How to argue with subjective moralists

[hatsoff]

yes you do, you just call it shared values orsome other code. and its enforced by law, so i dont see how that isnt a might makes right situation.

I can’t force you to believe me, but I can only assure you that I don’t.

 

[AntiTheist]

you were quite clear in that assertion. but then you justify an enforced objective morality, by the might makes right platform. a bit of a contradiction there no?

You are confused.

You appear to be using definitions that are entirely unique to you. So please give your definition of “objective morality” and your definition of “might makes right,” and I will tell you how my ideas fall into your peculiar definitions.

EDIT: As an example, I’m using “objective morality” to refer only to an absolute code of behavior, imposed by some intelligent force beyond the universe, that compels all people, in all situations to follow it. Anything else is not objective morality. If, for example, some warlord declares to his tribe, “No one in this tribe may kill anyone without my permission,” that’s not “objective morality” – that’s a warlord imposing his values on his subjects. Now his subjects may have values that lead them to obey or rebel against his laws.

I don’t know if that qualifies as “might makes right” under your definition, but if it does, I feel compelled to point out that this “god” character you believe in acts just like the warlord in my example. So, if the warlord in my example is exhibiting “might makes right,” so does your god.

 

[gearhead]

EDIT: As an example, I’m using “objective morality” to refer only to an absolute code of behavior, imposed by some intelligent force beyond the universe, that compels all people, in all situations to follow it. Anything else is not objective morality.

I disagree with that definition. I don’t think that objective morality necessarily implies that it was imposed by any sort of intelligent force.

It seems like you’re assuming one answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, but I don’t think that it’s reasonable to automatically exclude the other answer.

 

[AntiTheist]

I disagree with that definition. I don’t think that objective morality necessarily implies that it was imposed by any sort of intelligent force.

It seems like you’re assuming one answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, but I don’t think that it’s reasonable to automatically exclude the other answer.

Oh, yeah, you’re right. I stand corrected. “Objective morality” could also mean that “good” and “evil” exist as metaphysical values apart from the perspective of any human judgment.

 

[Betterave]

In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful to get people to behave decently by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong, even if they work just as well.

If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that’s generally good and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in bad ways, but it also stops it from being improved.

All of the above terms/phrases are inconsistent for someone who says there is no objective morality.

But regardless, the very claim that there is no objective morality, whether metaphysical and/or divinely ordained, must come from a transcendent/objective viewpoint, not a merely subjective viewpoint. Otherwise it is nothing but stupid hypocrisy, claiming that others may not make certain trans-subjective/trans-cultural criticisms, while itself making the very kinds of criticisms that it criticizes and claims are impossible. So do you recognize this? If so, what’s the story you give to justify your implicit claim to possess such a viewpoint?

 

[Oreoracle]

All of the above terms/phrases are inconsistent for someone who says there is no objective morality.

And I suppose it would be hypocritical for one who doesn’t accept that artistic quality is objective to use “pretty,” “beautiful,” and “stylish?”

 

[Filius_Prodigus]

As an ex-atheist I can tell you folks the difference, the only difference it appears to me there can be between an objective and a subjective moralist.

The difference in most cases is the belief in God. If there is no God, morals are social contract. And in most cases I believe that is the case. How did vegetarianism become a case of morality in India and not in, say, in the Persian Empire of Darius? Easy: the cultural consensus… that is to say −social contract.

What I believe as a Christian is that beyond the particular morals of different cultures, the is a divine legislation by which there are behaviors that are intrinsically upright and others that are not.

Consequently, an atheist can have a morality and, surely, thus believe in moral acts, but what they don’t believe is in inherently righteous acts.

So, a relativist cannot condemn the vicious acts of Nazi Germany or Khmer Rouge or Stalinist Russia. They can’t even condemn the participation of Russian Orthodox clergy in the anti-Jewish pogroms of XIXth century Russia! Not, of course, without sounding completely incoherent.

