How to transit from the concept of God to the existence of God

[polytropos]

P.S. the " Unmoved Mover " moves and causes as well as creates.

That’s true. The distinction I am making is this.

False: The Unmoved Mover has a potentiality to move. The Unmoved Mover has a potentiality to cause. The Unmoved Mover has a potentiality to create.
True: The Unmoved Mover moves. The Unmoved Mover causes. The Unmoved Mover creates.

Any modalities ascribed to the Unmoved Mover must be external, ie. “It is possible that the Unmoved Mover did not create.”

 

[CandideWest]

If two things are distinct, then they differ in some way. But if “two” things are pure act, then neither has any potentiality, so there is nothing that one has that the other lacks, so they do not differ in any way, and are thereby not distinct. (Another way of framing this is that pure act is absolutely simple, and so is not composed of matter and form, and so is not even individuated in the sense that we apply that term to created things. We speak of God as “one” because he is undivided and indivisible. There can be no multiplicity or individuation in pure act.)

No, all that shows is that we are not necessarily able to distinguish between multiple instances of a pure act.

Your claim here seems rather like saying that since pairs of identical twins are indistinguishable then there is only actually one of them (and I know this metaphor doesn’t hold 100% because we have other means of distinguishing between identical twins than differences between their appearance).

This isn’t an assumption, if he can show that each of the things shown by his Five Ways is purely actual, since he later argues that only one thing can be purely actual.

Sure, but he doesn’t show that each of the 5 ways refers to something which is purely actual, he only does it for one of them and then assumes that the others are referring to something purely actual on the basis the he called each “God”.

I think Ed Feser has constructed a pretty good case, though I’m hoping someday he issues a work of systematic theology that is more encompassing and less introductory than the books he has published so far.

Another route one could take is that of Barry Miller. He has (in my opinion, convincingly) challenged the idea that existence cannot be a first-order predicate, and has used his new analysis in a new cosmological argument (derived loosely from Aquinas’s Second Way) and theology. (He introduced the notion of “limit cases” as opposed to “limits simpliciter,” a limit simpliciter simply being the greatest element in a set, a limit case being an element outside of a set to which the other elements “tend,” but which differs from them absolutely. The distinction captures a lot of what I think is strong in traditional natural theology, ie. a robust doctrine of simplicity, and what has been lost in the more effete versions advocated by theists like Plantinga and Swinburne. It is difficult to properly argue for the unity and mutual entailment of God’s properties, as well as the uniqueness of the object of a cosmological argument, without a robust doctrine of simplicity, in my opinion, and the notion of God as a limit case instance of existence is capable of articulating God’s transcendence.) Unfortunately his books aren’t too easy to get a hold of if you don’t have access to an academic library.

Hmmm, I’ll keep an eye out for Barry Miller. If I can get hold of a copy I’ll have a read.

Because it must possess the forms of the things it creates qua universals, and that (to possess formal universals “eminently”) is what it is to be an intellect on Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. (In this case God is analogically an intellect.)

So essentially it’s defining this mind into existence. Not something I find very valuable.

I think it’s an unfortunate consequence of apologetics that discussions usually focus on cosmological arguments and do not get to discussions about the divine attributes. There is also the issue that the arguments made most often in the public eye (the kalam cosmolgocial argument, the fine tuning argument, the design argument) do not have robust ways of demonstrating the divine attributes.

I agree, that was actually the first problem I identified with the cosmological arguments, and the one which started me looking into this long ago in my days still being a Christian.

Pure act does not have any potentialities. A fortiori pure act does not have a potentiality to cause (or not cause) anything. Pure act creates. It is correct to say, “It is possible that pure act creates” and “It is possible that pure act not create.” But it is false to say that “Pure act possibly creates” or “Pure act possible does not create”, as the latter two de re modalities attribute a potentiality to pure act which is foreign to it.

So the multiverse, if it is to sustain/change the universe in the way that pure act does, must stand in causal relations. But there is still the issue, as I pointed out, it’s not clear that the “multiverse” is more than a mereological sum, and therefore cannot stand in causal relations apart from its constituents.

