P-zombies are conceivable: dualism
P-zombies are not conceivable: materialism.
That’s a vast over-simplication but close enough.
It is such a “vast over-simplification” that it amounts to a
false dichotomy.
Your implication ONLY holds true if dualism or materialism, as
you conceive of them, are the ONLY two options.
And clearly, you have a penchant for assuming that what you understand by certain terms is what all philosophers must mean.
That was the point you missed in attempting to “vastly over-simplify” (i.e., shred) the entire argument.
You keep assuming that, and keep ignoring my point as if I am simply repeating what you state, which isn’t true.
Hylomorphism [
being is a compound of
matter and
form] doesn’t amount to mind-body dualism unless you assume matter in that conception is exactly what moderns conceive of as ‘
matter,’ and that form is merely what moderns conceive of as ‘
mind’. That may not be entirely true, depending upon which Thomists or Aristotelians or hylemorphists you speak to.
Here is, for example, Edward Feser arguing that hylemorphic dualism doesn’t posit
two distinct substances (mind/body), but rather
one substance with two aspects or “constituents.”
In an
earlier post, I suggested that one of the advantages of hylemorphic dualism over Cartesian dualism is that its notion of formal causation allows it to sidestep the interaction problem. For
if the soul is the form of the body, rather than a distinct substance in its own right, then there is no question of two substances having to “interact” in the order of efficient causes on the model of two billiard balls. There is rather just the one substance, a human being, having (as every other material substance has) two constituents, its form (or soul) and its matter (or body). The “interaction” between them is no more problematic than the “interaction” between the form of a tree and the matter that makes up the tree. For soul and body do not “interact” in the first place the way two distinct things do; they together constitute a single thing.
Source:
Edward Feser: Search results for mind body dualism hylemorphism
The distinction might be too subtle for some with a tendency to “over-simplify” stuff to grasp, but it does exist and in sufficient degree that it makes a difference to those making the argument, despite that
you think they are only repeating what you state.
We might well ask, of your lack of philosophical accuracy (i.e., your tendency to "vastly over-simplify)…
How in heaven’s name did it get into the philosophy section?