For them, stealing would be an arbitrary personal act against societal laws and mores. But what would then societal laws and mores be if not arbitrarieties collectively agreed upon? In the end, pain for the atheist is simply electrochemical reactivity, and doesn’t really “matter”, it only may or may not produce electrochemical reactivity in other biochemical structures (i.e. people).

…] that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins – all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.
-Bertrand Russell
A free man’s worship

In the materialist’s world, in the end, nothing really matters. It matters right now in a totally subjective way meaning it produces (as I said) electrochemical responses. Who cares what an alka seltzer tablet is sizzling “about” in the glass of water? It matters but deep down it really doesn’t AT ALL.

Therefore, for the atheist, morality is as momentous and eminent as a patellar knee jerk reflex.

What a culturally uplifting view.
Not!

 

[AntiTheist]

So, a relativist cannot condemn the vicious acts of Nazi Germany or Khmer Rouge or Stalinist Russia. Uh, well, I wouldn’t call myself a “relativist,” but I don’t believe that objective morality exists, and I have no problem condemning those acts. Watch: I find their actions abhorent.

You don’t have to think that there is a “divine legislation” to hate certain actions and intensely dislike them.

Therefore, for the atheist, morality is as momentous and eminent as a patellar knee jerk reflex.

 

[Filius_Prodigus]

Uh, well, I wouldn’t call myself a “relativist,” but I don’t believe that objective morality exists, and I have no problem condemning those acts. Watch: I find their actions abhorent.

You don’t have to think that there is a “divine legislation” to hate certain actions and intensely dislike them.

Just as I said. You personally dislike them. And since likes and dislikes are nothing else but electrochemical reactions, it is as relevant to the universe as the sizzling of an alkaseltzer tablet.

I don’t know about you, but I value certain behaviors more than a knee jerk reflex. That’s what we’re talking about here, valuing certain actions and not valuing others.

And what is value for an atheist if not the firing of certain biochemicals in a collection of membranes? It matters for you, but “mattering” is nothing but this, in an atheistic universe.

Well, luckily for everyone else, the truth is not determined by what you think is “culturally uplifting.”

I agree. Truth is not determined by these considerations. The big difference that makes a morality objective and really meaningful beyond the ozzing of biochemicals in a dish or in a chain of membranes is the radical transcendence (transcendence = going beyond) of God’s law which gives a purpose beyond that. If you do not believe in a moral law beyond the pitiful squirming of biochemical reflexes, then there is no objective morality, no intrinsic righteousness of behaviors.

Your reaction to nazi horrors for example, is simply a glorified reflex response due to cultural conditioning: walking bags of biochems conditioning other walking bags of biochems, one of which is the one typing away and self-styled “AntiTheist” (again, in an atheistic world).

Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day
To the last syllable of recorded time,
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out brief candle!
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
-William Shakespeare
Macbeth, Act 5

Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins – all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.
−Bertrand Russell

An atheist’s morality can be no more “objective” than what he wills (à la Nietzsche’s superman), what he feels (emotivism) or what his society decrees (conventionalism).

 

[AntiTheist]

Just as I said. You personally dislike them. And since likes and dislikes are nothing else but electrochemical reactions, it is as relevant to the universe as the sizzling of an alkaseltzer tablet.

Right, but it’s more relevant to me than the sizzling of an alkaseltzer tablet. That’s the distinction. To me.

“Value” is a relationship between a valuer and a thing valued. It makes no sense to talk about the value that things have in the absence of a valuing consciousness. “Values” only ever express importance to an individual.

If you do not believe in a moral law beyond the pitiful squirming of biochemical reflexes, then there is no objective morality, no intrinsic righteousness of behaviors.

That’s correct, there is no intrinsic righteousness or unrighteousness of behaviors. Just what I value, which does not “matter” in some grand, “transcendent” sense, but which matters to me, right now.