No, because the multiverse contains within it all of the things which we need to explain the existence of in the first place.

 

[CandideWest]

I was going to suggest to Candide that she/he simply exchange the term Unmoved Mover or First Cause, etc. whenever he/she ran into the term God in Thomas’ works, since, he/she has such an aversion to the term God.

That doesn’t help because firstly a lot of the arguments assume self awareness etc, so calling it something which doesn’t explicitly join in that assumption doesn’t help much, and secondly it isn’t possible to unpick the separate threads of arguments to where they actually lead, because the assumption that the 5 ways are all pointing to one thing is so built into the rest of the arguments.

Thomas discusses the Knowledge of the " Unmoved Mover " in S.T., Part 1, Qs 14-18.

Indeed he does, but the nature of the “being” as something self aware is assumed, not demonstrated.

I had previously pointed out the same thing you did, but in a round about way. To act, an agent must will to act, and to will, an agent must have knowledge of what to will ( the universal forms you mention ). And to have knowledge and to will are signs of intelligence.

Yes, agents need will to act, but why would we therefore conclude that ANYTHING requires a will to act? As far as I know we have no reason to do so.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

No, all that shows is that we are not necessarily able to distinguish between multiple instances of a pure act.

Your claim here seems rather like saying that since pairs of identical twins are indistinguishable then there is only actually one of them (and I know this metaphor doesn’t hold 100% because we have other means of distinguishing between identical twins than differences between their appearance).

Sure, but he doesn’t show that each of the 5 ways refers to something which is purely actual, he only does it for one of them and then assumes that the others are referring to something purely actual on the basis the he called each “God”.

Hmmm, I’ll keep an eye out for Barry Miller. If I can get hold of a copy I’ll have a read.

So essentially it’s defining this mind into existence. Not something I find very valuable.

I agree, that was actually the first problem I identified with the cosmological arguments, and the one which started me looking into this long ago in my days still being a Christian.

No, because the multiverse contains within it all of the things which we need to explain the existence of in the first place.

Observing. You are making obvious errors. For instance, there can exist only one Being, which is pure act, having no potency to any thing. Pure act, without potence, is Perfect Act, Absolute Perfection, It is and has absolutely everything. If, indeed, there are multiverses, it causes them to be and to move and to change and to be directed to their proper ends as well. Just call this Being, the Unmoved Mover, the Uncaused First Cause, since the word God is so abhorrent to you.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

That doesn’t help because firstly a lot of the arguments assume self awareness etc, so calling it something which doesn’t explicitly join in that assumption doesn’t help much, and secondly it isn’t possible to unpick the separate threads of arguments to where they actually lead, because the assumption that the 5 ways are all pointing to one thing is so built into the rest of the arguments.

Indeed he does, but the nature of the “being” as something self aware is assumed, not demonstrated.

Yes, agents need will to act, but why would we therefore conclude that ANYTHING requires a will to act? As far as I know we have no reason to do so.

I hate to say it but now you are saying things which are, well…just not Kosher ( to be polite ). Thomas discusses the Unmoved Mover’s self-awareness in S.T. Part 1, ques 14, art 2. But I confess that I don’t understand it. But it seems to say that a knowing being is ipso facto a being with self-awareness. Which is what I originally said. Now I am pretty sure that most people would agree with this. I it is sort of like a first principle. It is a basic assumpting like the Principle of Non-Contrdiction.

I am curious as to why you thought it so important to know whether or not the Unmoved Mover was self-aware?

And yes, the Unmoved Mover, the Uncaused Cause, etc. all five, are all the same being. Serious observers don’t question that.

So, hey, now you can talk to the Unmoved Mover when you are unhappy, sad, etc.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

No, all that shows is that we are not necessarily able to distinguish between multiple instances of a pure act.

Your claim here seems rather like saying that since pairs of identical twins are indistinguishable then there is only actually one of them (and I know this metaphor doesn’t hold 100% because we have other means of distinguishing between identical twins than differences between their appearance).

