Impossibility of free will

[Bobber90]

Do you always act according to the way you feel? Can’t you compel yourself to abstain from food if you realise you are overweight?

Whether one is aiming for reduced weight or reduced hunger, the point is the same. It doesn’t take free will to be rational.

Many intelligent species have become extinct whereas simple organisms without intelligence have survived. So much for the power of natural selection and the need for truth! As Stephen Hawking recently pointed out,** intelligence prejudices the chances of survival.** And instincts often prove to be a honey trap, i.e. a death trap. Blind chance is a hopelessly inadequate explanation of the origin of rationality.

The point is not that the environment we live in is such that every living thing will become intelligent or die. It is such that when intelligence and truth-recognition are important, they will be selected for. Given that we are to some degree truth seekers, and that evolution is a fact, it must be the case that our propensity to seek truth has been adaptive or at least harmless.

There is no evidence whatsoever that your fantasy could become a reality. Nor can you produce one jot of evidence for any of your assertions. Nor have you explained what your notion of truth is…

Most of what you have said is a diversion from the issue of the existence or not of free will. My additional points here are that the existence of rational behaviour and various other intelligent things do not require that free will also exists. Indeed, if free will is not possible, obviously these behaviours cannot indicate otherwise. Anyway, the main issues of contention are still unaddressed from post 149! Specifically, how we can isolate a causal chain from influence by outside causes and how can a conscious thinking self be a cause of thinking conscious activity.

 

[tonyrey]

Do you always act according to the way you feel? Can’t you compel yourself to abstain from food if you realise you are overweight?

Rationality entails freedom to choose the best explanation. A computer cannot do that unless it has been programmed to do so and then only to a limited extent.

Many intelligent species have become extinct whereas simple organisms without intelligence have survived. So much for the power of natural selection and the need for truth! As Stephen Hawking recently pointed out,** intelligence prejudices the chances of survival.**

• And instincts often prove to be a honey trap, i.e. a death trap. Blind chance is a hopelessly inadequate explanation of the origin of rationality.

The point is not that the environment we live in is such that every living thing will become intelligent or die. It is such that when intelligence and truth-recognition are important, they will be selected for

You have not explained how living things become intelligent.
.

Given that we are to some degree truth seekers, and that evolution is a fact, it must be the case that our propensity to seek truth has been adaptive or at least harmless.

You have not explained our propensity.

There is no evidence whatsoever that your fantasy could become a reality. Nor can you produce one jot of evidence for any of your assertions. Nor have you explained what your notion of truth is…

Most of what you have said is a diversion from the issue of the existence or not of free will.

If it is a diversion it must be of your making because I was responding to your statements.

My additional points here are that the existence of rational behaviour and various other intelligent things do not require that free will also exists.

Rationality entails far more than intelligence. It requires creativity and flexibility which do not exist within a mechanistic, causally determined system.

Indeed, if free will is not possible, obviously these behaviours cannot indicate otherwise. Anyway, the main issues of contention are still unaddressed from post 149! Specifically, how we can isolate a causal chain from influence by outside causes and how can a conscious thinking self be a cause of thinking conscious activity.

You are making the physicalist assumption that every event belongs to a causal chain. How can you justify that act of faith?

Is the success of science due to impersonal causal chains? Or to conscious thinking persons?

Where do your thoughts originate? In inanimate particles or in your mind?

Are you a cog in a machine or an autonomous agent?

Are you responsible for your decisions and conclusions? Or are they thrust upon you willynilly?

 

[Bobber90]

Rationality entails freedom to choose the best explanation. A computer cannot do that unless it has been programmed to do so and then only to a limited extent.

You have not explained how living things become intelligent.
.You have not explained our propensity.
If it is a diversion it must be of your making because I was responding to your statements.

Rationality entails far more than intelligence. It requires creativity and flexibility which do not exist within a mechanistic, causally determined system.

Then we can end the diversion by saying that whatever your notion of rationality, if it is dependent upon free will and cannot exist without it, I say it does not exist for the reasons that I claim free will is impossible, which are found in post 149.

You are making the physicalist assumption that every event belongs to a causal chain. How can you justify that act of faith?

Are you asserting that there are some actions which we are responsible for and yet which do not have antecedent causal chains? That takes either evidence/explanation or faith to sustain.

