How to argue with subjective moralists

[Betterave]

They don’t. When I say that someone is acting “decently,” for example, I’m not implying a trans-subjective standard. I’m making a value judgment. I’m saying that from the perspective of my values, that person is acting “decently.”

That’s all.

Now individual societies have developed rules of social interaction, so within a particular group, it might be possible to say that someone is acting “decently” with reference to a particular set of rules. For example, it’s “decent” to avoid belching at the table in this culture and “decent” to belch loudly at the table in other cultures. But that only applies in the context of societal rules.

It seems to me that you’re ignoring the context and missing the point. The point is that in the context referred to the ascriptions imply evaluations that extend beyond a particular group. The claims are talking about moral codes in general, not just some particular moral code which (at least theoretically) can unproblematically be said to receive the assent of some definable, functionally normative set of individuals with shared preferences/beliefs/inculturation.

To remind you of the context, gearhead wrote:
"In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful to get people to behave decently by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong, even if they work just as well.

If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that’s generally good and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in bad ways, but it also stops it from being improved."

p.s. Here’s an objective suggestion about morality in the context of your example here: No society sees belching as a moral issue, all societies see politeness as a moral issue.

 

[Betterave]

That seems reasonable - you try different theories to see what you like. But it seems to me there is more going on here.

What about when you start moralizing, i.e., not (apparently) just taste-testing? Indeed, what if the “taste-testing,” in part, at least, actually consists of moralizing? And when you start to critique particular methods of taste-testing as being “dangerous”, then you start to critique the very notion of the sufficiency of subjective taste-testing, and you start to imply that there is an objective value at stake, the attainment of which is imperative beyond any particular merely factual preferences. It usually starts to become difficult for an honest person to maintain that his theoretically posited limiting of his moral evaluations to merely personal or cultural preferences -]conflicts/-] does not conflict with his felt practical need to understand moral categories universally, to see others/other cultures as at least partially mutually morally understandable, and to co-exist with them with a certain level of mutuality of understanding and practical consideration/respect.

sorry, correction above…

 

[AntiTheist]

To remind you of the context, gearhead wrote:
"In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful to get people to behave decently by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong, even if they work just as well.

If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that’s generally good and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in bad ways, but it also stops it from being improved."

I see nothing in gearhead’s statement that requires there to be objective moral standards. He’s saying that if he could get people to behave decently – as judged by his values – by telling them that a god wants them to do X, Y, Z, then telling them that might be useful – but it might also create problems down the line if it becomes hardened into an unchanging dogma (for example, if conditions change and behaviors X, Y, or Z no longer produced the desired goals – desired, again, as defined by gearhead’s values).

I’m not trying to speak for gearhead, by the way – if he means something different, I’m sure he’ll tell you, but that’s how I’d approach it.

 

[VARC]

Heh - you realize that you just argued against your own point, right? If morality depends on the Creator, then it’s not objective; it’s just subjective at a very high level. For morality to be truly objective, God, if he exists, would have to be subject to it as well.

A very good point. Christians moral absolutists have a problem. They assert that killing innocent children is always wrong in all circumstances. However, in the Bible, God killed children with plagues and ordered them killed by the sword. So the problem is that either God committed sin or killing innocent children isn’t objectively immoral. (if that isn’t what is?)

 

[gearhead]

A very good point. Christians moral absolutists have a problem. They assert that killing innocent children is always wrong in all circumstances. However, in the Bible, God killed children with plagues and ordered them killed by the sword. So the problem is that either God committed sin or killing innocent children isn’t objectively immoral. (if that isn’t what is?)

I don’t necessarily have a problem with that “do as I say, not as I do” issue. I can make allowances for the idea that an action that’s inappropriate for one person can be appropriate for another. For instance, I’d have major issues if a vigilante mob were to apprehend a criminal and keep him prisoner for several years; however, I wouldn’t have the same issues if he’s caught by the police and legally incarcerated. Sometimes the same moral code or set of moral values can imply different actions at different levels or in different situations.

However, I guess that leaves us with the idea that killing children isn’t always objectively immoral, just like you say. Is that bad? I dunno.

But there’s another big problem I see with the assumption that morals come from God. Consider a hypothetical situation: say God descends from Heaven one day and announces “I have repealed the commandment ‘you shall not murder’. In its place, I give you this command: ‘you shall murder twice daily’. This is my commandment; obey me, the LORD your God.”

Personally, I would consider such a commandment to be immoral. But anyone who believes that morality comes from God would have to consider the commandment to be good, right, just and true.

I guess that leads me to another question for the people here: those of you who say that morals come from God… how do they come from God?