These are equivocal uses of “identical.” Identical twins are not identical in the logical sense of x = x; two identical twins do differ by potencies relative to the other. (Even if only in the respect that, as material bodies, they could never occupy the same space. This is not undermined by relativity, either, since one twin would have to be moved relative to the other in order to occupy the same space, which would of course preclude the other from occupying that space.)

Sure, but he doesn’t show that each of the 5 ways refers to something which is purely actual, he only does it for one of them and then assumes that the others are referring to something purely actual on the basis the he called each “God”.

I would say that each of the Five Ways conclude that something purely actual exists. The First and Second Ways are very similar, and the vicious regresses they invoke both (so the arguments go) can only be halted by purely actual being. An argument can be mounted with respect to the Fifth Way in the respect that final causes are specified in terms of the potencies that things have to act according to their form, so the supreme intellect cannot have ends specified in terms of something external to it (whereas other things do).

The Fourth Way argues pretty directly for subsistent being (ie. pure act) by way of the transcendentals. Such a conclusion can be mounted by way of the Third Way as well, I believe, if one properly specifies the modalities involved (which isn’t easy to do). Defending the Third and Fourth Ways is difficult however.

In any case, suppose that only one of the Five Ways discloses a purely actual being. Aquinas’s derivations of the divine attributes can still proceed from that starting point. The other four ways then have simply failed. But since they would have only failed to show that a purely actual being exists, they would be disclosing beings that are lesser than pure act, and are therefore composed of act and potency and so created. This is not really threatening to classical theism.

So essentially it’s defining this mind into existence. Not something I find very valuable.

Not really. It is observing that what pure act is essentially intelligent because it shares the essential features of intelligence with other intelligent beings.

No, because the multiverse contains within it all of the things which we need to explain the existence of in the first place.

I am still not clear on what “multiverse” refers to. If it refers to a collection of universes, then it seems like the explanation proper must be in terms of a constituent, rather than a set, since the multiverse is not something over and above what it contains (as far as I can tell).

 

[Partinobodycula]

Excuse my ignorance. I’m just trying to wrap my head around the concepts of potentiality and actuality. Not so much the concepts really, but more as to how they apply to God.

If God lacks potentiality, then wouldn’t it logically follow that there is no such thing as something that God COULD have done. Anything that He could have done, He did do, for He lacked the potentiality to do anything else.

Also, for an agent to will to act, doesn’t that necessitate the potentiality to not act, or to act differently. But if God lacks potentiality doesn’t He also lack the ability to will to act.

Doesn’t the will to act require the potential to act in a manner other than the one willed.

Confused,
Partinobodycular

 

[polytropos]

Excuse my ignorance. I’m just trying to wrap my head around the concepts of potentiality and actuality. Not so much the concepts really, but more as to how they apply to God.

No problem.

If God lacks potentiality, then wouldn’t it logically follow that there is no such thing as something that God COULD have done. Anything that He could have done, He did do, for He lacked the potentiality to do anything else.

God could not have done other than he did. (That would impute potentiality to him.) But it is possible that God did other than he did. (That does not impute potentiality to him.) The two statements are not equivalent. The internal modality is a de re modality and would suggest that God would be of a nature such that he can will differently than he does will, which is false.

But it is not necessary that God wills the way he wills. (Note the external modality.) It is necessary that God wills his own goodness and existence, but it is not necessary that he will the existence of a particular world in addition to his goodness and existence.

Also, for an agent to will to act, doesn’t that necessitate the potentiality to not act, or to act differently. But if God lacks potentiality doesn’t He also lack the ability to will to act.

God does act, but that is not the actualization of a potential or capability to act.

Doesn’t the will to act require the potential to act in a manner other than the one willed.

No.

God’s will is directed toward the creation of our world (as well as his own goodness and existence). But God cannot choose to not will the creation of our world, since he is changeless and does will it. However, it is possible that God willed the creation of a different world.

 

[Partinobodycula]

God could not have done other than he did. (That would impute potentiality to him.) But it is possible that God did other than he did. (That does not impute potentiality to him.) The two statements are not equivalent. The internal modality is a de re modality and would suggest that God would be of a nature such that he can will differently than he does will, which is false.

