Immaterial aspects of thought

[AndyT_81]

Hi all,

I would like to generate some discussion regarding a paper by Professor James Ross, entitled “Immaterial Aspects of Thought”, which I have found very interesting and can be found here:

nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/43151/ross-immateriality.pdf

The basic argument is summed up as (by aletheist at PhilosophyForums):

A. Some thoughts are incompossibly determinate.
B. No physical processes or functions of physical processes are incompossibly determinate.
C. Therefore, some thoughts are not physical processes or functions of physical processes.

What is meant by A? Well essentially, when we think things like modus ponens, when we add, square, conjoin etc. we think in a form that is incompossibly determinate amongst pure functions. Let’s consider the process of addition, which is of the form x+y=z. When we add two numbers, we certainly reason in this form and no other. For instance, we certainly know we do not perform some other process, such as Kripke’s quaddition, which can give the right output i.e. z, but is certainly not what we do when we add. In other words, when we add, we think in a form which is unique amongst incompossible functions. We may also say that, every rational judgement is truth perserving from the single case, i.e. no matter what x and y are, the single case process “x+y=z” will always be truth perserving.

What about B? Say we have an adding machine, which produces outputs, z, from two (name removed by moderator)uts, x and y, which seem to line up with our understanding of adding. Can we say that the machine is adding like we do, i.e. in a determine way amongst incompossible functions? The answer is no. By looking at the (name removed by moderator)ut and outputs, we can conceive a whole host of incompossible functions that the machine may be performing, while still simulating adding. For instance:

F1 : x+y=z, if x,y < 1e6
F2 : x+y=z, if x+y < 1e6
F3 : x+y=z, if t<10e140 years, otherwise x+y+1=z
etc.

It is clear to see that the machine is not incompossibly determinate, i.e. it’s (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs are related in such a way that suggests no uniqueness amongst incompossible functions. In other words, the machine cannot be considered to be truth preserving in all finite cases, it is indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. This is the case for all finite physical processes or states. For instance, if we are trying to describe an experiment via a mathematical abstraction, we may have a set points on a graph. There are an argueably infinite number of functions which could intersect with these points, so long as there are a finite number of points, and all of these possible functions are incompossible.

So finally the conclusion, C. It has been established that physical processes are inherently indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. However, if our thoughts arise from said physical processes, then they cannot be incompossibly determinate. Yet they are, so physical processes are not sufficient for certain thoughts.

I’m still working through this rather complex paper (and I may not have reproduced the main arguments accurately), but it seems pretty good to me. Any comments, positive or negative, would be appreciated.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Hi all,

I would like to generate some discussion regarding a paper by Professor James Ross, entitled “Immaterial Aspects of Thought”, which I have found very interesting and can be found here:

nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/43151/ross-immateriality.pdf

The basic argument is summed up as (by aletheist at PhilosophyForums):

A. Some thoughts are incompossibly determinate.
B. No physical processes or functions of physical processes are incompossibly determinate.
C. Therefore, some thoughts are not physical processes or functions of physical processes.

What is meant by A? Well essentially, when we think things like modus ponens, when we add, square, conjoin etc. we think in a form that is incompossibly determinate amongst pure functions. Let’s consider the process of addition, which is of the form x+y=z. When we add two numbers, we certainly reason in this form and no other. For instance, we certainly know we do not perform some other process, such as Kripke’s quaddition, which can give the right output i.e. z, but is certainly not what we do when we add. In other words, when we add, we think in a form which is unique amongst incompossible functions. We may also say that, every rational judgement is truth perserving from the single case, i.e. no matter what x and y are, the single case process “x+y=z” will always be truth perserving.

What about B? Say we have an adding machine, which produces outputs, z, from two (name removed by moderator)uts, x and y, which seem to line up with our understanding of adding. Can we say that the machine is adding like we do, i.e. in a determine way amongst incompossible functions? The answer is no. By looking at the (name removed by moderator)ut and outputs, we can conceive a whole host of incompossible functions that the machine may be performing, while still simulating adding. For instance:

F1 : x+y=z, if x,y < 1e6
F2 : x+y=z, if x+y < 1e6
F3 : x+y=z, if t<10e140 years, otherwise x+y+1=z
etc.

It is clear to see that the machine is not incompossibly determinate, i.e. it’s (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs are related in such a way that suggests no uniqueness amongst incompossible functions. In other words, the machine cannot be considered to be truth preserving in all finite cases, it is indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. This is the case for all finite physical processes or states. For instance, if we are trying to describe an experiment via a mathematical abstraction, we may have a set points on a graph. There are an argueably infinite number of functions which could intersect with these points, so long as there are a finite number of points, and all of these possible functions are incompossible.