I mean, I can see the argument that God could reward or punish you depending on whether you obey him or not, but how do you arrive at the idea that this reward or punishment is necessarily just? Is it just a matter of “might makes right”?

For instance, say God really did command everyone to murder people twice a day. You refuse and he punishes you for this; would you be justified in thinking that you were being punished wrongly?

 

[Oreoracle]

What about when you start moralizing, i.e., not (apparently) just taste-testing?

What does it mean to moralize? There have been lots of definitions of this throughout the history of philosophy.

And when you start to critique particular methods of taste-testing as being “dangerous”, then you start to critique the very notion of the sufficiency of subjective taste-testing, and you start to imply that there is an objective value at stake, the attainment of which is imperative beyond any particular merely factual preferences.

I don’t follow, but this could be because I still don’t know what you mean by “moralizing.” To me, taste-testing, in this sense, is synonymous with moralizing, so to make an ethical critique of moralizing–that is, our means of establishing ethics–is to posit a sort of “ethics of ethics” which is tautological. “How should ethics be?” is a meaningless question, because ethics are the prescriptive statements we use to dictate how things should be to begin with.

It usually starts to become difficult for an honest person to maintain that his theoretically posited limiting of his moral evaluations to merely personal or cultural preferences does not conflict with his felt practical need to understand moral categories universally, to see others/other cultures as at least partially mutually morally understandable, and to co-exist with them with a certain level of mutuality of understanding and practical consideration/respect.

I don’t think our compulsion to form honest ethical systems is a subconscious attempt to understand an objective morality. As humans, we like to rationalize. Most ethical thinking is used to justify one’s preconceived ethical notions. We may feel that having contradictory beliefs is unfair (think of the golden rule: we wouldn’t want others to hold contradictory beliefs), or that holding them hurts our cause, and so forth. And sometimes, we actually do form new beliefs or discard old ones because of ethical thought, but that’s usually because we never gave the subjects much thought in the first place.

 

[tonyrey]

A very good point. Christians moral absolutists have a problem. They assert that killing innocent children is always wrong in all circumstances. However, in the Bible, God killed children with plagues and ordered them killed by the sword. So the problem is that either God committed sin or killing innocent children isn’t objectively immoral. (if that isn’t what is?)

You are assuming that the Old Testament has to be interpreted literally in every detail…

 

[Betterave]

I see nothing in gearhead’s statement that requires there to be objective moral standards. He’s saying that if he could get people to behave decently – as judged by his values – by telling them that a god wants them to do X, Y, Z, then telling them that might be useful – but it might also create problems down the line if it becomes hardened into an unchanging dogma (for example, if conditions change and behaviors X, Y, or Z no longer produced the desired goals – desired, again, as defined by gearhead’s values).

I’m not trying to speak for gearhead, by the way – if he means something different, I’m sure he’ll tell you, but that’s how I’d approach it.

So let’s try to formulate a more explicit/honest version of gearhead’s comment:

Gearhead: In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful to get people to behave decently by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong, even if they work just as well.

Translation: In a pragmatic way, it can help to get people to behave the way I want them to behave to bring God into the equation, but it might not work out the way I want it to: if you convince people that they should behave they way that I want them to because it is God’s will and God should be obeyed, it also implies that other moral codes (i.e., other than mine) are wrong (i.e., are other than mine), even if they work just as well (i.e., even if they are no different (i.e., not ‘other’) from mine).

Gearhead: If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that’s generally good and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in bad ways, but it also stops it from being improved.

Translation: If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that generally conforms to my preferences and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in ways that conflict with my preferences, but it also stops it from being made to conform even more to my preferences.

Now, first question: how’s my translation in your view?

 

[Betterave]

I see nothing in gearhead’s statement that requires there to be objective moral standards. He’s saying that if he could get people to behave decently – as judged by his values – by telling them that a god wants them to do X, Y, Z, then telling them that might be useful – but it might also create problems down the line if it becomes hardened into an unchanging dogma (for example, if conditions change and behaviors X, Y, or Z no longer produced the desired goals – desired, again, as defined by gearhead’s values).

I’m not trying to speak for gearhead, by the way – if he means something different, I’m sure he’ll tell you, but that’s how I’d approach it.

So let’s try to formulate a more explicit/honest version of gearhead’s comment:

Gearhead: In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful to get people to behave decently by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong, even if they work just as well.

Translation: In a pragmatic way, it can help to get people to behave the way I want them to behave to bring God into the equation, but it might not work out the way I want it to: if you convince people that they should behave they way that I want them to because it is God’s will and God should be obeyed, it also implies that other moral codes (i.e., other than mine) are wrong (i.e., are other than mine), even if they work just as well (i.e., even if they are no different (i.e., not ‘other’) from mine).

