhetorical.

My experience in philosophy and language has only reinforced my belief that there are no clear boundaries between genres/styles and that one can’t truly interpret a sentence incorrectly. One can miss the author’s intended meaning or misuse a definition, but there is no such thing as objective misinterpretation. It requires a great deal of ignorance to say that there’s only one correct way to read or view anything artistic.

How is missing the author’s intended meaning not misinterpretation? Of course, you can use the words of another person’s work of art to create your own work of art – a separate interpretation – but this is just intentionally false inference.

I think you’re on your own there buddy. Could you give me an example of “objectively bad” writing?

Of course. If you were a teacher, you could, too.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The fact that it plays a part is sufficient. It is objectively true, insofar as the terms are defined, that 2 + 2 = 4 because psychology plays no part in that evaluation whatsoever. If it played a part, all of mathematics would collapse as an objective system of deduction.

Psychology does play a part in math; if people thought differently, they would create different mathematical systems. This proven through cultural variation: different cultures, different maths. When we claim that mathematics can bring us to objectivity, we are essentially making an inference from incomplete evidence. And yet, I would claim, we are justified in that inference.

 

[AntiTheist]

I’m going to try one more time.

The lottery analogy is flawed because you’re comparing morals – which we don’t know has a better or worse (that’s the disagreement we’re having) – to something that we know has a better and a worse because it has an arbitrary standard that is imposed on all the tickets (i.e. the winning numbers).

The analogy would work better with something like rocks.

Let’s say that there are a whole bunch of rocks on a table. Some people claim that some rocks are “better” than others, but there’s no agreement as to which ones are better. Some people claim that they have divine inspiration that tells them that some rocks are better; others claim that all people can directly perceive that some rocks are better, except some people are “rockblind” (and there is, apparently, no way to tell who is “rockblind”).

How can a person in such a situation know that any of the rocks are better than any other objectively?

Let “position and momentum” be some fact about P. Then we cannot know some fact about electrons, which leads us to the bizarre conclusion that we have no grounds for claiming that electrons possess both position and momentum at the same time.

No, this is not a counterexample. We do have a way of determining position and momentum – just not to any degree of certainty at the same time.

Furthermore, that a physical object has position and momentum is not in question. If you were arguing that electrons are “better” than protons, I would say that you’d need a way of determining what makes a subatomic particle “better” before you could make such a claim.

 

[Oreoracle]

Let me ask a quick question, Prodigal, because I feel we’re missing the heart of the matter: Do you believe that aesthetic qualities would exist if consciousness did not? Being the subject, consciousness is the origin of subjective experience, and so if the existence of aesthetic qualities is dependent on its existence then we can’t rightly call those qualitites objective. Or are you using a different definition?

As “objective” and “subjective” are defined, the clear cut difference between an object and a subject/subjective quality is the fact that one would exist regardless of perception and the other would not. If awareness is required, then it’s subjective. Would you agree?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Let me ask a quick question, Prodigal, because I feel we’re missing the heart of the matter: Do you believe that aesthetic qualities would exist if consciousness did not? Being the subject, consciousness is the origin of subjective experience, and so if the existence of aesthetic qualities is dependent on its existence then we can’t rightly call those qualitites objective. Or are you using a different definition?

As “objective” and “subjective” are defined, the clear cut difference between an object and a subject/subjective quality is the fact that one would exist regardless of perception and the other would not. If awareness is required, then it’s subjective. Would you agree?

Good job p(name removed by moderator)ointing the problem, Oreo. I think we’ve gone through this before, but here goes…

Let **objective **= descriptive of a state of events that would exist regardless of perception.

Now enter in our assumptions.

You assume: There are states of events that exist regardless of perception. Thus, the above definition of objective works for you.

I assume: God exists; thus, there is no state of events that exists regardless of perception. This is why, if we take your definition of objective, of course I would say that *nothing *is strictly objective.

What I mean by objective is independent of all *human *perception. Since I consider that God is the underlying source of all reality, I consider His reality objective, in respect to my own perception.

Thus, no aesthetic or moral qualities would exist independent of agents to perceive them. But God is one such agent. (This is similar to Berkeley’s defense of idealism, by the way, although it by no means commits a person to Berkeley’s highly restrictive ontology.)

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The analogy would work better with something like rocks.

Let’s say that there are a whole bunch of rocks on a table. Some people claim that some rocks are “better” than others, but there’s no agreement as to which ones are better. Some people claim that they have divine inspiration that tells them that some rocks are better; others claim that all people can directly perceive that some rocks are better, except some people are “rockblind” (and there is, apparently, no way to tell who is “rockblind”).

How can a person in such a situation know that any of the rocks are better than any other objectively?

