I'm leaving Catholicism

[Hodos]

Look, I agree that God Infinitely supersedes my feeble understanding. This is why, as Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas rightfully point out, we can only know what God is by knowing what he isn’t.

I would disagree with this statement to an extent. We know what God is, or at least attributes of God based on what he reveals to us. So if God tells us, that he is one, we can assume there is one god. If God presents himself as the Father and creator, we know he is such. If God sends his Son in the flesh, we know that God’s unity is not limited to a single person, and that God is capable of assuming humanity for his purpose, if God pours out his Spirit upon the Church to bring them to faith in Christ, we know that God’s unity is defined by three separate persons who assume specific roles within the plan of redemption. And yet, we hold firmly to God’s own testimony that there is only one God. This is essentially what the doctrine of the Trinity does. It is a forensic description of how God has revealed himself through his work of redemption. I don’t have to understand everything there is to know about God, to accept what has explicitly revealed to us. Nor does the doctrine of the Trinity attempt to explain more than what is revealed through the witness of scripture.

 

[Wesrock]

That’s my main problem, basically. I agree with Classical Theist in that you could say, via analogical predication at least, that there are relational distinctions, but I disagree because I think that these distinctions are ultimately logical and not real.

They do have extra-mental reality, which is why they are real and not logical, as God’s intellect and what proceeds from it is real. But there is no multiplication of beings or parts. Relations are intelligible distinctions, real, but intelligible and not corporeal, and the Trinitarian relations subsist in the Simple divine essence.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

The intrinsic processions and relations are essential, not accidental. The essence is paternity and filiation, it does not have the accidents of being paternity and filiation.

Just by virtue of them sharing the exact same Divine Essence means that they have to be the same thing, as essence or quiddity answers the question of what the thing is, and given the Principle of Identity, it seems as though paternity and filiation would have to be identical.

I already wrote that the beginning and end should not be conceived as places in regards to a line, but intelligible activity that has God as both its source and terms, where the source and term are the same thing, where God exists relationally to himself as both source and term.

I understand that, but what I’m arguing is that the source/term distinction is, and must, be a logical distinction.

As St. Thomas wrote, “[A]lthough paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects.” And also, "Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument. "

I’m not sure if I agree with Aquinas on filiation and paternity being opposite and thus competing since we can only talk about God using analogical terms. It’s possible to say that God has something analogous to paternity and filiation without the need for a real distinction since the terms are used analogically and not univocally.

When relation is an accident there is a relation because there is a distinction between two subjects, such as Socrates being shorter than Plato. When a relation is subsistent it is the reason for the distinction.

I’m not sure if I understood what you meant by this. Could you clarify?

 

[TheDefaultMan]

But there is no multiplication of beings or parts. Relations are intelligible distinctions, real, but intelligible and not corporeal, and the Trinitarian relations subsist in the Simple divine essence.

Well one, I never said that the Trinity would make God corporeal, only that he would become a composite. Second, there has to be some form of a multiplicity of parts for the distinction to be ontological/metaphysical (which is what is entailed of a real distinction) as distinctions imply limitations of being in certain aspects, which implies act as well as potency.

 

[rdj69]

It is precisely because of Divine Simplicity that the Trinity must be true, because it means God must be self-referential. God is simultaneously the subject, the object, and the act - which we refer to as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. If Divine Simplicity weren’t true, then the Trinity could not be true, either. This is what’s explained in the video, and you really haven’t responded to this notion (that I’ve seen). You claim that they cannot both be true, but on the contrary, they must both be true - one necessarily implies the other.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

I agree that there is something like a Trinity in God due to self-referentiality. The problem that I have is with affirming a real as opposed to a logical distinction within the Trinity.

The problem with a real distinction in the Trinity is that it contradicts Divine Simplicity and logic. If the Father has the Divine Essence (and the essence answers the question of what it is), the Son has the Divine Essence and the Holy Spirit has the Divine Essence, it would have to follow that the Father is the Son and the Son is the Holy Spirit. It flows from the Principle of Identity.
Father = God
Son = God
Holy Spirit = God
Therefore, Father = Son = Holy Spirit

It also collapses into an ontological/metaphysical distinction, which cannot be made sense of without act and potency, which would reduce god to an act/potency composite.

The only way to affirms a real distinction in them is to either reduce them into accidents of the Divine Essence, or individuated substances, both of which contradict simplicity.