I’m sure that all of this modality, and de dicto/de re stuff was probably covered in Philosophy 101, but I’m trying to figure it out as I go. So bear with me while I work it through.

I have an idea that may have absolutely nothing to do with what you just attempted to explain, but let me run it by you and see if it makes any sense to you.

God could will what to create, but He could not will whether to create. To choose whether or not to create would imply that God had potentiality. That something would come into being was a given, but it’s God’s will that determined what actually did.

Hopefully this is in some sense correct.

But it leads me to another question. In what way does this differ from the way that I myself make choices? After all, time passes and I cannot stop it. So something will definitely come into actuality from potentiality. It’s not like I have a choice. It is definitely going to happen. The only choice I have is in deciding WHAT will happen, but not in deciding if something WILL happen.

This seems on the face of it to be the exact same scenario assigned to God. He couldn’t choose if to create, only what to create.

So how is God’s choice different than my choice?

 

[CandideWest]

Observing. You are making obvious errors. For instance, there can exist only one Being, which is pure act, having no potency to any thing. Pure act, without potence, is Perfect Act, Absolute Perfection, It is and has absolutely everything. If, indeed, there are multiverses, it causes them to be and to move and to change and to be directed to their proper ends as well. Just call this Being, the Unmoved Mover, the Uncaused First Cause, since the word God is so abhorrent to you.

You misunderstand, it isn’t about the word being abhorrent to me, it’s about it being misleading. Because it conflates the “Unmoved mover” with “some self aware agent”.

So I guess I could take that “unmoved mover” as existing and look at the rest of the arguments, but the problem then is that the rest of the arguments assume that the “unmoved mover” is a self aware being, and that each of the 5 ways describe that being etc.

Hence the problem.

I hate to say it but now you are saying things which are, well…just not Kosher ( to be polite ). Thomas discusses the Unmoved Mover’s self-awareness in S.T. Part 1, ques 14, art 2. But I confess that I don’t understand it. But it seems to say that a knowing being is ipso facto a being with self-awareness. Which is what I originally said. Now I am pretty sure that most people would agree with this. I it is sort of like a first principle. It is a basic assumpting like the Principle of Non-Contrdiction.

Indeed he does, but if you try to trace back you’ll find that the nature of God as a self aware being is assumed, not demonstrated. He never covers the possibility that God is not an “agent” but a “thing”.

I am curious as to why you thought it so important to know whether or not the Unmoved Mover was self-aware?

Because if it’s just a “thing” then all the other stuff about God which Aquinas writes afterwards is just so much straw.

And yes, the Unmoved Mover, the Uncaused Cause, etc. all five, are all the same being. Serious observers don’t question that.

Ok, can you demonstrate this to be true?

So, hey, now you can talk to the Unmoved Mover when you are unhappy, sad, etc.

Alas, it won’t be moved by the things I say, so there’s no point. Haha.

But on a serious note, why would I go talking to something which might well turn out to be a quantum fluctuation? Or vacuum? Etc. seems pointless.

 

[polytropos]

God could will what to create, but He could not will whether to create. To choose whether or not to create would imply that God had potentiality. That something would come into being was a given, but it’s God’s will that determined what actually did.

re the bolded statement: No, it is possible that God create the actual world, it is possible that God create some other world, and it is possible that God not create.

What we cannot do is transfer those external modalities “inside”: It is false that God possibly creates the actual world, God possibly creates some other world, or God possibly does not create.

God wills the creation of this world freely. It is possible that God did not will the creation of this world. But God did not choose to create this world, ie. there was no point where he deliberated and arrived at the decision to create this world (as that would impute potentiality to him, and possibly even mutability).

But it leads me to another question. In what way does this differ from the way that I myself make choices? After all, time passes and I cannot stop it. So something will definitely come into actuality from potentiality. It’s not like I have a choice. It is definitely going to happen. The only choice I have is in deciding WHAT will happen, but not in deciding if something WILL happen.

This seems on the face of it to be the exact same scenario assigned to God. He couldn’t choose if to create, only what to create.