So finally the conclusion, C. It has been established that physical processes are inherently indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. However, if our thoughts arise from said physical processes, then they cannot be incompossibly determinate. Yet they are, so physical processes are not sufficient for certain thoughts.

I’m still working through this rather complex paper (and I may not have reproduced the main arguments accurately), but it seems pretty good to me. Any comments, positive or negative, would be appreciated.

the writers tac on the immateriality of thought opens up an avenue to a stronger proof i havent thought of before. could you explain how we know that we arent using different processes in arithmetic reasoning, and could you dumb down B. a little so i can catch up?

the appearance of free will is incompatibe with the universe, be it deterministic, or indeterministic. in other words, thoughts cannot be generated from physical processes. if we really have free will that violates determinism and indeterminism, if we do not, then it is quite unbelievable that the trillions of free will events people experience everyday could be faked in determinant system, or an indeterminite system. simply by random chance.

maybe this argument can help me close up some holes in mine if i understood it a little better.

 

[AndyT_81]

Hi warpspeedpetey,

Thanks for the comments.

could you explain how we know that we arent using different processes in arithmetic reasoning, and could you dumb down B. a little so i can catch up?

I’m not too sure what your asking here with regards to arithmetic reasoning, but I’ll try to expand on my initial comments. Basically, when we perform addition, we know that we are performing the operation x+y=z and not some other operation such as “x+y, if x<1e6, otherwise x+y+1”. The functions “x+y” and “x+y, if x<1e6, otherwise x+y+1” are incompossible with respect to what we do when we add, that is, we can’t perform both functions when we add, it has to be one or the other. However, when we add it is abundantly clear that we perform x+y and not some other function. Hence, similiar such thought processes are incompossibly determinate, i.e. it is clearly defined which function we perform. To say otherwise, like we simulate addition but we do not actually perform it, grants the argument, for we determinately know what addition is before we claim that we don’t really perform it.

But now, let’s consider the adding machine. As I showed above, while the adding machine spits out the right outputs, those right outputs could be produced from any number of functions. Therefore, while we have the definite physical states of the (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs, what interacts with these (name removed by moderator)uts to produce the outputs in the machine is indeterminate amongst incompossible functions. We have no way of knowing what function the machine is performing, with a finite number of outputs. The evidence of the conjunction of (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs is equally strong for any of the functions I listed, within the stated bounds.

To illustrate further, consider Goodman’s colour grue. The colour grue can be defined generally as (from wikipedia) “An object X satisfies the proposition “X is grue” if X is green and was examined before time t, or blue and was not examined before t”. In other words, the inductive evidence that all the emeralds that we know of are green, gives credence to both of these propositions:

1. All emeralds are green
2. All emeralds are grue

as long as grue in this case hinged on the emeralds being examined before, say, 2050. It becomes clear then, that assigning functions to physical processes is indeterminate with respect to an infinite number of incompossible functions. This is an inherent property of physical states and processes. However, some of our thoughts are not like this i.e. they are incompossibly determinate, and therefore they have aspects which are not composed of physical processes.

A final note: Just remember that determinate and indeterminate are different to determinism and non-determinism…

 

[hatsoff]

A. Some thoughts are incompossibly determinate.
B. No physical processes or functions of physical processes are incompossibly determinate.
C. Therefore, some thoughts are not physical processes or functions of physical processes.

I have serious issues with premise (A). A sentence like “a+b=c” does not describe a thinking process. We can think about such sentences, but our thinking is not itself a sentence.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Hi warpspeedpetey,

Thanks for the comments.

I’m not too sure what your asking here with regards to arithmetic reasoning, but I’ll try to expand on my initial comments. Basically, when we perform addition, we know that we are performing the operation x+y=z and not some other operation such as “x+y, if x<1e6, otherwise x+y+1”. The functions “x+y” and “x+y, if x<1e6, otherwise x+y+1” are incompossible with respect to what we do when we add, that is, we can’t perform both functions when we add, it has to be one or the other. However, when we add it is abundantly clear that we perform x+y and not some other function. Hence, similiar such thought processes are incompossibly determinate, i.e. it is clearly defined which function we perform. To say otherwise, like we simulate addition but we do not actually perform it, grants the argument, for we determinately know what addition is before we claim that we don’t really perform it.

i think in pictures, so bear with me. in this paragraph it seems you may be trying to say that the function we perform when adding is mutually exclusive with other functions that might yield the same value? and it must be addition because we have to know what addition is in order to claim thats not the process.?