Now, on the other hand, a logical distinction would still hold that self-referentiality is indeed real, but that the distinctions between Knower and Known would not exist extra-mentally, and the predicates of God as Knower and Known would be analogical predicates that are synonymous, just like God’s other attributes.

 

[Rau]

Don’t get me wrong. I still respect the Catholic Church, and I’m open to listening to your guys’ objections and I’m more than willing to engage, I just cannot be Catholic if it means accepting logically contradictory doctrines.

As a consequence, do you reject the truths in Scripture? Do you reject the person of Jesus Christ as God incarnate? Or is your argument solely on the specific theological issue you describe?

 

[rdj69]

The problem that I have is with affirming a real as opposed to a logical distinction within the Trinity.

It is a real distinction because God’s self-knowledge is real - God really, truly, knows himself, and because of this there is a real relational distinction within God (subject/knower, object/known, and act/knowing). The fact that you’re struggling to comprehend this doesn’t say anything about its objective coherence.

The problem with a real distinction in the Trinity is that it contradicts Divine Simplicity and logic. If the Father has the Divine Essence (and the essence answers the question of what it is), the Son has the Divine Essence and the Holy Spirit has the Divine Essence, it would have to follow that the Father is the Son and the Son is the Holy Spirit. It flows from the Principle of Identity.
Father = God
Son = God
Holy Spirit = God
Therefore, Father = Son = Holy Spirit

The persons of God do not have the divine essence, they are the divine essence - God is synonymous with his essence. God does not have omnipotence or omniscience; God is omnipotence and omniscience. God does not have goodness; God is goodness. God does not have love; God is love.

As for your principle of identity explanation, it equivocates the term “is”. When saying “The Father is God”, that is not a claim of identity, it’s a claim of substantial relation. Are all three persons of the Trinity of the same substance? Yes. Does that mean they all share the same personal identity? No.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

I’m still more or less agnostic on those issues, but my conclusions on the Trinity seem to undermine most, if not all of Christianity

 

[Rau]

Agnostic on those issues (whether Jesus was God)? That is the centerpiece of Christian faith…

 

[rdj69]

I’m still more or less agnostic on those issues, but my conclusions on the Trinity seem to undermine most, if not all of Christianity

Isn’t the most rational explanation that your conclusions are in error, not the theological tradition which has been studied and developed over millennia by some of the greatest human minds?

Do you not see the arrogance of what you’re asserting?

If you came here seeking answers to this apparent contradiction under the assumption that your understanding was incorrect, that would have been fantastic. But you came here to assert that your understanding is correct and the entire intellectual tradition of the Church is wrong.

Your real problem isn’t even your lack of understanding, it’s your lack of humility.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

It is a real distinction because God’s self-knowledge is real - God really, truly, knows himself, and because of this there is a real relational distinction within God (subject/knower, object/known, and act/knowing).

Real relations don’t entail real distinctions. It’s possible for God to truly know himself and be the object of his self-knowledge while recognizing that they aren’t really distinct from one another.

The persons of God do not have the divine essence, they are the divine essence - God is synonymous with his essence. God does not have omnipotence or omniscience; God is omnipotence and omniscience. God does not have goodness; God is goodness. God does not have love; God is love.

I don’t deny any of this. To say that God has the Divine Essence is just to say that they are the Divine Essence. This is why many Thomists, including Classical Theist, make use of phrases like “share consubstantially in the Divine Essence.”

As for your principle of identity explanation, it equivocates the term “is”. When saying “The Father is God”, that is not a claim of identity, it’s a claim of substantial relation

It is a claim of identity. It has to be, otherwise, it would be incoherent to say that that the Father is God. The identity of a thing is what it is.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

Isn’t the most rational explanation that your conclusions are in error, not the theological tradition which has been studied and developed over millennia by some of the greatest human minds?

Imagine if a Muslim told you that the most rational explanation for why you don’t believe in Islam is that you’re simply wrong and that the billions of believers, along with the hundreds and thousands of Islamic Scholars throughout history, most of which were incredibly brilliant, are correct.

Or an atheist appealing to a multitude of rigorous and academic philosophy experts who are atheists.

You see the problem, right? This can be applied to virtually all belief systems and all schools of thought.

I should also point out that I’m using a lot of philosophy concepts from the very tradition you are appealing to.

And no, I’m not just asserting that my understanding is correct. I’m arguing for it on the basis of philosophical concepts we know through reason.

 

[ontheway1]

epistemic realism

I accept what you sat at face value, mainly because I can’t argue from the position of ignorance. Is this what we are talking about?