So how is God’s choice different than my choice?

Well, it is possible that God does not create any world. It is necessary, however, that God wills something because it is necessary that he wills his own existence and goodness.

However, God is absolutely simple. He is subsistent being and subsistent goodness. His goodness, therefore, is complete. He has no “ends” to achieve in the sense that there is nothing he must do in order to improve or perfect himself, since he is the fullness of perfection apart from anything else. So it is not necessary that God will the existence of a particular world in addition to his own goodness and existence. (In possible worlds in which he does create, like our own, God’s willing of his own existence and goodness and his willing of the creation of the world are in fact the same act of will, by divine simplicity.)

 

[Partinobodycula]

… it is possible that God create the actual world, it is possible that God create some other world, and it is possible that God not create.

Well it is extremely possible that Im confused.

But if I look back at things that I have done in the past, how are they any different than what God did?

It’s possible that God create the actual world…It’s possible that I create this actual post.
It’s possible that God create some other world.…It’s possible that I create some other post.
It’s possible that God not create a world at all…It’s possible that I not create a post at all.

In what way are these different?

Definitely confused.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You misunderstand, it isn’t about the word being abhorrent to me, it’s about it being misleading. Because it conflates the “Unmoved mover” with “some self aware agent”.

Not " conflate, " Thomas makes it clear that the " Unmoved Mover, the First Efficient Cause, the One Necessary Being, the Most Perfect Being, the Final End of all things, must be a being with Self Knowledge ( S.T., Part 1, Ques 14, arts, 1,2,3 ) or Self Aware. Thus He cannot be identified with anything He has caused to exist, whose end he directs, both through the Natures He has given them and by His direct action in some instances, and by sustaining their existence and the existence of the things which they move and change themselves. Such ability demands knowledge of what is being done and the will and the power to do it. He must be self aware.

To put it on a practical level or to make an analogy, I am self aware because I can reflect on the self. Can I prove that to you? No. By the same reasoning, you cannot prove to me that you are self aware just by saying it. However I can see that you do things which require power, knowledge and will. So, from that, I say you are self aware. Society supports this in many ways, our entire legal system assumes this, science supports it.
By analogy, God must be self aware.

I see God’s works and make the same judgment. Is that absolute proof? It is if you see how unreasonable it is to assume that non-intelligent matter caused itsef to exist, caused everything else to exist, and has caused, without mind, a universal, coordinated order and purpose throughout the universe. The latter seems most unreasonable.

And I think most people would agree. It is proof enough that an All Powerful Being Exists, which we can call God. All people should at least be Deist on that basis. And if one follows Thomas’ arguments, or those of St. Augustine ( whom I think you would like a lot ), then one might well conclude the the God of St. Thomas is the God of Christianity. He certainly had no doubts and he was no fool, neither was St. Augustine.

You asked Poly if there could not be another purely existent being. You also asked whether we could not consider that the Being concluded to in each of the Five Ways was not a different Being. And you have asked, if perhaps there were not other universes which might not have their own Unmoved Mover.

Thomas has established that the Unmoved Mover is Pure Act, without any potency to be more or less. That is a condition of absolute limitlessness, not just in existence, but in everything that implies existence ( i.e. intelligence, will, goodness, love, etc. ). The First Efficient Cause is absolutely First, it is limitless in the power of causality. Therefore He is identified with the Unmoved Mover.

In the same manner, the One Necessary Being of the third way is One. There can only be One Being which is the cause from which everything else in the universe derives it limited ( caused ) necessity. And such a Being, which is the cause of its own Necessity, is limitless in power, existence and every other perfection, is identifiable with the Unmoved Mover.

And we have already estsablished that there can only be on Being that is absolutely perfect and limitless in anyway. In the same way, there can only be one being which possesses any other perfection ( Goodness, Intelligence, Beauty, existence, power, will, etc. the Being of the Fourth Way) in a limitless way. Being limitless, this Being is identifiable with the Unmoved Mover.

