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fakename
Guest
I was wondering, if the conscience can commit a sin by mistakenly believing that the thing you do is a sin, then can the conscience perform a virtue by mistakenly believing that the thing you are doing is a virtue?
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fred_conty
Guest
Sin can only take place in the mind and heart. The outward act completes the sin already conceived.
Don’t think it is a sin, then no sin committed.
Do think it is a sin, then sin committed.
This applies to a person of good conscience and not avoiding information…
Don’t think it is a sin, then no sin committed.
Do think it is a sin, then sin committed.
This applies to a person of good conscience and not avoiding information…
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starsmurf
Guest
If you are not aware that what you are doing is a sin, then it isn’t one. That doesn’t mean, however, that it is a virtue, even if you think it is one. If that were the case, then Catholics denouncing their Jewish neighbours to the Nazis could be said to be a virtue. If they genuinely hadn’t realised that what they were doing was wrong, then no sin was committed but it certainly wasn’t a virtuous act, even if they thought it was. Those Catholics who helped Jews and others escape from the Nazis were doing a virtuous act, even if they didn’t realise it. One Mother Superior who hid men from the Nazis in her convent was technically breaking her Order’s rules but she was given a Papal absolution after the war was over, because what she did was right.
God sees what is in our heart. If you do lots of virtuous acts but do them with hatred in your heart, then those acts will not make you a better person and will not gain favour with God. On the other hand, if you do something wrong but don’t realise that it is wrong and do it out of love, God will see the love and not the wrong act.
God sees what is in our heart. If you do lots of virtuous acts but do them with hatred in your heart, then those acts will not make you a better person and will not gain favour with God. On the other hand, if you do something wrong but don’t realise that it is wrong and do it out of love, God will see the love and not the wrong act.
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fred_conty
Guest
Got a question. Mother superior received absolution for something good? There must
be more to this than meets the eye.
be more to this than meets the eye.
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fakename
Guest
So in general one must know what is good to truly do good, but one doesn’t have to know that something is truly bad, to be bad?
But if the firm belief that something is bad is enough to make it so, then why doesn’t the same apply to good?
po18guy
Well-known member
It does remain ignorance, however, which is opposed to seeking the illumination of the Holy Spirit. I believe that a certain portion of the new age movement relies upon the assumption that the human will can make things (even oneself) into whatever it desires.
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fred_conty
Guest
Yes if in good conscience. Case in question, 9/11. If done in good conscience for the
glory of God. This is a tough one and that is why I chose it. I am not saying that I
approve it. The reasons why this happened and what the correct solution for this is, is
a different topic.
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fakename
Guest
So if something is done that seems good, it is counted as good?
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fred_conty
Guest
God judges the intention and the heart. Yes. he counts it as good, but I can’t speak for
your neighbor’s thoughts on this. And as my prior answer said, if it was done in good conscience.
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fakename
Guest
If it’s true then, it gets us into the problems noted above -if a nazi thinks he’s doing good then he really is doing good. So how do we get around this?
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Newbie2
Guest
If you think something is good, does it become (objectively) good?
Not necessarily.
Dittos with evil, although the intention may be evil but the act morally neutral.
In other words, I may think leaving a wad of gum on the sidewalk is evil (harmful to the environment, possibly harmful to an animal eating it, whatever), but that does not make the act of walking by and failing to pick it up an evil. I may think parking close to the store (but not in a handicap parking slot) is an evil act, because there are still people who have a hard time walking who do not have a handicap sticker, and my parking close rather than far away is making them walk further than necessary.
My intention may be evil, but the act morally neutral. I may decide to park close to the store with the intent of making an elderly person walk further, but they may choose to park in a spot that is equidistant from the store where I decided to park; my choosing to take that spot did nothing to make them walk further. The intention is evil, the act morally neutral.
Not necessarily.
Dittos with evil, although the intention may be evil but the act morally neutral.
In other words, I may think leaving a wad of gum on the sidewalk is evil (harmful to the environment, possibly harmful to an animal eating it, whatever), but that does not make the act of walking by and failing to pick it up an evil. I may think parking close to the store (but not in a handicap parking slot) is an evil act, because there are still people who have a hard time walking who do not have a handicap sticker, and my parking close rather than far away is making them walk further than necessary.
My intention may be evil, but the act morally neutral. I may decide to park close to the store with the intent of making an elderly person walk further, but they may choose to park in a spot that is equidistant from the store where I decided to park; my choosing to take that spot did nothing to make them walk further. The intention is evil, the act morally neutral.
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ganonscrub
Guest
The simplest way to go about things is to consider if any harm is being done to anything. If you think you are doing something good even though it is harming someone, that does not make it good. There is an objective reality filled with other entities that has to be considered when deciding whether or not the actions you take are good or bad.
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Bookcat
Guest
If I think that this woman left her pen at the store. So I pick it up and run out of the store after her and give it to her…and she says thanks…and the we part right away.
