X
XndrK
Guest
So a lot of St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence are based in part on the principle that there can’t be an infinite backward line of causes.
Why not?
Why not?
- Status
E
edward_george
Guest
Very simply, if there is no first cause, there can’t be a second cause.
Perhaps less simply, an effect cannot be greater than its cause on the order of being–in other words, something which is metaphysically, essentially greater cannot arise from something which is metaphysically, essentially lesser. So the cause of all things would have to be greater than all things, that is, it would not simply be a caused thing among other uncaused things, but would have to be itself uncaused. Have you read Aquinas’ Five Ways from the Summa? He delineates why an infinite regress is impossible, somewhat anyway.
-Fr ACEGC
Perhaps less simply, an effect cannot be greater than its cause on the order of being–in other words, something which is metaphysically, essentially greater cannot arise from something which is metaphysically, essentially lesser. So the cause of all things would have to be greater than all things, that is, it would not simply be a caused thing among other uncaused things, but would have to be itself uncaused. Have you read Aquinas’ Five Ways from the Summa? He delineates why an infinite regress is impossible, somewhat anyway.
-Fr ACEGC
X
XndrK
Guest
Then why not have an infinite series of causes of equal magnitude?
E
edward_george
Guest
Translation: why not infinite regress? Because if there isn’t a first, and thus uncaused, cause, there can be no subsequent causes.
P
ProdglArchitect
Guest
Because that would be logically impossible. The effect of each cause is the result of the force of that cause acting on an external entity and transferring some portion of it’s energy to the affected entity. For each cause to be of equal magnitude would violate the principle of conservation of energy, because it would mean that an object is receiving energy from nowhere. Either that, or in the act of affecting something, the cause of the effect would invariably transfer 100% of it’s energy to the affected entity. Science and general observation clearly shows that this is not the case, so we can rule that out.
Ignoring all of this, you still can’t ignore the fact that a series of events must have a beginning. Think of it like a Newton’s Cradle toy. Once it’s going it will keep going for quite a while without any extra help from the watcher; but without that initial application of energy from an external force, it will just sit there doing nothing. No matter how long the toy goes afterward, even if it continues to clank back and forth until the end of time and beyond, without that initial application of energy, it wouldn’t b doing anything.
B
Beryllos
Guest
F
fisherman_carl
Guest
Aquinas’ arguments are not about a temporal sequence of causes going back in time to some first cause. Aquinas’ argument works even if the universe was infinite. Any hierarchical series of causes must be finite. It must have a first cause, not in order of time, but in order of cause. An example of a hierarchical sequence of causes would be the lamp is being held up by the table, the table is held up by the floor, the floor is held up by the ground, the ground is held up by the earth. The table derives its power or foundation to hold up the lamp from the floor. Likewise, the floor derives its power from the ground, and the ground from the earth. In this example, we can consider the earth to be the first cause, not in order of time, but in causes. Since all the causes occur simultaneously. And all the causes derive their causal power from the first cause. In such a hierarchical series of causes the causes can not stretch back infinitely, but must have a First Cause. This is what Aquinas means by a First Cause, not something in order of time, but first in a hierarchical series of causes. And, in this example the earth is the first cause regardless if the lamp has been sitting on the table for infinite amount of time. For more information see edwardfeser.com/mediaappearances.html an Aristotelean proof…
I
inocente
Guest
Seems William Lane Craig and Wes Morriston have been arguing over this for years.
“*In the present paper, I seek to establish, first, that the a priori arguments
against the infinite past are vital to the overall success of the kalam argument.