Gearhead: If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that’s generally good and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in bad ways, but it also stops it from being improved.

Translation: If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that generally conforms to my preferences and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in ways that conflict with my preferences, but it also stops it from being made to conform even more to my preferences.

Now, first question: how’s my translation in your view?

 

[Betterave]

What does it mean to moralize? There have been lots of definitions of this throughout the history of philosophy.

Moralizing is just moving beyond taste-testing and saying this is what I prefer, don’t even try to feed me that other stuff, I’ve tried it, it’s terrible. That is bad; this is good. Regardless of what you happen to prefer, I will oppose you on that and support you on this because that is vicious/morally wrong and this is virtuous/morally right.

With that clarification, do your other comments stand, or do you want to modify them before I respond?

 

[gearhead]

Yes, they are! Your putting your words in different words doesn’t change the fact that in each case where you used them here, they imply the application of a trans-subjective/trans-cultural (i.e., global, not merely local) standard, one which you inconsistently claim is impossible/does not exist.

Please show me where I claimed this. I disagree with the idea of objective morality, not the idea of objective facts.

When you actually make a statement which could only be possible given certain conditions, you imply that those conditions are not merely possible, but actually obtain. If your viewpoint was merely subjective, as you claim, it would not be possible for you to make an objective claim about morality, such as: “there is no objective morality”.

IOW, if my statements can’t be true everywhere and for all time, they can’t be true in any sense at any time?

However, if you really do think that objective morality exists, it should be easy enough to demonstrate it: tell us one moral precept that’s objectively true. Just one.

Sorry, I don’t follow.

At this point, I’m not surprised.

What’s your point?

I’m saying that until you demonstrate that your argument is actually based on something that can be validly be considered transcendent or “trans-subjective”, you’re really just engaging in self-righteous puffery.

See above.

I did. I saw quite a bit of apparent anger, but not much of substance.

So let’s try to formulate a more explicit/honest version of gearhead’s comment:

A lack of understanding on your part does not imply any sort of dishonesty on my part.

 

[Betterave]

I did. I saw quite a bit of apparent anger, but not much of substance.

gearhead, let me just clarify: nothing that I wrote was written in anger. What gave you that impression? I suspect you’re projecting your own anger onto me. It’s getting late, so for now I’ll just say that your reply here seems to me to be a very childish response to what I wrote, in stark contrast, for example, to AntiTheist’s or Oreo’s topical and substantive replies. I think you need to set aside your prejudices and read more carefully.

 

[AntiTheist]

So let’s try to formulate a more explicit/honest version of gearhead’s comment:

Gearhead: In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful to get people to behave decently by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong, even if they work just as well.

Translation: In a pragmatic way, it can help to get people to behave the way I want them to behave to bring God into the equation, but it might not work out the way I want it to: if you convince people that they should behave they way that I want them to because it is God’s will and God should be obeyed, it also implies that other moral codes (i.e., other than mine) are wrong (i.e., are other than mine), even if they work just as well (i.e., even if they are no different (i.e., not ‘other’) from mine).

Gearhead: If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that’s generally good and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in bad ways, but it also stops it from being improved.

Translation: If a religion manages to latch on to a moral system that generally conforms to my preferences and declares it to be from God, then this cements it. It stops it from changing in ways that conflict with my preferences, but it also stops it from being made to conform even more to my preferences.

Now, first question: how’s my translation in your view?

Eh, you’re almost there. In the first translation, I would end it like this: “it also implies that other moral codes (i.e., other than mine) are wrong, even if they work just as well (i.e., even if they are not directly in conflict with mine”

It depends on what gearhead means by “work” – I think he might actually mean “be conducive to the growth of the society (as my values judge ‘growth’)”

In th second translation, it’s not so much that the codes won’t “conform even more to my preferences” but that they won’t be able to adapt to changing circumstances (that might not conform to my preferences as modified by those circumstances).

Again, that’s purely how I would read those statements – gearhead is free to tell us what he actually means. But what, in your opinion, is wrong with the translations? They read perfectly fine to me, especially with my corrections.

 

[gearhead]

How about you guys let me say what I mean myself?

In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful to get people to behave decently by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong, even if they work just as well.

I thought I was clear, but apparently I wasn’t. Try this instead:

In a pragmatic way, I think it can be useful in acheiving the shared set of goals our society has apparently come to consensus upon to get people to behave in a manner in keeping with our society’s definition of decency by bringing God into the equation, but there’s a danger there as well: if you convince the people that their moral code comes from God and therefore should be followed, it also implies that other moral codes are wrong by the authority, real or false, that you cite in justification of holding one moral code up above all others, even if they work just as well at acheiving those shared societal goals.

There - are we clear? Betterave, can you please stop putting words in my mouth now?

 

[Betterave]

How about you guys let me say what I mean myself?

I thought I was clear, but apparently I wasn’t. Try this instead:

…

There - are we clear? Betterave, can you please stop putting words in my mouth now?

Thanks for the clarification, gearhead. I hope you realize that your words are not always perfectly clear and that if I put words in your mouth, I do so (I hope!) with the intention of seeking clarification as to whether I have understood you correctly. That’s just how constructive dialogue works! (There is also the matter of trying to draw out consequences, which is also perfectly legitimate.)

Anyway! What do you think AntiTheist? Are you happy with gearhead’s reformulation? Does it jive with yours, IYO? (It would be nice - promote clarity, avoid confusion - if we could start from a single formulation that you both agree on – assuming that your positions turn out to be substantially the same.)

 

[Oreoracle]

Moralizing is just moving beyond taste-testing and saying this is what I prefer, don’t even try to feed me that other stuff, I’ve tried it, it’s terrible. That is bad; this is good. Regardless of what you happen to prefer, I will oppose you on that and support you on this because that is vicious/morally wrong and this is virtuous/morally right.

With that clarification, do your other comments stand, or do you want to modify them before I respond?

I don’t think this changes anything; all you’ve done is raised the stakes. This doesn’t change that ethics are a matter of taste, all this means is that the individual isn’t willing to taste anything else. We’ve went from preference to strong, exclusive preference.

 

[Betterave]

I don’t think this changes anything; all you’ve done is raised the stakes. This doesn’t change that ethics are a matter of taste, all this means is that the individual isn’t willing to taste anything else. We’ve went from preference to strong, exclusive preference.

Okay, I’m trying to understand your position here:
You want to say that ethics is “a matter of taste” because it arises from “taste-testing” (i.e., moral experience?)? (I would say, of course it’s a matter of taste for this reason; but why should that be taken to imply that it is merely subjective and not objective?)

And when you say “I like mustard, I dislike ketchup”, the concept that you deploy is, in terms of its reference to merely subjective preferences, no different from the concept you deploy when you say “I praise generosity as morally good and condemn malevolence as morally evil”?

Can you explain how exactly “taste-testing” turns out to be synonymous with “moralizing”, as you claimed was your view? (That would seem to me like saying that trying some samples is exactly the same as (synonymous with) ordering a meal - i.e., it’s just not true.)

 

[Oreoracle]

Okay, I’m trying to understand your position here:
You want to say that ethics is “a matter of taste” because it arises from “taste-testing” (i.e., moral experience?)? (I would say, of course it’s a matter of taste for this reason; but why should that be taken to imply that it is merely subjective and not objective?)

That is my position, yes. If morality is a matter of taste, it is obviously subjective. Think of other things involving taste: We can’t objectively establish that pizza is better than broccoli any more than we can objectively establish that one painting is better than another.

And when you say “I like mustard, I dislike ketchup”, the concept that you deploy is, in terms of its reference to merely subjective preferences, no different from the concept you deploy when you say “I praise generosity as morally good and condemn malevolence as morally evil”?

Right on.

Can you explain how exactly “taste-testing” turns out to be synonymous with “moralizing”, as you claimed was your view? (That would seem to me like saying that trying some samples is exactly the same as (synonymous with) ordering a meal - i.e., it’s just not true.)

I’m not sure what you want me to explain. But let me give an example to see if I can clear things up: A child has been around his mother for years, and he enjoys her company. In fact, he prefers for her to be with him (a preference has formed). Eventually, the mother becomes ill and dies. The child, now bearing an unsatisfied preference, suffers. This suffering prompts him to say, “My mother should not have died.” He is expressing his own conception of an ideal world–a world in which his mother is not dead–by making a prescriptive statement. This statement in no way describes reality, and it is the result of emotional activity caused by the relation between external circumstances and preferences (or “values”). The child is not making a factual statement, but rather demanding that reality be a certain way because, in keeping with our taste-testing analogy, he dislikes the flavor of what he has tasted. Indeed, without emotions playing a part, the utterance would never have occurred.

I think this example could be used as a model for all ethical statements, really.

 

[Betterave]

That is my position, yes. If morality is a matter of taste, it is obviously subjective. Think of other things involving taste: We can’t objectively establish that pizza is better than broccoli any more than we can objectively establish that one painting is better than another.