To modify your situation slightly: nearly all people, in the history of the world, have felt quite justified in agreeing that some rocks are better than others. Some of them ascribe that to divine inspiration, perhaps, but nearly everyone says that “they can just tell some rocks are better”.

Here is what I am not claiming: I am not claiming that, on the basis of the evidence, anyone is rationally obligated to agree that (in your hypothetical) “some rocks are better than others.” (That would be an argumentum ad populum fallacy). I am claiming that the rational person ought to seriously consider, however, whether other people might be noticing something they do not notice. Especially if those other people often seem to be speaking quite reasonably.

How can they know objectively? Well, they can believe. They can have good reasons for that belief – “it seems to be the case and other people agree with me”. (This is our justification for the existence of, say, an external world). So they can have a belief.

If that belief happens to be true, then, they have a justified true belief. Voila!

No, this is not a counterexample. We do have a way of determining position and momentum – just not to any degree of certainty at the same time.

“The electron has position and momentum”. Isn’t that a fact? And yet we cannot determine both parts of that conjunction, although we can determine one or the other of its conjuncts.

I gather you agree that “If you don’t have a way of determining some fact about P’s essential character, then you have no grounds for claiming P”? If so, how do you know this? You certainly have no way of determining it, which makes your claim to knowledge circular.

 

[Oreoracle]

Good job p(name removed by moderator)ointing the problem, Oreo. I think we’ve gone through this before, but here goes…

Actually, this sounds new to me.

I assume: God exists; thus, there is no state of events that exists regardless of perception. This is why, if we take your definition of objective, of course I would say that *nothing *is strictly objective.

What I mean by objective is independent of all *human *perception. Since I consider that God is the underlying source of all reality, I consider His reality objective, in respect to my own perception.

Hold up a moment. Your assumption is that God exists. Now how do you get from that premise to the conclusion “all of reality is objective?” I’ve heard some members here share a similar sentiment that all things are God’s thoughts, or something of that nature. Would you say that you belong to that school of thought? If so, I think a working definition of “consciousness/awareness” might be in order, because that view seems to raise problems if we use the traditional definition. I’ll state some of the issues I have, if you’d like.

 

[AntiTheist]

I am claiming that the rational person ought to seriously consider, however, whether other people might be noticing something they do not notice. Especially if those other people often seem to be speaking quite reasonably.

I thought you were claiming that morality is something more than just a value judgment (i.e. that “some rocks are better” is more than just a value judgment of individual people).

If all you’re claiming is that I should consider whether other people might be noticing something that I’m not, then we’re done here, because I have seriously considered it and concluded that they are not.

If, however, you’re claiming that other people do notice things that I don’t, we still have something to talk about.

“it seems to be the case and other people agree with me”. (This is our justification for the existence of, say, an external world).

The existence of an external world is an assumption we’re forced to make for the purposes of living and communicating. The existence of an objective morality is a question about an aspect of the world; it’s entirely different.

Your argument seems to boil down to, “Gee, lots of people think there are objectively better rocks – even though no one seems to agree which ones are better and no one can produce criteria for objectively determining which ones are better – but they think it. And they make so much sense when they talk, so hey, why not believe it?”

Not very compelling. Is that seriously the best reason you have for believing that morality is objective?

“The electron has position and momentum”. Isn’t that a fact?

Every physical thing has position and momentum. Those are qualities that things have. I have position and momentum. The existence of position and momentum is not in question.

You need to stop with the irrelevant stuff and focus on what I’m trying to get you to see. You’re trying to claim that there’s a “better,” but you’re not giving me standards for judging what is better and what is not. All you’re giving me is perceptions and intuitions, which suggest not some objective moral sense, but value judgments.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Hold up a moment. Your assumption is that God exists. Now how do you get from that premise to the conclusion “all of reality is objective?” I’ve heard some members here share a similar sentiment that all things are God’s thoughts, or something of that nature. Would you say that you belong to that school of thought? If so, I think a working definition of “consciousness/awareness” might be in order, because that view seems to raise problems if we use the traditional definition. I’ll state some of the issues I have, if you’d like.

Objectivity refers to states of events; objective knowledge refers to knowledge that P. All reality is objective; this is an analytic statement about reality, when Reality = Sumtotal of All True States of Events. I can have knowledge that “I think vanilla ice cream is good”, but such knowledge does not entail “vanilla ice cream is good”. Objective truth is the state of all events that are the case.

For the record, I do not believe that “all things are God’s thoughts”, although I would say that God is a necessary condition for all existent states of events.

It’s worth remembering, though, that there are two questions here:

1. Are there objective morals?
2. How are there objective morals?

The first question does not require an answer to the second question. A person who believes in an objective external world does not need to explain HOW the external world exists in order to have a justified belief. Neither does a person (like Leela) who believes in objective morality need to explain how in order to be justified, although we can certainly be curious about her explanation.