In philosophy and epistemology, epistemic theories of truth [1] are attempts to analyze the notion of truth in terms of epistemic notions such as knowledge, belief, acceptance, verification, justification, and perspective.

A variety of such conceptions can be classified into verificationist theories, perspectivist or relativist theories, and pragmatic theories.

Verificationism is based on verifying propositions. The distinctive claim of verificationism is that the result of such verifications is, by definition, truth. That is, truth is reducible to this process of verification.

According to perspectivism and relativism, a proposition is only true relative to a particular perspective. Roughly, a proposition is true relative to a perspective if and only if it is accepted, endorsed, or legitimated by that perspective.

Many authors writing on the topic of the notion of truth advocate or endorse combinations of the above positions. Each of these epistemic conceptions of truth can be subjected to various criticisms. Some criticisms apply across the board, while others are more specific.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

I accept what you sat at face value, mainly because I can’t argue from the position of ignorance. Is this what we are talking about?

Yeah that’s what I’m talking about. There are certainly different competing theories of truth, but it seems to me that most academics I’ve read on this subject are willing to grant some form of epistemic realism.

 

[rdj69]

To say that God has the Divine Essence is just to say that they are the Divine Essence.

It’s not; “has” denotes possession, “is” denotes equivalency.

It is a claim of identity. It has to be, otherwise, it would be incoherent to say that that the Father is God. The identity of a thing is what it is.

Maybe a different example will help.

You argued that if The Father = God and The Son = God then The Father = The Son.

By your logic, if Omnipotence = God and Love = God then Omnipotence = Love.

Hopefully we can agree that this is not the case, it’s pretty self-evident. The question is why this is not the case. The answer is that it’s a matter of semantic equivocation.

“Is” in the phrase “The Father is God” is being used differently than “is” in the phrase “The Father is the Son” - the Father and Son are persons, while “God” is not a person. God is not in any genus, not even the genus of “being”, because God is Being itself. You are treating “The Father” and “God” as conceptually equivalent terms when they are not, and this difference changes the meaning of the term “is” in your example.

 

[nicholasG]

God is not a true thing
But truth itself.

God is not a good thing among many
God is goodness itself.

God is not just one state of affairs
God is justice itself.

Bishop Barron

 

[rdj69]

I should also point out that I’m using a lot of philosophy concepts from the very tradition you are appealing to

That is exactly my point; you must believe that the intellectual tradition of the Church is sound, yes? You’re appealing to it in all kinds of ways. Yet you seem to think that the Church is right about everything except this one issue, which they are wrong about because it doesn’t make sense to you.

If everything else they teach is true, including the doctrine that the Church is lead by the Holy Spirit who protects her from error, there’s nothing rational about throwing it all away when you find one single thing that you, personally, cannot comprehend.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

It’s not; “has” denotes possession, “is” denotes equivalency.

In God (since he is absolutely simple), his properties are equal to his existence, meaning that he is equal to his properties. His Existence is equal to his Omnipresence, his Love, etc. So really, there isn’t much of a difference.

Hopefully we can agree that this is not the case, it’s pretty self-evident. The question is why this is not the case.

I agree with you that it’s wrong, but it’s wrong for different reasons. To say that God = Omnipresence or God = Love is to implicitly use it in a univocal way rather than an analogical way, which is the only way predicates to God can be made.

However, if it was true that Omnipresence was equal to God, and that Love was equal to God, then it actually would follow that Omnipresence is equal to Love.

In fact, as most Classical Theists affirm, What is Love and Omnipresence in God (in an analogous way) are not really distinct.

“Is” in the phrase “The Father is God” is being used differently than “is” in the phrase “The Father is the Son” - the Father and Son are persons, while “God” is not a person. God is not in any genus, not even the genus of “being”, because God is Being itself . You are treating “The Father” and “God” as conceptually equivalent terms when they are not, and this difference changes the meaning of the term “is” in your example.

The problem is that assuming Divine Simplicity, they would have to be conceptually equivalent terms. To say that the Father is the Divine Essence is simply a statement about the Identity/Essence of the Father, and it couldn’t be anything else. You simply can’t appeal to some distinction between the persons and God without affirming, in some way, that God would have to be composite.

 

[TheDefaultMan]

That is exactly my point; you must believe that the intellectual tradition of the Church is sound, yes?

No no no not entirely. What I said was that I appealed to a lot of concepts from the Catholic, and more broadly the NeoScholastic intellectual tradition. That doesn’t mean that I can’t object to certain other parts of that Intellectual Tradition on the basis of it being absurd.