I was doing what I honestly thought was good…I was returning her pen. Though in reality what happened was it was the stores pen and I just stole it by mistake!
The stealing of the pen does not become a good act.
But God does see that I was invincibally ignorant and wholeheartedly seeking to do good. So he could reward me in some way.
But the stealing of the pen will always objectively remain a not good thing. It will remain objectively stealing.
I will not be rewarded for stealing but for the good that I was seeking to do in good faith.
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puzzleannie
Guest
no it does not. even if you mistakenly thought the action was good, it is still objectively evil, and carries the natural consequences attached to that evil. Your own guilt may be subjectively less, or even absent, because you did not have full knowledge, but that does not change the objective reality.
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fred_conty
Guest
Suppose a priest preaches a sermon (sowing seed) and of the 20
persons hearing, 10 do acts of charity, and 10 do evil acts, just because
of something he said in his sermon. But later he found out that
something he said was wrong unintentionally, and led 10 to do evil acts.
Would he be punished for the bad and rewarded for the good?
Or is it a wash? Or would he be responsible for the bad and not
for the good?
Sin and virtue takes place in the mind and not outside. He would be
rewarded for the sermon even tho bad took place from listening to it.
Objective and subjective may be a way to explain this theologically,
but the practical explaination is, was there something evil or good in
the intention of the doer? And according to this he is rewarded or
punished because sin/virtue is conceived in the mind. .
Suppose Adam and Eve had eaten the fruit not knowing that it was
evil to eat it. And they saved some for their children for them to
eat not knowing it was wrong but thinking that they were doing
a favor and a goodness to their children.
Just a thought. What do you think?
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fakename
Guest
Well like other posters said, there is also the extra-mental dimension that can influence the wrongness or rightness of an act. I think my confusion stems for the reasons behind why things thought wrong, are wrong when you do them, though they be objectively right.
I would say that there are two possibilities that are likeliest: that the intention suffices for making an act either good or bad, or the intention is merely necessary for making an act good or bad. In logical symbolism either: I (good or bad intention) → good or bad act (g v b) or (g v b act)—>(intention good or bad). In the latter formula, the goodness or badness of the action cannot be good or bad without a good or bad intention, but it is possible for something to be bad even if you have a good intention and vice versa. In the former formula, the intention suffices for making something good or bad, and so it would be impossible for the intention to be good and the action bad -this is absurd. So I think that the most likely answer then is that a good or bad intention is necessary but not alone sufficient to make something good or bad.
But I run into trouble even with the most likely option, since if there were to be a good act with a bad intention, then the logical rule of Modus Tollens would be achieved and so I would have said that it is impossible for the intention to be bad and the act to be good! Therefore, I’m led all the way back to the beginning and I’m not anymore enlightened about the issue at hand. I personally think I’ll have to crop the meanings of my terms -they’re clearly getting me in trouble.
Let’s just say, that two contradictions occur when I take up either options presented in this thread:
- if intentions are sufficient to change the moral value of an act, then a good intention and a good act would be synonymous -you could never have a situation where one’s intention was opposite of the act. This is impossible considering that this situation occurs in every day life.
- if intentions are merely necessary for an act to have moral value, then again it would be impossible for a good intention to be coupled with a bad act, since the only way to have a good intention is to do good acts and the same applies to bad acts.
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Bookcat
Guest
The Catechism explains in the links above.
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Bookcat
Guest
Here: This section of the Catechism will be of help:
THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS
1749 Freedom makes man a moral subject. When he acts deliberately, man is, so to speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that is, acts that are freely chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can be morally evaluated. They are either good or evil.
I. The Sources of Morality
1750 The morality of human acts depends on:
1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. the end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. the intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.
1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. the end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39
1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
II. Good Acts and Evil Acts
1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).
The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.
1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
IN BRIEF
1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three “sources” of the morality of human acts.
1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.
1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). the end does not justify the means.
1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.
1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P5Q.HTM and following
THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS
1749 Freedom makes man a moral subject. When he acts deliberately, man is, so to speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that is, acts that are freely chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can be morally evaluated. They are either good or evil.
I. The Sources of Morality
1750 The morality of human acts depends on:
- the object chosen;
- the end in view or the intention;
- the circumstances of the action.
The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.
1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. the end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. the intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.
1753 A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. the end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39
1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
II. Good Acts and Evil Acts
1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).
The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.
1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
IN BRIEF
1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three “sources” of the morality of human acts.
1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.
1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). the end does not justify the means.
1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.
1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P5Q.HTM and following
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fakename
Guest
So a good act is both necessarily and sufficiently a good intention, circumstance, and act all together?
But then how can it be that a bad intention can cause the objective thing to be bad too? I suppose this is my new problem: does a bad intention cause the objective act to become bad? I’m starting to believe that it doesn’t.
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