But now, let’s consider the adding machine. As I showed above, while the adding machine spits out the right outputs, those right outputs could be produced from any number of functions. Therefore, while we have the definite physical states of the (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs, what interacts with these (name removed by moderator)uts to produce the outputs in the machine is indeterminate amongst incompossible functions. We have no way of knowing what function the machine is performing, with a finite number of outputs. The evidence of the conjunction of (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs is equally strong for any of the functions I listed, within the stated bounds.

ok. so we know what function we are using to perform addition, but we dont knnow what function the machine is using?

To illustrate further, consider Goodman’s colour grue. The colour grue can be defined generally as (from wikipedia) “An object X satisfies the proposition “X is grue” if X is green and was examined before time t, or blue and was not examined before t”. In other words, the inductive evidence that all the emeralds that we know of are green, gives credence to both of these propositions:

1. All emeralds are green
2. All emeralds are grue

as long as grue in this case hinged on the emeralds being examined before, say, 2050. It becomes clear then, that assigning functions to physical processes is indeterminate with respect to an infinite number of incompossible functions. This is an inherent property of physical states and processes. However, some of our thoughts are not like this i.e. they are incompossibly determinate, and therefore they have aspects which are not composed of physical processes.

A final note: Just remember that determinate and indeterminate are different to determinism and non-determinism…

i dont understand this part. i was really asking you to put this argument in plain english. i watched a dissertation defense once, where it took an hour for the canidate to say that the morality of civil disobedience was proportional to the egregiousness of the provocation. i.e civil disobediance is ok, if the cause is bad enough.

i got up the next day and changed majors.

i have a feeling that youre trying to say something profound. in a complicated way. what is the simplest, plainest way you can state this argument? without technical jargon? i.e instead of “incompossible” say “mutually exclusive”, determinate, is precisely defined, etc.

there is a diamond in the rough buried i that argument, i just cant see it for all the wordiness.

 

[Ghosty]

This sounds similar in some ways to Searle’s “Chinese room” thought experiment. In brief, you can give an English-speaking man a book that has all possible answers to all possible questions, in Chinese, and tell him “if you see this set of symbols here, write down this set of symols there”. You can then hand questions in Chinese to him on a slip of paper through a window, and he’ll respond with the correct answer in Chinese on another piece of paper handed back out of the window. From the outside we might think there is a Chinese speaker inside the room, but in fact there is an entirely different process apart from thinking in Chinese going on inside the room.

The fact that there is such a clear actual difference between the two processes indicates that there is something more going on when a person “thinks in Chinese” than a mere (name removed by moderator)ut and output of predetermined information, as is the case with the man with the book. Actually “thinking” may not be faster, or more accurate, than what the man is doing, but it is wholly different, and not reducible to purely material factors like the man’s actions are. What’s more, each individual human brain processes these facts, like “circle” and “time” differently (different parts of the brain activate when thinking of them, and different chemicals are produced depending on the person’s associations with these ideas) yet two people can communicate the ideas without error to eachother.

There are other elements of human thinking which appear to go well beyond material causes. For example, we can think of “circle” and we can think of “time”, two very distinct things understood by looking at very different aspects of the world around us. One could argue that we merely recognize the material reality of “circles” and “time” when the two ideas are taken seperately, but something strange happens in the human mind. We can take these two very distinct concepts and compose something that not only hasn’t been experienced, but can’t exist materially: a time loop. We aren’t using any material “reality” to form this concept, and yet the concept exists in the mind, and what’s more if I say “time loop” you will also know what I’m talking about. There is something apparently immaterial going on in our thought process, and what’s more we seem to be unique among all other animals in this regard; other animals can visualize, problem solve, and perhaps even carry “concepts” in their brains, but none have exhibited this kind of immaterial combining of concepts. To put it another way, we can teach an ape to write a sentence, but we can’t teach them to write poetic metaphors.

Our uniqueness lies not in the level with which we speedily solve problems or recognize distinct elements of the world around us, but in the WAY in which we utilize these things with our mind. This is why a toddler might have a lower problem-solving/processing ability than an adult dolphin, but the toddler has an apparently immaterial process occuring at the same time as the material process, while the dolphin apparently only operates on the material level.

Interesting stuff indeed!

Peace and God bless!

 

[warpspeedpetey]

This sounds similar in some ways to Searle’s “Chinese room” thought experiment. In brief, you can give an English-speaking man a book that has all possible answers to all possible questions, in Chinese, and tell him “if you see this set of symbols here, write down this set of symols there”. You can then hand questions in Chinese to him on a slip of paper through a window, and he’ll respond with the correct answer in Chinese on another piece of paper handed back out of the window. From the outside we might think there is a Chinese speaker inside the room, but in fact there is an entirely different process apart from thinking in Chinese going on inside the room.

