If Christians believe abortion is virtually morally equivalent to murder, why do we react to them differently in the US?

[Chris258]

Not exactly. I’m saying that it is not always moral to put on the mask and cape and attempt to resolve injustice through force. You have to satisfy ALL of the just war criteria for it to be just.

Nelka:

Which is more effective?

Stopping a woman from having an abortion?
Burning down a clinic of murder?
Praying?

You could always speak to the woman, she may be pressured into doing it.

But assuming non-violent means have all been exhausted or are precluded by the situation, we know that an individual using force to impede an imminent murder is legitimate – at the very least, morally permissible.

I know that there are parallels between Just War theory and this question of an individual’s moral responsibility or legitimate moral options, but at some point there must be differences in the way we approach the two situations, as jus ad bellum Just War Theory is concerned primarily with the legitimate moral options of a sovereign political entity, not so much individuals. Just War theory, as I see it, is an extension of Catholic moral theology surrounding the moral options of individuals, not the other way around.

I’m not asking whether it is morally obligatory to physically restrain a woman about to kill her child via abortion, at this point I am only asking whether it is morally permissible. That is, if someone actually did it, assuming he believed it was the only way at the time to impede the child’s unjust death, would we have any moral grounding to rebuke him and say “You have committed an immoral action.” It is this that I am having much difficulty finding an argument for, one that is consistent with the rest of Catholic moral theology.

 

[Friar_David_O.Carm]

According to the moral theology of Catholics (and most non-Catholic Christians), we are morally obligated to impede an imminent murder (whether by removing the victim or physically restraining the murderer).

I am not so sure about this. Can you provide actual Church documents that support this idea that we are “obligated” to act in this manner.

 

[Chris258]

I am not so sure about this. Can you provide actual Church documents that support this idea that we are “obligated” to act in this manner.

I assume you agree that it is morally legitimate to impede murder using violence if that is reasonably the only option. There are plenty of sources to corroborate that. As for moral obligation to defend life from an imminent murder:

2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life. Preserving the common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. To this end, those holding legitimate authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their charge.

I assert that, though the Catechism here mentions legitimate arbiters of justice as the agents, the Catechism is not absolutely limiting such “grave duty” to these authorities. Such an idea would be absurdly dissonant with the rest of moral theology. This would mean that I am well within my moral rights to stand idly by while a murderer is strangling a woman to death. The fact is that I would be committing a grave sin of omission by my inaction. We can’t hide behind the silly idea that inaction is not a moral choice.

What is unlawful, however, is the use of violence to enact justice on your own private authority. This falls to legitimate authorities. You cannot go knock down your neighbor’s door and hog-tie him because you believe he is about to kill his wife tomorrow. To reiterate, however, if this man were strangling his wife before your very eyes, you would be obligated to attempt removing his wife from this danger, which would certainly require violence.

Please note that, since I’ve started the thread, I’ve left off discussing moral obligation and have merely focused on moral legitimacy or moral permissibility. I have noted that there is perhaps a legitimate argument against the moral obligation of using violence to impede an imminent abortion in our society, but if you do claim that individuals (non-“legitimate authority” figures) are never obligated to use violence to impede imminent murders, then I’ll continue that discussion.

 

[Chris258]

Chris258:

I know that there are parallels between Just War theory and this question of an individual’s moral responsibility or legitimate moral options, but at some point there must be differences in the way we approach the two situations, as jus ad bellum Just War Theory is concerned primarily with the legitimate moral options of a sovereign political entity, not so much individuals. Just War theory, as I see it, is an extension of Catholic moral theology surrounding the moral options of individuals, not the other way around.

I’m not asking whether it is morally obligatory to physically restrain a woman about to kill her child via abortion, at this point I am only asking whether it is morally permissible. That is, if someone actually did it, assuming he believed it was the only way at the time to impede the child’s unjust death, would we have any moral grounding to rebuke him and say “You have committed an immoral action.” It is this that I am having much difficulty finding an argument for, one that is consistent with the rest of Catholic moral theology.

Bumpity. Is there no such argument that I’m searching for?

 

[Friar_David_O.Carm]

I assume you agree that it is morally legitimate to impede murder using violence if that is reasonably the only option. There are plenty of sources to corroborate that. As for moral obligation to defend life from an imminent murder:

Yes I agree with this.

2265 Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life. Preserving the common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. To this end, those holding legitimate authority have the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the civil community entrusted to their charge.

I assert that, though the Catechism here mentions legitimate arbiters of justice as the agents, the Catechism is not absolutely limiting such “grave duty” to these authorities. Such an idea would be absurdly dissonant with the rest of moral theology. This would mean that I am well within my moral rights to stand idly by while a murderer is strangling a woman to death. The fact is that I would be committing a grave sin of omission by my inaction. We can’t hide behind the silly idea that inaction is not a moral choice.