I wouldn’t call biochemical reflexes “pitiful” at all. I would probably choose adjectives like “amazing” or “complicated” or “awe-inspiring.” But then again, my approach to reality is clearly more positive than yours.

Your reaction to nazi horrors for example, is simply a glorified reflex response due to cultural conditioning: walking bags of biochems conditioning other walking bags of biochems, one of which is the one typing away and self-styled “AntiTheist” (again, in an atheistic world).

You are absolutely, 100% correct. I don’t particularly care that my value judgments don’t mean anything to the universe. They mean something to me.

It’s childish to insist that some imaginary friend has to agree with my value judgments in order for me to find “meaning” in those judgments. The universe doesn’t run on our feelings, and the sooner we all wise up to that fact, the better.

 

[gearhead]

All of the above terms/phrases are inconsistent for someone who says there is no objective morality.

Arrgh. No, they’re not:

• decently: “in a mutually respectful or beneficial way”
• just as well: “equally effective at acheiving a set of desired goals”
• changing in bad ways: “changing in ways that would be less effective at acheiving the set of desired goals”
• improved: “more effective at acheiving a set of desired goals”

But regardless, the very claim that there is no objective morality, whether metaphysical and/or divinely ordained, must come from a transcendent/objective viewpoint, not a merely subjective viewpoint.

What makes you say that?

Otherwise it is nothing but stupid hypocrisy, claiming that others may not make certain trans-subjective/trans-cultural criticisms, while itself making the very kinds of criticisms that it criticizes and claims are impossible. So do you recognize this?

Just as much as I realize that claiming that objective morality exists without a transcendental viewpoint is nothing more than hubris.

If so, what’s the story you give to justify your implicit claim to possess such a viewpoint?

Demonstrate to me why I need to justify myself in your terms, and then I might consider doing it.

 

[Filius_Prodigus]

Right, but it’s more relevant to me than the sizzling of an alkaseltzer tablet. That’s the distinction. To me.

“Value” is a relationship between a valuer and a thing valued. It makes no sense to talk about the value that things have in the absence of a valuing consciousness. “Values” only ever express importance to an individual.

That “to me” of yours is the hallmark of relativistic morality. Q.E.D. What I have been meaning to say all along. It is relativistic because, if you recognize that your values are yours and yours alone, morality will change, however slightly or greatly, regarding the very next Joe around the block.

That’s correct, there is no intrinsic righteousness or unrighteousness of behaviors. Just what I value, which does not “matter” in some grand, “transcendent” sense, but which matters to me, right now.

Yes, this relates to another point I have been trying to make: it only transcends when there is trascendent Being and it is recognized. One who does not recognize it, would tend to consider values particularistic and fluctuating… to use your own words: “…but which matters to me, right now”.

I wouldn’t call biochemical reflexes “pitiful” at all. I would probably choose adjectives like “amazing” or “complicated” or “awe-inspiring.” But then again, my approach to reality is clearly more positive than yours.

Which, given your particularistic and fluctuating view of values, has little import, since it is just what a glorified walking bag of biochems destined to perish forever reacts like, and in addition might very well change at another point in time. In short, fickle, variable, relativistic, not objective, unequivocal and decisive.

You are absolutely, 100% correct. I don’t particularly care that my value judgments don’t mean anything to the universe. They mean something to me.

Given your view of values, it is basically the same thing as a preference of strawberries over blackberries −individual and temporary, basically particular versus universal, ergo unfirm and unauthoritative.

It’s childish to insist that some imaginary friend has to agree with my value judgments in order for me to find “meaning” in those judgments. The universe doesn’t run on our feelings, and the sooner we all wise up to that fact, the better.

Ok, now we got to the goodies. Let me break it up into morsels:

“It’s childish to insist that some imaginary friend has to agree with my value judgments…”

First, that is not the Christian position, and certainly not the one I have espoused here. God does not agree with me, on the contrary, I endeavor to acquiesce to His divine will.
Second, well, yes, to have an imaginary friend to agree with me would be a sign of pathological narcissism and unconcealed psychosis.