The fact that there is such a clear actual difference between the two processes indicates that there is something more going on when a person “thinks in Chinese” than a mere (name removed by moderator)ut and output of predetermined information, as is the case with the man with the book. Actually “thinking” may not be faster, or more accurate, than what the man is doing, but it is wholly different, and not reducible to purely material factors like the man’s actions are. What’s more, each individual human brain processes these facts, like “circle” and “time” differently (different parts of the brain activate when thinking of them, and different chemicals are produced depending on the person’s associations with these ideas) yet two people can communicate the ideas without error to eachother.

There are other elements of human thinking which appear to go well beyond material causes. For example, we can think of “circle” and we can think of “time”, two very distinct things understood by looking at very different aspects of the world around us. One could argue that we merely recognize the material reality of “circles” and “time” when the two ideas are taken seperately, but something strange happens in the human mind. We can take these two very distinct concepts and compose something that not only hasn’t been experienced, but can’t exist materially: a time loop. We aren’t using any material “reality” to form this concept, and yet the concept exists in the mind, and what’s more if I say “time loop” you will also know what I’m talking about. There is something apparently immaterial going on in our thought process, and what’s more we seem to be unique among all other animals in this regard; other animals can visualize, problem solve, and perhaps even carry “concepts” in their brains, but none have exhibited this kind of immaterial combining of concepts. To put it another way, we can teach an ape to write a sentence, but we can’t teach them to write poetic metaphors.

Our uniqueness lies not in the level with which we speedily solve problems or recognize distinct elements of the world around us, but in the WAY in which we utilize these things with our mind. This is why a toddler might have a lower problem-solving/processing ability than an adult dolphin, but the toddler has an apparently immaterial process occuring at the same time as the material process, while the dolphin apparently only operates on the material level.

Interesting stuff indeed!

Peace and God bless!

ooooooohhhhhh…i get it now.

 

[AndyT_81]

Thanks all for the comments.

hatsoff,

I have serious issues with premise (A). A sentence like “a+b=c” does not describe a thinking process. We can think about such sentences, but our thinking is not itself a sentence.

No, we don’t, but I don’t see how that is relevant? “a+b” is a representation of the thinking we do when we add. This thinking is determinate, we know we are doing something formal like adding and not doing something else, such as quaddition* i.e. it is a determinate operation. Add 15 and 24. You know you are putting those two numbers together and getting 39, which is the definite operation of addition, and not doing some other function, right? Also, we know that when we perform addition i.e. x+y=z, it is truth preserving with respect to all values of x and y. Same goes for things like modus ponens.

Contrast this with a physical process, such as an adding machine we create. While it reliably simulates what we do when we add, we do not know definitely what function is essentially being performed between the functors, or (name removed by moderator)uts. In other words, the adding machine is indeterminate amongst functions, and therefore we cannot be definite about whether it is truth preserving for all (name removed by moderator)uts, short of an infinite collection of said (name removed by moderator)uts. So we can see that physical processes are inherently different from some thoughts, and therefore physical processes can’t be sufficient for some types of thoughts.

*quaddition (“quus”) is defined as:
x quus y = x plus y, for x,y < z
x quus y = 5 for x,y > z
where z is any number.

warpspeed,

i think in pictures, so bear with me. in this paragraph it seems you may be trying to say that the function we perform when adding is mutually exclusive with other functions that might yield the same value? and it must be addition because we have to know what addition is in order to claim thats not the process.?

Essentially yes.

ok. so we know what function we are using to perform addition, but we dont knnow what function the machine is using?

Yes that’s right, it’s an inherent property of physical processes. We can never be completely definite with regards to what function we are dealing with, this is not the case with our thoughts, they are definite. Therefore, thoughts can’t be solely the result of physical processes, otherwise they would be indeterminate amongst functions i.e. we wouldn’t know if we were adding, instead of quadding or some other function, but that doesn’t make sense in our case. As I said, to think that we are only simulating adding is to know what adding definitely is.

i dont understand this part. i was really asking you to put this argument in plain english. i watched a dissertation defense once, where it took an hour for the canidate to say that the morality of civil disobedience was proportional to the egregiousness of the provocation. i.e civil disobediance is ok, if the cause is bad enough.

i got up the next day and changed majors.

i have a feeling that youre trying to say something profound. in a complicated way. what is the simplest, plainest way you can state this argument? without technical jargon? i.e instead of “incompossible” say “mutually exclusive”, determinate, is precisely defined, etc.

there is a diamond in the rough buried i that argument, i just cant see it for all the wordiness.

Sorry. Hopefully the above has helped, let me know if otherwise.