I disagree agree with your assertion as it does state those in “legitimate authority”.

This paragraph does not apply a moral obligation as you state.
What is unlawful, however, is the use of violence to enact justice on your own private authority. This falls to legitimate authorities. You cannot go knock down your neighbor’s door and hog-tie him because you believe he is about to kill his wife tomorrow. To reiterate, however, if this man were strangling his wife before your very eyes, you would be obligated to attempt removing his wife from this danger, which would certainly require violence.

Please note that, since I’ve started the thread, I’ve left off discussing moral obligation and have merely focused on moral legitimacy or moral permissibility. I have noted that there is perhaps a legitimate argument against the moral obligation of using violence to impede an imminent abortion in our society, but if you do claim that individuals (non-“legitimate authority” figures) are never obligated to use violence to impede imminent murders, then I’ll continue that discussion.

As you state here, one is not morally obligated nor can it be morally permissible to stop an abortion as an abortion would be the same as the example you give of your neighbor is behind his closed door.
Also if

 

[Chris258]

I disagree agree with your assertion as it does state those in “legitimate authority”.

Are you really willing to defend the notion that I have no moral obligation at all to use physical means to protect a person being strangled to death if those physical means are the only feasible way of removing the person from this danger? I should just call 911 and let him finish the job?

As you state here, one is not morally obligated nor can it be morally permissible to stop an abortion as an abortion would be the same as the example you give of your neighbor is behind his closed door.

I’m not talking about suspecting a woman of seeking an abortion. Or strongly suspecting that she’s going to get one tomorrow. I mean she is walking into the procedure room at the clinic and fully intent on killing her child, deciding against any attempts you have made to dissuade her. This is manifestly not like the example of a neighbor wife-killer behind closed doors; it is closer to the first. Compare it rather with a man being fully intent on strangling his wife to death and is about to attempt carrying it out in the next minute in front of your eyes.

To say that I am not within my moral rights to use physical means to impede this imminent murder is indefensible. That this is morally impermissible is untenable from the standpoint of Catholic moral theology. Now why should it be morally impermissible to physically restrain and remove a woman who is about to begin the abortion procedure in the next minute?

 

[Friar_David_O.Carm]

Are you really willing to defend the notion that I have no moral obligation at all to use physical means to protect a person being strangled to death if those physical means are the only feasible way of removing the person from this danger? I should just call 911 and let him finish the job?

You have failed to show that such a moral obligation exists.

I’m not talking about suspecting a woman of seeking an abortion. Or strongly suspecting that she’s going to get one tomorrow. I mean she is walking into the procedure room at the clinic and fully intent on killing her child, deciding against any attempts you have made to dissuade her. This is manifestly not like the example of a neighbor wife-killer behind closed doors; it is closer to the first. Compare it rather with a man being fully intent on strangling his wife to death and is about to attempt carrying it out in the next minute in front of your eyes.

I am sorry but it is the same. For one thing you would not be standing near the procedure room door. For another thing even if you were in the waiting room of the abortion clinic you would have no way of knowing that a woman whose name is called is going in for an abortion as most of these sorts of clinics do other things as well.

To say that I am not within my moral rights to use physical means to impede this imminent murder is indefensible. That this is morally impermissible is untenable from the standpoint of Catholic moral theology. Why should it be morally impermissible to physically restrain and remove a woman who is about to begin the abortion procedure in the next minute?

Again, you have no way of knowing that such is going to occur and you do not have any moral rights to physically impede anyone based on your assumptions.

 

[Chris258]

You have failed to show that such a moral obligation exists.

I will leave the question of moral obligation to impede imminent murders for now.

Again, you have no way of knowing that such is going to occur and you do not have any moral rights to physically impede anyone based on your assumptions.

Then are you willing to admit that I would be committing an immoral act by physically restraining a man who is about to slit his wife’s throat? I’m only going on my assumptions that his crazed chasing her with a knife or holding the knife to her throat is an intent to kill.

You’re somewhat missing the point of the question. We’re getting hung up on questions of certainty. I’m saying, assuming that I have just as much certainty as the above scenario that a woman is about to have her child killed, why should similar action as that proposed in the above situation be morally impermissible?

 

[markomalley]

That’s a really good question. I can’t say as I have a good reason why the two haven’t ever been treated the same in our civil law.

 

[Rence]

I will leave the question of moral obligation to impede imminent murders for now.

Then are you willing to admit that I would be committing an immoral act by physically restraining a man who is about to slit his wife’s throat? I’m only going on my assumptions that his crazed chasing her with a knife or holding the knife to her throat is an intent to kill.

A man about to slit his wife’s throat is breaking the law, and should be restrained and prevented from doing so. That doesn’t compare with abortion, which is legal. You can’t restrain a person seeking an abortion because today they have the legal right to do so, and you, interfering with that right, would be breaking the law.