But it is an altogether different case when one has become cognizant to the reality of the transcendent Being. And that is my point. In that case, I would be insane not to recognize and avow the existence of the One transcendent I have come to know. Hypothetically speaking, in the case I have become cognizant of Him, wouldn’t you agree?

Of course you might answer “There is no case where we have become cognizant of Him”. In such case I would answer not surprisingly: “Speak for yourself, because I have”. In any case that is beside the point I’m trying to make, which is to define when there is objective morality and when there is not.

“The universe doesn’t run on our feelings, and the sooner we all wise up to that fact, the better.”

I have, and a long time ago. What matters is what in fact is “out there”, in all honesty.

 

[djeter]

Perhaps you might want to take a break from this and look at some reading selections from Dr. Peter Kreeft’s A Refutation of Moral Relativism. Part of a review below:

*“Professor `Isa Ben Adam (nice name in translation), a Palestinian Arab scholar and Absolutist, is interviewed (and debated) by Moral Relativist Libby Rawls, a black journalist and former wife, psychological social worker, surfing instructor, actress, alcoholic, and PI. What a marvellous debate ensues as Libby throws every relativist argument at the learned prof, only to have them roundly and soundly demolished!

This easy non-academic read is a useful guide for those engaged in dinner-table debates on this most crucial of issues. Obviously born from years of experience as an embattled Absolutist in American adademia, this Kreeft work is a delight to read as it sets out the arguments for and against. As everyone who’s ever debated this subject knows, it’s very hard to avoid ad hominems and other flesh-cutting retreats from reason, and they’re here just as in real life. Another step towards the Restoration of Metaphysics. This is the book you’ll want your Relativist friends to read (but which they’ll probably ignore because refutation has too many implications for their personal lives). Get it.”*

Great Book!

payingattentiontothesky.com/2009/09/16/book-recommendation-a-refutation-of-moral-relativism-by-peter-kreeft/

dj

 

[AntiTheist]

Which, given your particularistic and fluctuating view of values, has little import, since it is just what a glorified walking bag of biochems destined to perish forever reacts like, and in addition might very well change at another point in time

Well, it has great import to me, right now. Sure, that could change tomorrow, but I think it’s unlikely to. Either way, I’ll deal with it tomorrow.

In short, fickle, variable, relativistic, not objective, unequivocal and decisive.

Granted, except for decisive (one can be quite decisive about one’s value judgments). You seem to regard this as a problem. Why?

Given your view of values, it is basically the same thing as a preference of strawberries over blackberries −individual and temporary, basically particular versus universal, ergo unfirm and unauthoritative.

Well, values aren’t the same exact things as preferences, which tend to be instinctive, particularly in matters of sensory perception. “Values” can be – and often are – informed by reason, tradition, training, etc. in addition to one’s preferences.

You say that these values are “unfirm and unauthoritative.” Okay, I’ll accept that they are, given what I think you probably mean by those terms. You seem to regard this as a problem. Why?

God does not agree with me, on the contrary, I endeavor to acquiesce to His divine will.

Sure, I know you believe that. But you chose which religion to believe in, and guess what drove that decision? Your values.

 

[Betterave]

And I suppose it would be hypocritical for one who doesn’t accept that artistic quality is objective to use “pretty,” “beautiful,” and “stylish?”

No, of course not, Oreo. My point is that it would be hypocritical to say that artistic quality is purely subjective/culturally situated, but also that the art of my culture can be aesthetically justaposed with the art of another culture in a way that would imply the existence of non-subjective/cross-cultural evaluative norms.

 

[Betterave]

Quoting AntiTheist: You are absolutely, 100% correct. I don’t particularly care that my value judgments don’t mean anything to the universe. They mean something to me.

It’s childish to insist that some imaginary friend has to agree with my value judgments in order for me to find “meaning” in those judgments. The universe doesn’t run on our feelings, and the sooner we all wise up to that fact, the better.