Likewise the Fifth Way which concludes to a Being which is the End for which everything else in existence acts and directs its activity. There can only be One Such Being, the Unmoved Mover of the First Way, the One and only Limitless, Pure Act of Being.

Thus the End of each of the Five Ways is the same Limitless Being, the Unmoved Mover.

Thomas begins article 3 of Part 1 of S.T. by identifying this Being with the Being which is the conclusion of each of the Five Ways. So each Being of the Five Ways is the same Being, the Unmoved Mover.

Based on this argument, there could only exist One such Being. There may well be other universes of which we know nothing, but the same Being would be their Cause as well.

The remainder of your objections should be considered as answered by this presentation. It is certainly a more reasonable explanation than any alternative.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Simply put, a God who lacks self-awareness would lack a power that I possess.

It makes no sense to allege that God has less powers than I have.

It makes eminent sense to allege that God made me in his “image and likeness.”

 

[CandideWest]

These are equivocal uses of “identical.” Identical twins are not identical in the logical sense of x = x; two identical twins do differ by potencies relative to the other. (Even if only in the respect that, as material bodies, they could never occupy the same space. This is not undermined by relativity, either, since one twin would have to be moved relative to the other in order to occupy the same space, which would of course preclude the other from occupying that space.)

I know, that was my point about having other ways to distinguish between twins. We wouldn’t necessarily have such means to distinguish between separate instances of pure act, but that doesn’t necessarily mean there can only be one. It just means that if there is more than one we won’t be able to tell one from the other, but that does nothing to eliminate such a possibility.

In any case, suppose that only one of the Five Ways discloses a purely actual being. Aquinas’s derivations of the divine attributes can still proceed from that starting point.

Ok, but with this lone starting point, what can we show in terms of attributes? I haven’t yet seen a method to show that this “pure act” is some agent (as opposed to a thing), even with all 5 of the ways assumed. If we strip out 4 of them then I don’t think we’re getting any closer.

And really, if we can’t even show that this “pure act” is some self aware agent, then why do we care about it? It could be a mindless quantum fluctuation, or the multiverse… Should we all then pray to the quantum? No, that’s just silly.

Really it all still comes back to showing that the 5 ways prove the existence of something that might call itself “I”. Which was my first problem with cosmological arguments and one which remains unanswered.

Not really. It is observing that what pure act is essentially intelligent because it shares the essential features of intelligence with other intelligent beings.

??? Really? That didn’t seem to be your argument at all, it seemed to be trying to argue that we define the cause of a thing as necessarily being something which has at least all of the attributes of the effect therefore whatever caused the universe must have a mind as there are minds in the universe.

Well firstly this is based on an unsupported assumption (and one which appears based on observation to be false) and secondly the multiverse would still qualify as it has minds in it too.

I am still not clear on what “multiverse” refers to. If it refers to a collection of universes, then it seems like the explanation proper must be in terms of a constituent, rather than a set, since the multiverse is not something over and above what it contains (as far as I can tell).

There are quite a few definitions floating around, one which rather appeals to me is that it includes “all that ever was, is or will be and everything that could have been, could be or could ever be.”

 

[CandideWest]

Not " conflate, " Thomas makes it clear that the " Unmoved Mover, the First Efficient Cause, the One Necessary Being, the Most Perfect Being, the Final End of all things, must be a being with Self Knowledge ( S.T., Part 1, Ques 14, arts, 1,2,3 ) or Self Aware.

I know, I replied to this in my previous post,

“Indeed he does, but if you try to trace back you’ll find that the nature of God as a self aware being is assumed, not demonstrated. He never covers the possibility that God is not an “agent” but a “thing”.”

All you’ve added in the above is to repeat the (unsupported) assertion that each of the 5 ways are pointing to one thing.

I’m not sure how you think this is likely to generate progress?

• I point out an unsupported assumption in the argument
• you point to somewhere in the Summa which you think it’s answered although you admit to not understanding it.
• I tell you that I’ve been through that argument and found that the assumption is made in this section too.
• you point me to that part of the Summa again and tell me that it’s answered there.
• I tell you again I’ve been through that and it’s assumed, not demonstrated…
• … Now what?