It is not necessary from my point of view to say that everything belongs to a causal chain, only that if it did, free will is impossible, and if there are some things which appear without being caused, free will is still impossible! That is the nature of the incompatibilist view. Neither determinism nor indeterminism (or any macro/micro combination) can provide for free will. I have added my thoughts on this in post 149.

Is the success of science due to impersonal causal chains? Or to conscious thinking persons?

Yes scientists are conscious and thinking, but no they need not have free will as their ideas might come from their unconscious into consciousness and never be freely willed. Take the famous example of Kekulé arriving at a structure for benzene in a dream, or the common enough examples of inspiration hitting geniuses or creative types out of the blue. Even Don Draper offers this advice when creating adverts: ‘Just think about it deeply, then forget it…then an idea will jump up in your face.’

Where do your thoughts originate? In inanimate particles or in your mind?

I think the entirety of the mind is dependent upon the body, ie upon matter, so yes thoughts are from particles.

Are you a cog in a machine or an autonomous agent?

Well given that I think free will is impossible, clearly we are not autonomous agents.

Are you responsible for your decisions and conclusions? Or are they thrust upon you willynilly?

They are given and received, I do not will them into existence.

 

[Sair]

Yes I think that is exactly the problem, having to create a source or seat of us which is fundamentally unconnected with all the other manifest influences on our behaviour, from mood to physiology. I don’t think such a view works, though removing the self has difficult social consequences!

I don’t know that it’s possible, let alone desirable, to eliminate the concept of the self, since it seems quite fundamental to the way our brains process information. It is probably necessary to radically reconfigure the notion of what self is, and what responsibility is, based upon scientific data - if there’s no homunculus, it’s not legitimate to go on pretending that there is one just for the sake of keeping the dream alive, so to speak.

That’s the thing though - I don’t think we can claim ownership of anything we conventionally say we do. Dennett says we should have a more encompassing view of ourselves, but frankly, where can we legitimately place the boundaries (however wide) if we accept there is no homunculus?

There is always a question of boundaries, though, even with traditional notions of the self - after all, let’s say a child grows up to become an accomplished concert pianist; to what extent is this achievement the responsibility of the individual child, as such, and to what extent is it to the credit of the child’s parents - to the genes they passed on, to the investment they made in their child’s education, the support they provided along the way? Even traditionally, we can consider our accomplishments to be a team effort. Under Dennett’s view, the concert pianist is responsible, even if not exclusively so, for her participation in the processes that led to her success. It’s not that different, I would suggest, to the traditional view.

To put it practically, if there is no logically consistent homunculus, nor one which survives introspection or experimental testing, then the ‘self’ is simply a label applied to a portion of causes/effects arbitrarily located within an ongoing, monolithic stream. So if ‘we’ are held responsible for ‘our’ actions, which bit of ‘us’/the stream is going to be punished, and why?

Punishment, or the prospect of punishment and social sanction is one of the elements that shape our interactions. We have to be held responsible for our participation in events, simply because it is this social structure - the ability to detect the ‘freeloaders’ or the ‘defectors’ amongst us - is a big part of what shapes our behaviour. As Sam Harris says in this video (it’s quite long, but well worth watching if you haven’t already), we would lock up natural disasters if we could, just because they are harmful. For the same reasons, we lock up serial killers and those who have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted. We might not have the comfort of being able to consider such people evil, but practically, there is always a place for sanctions.

 

[tonyrey]

I don’t know that it’s possible, let alone desirable, to eliminate the concept of the self, since it seems quite fundamental to the way our brains process information. It is probably necessary to radically reconfigure the notion of what self is, and what responsibility is, based upon scientific data - if there’s no homunculus, it’s not legitimate to go on pretending that there is one just for the sake of keeping the dream alive, so to speak.

If there is no homunculus there is no mulierunculus either!

You have hit the nail on the head. Without the self there can be no selfishness, no self-control and no self-determination. In other words there is only - in Hume’s words - “a bundle of perceptions”. All claim to be rational or responsible disappears out the window…

 

[tonyrey]

Rationality entails freedom to choose the best explanation. A computer cannot do that unless it has been programmed to do so and then only to a limited extent.

You have not explained how living things become intelligent.
.You have not explained our propensity.
If it is a diversion it must be of your making because I was responding to your statements.