… the “better”? Really better? Or just in your estimation, based on… ??? But obviously, in context, you must mean in your estimation, but still in a way that can be opposed to the estimation of others as if your estimation was objective.

 

[Betterave]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Betterave
All of the above terms/phrases are inconsistent for someone who says there is no objective morality.

Arrgh. No, they’re not:

• decently: “in a mutually respectful or beneficial way”
• just as well: “equally effective at acheiving a set of desired goals”
• changing in bad ways: “changing in ways that would be less effective at acheiving the set of desired goals”
• improved: “more effective at acheiving a set of desired goals”

Yes, they are! Your putting your words in different words doesn’t change the fact that in each case where you used them here, they imply the application of a trans-subjective/trans-cultural (i.e., global, not merely local) standard, one which you inconsistently claim is impossible/does not exist.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Betterave
But regardless, the very claim that there is no objective morality, whether metaphysical and/or divinely ordained, must come from a transcendent/objective viewpoint, not a merely subjective viewpoint.

What makes you say that?

When you actually make a statement which could only be possible given certain conditions, you imply that those conditions are not merely possible, but actually obtain. If your viewpoint was merely subjective, as you claim, it would not be possible for you to make an objective claim about morality, such as: “there is no objective morality”.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Betterave
Otherwise it is nothing but stupid hypocrisy, claiming that others may not make certain trans-subjective/trans-cultural criticisms, while itself making the very kinds of criticisms that it criticizes and claims are impossible. So do you recognize this?

Just as much as I realize that claiming that objective morality exists without a transcendental viewpoint is nothing more than hubris.

Sorry, I don’t follow. What’s your point?

Quote:
Originally Posted by Betterave
If so, what’s the story you give to justify your implicit claim to possess such a viewpoint?

Demonstrate to me why I need to justify myself in your terms, and then I might consider doing it.

See above.

 

[AntiTheist]

they imply the application of a trans-subjective/trans-cultural (i.e., global, not merely local) standard, one which you inconsistently claim is impossible/does not exist.

They don’t. When I say that someone is acting “decently,” for example, I’m not implying a trans-subjective standard. I’m making a value judgment. I’m saying that from the perspective of my values, that person is acting “decently.”

That’s all.

Now individual societies have developed rules of social interaction, so within a particular group, it might be possible to say that someone is acting “decently” with reference to a particular set of rules. For example, it’s “decent” to avoid belching at the table in this culture and “decent” to belch loudly at the table in other cultures. But that only applies in the context of societal rules.

 

[Oreoracle]

No, of course not, Oreo. My point is that it would be hypocritical to say that artistic quality is purely subjective/culturally situated, but also that the art of my culture can be aesthetically justaposed with the art of another culture in a way that would imply the existence of non-subjective/cross-cultural evaluative norms.

Okay, so how does comparing ethics to determine which are better than others suggest that they’re objective? Couldn’t this simply be a form of taste-testing, like comparing various foods or artistic works?

 

[Betterave]

Okay, so how does comparing ethics to determine which are better than others suggest that they’re objective? Couldn’t this simply be a form of taste-testing, like comparing various foods or artistic works?

That seems reasonable - you try different theories to see what you like. But it seems to me there is more going on here.

What about when you start moralizing, i.e., not (apparently) just taste-testing? Indeed, what if the “taste-testing,” in part, at least, actually consists of moralizing? And when you start to critique particular methods of taste-testing as being “dangerous”, then you start to critique the very notion of the sufficiency of subjective taste-testing, and you start to imply that there is an objective value at stake, the attainment of which is imperative beyond any particular merely factual preferences. It usually starts to become difficult for an honest person to maintain that his theoretically posited limiting of his moral evaluations to merely personal or cultural preferences conflicts with his felt practical need to understand moral categories universally, to see others/other cultures as at least partially mutually morally understandable, and to co-exist with them with a certain level of mutuality of understanding and practical consideration/respect.