Ghosty,

Thanks for the helpful discussion. I think what you are saying is certainly a less formal analogy to what the argument essentially gets at. However, I think that when the argument is stated in a less formal way, it is open to the sort of vague appeals to emergence that are often presented against qualia type phenomenon. But of course, more formality leads to more verbose language and more difficult discussion!

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Thanks all for the comments.

hatsoff,

No, we don’t, but I don’t see how that is relevant? “a+b” is a representation of the thinking we do when we add. This thinking is determinate, we know we are doing something formal like adding and not doing something else, such as quaddition* i.e. it is a determinate operation. Add 15 and 24. You know you are putting those two numbers together and getting 39, which is the definite operation of addition, and not doing some other function, right? Also, we know that when we perform addition i.e. x+y=z, it is truth preserving with respect to all values of x and y. Same goes for things like modus ponens.

Contrast this with a physical process, such as an adding machine we create. While it reliably simulates what we do when we add, we do not know definitely what function is essentially being performed between the functors, or (name removed by moderator)uts. In other words, the adding machine is indeterminate amongst functions, and therefore we cannot be definite about whether it is truth preserving for all (name removed by moderator)uts, short of an infinite collection of said (name removed by moderator)uts. So we can see that physical processes are inherently different from some thoughts, and therefore physical processes can’t be sufficient for some types of thoughts.

*quaddition (“quus”) is defined as:
x quus y = x plus y, for x,y < z
x quus y = 5 for x,y > z
where z is any number.

warpspeed,

Essentially yes.

Yes that’s right, it’s an inherent property of physical processes. We can never be completely definite with regards to what function we are dealing with, this is not the case with our thoughts, they are definite. Therefore, thoughts can’t be solely the result of physical processes, otherwise they would be indeterminate amongst functions i.e. we wouldn’t know if we were adding, instead of quadding or some other function, but that doesn’t make sense in our case. As I said, to think that we are only simulating adding is to know what adding definitely is.



Sorry. Hopefully the above has helped, let me know if otherwise.

Ghosty,

Thanks for the helpful discussion. I think what you are saying is certainly a less formal analogy to what the argument essentially gets at. However, I think that when the argument is stated in a less formal way, it is open to the sort of vague appeals to emergence that are often presented against qualia type phenomenon. But of course, more formality leads to more verbose language and more difficult discussion!

thank you, im getting the gist if still fuzzy on details. ill watch and ask questiosn when appropriate on this thread.

 

[hatsoff]

No, we don’t, but I don’t see how that is relevant? “a+b” is a representation of the thinking we do when we add. This thinking is determinate, we know we are doing something formal like adding and not doing something else, such as quaddition* i.e. it is a determinate operation. Add 15 and 24. You know you are putting those two numbers together and getting 39, which is the definite operation of addition, and not doing some other function, right? Also, we know that when we perform addition i.e. x+y=z, it is truth preserving with respect to all values of x and y. Same goes for things like modus ponens.

We make errors all the time, but I suppose you could still say that we “know” that certain deductive inferences can be truth-preserving. However, I’m not sure to what inference you are referring when you talk about “x+y=z”.

Contrast this with a physical process, such as an adding machine we create. While it reliably simulates what we do when we add, we do not know definitely what function is essentially being performed between the functors, or (name removed by moderator)uts. In other words, the adding machine is indeterminate amongst functions, and therefore we cannot be definite about whether it is truth preserving for all (name removed by moderator)uts, short of an infinite collection of said (name removed by moderator)uts. So we can see that physical processes are inherently different from some thoughts, and therefore physical processes can’t be sufficient for some types of thoughts.

Why is an adding machine so mysterious to you? We build calculators all the time which are able to perform well-understood mathematical tasks. We even have computer algebra systems capable of handling the operations you describe, namely “x+y=z”. I fail to see how it is that we cannot be said to “know” what functions are going on underneath the hood of a machine that we ourselves designed.

 

[Ghosty]

Thanks for the helpful discussion. I think what you are saying is certainly a less formal analogy to what the argument essentially gets at. However, I think that when the argument is stated in a less formal way, it is open to the sort of vague appeals to emergence that are often presented against qualia type phenomenon. But of course, more formality leads to more verbose language and more difficult discussion!

The problem with “formal analogies” is that they don’t really cut to the heart of the argument. They may be entertaining to a very small subset of the population, but they have no appeal to regular folks, and they’re the ones who actually matter in any such debates. I’m a firm believer that any philosophy that can’t be put into common terms isn’t really worth the effort, unless all you’re doing is arguing with a very specific group of academics for entertainment. IMO, analytic philosophy is a pox on higher thought and reasoning (incidentally, my analogy was adapted from an originally analytic approach; it needed to be translated to be worth discussing on these forums).