Hmm… Interesting. So if you came home from school and your mom served you broccoli (and that’s all) for dinner one night and pizza for dinner on another night, assuming that the pizza is a subjectively preferable/better dinner, you don’t think that the pizza would in any respect also be an objectively better dinner?

But maybe that’s just comparing pizza and broccoli, as the old saying goes… So what if she gave you frozen pizza one night, still cold in the middle and burnt on the edges, and the #1 delivery pizza in the city the next, and everyone agrees: the delivery is better? Or do you really want to say, “If someone wants to eat pig slop and drink dirty water, there’s nothing objectively disgusting about that - if pigs like it, why not a human?”? Or “I prefer fresh milk, but objectively it’s no better than bad milk”?

I’m not sure what you want me to explain. But let me give an example to see if I can clear things up: A child has been around his mother for years, and he enjoys her company. In fact, he prefers for her to be with him (a preference has formed). Eventually, the mother becomes ill and dies. The child, now bearing an unsatisfied preference, suffers. This suffering prompts him to say, “My mother should not have died.” He is expressing his own conception of an ideal world–a world in which his mother is not dead–by making a prescriptive statement. This statement in no way describes reality, and it is the result of emotional activity caused by the relation between external circumstances and preferences (or “values”). The child is not making a factual statement, but rather demanding that reality be a certain way because, in keeping with our taste-testing analogy, he dislikes the flavor of what he has tasted. Indeed, without emotions playing a part, the utterance would never have occurred.

I think this example could be used as a model for all ethical statements, really.

To clarify: I just wanted you to explain the claim that you made: “moralizing” is synonymous with “taste-testing” - and I don’t see how you’ve done that. I’m inviting you, if I may, to be careful and precise with how you frame your views in the hopes that they will be clarified for all of us, yourself included. It seems like you’re saying that “preferring A” is the same as “trying A in order to determine if you prefer it” - obviously most people will not agree to this alleged synonymy.

As to what you did write:
“This statement in no way describes reality…” - That’s what you believe? Really? In no way, not even paraphrastically? (I’d be interested to know what gearhead and AntiTheist think about this.)
You write: “it is the result of emotional activity” - you do believe (dare I say recognize?) that emotional activity, as well as “demands that reality be a certain way,” are part of reality, don’t you?

 

[Oreoracle]

Hmm… Interesting. So if you came home from school and your mom served you broccoli (and that’s all) for dinner one night and pizza for dinner on another night, assuming that the pizza is a subjectively preferable/better dinner, you don’t think that the pizza would in any respect also be an objectively better dinner?

But maybe that’s just comparing pizza and broccoli, as the old saying goes… So what if she gave you frozen pizza one night, still cold in the middle and burnt on the edges, and the #1 delivery pizza in the city the next, and everyone agrees: the delivery is better? Or do you really want to say, “If someone wants to eat pig slop and drink dirty water, there’s nothing objectively disgusting about that - if pigs like it, why not a human?”? Or “I prefer fresh milk, but objectively it’s no better than bad milk”?

I think you would answer many of your own questions if you’d ask yourself what you mean by saying something is better than something else. Is clean water better than contaminated water? Well, what do you mean by better? Better for your health? If that’s what you mean, then yes. What do we mean when we say that one course of action is better than another? Or what do you mean, at least?

You see, any instance of “should” assumes a goal. When we say, “you should get some rest” we mean “you should get some rest if you want to be healthy.” When we say, “you really shouldn’t lie to your parents” we mean “you really shouldn’t lie to your parents if you wish to maintain their trust.” But there isn’t any objective way to determine which goals are “better” than others. There is nothing in the universe telling us that maintaining trust (or our health) is a worthwhile end other than–you guessed it–our own emotional assurances. And even if there was some natural indication that we should act a certain way, why should we respect nature? What tells us that? Eventually you reach a dead end no matter how you look at it. Most people stop long before they get to that dead end, however.

It seems like you’re saying that “preferring A” is the same as “trying A in order to determine if you prefer it” - obviously most people will not agree to this alleged synonymy.

That isn’t what I’m saying. I’m saying that moralizing–the process of determining what is right and wrong–is comparable to taste-testing–the process of determining what is preferable and what is not.

You write: “it is the result of emotional activity” - you do believe (dare I say recognize?) that emotional activity, as well as “demands that reality be a certain way,” are part of reality, don’t you?

“Oreoracle feels that suffering shouldn’t exist” is not the same as “suffering shouldn’t exist.” Prescriptions are part of reality, but they are not descriptive. Hence, they describe nothing, as I’ve said.