You’re somewhat missing the point of the question. We’re getting hung up on questions of certainty. I’m saying, assuming that I have just as much certainty as the above scenario that a woman is about to have her child killed, why should similar action as that proposed in the above situation be morally impermissible?

Because one situation (a woman seeking an abortion) is legal, and the other (man about to slit his wife’s throat) is not legal. If you interfere with a legal action, you are the one breaking the law. If you interfere in an illegal action, you are upholding the law and are a hero.

I think your energy would be better spent trying to change the law, rather than trying to circumvent a legal procedure backed by the law.

 

[Chris258]

A man about to slit his wife’s throat is breaking the law, and should be restrained and prevented from doing so. That doesn’t compare with abortion, which is legal. You can’t restrain a person seeking an abortion because today they have the legal right to do so, and you, interfering with that right, would be breaking the law.

Because one situation (a woman seeking an abortion) is legal, and the other (man about to slit his wife’s throat) is not legal. If you interfere with a legal action, you are the one breaking the law. If you interfere in an illegal action, you are upholding the law and are a hero.

I think your energy would be better spent trying to change the law, rather than trying to circumvent a legal procedure backed by the law.

I have already said before I’m not going to go out and kidnap women from abortion clinics.

You continue to invoke the legal status of this or that, but that is more or less irrelevant to the question I am really asking. I am asking from the standpoint purely of Christian moral theology. If it is morally permissible – simply on the grounds of Christian ethics – to impede a man from slitting his wife’s throat using physical means, why – simply on the grounds of Christian ethics – should it be morally impermissible for me to use similar physical means to impede a woman fully intent on getting an abortion?

 

[Rence]

I have already said before I’m not going to go out and kidnap women from abortion clinics.

Then how do you plan to “impede a woman fully intent on getting an abortion”? How can you accomplish this without commiting a grave evil yourself? Again, I think your focus should be on changing the law, not trying to circumvent someone’s right to excercise the law.

You continue to invoke the legal status of this or that, but that is more or less irrelevant to the question I am really asking.

Actually, it’s not irrelevent to the question you are really asking, because you’re asking about comitting an evil to make up for another evil.

I am asking from the standpoint purely of Christian moral theology. If it is morally permissible – simply on the grounds of Christian ethics – to impede a man from slitting his wife’s throat using physical means, why – simply on the grounds of Christian ethics – should it be morally impermissible for me to use similar physical means to impede a woman fully intent on getting an abortion?

Chris, people just as pro-life as you keep answering your question according to Church teaching, but you continue to discount the answers as unimportant and irrelevent and continue to re-ask your questions.

It is morally impermisible for you to use physical means to impede a woman fully intent on getting an abortion because it is forbidden by the Church to use evil in order to do what you think is “good” or to prevent another evil. In other words, it is immoral to use physical means to impede someone from doing anything that they have a right to do, and whether you like it or not, or agree with it or not, a woman currently has the right to seek an abortion. You cannot commit a wrong in order to try and make something right. That’s why.

The CCC says:

*Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil. *

*1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not justify the means. *

To apply it to your senario, you cannot physically impede someone from doing something that you believe is evil. Your act of impeding the woman is still evil.

 

[Friar_David_O.Carm]

Then are you willing to admit that I would be committing an immoral act by physically restraining a man who is about to slit his wife’s throat? I’m only going on my assumptions that his crazed chasing her with a knife or holding the knife to her throat is an intent to kill.

You are comparing apples to oranges here.

A man about to slit the throat of his wife is a totally different case than a woman having her name called and walking through a door.

One you can see the intent as the man is holding the woman with a knife out the other you can not tell the intent without making assumptions that you have no right to make.

 

[Chris258]

It is morally impermisible for you to use physical means to impede a woman fully intent on getting an abortion because it is forbidden by the Church to use evil in order to do what you think is “good” or to prevent another evil. In other words, it is immoral to use physical means to impede someone from doing anything that they have a right to do, and whether you like it or not, or agree with it or not, a woman currently has the right to seek an abortion. You cannot commit a wrong in order to try and make something right. That’s why.

Where exactly is it in Catholic moral theology that a person is given the moral right to commit an evil action because a society legitimizes said action? The right of an individual to end innocent life cannot be established by civil law, because this “right” blatantly contradicts natural law.

This applies as much to the “right” of a man to slit his wife’s throat because of infidelity as it does to the “right” of a woman to dismember her 8-year-old child, and as much to the “right” of a woman to cooperate with a physician to have her fetus killed.

Civil law gives no one such moral rights. You cannot appeal, then, to these “rights” (evil actions legitimized by civil law) to say that a person would be committing an immoral act by physically impeding their exercise if that was the only feasible way to impede the act from being completed.