I’m capable of speaking in formulas and logic proofs, but they don’t tend to serve much of a purpose in conveying meaning to most people, and that’s ultimately the whole point of such discussions. Common sense is worth far more than formulas and graphs at the end of the day. Notice that Warpspeedpetey understood what you were getting at when I said it?

As for appeals to emergence, they are baseless fantasy until they are demonstrated clearly. Anyone who says “well, such properties can emerge from less complex elements, and maybe that’s how the mind works” isn’t actually making an argument, but appealing to the unknown in hopes that one day, maybe, they’ll be proven right. Just remind them that you’re dealing with facts and actual data, and if they can’t provide a demonstrable counter-example then they might as well be saying that fairies put thoughts in our heads when we’re asleep.

The fact is that even with appeals to emergent properties, these people can’t demonstrate any emergent properties that match what we know about human thought. They are appealing to ignorance, not facts. Both sides end up proposing things that can’t be imperically proven at this time, but the “immaterial mind” side has the benefit of its theory matching the shared experience of humanity, while the other side has only appeals to a mystery. Which side is more solidly grounded?

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

BTW, you might find this essay by a Dominican aquintance of mine interesting:

opwest.org/Archive/2006/FadokThesis.doc

Peace and God bless!

 

[AndyT_81]

hatsoff,

We make errors all the time, but I suppose you could still say that we “know” that certain deductive inferences can be truth-preserving. However, I’m not sure to what inference you are referring when you talk about “x+y=z”.

Indeed, even though we make errors, we still do know that certain forms of thought are (not “can”) always truth preserving. For instance, take modus ponens i.e.:

If p then q,
p
therefore q

You can substitute any valid p and q pair, from all possible p and q pairs, and we know that it will truth preserving.

x+y is a representation of the form of thought we undertake when we peform addition. I’m not sure how else I can illustrate the form of addition except for x+y.

Why is an adding machine so mysterious to you? We build calculators all the time which are able to perform well-understood mathematical tasks. We even have computer algebra systems capable of handling the operations you describe, namely “x+y=z”. I fail to see how it is that we cannot be said to “know” what functions are going on underneath the hood of a machine that we ourselves designed.

I think you are on the surface of the argument here, not at its depths. That’s probably my fault, as Ghostly pointed out, perhaps my original post was too verbose. We do develop adding machines that simulate what we do, i.e. addition, that’s not in question. But how do we develop said adding machines? Well, with regards to electronic adding machines, we have an array of logic gates composed of transistors, which essentially perform operations such as conjunction between bits, i.e. 0 volts and +x volts. We know that if we apply certain voltages to these transistors, they allow current flow, so we know (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs with regards to these devices. However what could the function that controls these (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs be? Well, there can be an infinite number of mutually exclusive (hope that is better warpspeed and Ghosty ) functions to describe these (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs i.e.:

if Vb > y, Vout > 0V, else Vout=0V
if Vb > y, Vout > 0V, else Vout=0V only if t<1e6 hours after the transistor is created, otherwise Vout < 0V
if Vb > y, Vout >0V, else Vout=0V only if t<1e7 hours after the transistor is created, otherwise Vout = 10V
etc.

The imagine is the limit to what sort of functions we could dream up which still satisfy the (name removed by moderator)ut-output pairs, and each (name removed by moderator)ut-output pairs within certain limits will confirm all of these functions, not just the simplest one. You could say “well we know that the transistor behaves this way because we know about how doped silicon behaves under applied potentials” but again, this behaviour can have an infinite amount of functions which match the behaviour we have already observed for this material. However far down we go into the atomic realm, we are still faced with the same indeterminancy between functions.

So in summary then, as I have said earlier, physical processes are inherently indeterminate between mutually exclusive functions in a way that certain thoughts aren’t. Therefore said thoughts cannot be wholly physical.

 

[AndyT_81]

Ghosty,

BTW, you might find this essay by a Dominican aquintance of mine interesting:

Great, thanks! Looks like a good read.

 

[hatsoff]

Indeed, even though we make errors, we still do know that certain forms of thought are (not “can”) always truth preserving. For instance, take modus ponens i.e.:

If p then q,
p
therefore q

You can substitute any valid p and q pair, from all possible p and q pairs, and we know that it will truth preserving.

x+y is a representation of the form of thought we undertake when we peform addition. I’m not sure how else I can illustrate the form of addition except for x+y.

I hesitate to repeat this point, because I doubt it is necessary to discuss the argument, but I feel like I must remind you that modus ponens is not literally a “form] of thought,” but rather a logical inference. At best you could say that modus ponens models some thinking, but even then you’d be making some steep assumptions with which I for one am not at all comfortable.

I think you are on the surface of the argument here, not at its depths. That’s probably my fault, as Ghostly pointed out, perhaps my original post was too verbose. We do develop adding machines that simulate what we do, i.e. addition, that’s not in question. But how do we develop said adding machines? Well, with regards to electronic adding machines, we have an array of logic gates composed of transistors, which essentially perform operations such as conjunction between bits, i.e. 0 volts and +x volts. We know that if we apply certain voltages to these transistors, they allow current flow, so we know (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs with regards to these devices. However what could the function that controls these (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs be? Well, there can be an infinite number of mutually exclusive (hope that is better warpspeed and Ghosty ) functions to describe these (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs i.e.:

if Vb > y, Vout > 0V, else Vout=0V
if Vb > y, Vout > 0V, else Vout=0V only if t<1e6 hours after the transistor is created, otherwise Vout < 0V
if Vb > y, Vout >0V, else Vout=0V only if t<1e7 hours after the transistor is created, otherwise Vout = 10V
etc.

The imagine is the limit to what sort of functions we could dream up which still satisfy the (name removed by moderator)ut-output pairs, and each (name removed by moderator)ut-output pairs within certain limits will confirm all of these functions, not just the simplest one. You could say “well we know that the transistor behaves this way because we know about how doped silicon behaves under applied potentials” but again, this behaviour can have an infinite amount of functions which match the behaviour we have already observed for this material. However far down we go into the atomic realm, we are still faced with the same indeterminancy between functions.

If I’ve understood you correctly (which is not at all certain), then I don’t see how that’s any different from human brains. No matter how unlikely it appears, there’s always the chance that we’re wrong even about something as seemingly straightforward as, say, modus ponens, to extend your analogy. But of course we can still know with as much or nearly as much confidence that a machine operates in a particular way as we can that one’s own mind operates in another particular way.

So in summary then, as I have said earlier, physical processes are inherently indeterminate between mutually exclusive functions in a way that certain thoughts aren’t. Therefore said thoughts cannot be wholly physical.

I still don’t know what “inherently indeterminate between mutually exclusive functions” is supposed to mean. Are you just saying that it’s possible we’re making a mistake in our conception of a calculator’s mechanics? The same can be said for our conception of our brains’ mechanics. I do not see anything relevant here.

 

[Bob_Crowley]

Hi all,

I would like to generate some discussion regarding a paper by Professor James Ross, entitled “Immaterial Aspects of Thought”, which I have found very interesting and can be found here:

nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/43151/ross-immateriality.pdf

The basic argument is summed up as (by aletheist at PhilosophyForums):

A. Some thoughts are incompossibly determinate.
B. No physical processes or functions of physical processes are incompossibly determinate.
C. Therefore, some thoughts are not physical processes or functions of physical processes.

What is meant by A? Well essentially, when we think things like modus ponens, when we add, square, conjoin etc. we think in a form that is incompossibly determinate amongst pure functions. Let’s consider the process of addition, which is of the form x+y=z. When we add two numbers, we certainly reason in this form and no other. For instance, we certainly know we do not perform some other process, such as Kripke’s quaddition, which can give the right output i.e. z, but is certainly not what we do when we add. In other words, when we add, we think in a form which is unique amongst incompossible functions. We may also say that, every rational judgement is truth perserving from the single case, i.e. no matter what x and y are, the single case process “x+y=z” will always be truth perserving.

What about B? Say we have an adding machine, which produces outputs, z, from two (name removed by moderator)uts, x and y, which seem to line up with our understanding of adding. Can we say that the machine is adding like we do, i.e. in a determine way amongst incompossible functions? The answer is no. By looking at the (name removed by moderator)ut and outputs, we can conceive a whole host of incompossible functions that the machine may be performing, while still simulating adding. For instance:

F1 : x+y=z, if x,y < 1e6
F2 : x+y=z, if x+y < 1e6
F3 : x+y=z, if t<10e140 years, otherwise x+y+1=z
etc.

It is clear to see that the machine is not incompossibly determinate, i.e. it’s (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs are related in such a way that suggests no uniqueness amongst incompossible functions. In other words, the machine cannot be considered to be truth preserving in all finite cases, it is indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. This is the case for all finite physical processes or states. For instance, if we are trying to describe an experiment via a mathematical abstraction, we may have a set points on a graph. There are an argueably infinite number of functions which could intersect with these points, so long as there are a finite number of points, and all of these possible functions are incompossible.

So finally the conclusion, C. It has been established that physical processes are inherently indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. However, if our thoughts arise from said physical processes, then they cannot be incompossibly determinate. Yet they are, so physical processes are not sufficient for certain thoughts.

I’m still working through this rather complex paper (and I may not have reproduced the main arguments accurately), but it seems pretty good to me. Any comments, positive or negative, would be appreciated.