To put it on a practical level or to make an analogy, I am self aware because I can reflect on the self. Can I prove that to you? No. By the same reasoning, you cannot prove to me that you are self aware just by saying it. However I can see that you do things which require power, knowledge and will. So, from that, I say you are self aware. Society supports this in many ways, our entire legal system assumes this, science supports it.
By analogy, God must be self aware.

No, you see what happens is that i know that I’m self aware, and I observe other people walking and talking and laughing and eating and working, all just like I do. So based on our similarities I believe that all these other people are self aware too.

This first mover? If we ignore all the other problems with the 5 ways we are still left with something which shows no sign of anything I would associate with behaviour of a person. So, no. This doesn’t help your case one bit.

I see God’s works and make the same judgment.

Not quite, you see things which exist and because our brains evolved to be highly efficient at identifying patterns and intent behind things that happen you apply this to the things you observe.

The only difference between this and a teenager getting angry with their phone because it “refuses to work” or a child lashing out at a chair for “because it hit me” is a difference in scale.

It is if you see how unreasonable it is to assume that non-intelligent matter caused itsef to exist, caused everything else to exist, and has caused, without mind, a universal, coordinated order and purpose throughout the universe. The latter seems most unreasonable.

I assume nothing of the sort of course. I don’t know how the universe started. But, it’s a really exciting area of research and I think there’s good hope that in 50 years time our species will have solved the question. Nothing certain of course, but we’ve made such VAST progress over the last 50 it doesn’t seem unreasonable.

Until we have a solution I’m not gonna go leaping to any assumptions about the cause, either to believe its a quantum fluctuation, or a god, or anything else.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Someone is whistling in the dark .

Linus2nd

 

[CandideWest]

Someone is whistling in the dark .

Linus2nd

Er, you want me to guess what tune you’re whistling? If so you’ll have to give me a clue.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Er, you want me to guess what tune you’re whistling? If so you’ll have to give me a clue.

uch:uch:uch: Really, that was quick.

For your edification, from another thread on this forum. You can access part 2 on your own, no sense in wasting good " electrons ? "

: Re: Discussion on Reason for Logical/Rational/Scientific Belief in God

---

Quote:
Originally Posted by 65Stang
If I can give any more information, or thoughts… Please let me know. I am open to any criticism, thoughts, prayers, or wisdom you may be able to share. Thank you all!!

Hi 65Stang

I’ll start with my favourite apologetic argument, which is the truth argument.

This I believe is one of the most powerful arguments for theism, because without God, the words true or false simply become meaningless, so the question I ask the atheist is if there is no God, why do you believe it to be true?

C.S. Lewis explains it well I believe.

“Supposing there was no intelligence behind the universe, no creative mind. In that case, nobody designed my brain for the purpose of thinking. It is merely that when the atoms inside my skull happen, for physical or chemical reasons, to arrange themselves in a certain way, this gives me, as a by-product, the sensation I call thought. But, if so, how can I trust my own thinking to be true? It’s like upsetting a milk jug and hoping that the way it splashes itself will give you a map of London. But if I can’t trust my own thinking, of course I can’t trust the arguments leading to Atheism, and therefore have no reason to be an Atheist, or anything else. Unless I believe in God, I cannot believe in thought: so I can never use thought to disbelieve in God.” - C.S. Lewis

The theory that thought is merely a movement in the brain is, in my opinion, nonsense; for if so, that theory itself would be merely a movement, an event among atoms, which may have speed and direction but of which it would be meaningless to use the words ‘true’ or ‘false’. C.S. Lewis

If the solar system was brought about by an accidental collision, then the appearance of organic life on this planet was also an accident, and the whole evolution of Man was an accident too. If so, then all our present thoughts are mere accidents - the accidental by-product of the movement of atoms. And this holds for the thoughts of the materialists and astronomers as well as for anyone else’s. But if their thoughts - i.e., Materialism and Astronomy - are mere accidental by-products, why should we believe them to be true? I see no reason for believing that one accident should be able to give me a correct account of all the other accidents. It’s like expecting the accidental shape taken by the splash when you upset a milk-jug should give you a correct account of how the jug was made and why it was upset. - C.S. Lewis