To be clear, I’m not trying to find excuses for people who blow up abortion clinics or kidnap women about to get abortions. I’m trying to clear up what seems to be a major discrepancy in moral theology as it touches abortion vs. other forms of deliberate murder.

 

[Chris258]

You are comparing apples to oranges here.

A man about to slit the throat of his wife is a totally different case than a woman having her name called and walking through a door.

One you can see the intent as the man is holding the woman with a knife out the other you can not tell the intent without making assumptions that you have no right to make.

Then, to reiterate:

Assuming that I have just as much certainty as the above scenario that a woman is about to have her child killed, why should similar action as that proposed in the above situation be morally impermissible?

 

[Friar_David_O.Carm]

Then, to reiterate:

Assuming that I have just as much certainty as the above scenario that a woman is about to have her child killed, why should similar action as that proposed in the above situation be morally impermissible?

I never said it was morally impermissible.

I just disagree that we are morally obligated.

 

[Rence]

Where exactly is it in Catholic moral theology that a person is given the moral right to commit an evil action because a society legitimizes said action?

There is no where in Catholic moral theology that a person is given a moral right to commit an evil action because a society legitimizes said action. However, there IS a part in the CCC that I quoted you that specifically states that you cannot do evil to prevent another evil. That was your question and I answered it.

The right of an individual to end innocent life cannot be established by civil law, because this “right” blatantly contradicts natural law.

You’re forgetting that it is an established civil law. It’s a fact: abortion is legal.

This applies as much to the “right” of a man to slit his wife’s throat because of infidelity as it does to the “right” of a woman to dismember her 8-year-old child, and as much to the “right” of a woman to cooperate with a physician to have her fetus killed.

Civil law gives no one such moral rights. You cannot appeal, then, to these “rights” (evil actions legitimized by civil law) to say that a person would be committing an immoral act by physically impeding their exercise if that was the only feasible way to impede the act from being completed.

Civil law allows a woman to be in complete control of her body, and her reproductive system. I know you don’t like that, but it’s a fact. You can argue until you’re blue that it shouldn’t be true, but it is. If you don’t like it, work to make it different.

To be clear, I’m not trying to find excuses for people who blow up abortion clinics or kidnap women about to get abortions. I’m trying to clear up what seems to be a major discrepancy in moral theology as it touches abortion vs. other forms of deliberate murder.

The discreptacy is that the civil laws don’t mirror the laws of the Catholic Church in everything. The Church forbids abortion, not civil law. The Church forbids invitro fertilization, the law does not. The Church forbids birth control in all forms, the law does not. If you don’t like the law, work to make it change. But don’t argue that you have the right to commit an evil to prevent someone from excercising their rights by civil law, because it doesn’t wash. Cutting someone’s throat and abortion are not the same no matter how you look at it. You’d do better by taking it for what it is. Abortion is abortion. Get like-mindedpeople to gether and lobby to make the law change. That’s what you should do. Do good to combat an evil.

 

[Chris258]

However, there IS a part in the CCC that I quoted you that specifically states that you cannot do evil to prevent another evil. That was your question and I answered it.

You do not answer at all why the way you are using this CCC reference shouldn’t apply with equal force to physical means to impede a murder. I presume you believe that is legitimate. The only appeal you are making is to legality, and you yourself have admitted that legality does not make or break moral rights according to Catholic moral theology:

Rence:

There is no where in Catholic moral theology that a person is given a moral right to commit an evil action because a society legitimizes said action.

Rence:

Cutting someone’s throat and abortion are not the same no matter how you look at it. You’d do better by taking it for what it is. Abortion is abortion.

Prove, then, using Catholic moral principles, this moral differentiation between abortion and deliberate murder, and that will soundly explain the discrepancy. You have only claimed that abortion and deliberate murder are morally different.

Both are cases wherein an individual takes it upon himself/herself to end the life of another unjustly. Where exactly is the source of differentiation then?

You have already admitted that legality does not change the morality of these actions, so what is it exactly that differentiates them, such that physical means can be used morally in response to one and not the other?

You don’t have to keep talking at me as if I’ve really got a horse in this race, or that I’m not trying to change the laws. Like I said, just trying to see what’s up with this.

 

[Chris258]

I never said it was morally impermissible.

I just disagree that we are morally obligated.

Alright then. Glad we’re getting somewhere.

So exactly on what basis would we rebuke a man who, say, physically restrained his wife because he knew she was about to procure an abortion and he had exhausted all non-physical means of convincing her to avert her course?

Or would you say we wouldn’t have any moral basis to rebuke him for his action?

 

[Rence]

You do not answer at all why the way you are using this CCC reference shouldn’t apply with equal force to physical means to impede a murder. I presume you believe that is legitimate. The only appeal you are making is to legality, and you yourself have admitted that legality does not make or break moral rights according to Catholic moral theology:

I’ve already taken the time to answer you. I’m sorry that you don’t like the answer