Merely appealing to the big bang theory of the origin of the universe will not
do the trick. In the second place, I show that neither of these arguments is at
all successful in showing that “metaphysical time” has a beginning. Along the
way, various discoveries are made about the relation of dynamic time to the
possibility that the past has no beginning. The final section of the paper shows
that if (as is commonly assumed) there is a complete body of truth about the
future, then an endless future is (also) an actual infinite.”
spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/metaphysical-time.pdf*
I
IWantGod
Guest
That is not what Aquinas argues. Aquinas does not argue against the possibility of an infinite number. Aquinas essentially argues against the existence of an infinite number of contingent causes without a cause. If the existence of every cause in the series is contingent then the existence of the whole series itself would be contingent regardless of the number. Therefore the existence of the series requires a cause that is not itself contingent on a cause for its existence.
T
Tandem
Guest
The problem with all of these “first”-types of arguments is that they all assume that the events (whether viewed temporarily of causatively) can be mapped unto the positive integers - that is one can speak meaningfully about “first”, “second”, etc… events. And that is NOT just an unproven assumption, it is false, since certain acts have multiple “child”-causes and others need several “parent”-events.
F
fisherman_carl
Guest
I don’t see how that is a problem. There is no such thing as negative events. And Aquinas is not speaking about a temporal order of causes. For Aquinas it is not events but causes. And events are not causes. For Aristotle/Aquinas arguments, they were done at a time when it was thought the universe was infinite. So they again are not about an order in time. Simultaneous causes can not have an infinite regress. As they must start with a first cause. If there was no first cause of the lamp resting on the table, the lamp could not be supported. Since all causes in a hierarchical series derive their causal power from the first cause. Similarly, if there is no first cause of our existence at any moment then we could not exist at any moment.
L
LethalMouse
Guest
The sum of multiple causes makes it a cause.
You are nitpicking terms to create a seemingly interesting proposition that God can be replaced with "a bunch of things simultaneously happening in random order = not a first cause but have such effect…
Which is basically like arguing the difference between God and multiple gods…
In regard to cause and effect logic, that arguemwnt is without purpose.
B
Blue_Horizon
Guest
I believe he accepts that there can be infinite regress when we speak of material efficient causality (e.g. local motion).
So why this should not be true for other types of “motion” or causality I do not know
.
B
Blue_Horizon
Guest
I have never understood the validity of this alleged example of simultaneous causality.
Aristotle’s 4 cauxses are all about explaining change/motion.
Where is the change/motion in this example?
E
e_c
Guest
Because the immaterial causes are not temporal but only have logical succession.I believe he accepts that there can be infinite regress when we speak of material efficient causality (e.g. local motion).
So why this should not be true for other types of “motion” or causality I do not know
X
XndrK
Guest
I’m going to try to answer my own question real quick:
If each cause was equally infinite and transferred its infinity to the next one, what would the difference between them be? Can’t we just consider them all the same thing?
Can’t we? Seriously, I need to know if I’m wrong.
I
IWantGod
Guest
The issue is not quantity. The issue is that each cause in an infinite series is itself caused. Therefore each cause in the series is itself an effect. Which means you essentially have an infinite effect. You cannot have an infinite effect without a cause, and it cannot be a cause that is itself an effect because in that case you haven’t explained the existence of the effect regardless of the quantity. Thus the reason for the effects existence has to be a cause existing outside of the series of an infinite effect - it cannot be itself an effect. It has to be an uncaused cause.
Quantity is irrelevant.
B
Blue_Horizon
Guest
If infinite causal regression is possible what difference does it make whether we speak of material or spiritual orders. A principle has been established which should be consistently applied.
And if a principle established in the material order need not hold in the spiritual order … then how do we know Aristotle’s four causal principles that explain change in the physical realm also hold the same in the metaphysical realm?
There seems to be a problem of non univocal prediction when we speak of causality, motion and regression in these two different realms.
B
Blue_Horizon
Guest
Yet Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that an infinite effect is possible when it comes to motion in the material order
.
I
IWantGod
Guest
Its really a question of dependency not quantity. Aquinas does not intend to disprove an infinite regress, but rather he intends to show the dependency of our world on an uncaused cause.Yet Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that an infinite effect is possible when it comes to motion in the material order
- Status