John Lennox also explains it well I believe

I believe in God because I believe there is evidence for God, for example, in the very fact that we can do science, we believe that the universe is rationally intelligable. Why does a scientist believe it is rationally intelligable? Atheism tells us that the human mind is the human brain and it’s the end product of a mindless unguided process, why should I believe anything it tells me if thats the case? Whereas theism tells me that there is intelligence behind the universe and behind the human mind which fits perfectly with science. So part of the evidence for God would be the fact that we can do science.

Infact the rise of science in the 16th and 17th century came about because people expected law in nature, because they believed in the Law giver (God). So science and faith in God fit perfectly together. - John Lennox

Thus I believe it’s not science and theism that are in conflict as most atheists like to claim, it’s actually science and atheism that are in conflict, because atheism cannot trust the cognitive faculties we use to do science, as C.S. Lewis say’s atheism and science is like expecting the accidental shape taken by the splash when you upset a milk jug should give you a correct account of how the jug was made and why it was upset.

“Atheism tells me that the human mind is the human brain and it’s the end product of a mindless unguided process, why should I believe anything it tells me if thats the case? Whereas theism tells me that there is intelligence behind the universe and behind the human mind.” - John Lennox

Thus I believe by denying God, the honest skeptic becomes skeptical of his skepticism.

Please continue to next post -

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“If you turn devoutly to the wounds and precious stigmata of Christ, you will find great comfort in suffering, you will mind but little the scorn of men, and you will easily bear their slanderous talk.”

• Extract from the book Imitation of Christ by Thomas A Kempis

Another good book, Candide, and every page has an art master piece. Get the Confraternity of the Precious Blood edition. Another great one by the same folks is My Daily Psalm Book, more terrific art, the artist is a survivor of the Armenian genocide of WW1.

And speaking of great books, Lord of the World by Monsignor Robert Hugh Benson is quite gripping. He was a contemporary of Blessed John Henry Neuman, G.K. Chesterton, Conan Doyle, his Father was Archbishop of Canterbery, he converted to Catholicism as a young man. It can be read free many places on line.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I know, I replied to this in my previous post,

“Indeed he does, but if you try to trace back you’ll find that the nature of God as a self aware being is assumed, not demonstrated. He never covers the possibility that God is not an “agent” but a “thing”.”

All you’ve added in the above is to repeat the (unsupported) assertion that each of the 5 ways are pointing to one thing.

I’m not sure how you think this is likely to generate progress?

• I point out an unsupported assumption in the argument
• you point to somewhere in the Summa which you think it’s answered although you admit to not understanding it.
• I tell you that I’ve been through that argument and found that the assumption is made in this section too.
• you point me to that part of the Summa again and tell me that it’s answered there.
• I tell you again I’ve been through that and it’s assumed, not demonstrated…
• … Now what?

No, you see what happens is that i know that I’m self aware, and I observe other people walking and talking and laughing and eating and working, all just like I do. So based on our similarities I believe that all these other people are self aware too.

This first mover? If we ignore all the other problems with the 5 ways we are still left with something which shows no sign of anything I would associate with behaviour of a person. So, no. This doesn’t help your case one bit.

Not quite, you see things which exist and because our brains evolved to be highly efficient at identifying patterns and intent behind things that happen you apply this to the things you observe.

The only difference between this and a teenager getting angry with their phone because it “refuses to work” or a child lashing out at a chair for “because it hit me” is a difference in scale.

I assume nothing of the sort of course. I don’t know how the universe started. But, it’s a really exciting area of research and I think there’s good hope that in 50 years time our species will have solved the question. Nothing certain of course, but we’ve made such VAST progress over the last 50 it doesn’t seem unreasonable.

Until we have a solution I’m not gonna go leaping to any assumptions about the cause, either to believe its a quantum fluctuation, or a god, or anything else.

I’m not disappointed in the least. Endless denials right down to the last breath.

Linus2nd