Rationality entails far more than intelligence. It requires creativity and flexibility which do not exist within a mechanistic, causally determined system.
Then we can end the diversion by saying that whatever your notion of rationality, if it is dependent upon free will and cannot exist without it, I say it does not exist for the reasons that I claim free will is impossible, which are found in post 149.

Your arguments cease to be valid if you are not rational!

You are making the physicalist assumption that every event belongs to a causal chain. How can you justify that act of faith?

Are you asserting that there are some actions which we are responsible for and yet which do not have antecedent causal chains? That takes either evidence/explanation or faith to sustain.

It is a legal presumption, it corresponds to everyone’s experience and it is the sine qua non of rationality.

You are making the physicalist assumption that every event belongs to a causal chain. How can you justify that act of faith?

It is not necessary from my point of view to say that everything belongs to a causal chain, only that if it did, free will is impossible, and if there are some things which appear without being caused, free will is still impossible! That is the nature of the incompatibilist view. Neither determinism nor indeterminism (or any macro/micro combination) can provide for free will. I have added my thoughts on this in post 149.

You are trying to have it both ways - which doesn’t work!

Is the success of science due to impersonal causal chains? Or to conscious thinking persons?

Yes scientists are conscious and thinking, but no they need not have free will as their ideas might come from their unconscious into consciousness and never be freely willed. Take the famous example of Kekulé arriving at a structure for benzene in a dream, or the common enough examples of inspiration hitting geniuses or creative types out of the blue. Even Don Draper offers this advice when creating adverts: ‘Just think about it deeply, then forget it…then an idea will jump up in your face.’

So you base rationality on the unconscious?

Where do your thoughts originate? In inanimate particles or in your mind?

I think the entirety of the mind is dependent upon the body, ie upon matter, so yes thoughts are from particles.

Then they are completely determined and you cannot claim to be any more rational than a computer!

Are you a cog in a machine or an autonomous agent?

Well given that I think free will is impossible, clearly we are not autonomous agents.

Then you are a cog in a machine which cannot think for itself.

Are you responsible for your decisions and conclusions? Or are they thrust upon you willynilly?

They are given and received, I do not will them into existence.

Then you are a cog in a machine which cannot think for itself, come to its own conclusions or make decisions for itself.

 

[tonyrey]

If there is no homunculus there is no mulierunculus either!

You have hit the nail on the head. Without the self there can be no selfishness, no self-control and no self-determination. In other words there is only - in Hume’s words - “a bundle of perceptions”. All claim to be rational or responsible disappears out the window…

Hume did remark that thought is merely “a little agitation of the brain” - thereby undermining his own conclusions! Little agitations are insignificant and meaningless when it comes to interpreting the nature of reality.

 

[Sair]

Hume did remark that thought is merely “a little agitation of the brain” - thereby undermining his own conclusions! Little agitations are insignificant and meaningless when it comes to interpreting the nature of reality.

But if those agitations are caused by the nature of reality - which they must be, if we are part of reality - then there’s only so far we can go in being wrong before the truth will out. If minds are indeed ultimately physical phenomena which have evolved as an effective means of allowing us to operate within the world, it seems odd to assume that it will lead us astray, or that our physically determined thoughts and intuitions will necessarily be inaccurate. Incomplete, perhaps, but it seems that if our evolved minds had generated really false or imperviously mistaken impressions as regards the nature of reality, we wouldn’t be here. As Einstein is reported to have said, “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”

 

[Sair]

To put it practically, if there is no logically consistent homunculus, nor one which survives introspection or experimental testing, then the ‘self’ is simply a label applied to a portion of causes/effects arbitrarily located within an ongoing, monolithic stream. So if ‘we’ are held responsible for ‘our’ actions, which bit of ‘us’/the stream is going to be punished, and why?

I have now finished Sam Harris’s Free Will - conveniently short as it is! - and I’ll admit one of the parts I found the most illuminating was his discussion of what seems to be the key difference between his approach and Dennett’s. Harris claims (rightly, I think at the moment) that there really isn’t a place for classical libertarian free will, given the evidence for physical determinism, even of mental events. He also points out that we simply can’t say, for example, where our desires come from - and that the illusion of free will, of being the conscious authors of our decisions and actions from the ground up, so to speak, is merely the result of being unaware, at a conscious level, of the various machinations of the substance of our brains and bodies.

Be that as it may - and I think this is the key departure Dennett makes from the conclusion that free will simply can’t exist in any way if it isn’t what we thought and felt it was - the bodies/brains in which these machinations take place are still discrete entities. Dennett’s intention in Freedom Evolves appears to be to lay some groundwork for a radical re-imagining of our concepts of self and of what personal responsibility actually entails. Dennett is certainly not claiming - at least from my own reading of him - that free will exists in the classical libertarian sense, nor indeed the supernaturalist/dualist sense. He does make it quite clear, I think, that our abilities are very much the result of the particular configuration of matter and energy that instantiates human bodies and brains; and that although we are subject to (name removed by moderator)uts from the physical environment we inhabit, it is only because we are these particular arrangements that we have the ability to be “choice machines” (in Gary Drescher’s words) - and thus actually take some genuinely active part in determining what we do, even if we cannot assume full credit or absolute guilt.

I do think, though, that Harris is onto something when he says (and I noticed as I read his book that his comments in the video I linked to last time are actually made in more detail here!) that what we condemn and tend to punish in individual human entities is the intent to actually cause harm and to act in ways that are contrary to the welfare of others, where this intent reflects the cast of mind of the perpetrator. Obviously we are less inclined to punish (or at least inclined to impose less severe sanctions) upon those we find are acting “out of character”, but that is, in practical terms, less because we hold their actual actions to be less reprehensible, but because we don’t perceive an ongoing danger from them.

 

[tonyrey]

But if those agitations are caused by the nature of reality - which they must be, if we are part of reality - then there’s only so far we can go in being wrong before the truth will out. If minds are indeed ultimately physical phenomena which have evolved as an effective means of allowing us to operate within the world, it seems odd to assume that it will lead us astray, or that our physically determined thoughts and intuitions will necessarily be inaccurate. Incomplete, perhaps, but it seems that if our evolved minds had generated really false or imperviously mistaken impressions as regards the nature of reality, we wouldn’t be here. As Einstein is reported to have said, “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”

Physically determined thoughts would sometimes lead to survival but they would be no more efficient than physical instincts - which are notorious for leading animals astray and often to their deaths. Physically determined thoughts would be restricted to **physical **needs and like animals we would be completely unaware of abstract issues such as the nature of reality and the question of free will.

And of course we don’t regard animals as responsible for their behaviour. Without the self there could be no self-control and no self-determination…

 

[jpelham]

For free will, surely we would have to be mini gods - creating causes where there was no prior cause of our decisions, which is physically unusual to say the least… ?

This seems to be precisely the wonder of free will, though our role as creators ex nihilo, in the image of God, extends only to acts of will. It is God’s work that extends to the “physically unusual.”

 

[Jjac2843]

If determinism on a macro level is true, everything has been set since the big bang, there is only one future, and all our choices are fixed… ?

For free will, surely we would have to be mini gods - creating causes where there was no prior cause of our decisions, which is physically unusual to say the least… ?

This entire thread reminds me of a discussion in Augustine’s Confessions on these topics. Also look at John Calvin and the contemporary neurologist who is arguing similarly from evolution. Augustine is best on unwrapping the conundrum, and is also helpful for thoughtful agnostics.

 

[glowingembers]

Free will as it is usually understood is the ability of an agent to do an intentional action that is at least to some extent independent of influences affecting the agent. This independence is supposed to make the agent the ultimate controller of his actions, which guarantees that the agent is morally responsible for his actions and deserves rewards or punishments for them.

However, an agent that does an intentional action can never be the ultimate controller of this action, because the action is determined by an intention (and possibly also by some influences affecting the agent). For example, if raising of my left arm is my intentional action, then it must be determined by my intention to raise my left arm. But how does the determination of an action by the agent’s intention rule out the agent’s ultimate control over the action?

To answer that question let us first look at what an intention is. Here we may help ourselves with some definitions in a dictionary, such as the Merriam-Webster dictionary (www.m-w.com). The first definition of the word “intention” in this dictionary is “a determination to act in a certain way”, which indicates that an intention is A STATE OF MIND. Another relevant definition of this word is “what one intends to do or bring about”, which indicates that an intention is a goal or purpose, AN IDEA one has in mind.

So A STATE OF MIND or AN IDEA determines an intentional action. Then for an agent to be in control of his intentional action it seems that he must determine his state of mind or the idea he has in mind, and through these he can determine the action. However, determining a state of mind or an idea in mind is an action too! It is an action of creating the state of mind or the idea and if THIS action is not intentional then obviously the agent is not in control of it and consequently not in control of the final action determined by the state of mind/idea. On the other hand, if the determining of the state of mind/idea is an intentional action, then it must be determined by an intention to create that state of mind/idea, and this intention is just another state of mind/idea. So we get an infinite regress of states of mind/ideas determining other states of mind/ideas, in which there is no place for an agent’s ultimate control of his actions. Or assuming (as we usually do) that the agent’s mind has a finite history, we arrive at the first state of the agent’s mind or the first idea in his mind, which is not determined by his preceding states of mind/ideas, and therefore it is not intentional, he doesn’t have control over it and consequently he doesn’t have control of actions determined by it.

And moreover, it seems doubtful that it is possible to even have an intention to form an intention. Just try to imagine it - if you have an intention A to form an intention B, you actually already have the intention B in your mind, so the intention A is a fiction. If we cannot have intentions to form an intention that makes any regress of intentions impossible, and thus all of our intentions emerge unintentionally in our minds. And then they determine our intentional actions.

What happens if we have divergent intentions at the same time (similar to divergent desires)? Isn’t this the point where free will could choose one intention over another? Well, this choosing would have to be an intentional action, which would bring us to the problems described above. In general, our intentional action will be determined by the joint influence of all our intentions, and stronger intentions will weigh more heavily in the result than weaker ones.

In conclusion, intentionality is regarded as a necessary component of free will, but at the same time it rules out free will. That’s why free will, as it is usually understood, is impossible.

 

[Bobber90]

Your arguments cease to be valid if you are not rational!

No, they don’t. You’re trying to posit a different type of rationality which you insist cannot be found without free will, so it is no wonder you then try to say that my conclusions are not rational. However, even following your idea of rationality, if we have no free will and miraculously are also prevented from saying the truth, your comment is equally non-rational/false/insignificant/worthless.

But no, none of this has to follow anyway. Something is true if it matches reality, even if it is not willed. Some action or thought is rational if it is consistent with logic - again irrespective of whether it was willed. Surely a simple point?

((Are you asserting that there are some actions which we are responsible for and yet which do not have antecedent causal chains? That takes either evidence/explanation or faith to sustain.)) It is a legal presumption, it corresponds to everyone’s experience and it is the sine qua non of rationality.

The law is not an arbiter of truth… barely needs to be said. Free will is not experienced when introspected on. As I gave earlier with the example of coming up with ideas, people report that ideas and thoughts just hit them. Also, a feeling of responsibility does not counter the experimental evidence that decisions are the product of non-conscious mental activity subsequently detected consciously. Sam Harris has written on that. Again the assertion of rationality pops up unjustified! If your idea of rationality is “an autonomous self being rational” then clearly nothing can be rational because nothing can be autonomous. But if your definition of rational is “Behaviour/thought/statement etc that is consistent with logic” then it applies to the workings of watches, computers, insect behaviour and a host of other things which are not autonomous but are very frequently thought to be rational. Your examples may differ.

You are trying to have it both ways - which doesn’t work!

That seems like a naive response to an incompatibilist argument. Of course the incompatibilist says that in both scenarios there is no free will. That is the nature of the argument - neither determinism nor indeterminism provide for free will. Do you have a response to that?

So you base rationality on the unconscious?

I’m not scared by the unconscious. We’re not talking about a Freudian, subversive, chamber of sex and secrets unconscious but rather all mental activity which is not conscious. Walking, driving, forming words, reading, remembering, recognising faces… etc etc are non-conscious processes. Do you fear to base rationality on the part of the mind which gives rise to all of this? Besides, there is no other place it comes from. It doesn’t come from our bones…

Then they are completely determined and you cannot claim to be any more rational than a computer!

At last! Here we are. Yes, computers run logical programmes, so can we. Just to clarify, can anything be more rational than a computer?

Then you are a cog in a machine which cannot think for itself.

In that I do not have an autonomous self.

Then you are a cog in a machine which cannot think for itself, come to its own conclusions or make decisions for itself.

I have the illusion that I am making decisions, but I have got over the illusion that I am thinking for myself. My thoughts are happening to me. My, what a wonderful world.

 

[Bobber90]

This seems to be precisely the wonder of free will, though our role as creators ex nihilo, in the image of God, extends only to acts of will. It is God’s work that extends to the “physically unusual.”

I agree it is a wonder, and I can see how your perspective solves the problem - because as you say it is God’s actions which modify the physical world, while our actions modify only thought.

The problem I have is that I think thoughts are dependent upon matter and indeed are not separate from the physical world, which means that we must have some incredible power if we are able to create new causal chains of the sort we see around us, yet somehow isolated from these other ones.

The evidence that thoughts are detectable in the chemical/electrical states of the brain before the subject is aware of them themselves is discussed and challenged in this article:
aaeblog.com/2008/04/18/good-science-bad-philosophy/

 

[twinz2z]

The thing about fixed quantum phenomena affecting what happens on micro or macro levels above, is that these various levels are seperate from each other by layers that are akin to the event horizon of a gravitational object.
Information does not move so easily from one level to another.
On the question of the physical human mind, it is a kind of crossword puzzle.
Answers can be found, its workings can be understood and ultimately bought under the control of the spirit.
Faith is an act of Free will.

 

[Alberto_Q_CM]

Free will is partially demonstrated by the repent, also, I think. If you repent yourself, it should be recognized that you have some free will, much more if you desire to mend the evil you’ve committed. (excuse me for my English).

 

[tonyrey]

Free will is partially demonstrated by the repent, also, I think. If you repent yourself, it should be recognized that you have some free will, much more if you desire to mend the evil you’ve committed. (excuse me for my English).

Welcome to the forum!

Your thoughts are more important than linguistic mistakes.
We would say:

“Free will is partially demonstrated by repentance” and

“to make amends for the evil”

Otherwise very good.

 

[tonyrey]

Free will as it is usually understood is the ability of an agent to do an intentional action that is at least to some extent independent of influences affecting the agent. This independence is supposed to make the agent the ultimate controller of his actions, which guarantees that the agent is morally responsible for his actions and deserves rewards or punishments for them.

However, an agent that does an intentional action can never be the ultimate controller of this action, because the action is determined by an intention (and possibly also by some influences affecting the agent). For example, if raising of my left arm is my intentional action, then it must be determined by my intention to raise my left arm. But how does the determination of an action by the agent’s intention rule out the agent’s ultimate control over the action?

To answer that question let us first look at what an intention is. Here we may help ourselves with some definitions in a dictionary, such as the Merriam-Webster dictionary (www.m-w.com). The first definition of the word “intention” in this dictionary is “a determination to act in a certain way”, which indicates that an intention is A STATE OF MIND. Another relevant definition of this word is “what one intends to do or bring about”, which indicates that an intention is a goal or purpose, AN IDEA one has in mind.
So A STATE OF MIND or AN IDEA determines an intentional action.

It is not A STATE OF MIND or AN IDEA that determines an intentional action but a person. We are not always controlled by our states of mind: we are often responsible for them.

Then for an agent to be in control of his intentional action it seems that he must determine his state of mind or the idea he has in mind, and through these he can determine the action. However, determining a state of mind or an idea in mind is an action too! It is an action of creating the state of mind or the idea and if THIS action is not intentional then obviously the agent is not in control of it and consequently not in control of the final action determined by the state of mind/idea.

To be precise it is a conscious decision.

On the other hand, if the determining of the state of mind/idea is an intentional action, then it must be determined by an intention to create that state of mind/idea, and this intention is just another state of mind/idea.

Our intentions are rarely to create a state of mind unless we are practising self-hypnosis or relaxation. Our intentions are focused on achieving our goal.

So we get an infinite regress of states of mind/ideas determining other states of mind/ideas, in which there is no place for an agent’s ultimate control of his actions. Or assuming (as we usually do) that the agent’s mind has a finite history, we arrive at the first state of the agent’s mind or the first idea in his mind, which is not determined by his preceding states of mind/ideas, and therefore it is not intentional, he doesn’t have control over it and consequently he doesn’t have control of actions determined by it.

The flaw in your argument is the assumption that we are **only **determining our states of mind.

And moreover, it seems doubtful that it is possible to even have an intention to form an intention. Just try to imagine it - if you have an intention A to form an intention B, you actually already have the intention B in your mind, so the intention A is a fiction. If we cannot have intentions to form an intention that makes any regress of intentions impossible, and thus all of our intentions emerge unintentionally in our minds. And then they determine our intentional actions.

It is unnecessary to form an intention to form an intention. One intention at a time is enough! You might as well say we have to think to think or to choose to choose…

What happens if we have divergent intentions at the same time (similar to divergent desires)? Isn’t this the point where free will could choose one intention over another? Well, this choosing would have to be an intentional action, which would bring us to the problems described above. In general, our intentional action will be determined by the joint influence of all our intentions, and stronger intentions will weigh more heavily in the result than weaker ones.

We don’t choose intentions! We choose actions or inaction.

In conclusion, intentionality is regarded as a necessary component of free will, but at the same time it rules out free will. That’s why free will, as it is usually understood, is impossible.

Intentionality is necessary for free will but it doesn’t exclude free will because the source of the intention is a rational, independent mind - not a brain.

 

[tonyrey]

Your arguments cease to be valid if you are not rational!

Something is true if it matches reality, even if it is not willed but that is not the point. The issue is the all-important process by which one establishes the correspondence of belief to reality.

((Are you asserting that there are some actions which we are responsible for and yet which do not have antecedent causal chains? That takes either evidence/explanation or faith to sustain.))

It is a legal presumption, it corresponds to everyone’s experience and it is the sine qua non of rationality.
The law is not an arbiter of truth… barely needs to be said.

The law is not an arbiter of truth but it is a universal presumption, corresponds to everyone’s experience and is the sine qua non of rationality which puts the onus on you to disprove it.

Free will is not experienced when introspected on.

Introspection is often notoriously inadequate and misleading.

As I gave earlier with the example of coming up with ideas, people report that ideas and thoughts just hit them. Also, a feeling of responsibility does not counter the experimental evidence that decisions are the product of non-conscious mental activity subsequently detected consciously.

The origin of ideas and thoughts is irrelevant to the question of free will - unless you can prove that all ideas and thoughts come unbidden.

Sam Harris has written on that. Again the assertion of rationality pops up unjustified! If your idea of rationality is “an autonomous self being rational” then clearly nothing can be rational because nothing can be autonomous.

Nothing can be autonomous but a person is not a thing!

But if your definition of rational is “Behaviour/thought/statement etc that is consistent with logic” then it applies to the workings of watches, computers, insect behaviour and a host of other things which are not autonomous but are very frequently thought to be rational. Your examples may differ.

Rationality entails insight and choice as well as logic.

You are trying to have it both ways - which doesn’t work!

That seems like a naive response to an incompatibilist argument. Of course the incompatibilist says that in both scenarios there is no free will. That is the nature of the argument - neither determinism nor indeterminism provide for free will. Do you have a response to that?

Self-determinism!

So you base rationality on the unconscious?

I’m not scared by the unconscious. We’re not talking about a Freudian, subversive, chamber of sex and secrets unconscious but rather all mental activity which is not conscious. Walking, driving, forming words, reading, remembering, recognising faces… etc etc are non-conscious processes. Do you fear to base rationality on the part of the mind which gives rise to all of this? Besides, there is no other place it comes from. It doesn’t come from our bones…

It is not a question of fear but fact. There is no evidence that **all **mental activity is caused by non-conscious processes.

Then they are completely determined and you cannot claim to be any more rational than a computer!

At last! Here we are. Yes, computers run logical programmes, so can we. Just to clarify, can anything be more rational than a computer?

Yes! A person who has the necessary insight and knowledge to invent, make and programme a computer

Then you are a cog in a machine which cannot think for itself.

In that I do not have an autonomous self.

In any respect.

Then you are a cog in a machine which cannot think for itself, come to its own conclusions or make decisions for itself.

I have the illusion that I am making decisions, but I have got over the illusion that I am thinking for myself. My thoughts are happening to me. My, what a wonderful world.

Then you are a fatalist who should make no effort to do or change anything - or to reach the correct conclusions about free will or anything else!