While I have no doubt there are immaterial aspects to thought (partly because my father turned up spiritually in my room the night he died, during which session he apologised, we argued and conversed, and at the end he gave this almightly scream), I’m not convinced by the argument above.

For one thing, when I think a supposedly “logical” thought like “4x4 = 16”, I don’t carry out the mathematical calculation to prove it. All I really do is remember the tables I was taught so long ago in school. It’s a memory recall exercise.

Even a machine doesn’t carry out a merely logical exercise. It merely carries out programmed instructions, which in binary would include the use of “carries”, flags, parity checking bits, etc.

So while I have no doubt there is immaterial thought (as the angels and deceased spirits would necessarily do), the above philosophical argument misses the point that all we do when we carry out arithmetic calculations is indulge in recalling our tables. It’s merely a memory exercise.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

hatsoff,

Indeed, even though we make errors, we still do know that certain forms of thought are (not “can”) always truth preserving. For instance, take modus ponens i.e.:

If p then q,
p
therefore q

You can substitute any valid p and q pair, from all possible p and q pairs, and we know that it will truth preserving.

x+y is a representation of the form of thought we undertake when we peform addition. I’m not sure how else I can illustrate the form of addition except for x+y.

I think you are on the surface of the argument here, not at its depths. That’s probably my fault, as Ghostly pointed out, perhaps my original post was too verbose. We do develop adding machines that simulate what we do, i.e. addition, that’s not in question. But how do we develop said adding machines? Well, with regards to electronic adding machines, we have an array of logic gates composed of transistors, which essentially perform operations such as conjunction between bits, i.e. 0 volts and +x volts. We know that if we apply certain voltages to these transistors, they allow current flow, so we know (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs with regards to these devices. However what could the function that controls these (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs be? Well, there can be an infinite number of mutually exclusive (hope that is better warpspeed and Ghosty ) functions to describe these (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs i.e.:

if Vb > y, Vout > 0V, else Vout=0V
if Vb > y, Vout > 0V, else Vout=0V only if t<1e6 hours after the transistor is created, otherwise Vout < 0V
if Vb > y, Vout >0V, else Vout=0V only if t<1e7 hours after the transistor is created, otherwise Vout = 10V
etc.

The imagine is the limit to what sort of functions we could dream up which still satisfy the (name removed by moderator)ut-output pairs, and each (name removed by moderator)ut-output pairs within certain limits will confirm all of these functions, not just the simplest one. You could say “well we know that the transistor behaves this way because we know about how doped silicon behaves under applied potentials” but again, this behaviour can have an infinite amount of functions which match the behaviour we have already observed for this material. However far down we go into the atomic realm, we are still faced with the same indeterminancy between functions.

So in summary then, as I have said earlier, physical processes are inherently indeterminate between mutually exclusive functions in a way that certain thoughts aren’t. Therefore said thoughts cannot be wholly physical.

i am so tempted to put this argument in redneckese.

hats: he is saying that there are a bunch of ways to skin a cat, we can see the cat, and we can see the skinned cat, but we aint got no idea how the cat got skinned, if we didnt do the skinnin’ ourselves.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

While I have no doubt there are immaterial aspects to thought (partly because my father turned up spiritually in my room the night he died, during which session he apologised, we argued and conversed, and at the end he gave this almightly scream), I’m not convinced by the argument above.

For one thing, when I think a supposedly “logical” thought like “4x4 = 16”, I don’t carry out the mathematical calculation to prove it. All I really do is remember the tables I was taught so long ago in school. It’s a memory recall exercise.

Even a machine doesn’t carry out a merely logical exercise. It merely carries out programmed instructions, which in binary would include the use of “carries”, flags, parity checking bits, etc.

So while I have no doubt there is immaterial thought (as the angels and deceased spirits would necessarily do), the above philosophical argument misses the point that all we do when we carry out arithmetic calculations is indulge in recalling our tables. It’s merely a memory exercise.

the question that comes to mind here is, if arithmetics is a memory exercise, then how did the first guy do it?

 

[Betterave]

Or another point might be: Isn’t memory subject to a similar sort of proof/capable of being the source for a generalization of the proof in question? We generally know what we are remembering, that is, some particular ‘thing’ that is “incompossibly determinate” in relation to anything else, and which cannot be effectively designated as such by the merely formal ‘representations’ of a machine?

 

[Bob_Crowley]

the question that comes to mind here is, if arithmetics is a memory exercise, then how did the first guy do it?

He put sixteen objects on a table, and divided them up into four equal groups of four. Or he found that if he had four lots of four objects, and lined them up one after the other, he had to count to sixteen to cover them all.