That’s the problem alright. But it’s not true of all aspects of Catholicism to say that science is unable to support it. Scientific methods are able to support evidence of Jesus’ life or the time of the earliest Christians - they all left physical, material trails. For example, relics can be radiocarbon dated, and I think there is good evidence that Peter’s remains are from the right time. Is free will a matter of faith alone?
Bobber:
First of all, ‘sequence’ implies past, present and future, cause and effect - the former necessarily preceding the latter; and how can any movement occur in a “forever present”? I’m afraid this sounds like just a game with words.
No it doesn’t. Only in your mind’s eye.
No local motion. But, that does not apply to essentially subordinated, simultaneous motion, e.g., in instantaneous causation.
Often it does.
Last I checked, our brains are powered by electrochemical processes in our neurons. These electrochemical processes are somehow not quantum mechanical in nature to you? Certainly quantum phenomena alone is not a warranted topic to discuss, but the fact that our brains operate based on selection rules of quantum mechanics is certainly up for discussion.
Indeterminate (adjective)
Why would there be an issue with a determinate effect from an indeterminate cause? I agree there would be problems with a determinate cause and an indeterminate effect, but only because an indeterminate event cannot, by definition, have a determinate cause.
You are still confusing indeterminacy and randomness. Please use the above definitions to rid yourself of this confusion. Causality is the key, not randomness.
This almost proves free will, but it doesn’t make the cut. What it proves is that we make decisions, but it says nothing of the process of decision making. If our unconsciousness decides it will be a cheeseburger and passes on this choice to our consciousness, which then reasons why it is a good idea post hoc, it is not free will. That would be the same whether it is choosing a burger or choosing a sentence to write.
Then discuss it! What difference does it make to suppose a high degree of quantum weirdness within neuron function, or indeed a low degree? Let’s say that neurons function with lots of indeterminism - but where does that provide for free will? This is exactly my point about the irrelevance of indeterminism.
There is an issue for free will if we consider that even indeterminate events have determinate consequences. Say the neurons fire indeterminately, it would mean that we didn’t choose for that to happen. Say they have determinate effects eg preference for vegetarianism, then we also didn’t choose the consequences.
Let’s see. If we flip a coin, the result is random, right? But does it mean that it is just as likely that the coin will stay up in the air? No, just because something is random doesn’t mean that all alternatives have the same probability. Some are more likely, some are less likely, some are impossible. Thus, even if your actions were completely random, it wouldn’t necessarily mean that you could be expected to “start singing nursery rhymes backwards”…
Presence of randomness doesn’t mean that no one influenced the outcome. For example, if I understand it correctly, poker players use cards that are chosen randomly (or at least are supposed to be chosen randomly). Thus a random process influences the outcome of the match. But does it mean that the winner can take no credit for the outcome? (Yes, the question does assume that the players had free will.) After all, the decisions that the players made also influenced the outcome.
You are still doing it: indeterminate things are NOT random. It is astounding that you are still adhering to something that has been demonstrated to be completely erroneous. Indeterminate means having no cause, random means patternless. Two completely different ideas. If you stop thinking ‘random’ when you hear/read ‘indeterminate,’ you will start to understand and accept the positions put forth.
Free will is defined as “the power to act without constraint of necessity or fate.” If you can act via indeterminate firing of neurons, then you are acting without constraint of necessity or fate. It is completely and entirely relevant. Since the electrons running through your brain are caused by yourself, you can claim control & authorship of the thoughts.
I think you need to explain why on earth you would expect indeterminate effects from an indeterminate cause. There is zero logical reason for it. The neurons do not fire indeterminately, they fire determinately. The electrons in your brain behave in an indeterminate manner via the selection rules of quantum mechanics. Since you are controlling the flow of electrons (but not the (by definition) indeterminate selection rules), you are choosing the consequences.
No, free will is not an uncaused cause of thoughts. The electrons activating our neurons in our brains act in an indeterminate matter (via quantum selection rules), but our bodies directly choose the flow of the current.
Bobber:
Except that this is not what is meant. Carefully consider what an infinite being might be, even though such is not an easy task for us mere humans! I like to use a phrase that to some degree sums it up: infinity includes “everything, everywhere, and every when.” That is not a mathematical definition; rather, it is a definition from a salient ontological overview.
Here, too, the terms must be properly defined. A necessary cause is a principle. A principle (from the Latin principium, which means “beginning”) is that from which anything flows. It is source or starting point. In other words, it is a cause that is deterministic, such as something that would result from an ordered algorithm. A “free cause” is, instead, erratic - as though it operates in spite of said algorithm. A “necessary cause” would operate with a compulsion to avoid contradictory states and to proceed inexorably forward as toward a specific goal. A “free cause” would not take any of that into consideration, although it might - almost by accident, but not because it was compelled to.
Our nature is the reason for this. Our ability to alter a significant part of our nature is what we consider to be free. For example, we can’t fly, but, we can construct flying machines that we can fly in - and die in.
I am having trouble understanding the unconsciousness of sleep as “unfree.” I see the unconscious of sleep as even more erratic, thus freer, than conscious choice.
That question will probably require more thought. But perhaps: deciding either to actively pursue a distant shore, or passively allow ourself to drift under the water and drown.
That’s all fine! Indeterminate things can be random, or they can be non-random - all the while being uncaused, you’ve made the point and that is clear. The similarity between indeterminate and random things is the fact that they both bear no relation to the preceding state of affairs, and that is key.
You have presupposed that ‘we’ can control electrons, therefore that we can claim ownership of the indeterminate events in our neurons, in order to answer that yes we do have free will. The question remains unaddressed: how do we control determinate events, events which are already subject to a regress of causes going back to the Big Bang, or to a prior indeterminate event?
I admire the elaboration of free will that is contained in the distinction between free causes and necessary ones, but I cannot connect this description with my understanding of the rest of reality. In terms of determinism or indeterminism, there is no free will because either our actions are subject to causes outside ourself, or they are not subject to causes at all. Necessary causes relate well to determinism, but I cannot see how free causes fit in too.
You are still failing to come to terms with it: indeterminate things are not random. The rest of your post is moot because you are failing to consider the clear distinction between the two. If you can fathom that concept of their difference, you will understand completely everything that I have stated and realize the silliness of your responses.
Indeterminate things are not equal to random things… I get this. But that is clearly not the problem with free will.
Bobber:
Well, animals don’t have free will (?) but they do just fine, so it is not totally pointless to wonder if we are the same I think. If we are non-free, determined Borgs, then clearly we are still pretty clever and advanced - but all the while our choices are fixed! Our reflections, dreams, hopes, beliefs, choices and deepest emotions are given. I know it is a scary analysis, but interesting nonetheless.
Bobber: