Inherent Value of life (secular)

[HarryStotle]

And morality IS relative. Always. And that obviously doesn’t prevent me making objective statements. My car is red. Morality is subjective. It is nonsense to say my car ought to be red - it is a fact. And it is nonsense to say that morality ought to be subjective. That is also a fact (one with which you are nevertheless free to disagree).

You are burying the question of whether morality ought to be subjective under your assertion that “morality IS relative. Always.”

The problem, for you, is that if morality is relative – always – then it releases you from the question of whether it actually is objective or absolute in any sense. You have merely stipulated that it never is. That is a mere assertion. You haven’t demonstrated that it is, nor that it ought to be.

Since morality is inherently about what ought to be the case regarding our decisions, to merely stipulate that morality IS "relative – always – simply bypasses the issue of what ought to be the case under particular circumstances.

If you assert that morality is relative, always, then any particular moral claims are always relative. Your assertion essentially means that oughts do not exist since all claims about what ought to be the case are relative. There are no moral oughts, then, that apply from beyond the subjectivity of the individual because no one OUGHT to do anything that they do not determine for themselves that they choose to do.

You have circumvented the entire IS-OUGHT paradigm by mere stipulation that every OUGHT is merely an IS in disguise.

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

And morality IS relative. Always. And that obviously doesn’t prevent me making objective statements. My car is red. Morality is subjective. It is nonsense to say my car ought to be red - it is a fact. And it is nonsense to say that morality ought to be subjective. That is also a fact (one with which you are nevertheless free to disagree).

You are burying the question of whether morality ought to be subjective under your assertion that “morality IS relative. Always.”

The problem, for you, is that if morality is relative – always – then it releases you from the question of whether it actually is objective or absolute in any sense. You have merely stipulated that it never is. That is a mere assertion. You haven’t demonstrated that it is, nor that it ought to be.

Since morality is inherently about what ought to be the case regarding our decisions, to merely stipulate that morality IS "relative – always – simply bypasses the issue of what ought to be the case under particular circumstances.

What ought to be the case under particular conditions? Which means relative to particular conditions. Which is the case with every single moral act.

You have answered your own question without realising it. All moral acts are relative.

 

[HarryStotle]

What ought to be the case under particular conditions? Which means relative to particular conditions. Which is the case with every single moral act.

You have answered your own question without realising it. All moral acts are relative.

This is a bit of a tired point.

Merely because there are conditions which mitigate the culpability or wrong of some moral acts does not entail “All moral acts are relative.” In fact, the conditions could be made explicit within the statement of the moral act to make it always wrong.

It is wrong to kill, might need to have the conditions made explicit, but once that is done it is no longer relative.

It is wrong to kill an innocent human being purely for gain or convenience, is no longer conditional, as stated. Or simply stated, “Murder is wrong.” That statement is not relative because the circumstances, intentions and object or end are all contained within the word “murder.”

In addition, your claim that “Moral acts are relative,” does not make it clear what moral acts are relative to. It certainly doesn’t entail they are relative to the whims or changing determinations of individuals. Ergo, you appear to be heading to “relative” = “subjective,” which you certainly haven’t established.

We need to point you towards the Catholic teaching on the dimensions or constitutive elements of moral acts.

I. THE SOURCES OF MORALITY

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

• the object chosen;
• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.

[1751] The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by conscience.
[1752] In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one’s whole life toward its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping one’s neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order to obtain a favor or to boast about it.

Continued…

 

[HarryStotle]

[1753] A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).39

[1754] The circumstances , including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.

II. GOOD ACTS AND EVIL ACTS

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).

The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.

[1756] It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

IN BRIEF

1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three “sources” of the morality of human acts.

1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.

1759 “An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention” (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec . 6). The end does not justify the means.

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

Merely because moral acts are multidimensional does not mean they are relative in the sense you want to impose.

 

[o_mlly]

Fair enough. How ought a secularist value human life?

Science does not give us the answer as to when human life begins so we are in the realm of uncertainty; the status of the growing cells in the womb as persons is ambiguous.

We have a doubt of fact but, hopefully, not a doubt of law. I trust secularists agree that it is always unlawful to intentionally kill innocent human persons.

We do know that the fertilized egg is unique because, unlike somatic cells, it possesses an active potentiality to develop into an organism using its own genetic information. That organism is a human person. “It [a new human being] would never be made human if it were not human already” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith , 1974).

It is possible to combine certainty about normative obligations with uncertainty of facts – the embryo’s ontological status.

In the case of a doubt of fact always the safer course of action must be followed: we are not allowed to act if there is a probability that an innocent person will be killed or harmed.

“From a moral point of view this is certain: even if a doubt existed concerning whether the fruit of conception is already a human person, it is objectively a grave sin to dare to risk murder” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 1974. Declaration on procured abortion . http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/c...ith_doc_19741118_declaration-abortion_en.html.)

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

In addition, your claim that “Moral acts are relative,” does not make it clear what moral acts are relative to .

To the circumstances, of course. An absolute proposition would be independent of everything, circumstances included.

Yes, and how is “Murder is morally wrong,” not an absolute proposition?

Murder, by definition, means intentional or wanton killing without justification.

mur·der​

(mûr′dər)

n.

1.

a. The killing of another person without justification or excuse, especially the crime of killing a person with malice aforethought or with recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

Every moral act – in fact every act by any human or moral agent – is necessarily relative to circumstances, intention and its outcome.

To insist, as you seem to, that moral acts cannot be relative to be absolute is to speak nonsense.

What Bradskii is attempting to do is ambiguate on the word relative, as if moral acts being relative to circumstances, intentions or outcomes makes them not absolutely binding on all human moral agents. That is a logical misstep on his part.

Every human act is directly tied to circumstances, intentions and outcomes or it would not be a human act. That does not mean moral injunctions are not absolutely morally binding merely because they are considered relative to the factors surrounding them.

 

[HarryStotle]

Not so fast. The question of “personhood” is open. And “innocence” has nothing to do with it.

Well, now you are merely making assertions. Care to defend your two claims?

Innocence – i.e., an act done to an innocent individual – has nothing to do with the culpability of a perpetrator? Really? Seems an odd claim given that a great many laws are based upon unmerited harm or tort.

Just how is the question of personhood “open?” How would you determine personhood since the qualities of personhood are subject-dependent? How do you know someone is definitively a person?

 

[HarryStotle]

Indeed. So to say that an “act” is intrinsically evil is nonsense.

No it isn’t.

One possible definition of “intrinsically evil” is an act , the carrying out of which, no circumstances or motives could possibly justify.

Torturing and killing an innocent child for the sheer hedonistic pleasure of doing so would be intrinsically evil, because there is no logical justification for doing so, nor any possible mitigating circumstances.

There are others.

Now don’t confuse the fact that some defective moral agents might not believe in intrinsically evil acts with the existence of such acts.

Someone, somewhere, not agreeing that they are intrinsically evil does not demonstrate that they are not.

To use your own example, the fact that Hitler didn’t see anything morally wrong with murdering Jewish people does not mean there is some legitimate moral doubt that murdering Jewish people is wrong.

 

[HarryStotle]

Easy. If he/she/it behaves as a person, he/she/it is a person.

Does it really, Mr. Turing?

Care to specify at least some behaviours?

Seems to me you would have to compile a widely acceptable, comprehensive and compelling list of such traits in order to make your case.

“Easy,” meaning: Easy to assert. Hardly easy to demonstrate.

Besides, are you going to endow a six week old child with “personhood?” Based upon which behaviours, specifically?

Merely declaring the "question of personhood” to be “open” hardly solves the moral problem for you. You still have to build a compelling ethical system on the “open” question of personhood.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

Torturing and killing an innocent child for the sheer hedonistic pleasure of doing so would be intrinsically evil, because there is no logical justification for doing so, nor any possible mitigating circumstances.

Except that is not a simple act, it is a qualified act. Killing would be the act. Torturing would be an act.

There is, then, no such thing as “killing,” simpliciter. It is an abstraction. Every act of killing involves motives, circumstances and outcomes.

Therefore, killing would not be an act. It would be an idea, a theoretical construct.

I think you missed the point.

 

[HarryStotle]

Being able to think and reason on that level. Even a seriously retarded human is a person. Someone, whose brain activity cannot exceed the vegetative state is not a person. Terry Schiavo comes to mind.

On what level? You haven’t specified a thing. You mean, “think on the level of a six week old?” Does a six week old think or reason?

Terry Schiavo comes to mind there, too.

The problem is that merely by looking on Terry Schiavo from the outside, you have no idea what she is capable of thinking or reasoning. Thinking and reasoning are privileged activities that no one besides the person him/herself can possibly be certain are occurring.

So your entire premise regarding the moral value of life – i.e., only those endowed with personhood, have a moral right to life – means that it is impossible to determine besides in your own subjective case who does or does not possess personhood.

Your entire ethical system is founded on a ground that is literally impossible to determine for certain.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

Your entire ethical system is founded on a ground that is literally impossible to determine for certain.

Of course it is!

I see. So you aren’t proposing a serious ethical system, then?

 

[HarryStotle]

Someone, whose brain activity cannot exceed the vegetative state is not a person. Terry Schiavo comes to mind.

The literature is riddled with cases of individuals who were determined to be without conscious awareness after years in comatose or “vegetative states,” and came out of them claiming to have been fully conscious all along.

'I screamed, but there was nothing to hear': Man trapped in 23-year 'coma' reveals horror of being unable to tell doctors he was conscious

Rom Houben, trapped in his paralysed body after a car crash, described his real-life nightmare as he screamed to doctors that he could hear them - but could make no sound.

www.dailymail.co.uk

https://www.littlethings.com/martin-pistorius-coma-12-years-ghost-boy/

Man Wakes from Two-Year Coma – was Aware and Remembers Everything - LifeSite

CATANIA, October 6, 2005 (LifeSiteNews.com) -Â When Salvatore Crisafulli, 38, awoke Monday from a two-year long coma, his first word, according to his mother,

www.lifesitenews.com

Seems your grounds for determining personhood are on shaky grounds.

That Terry Schiavo comes to your mind is just a tad less important than what came to Terry Schiavo’s mind when she was killed.

 

[VanitasVanitatum]

Being able to think and reason on that level. Even a seriously retarded human is a person. Someone, whose brain activity cannot exceed the vegetative state is not a person. Terry Schiavo comes to mind.

How about when people are unconscious or asleep?

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

What ought to be the case under particular conditions? Which means relative to particular conditions. Which is the case with every single moral act.

You have answered your own question without realising it. All moral acts are relative.

This is a bit of a tired point.

Merely because there are conditions which mitigate the culpability or wrong of some moral acts does not entail “All moral acts are relative.” In fact, the conditions could be made explicit within the statement of the moral act to make it always wrong.

It is wrong to kill, might need to have the conditions made explicit, but once that is done it is no longer relative.

It is wrong to kill an innocent human being purely for gain or convenience, is no longer conditional, as stated. Or simply stated, “Murder is wrong.” That statement is not relative because the circumstances, intentions and object or end are all contained within the word “murder.”

You are arguing my point and then denying it is valid. Colour me confused.

‘Killing is wrong’ is an objective statement. It isn’t conditional upon anything. If you make it conditional to anything then it becomes, obviously, an act relative to those conditions. So killing someone if it is unlawful and premeditated and with forethought and malice, it is immoral. It is murder. We tend to use the term murder because it’s a lot shorter than saying ‘killiing in an unlawful and premeditated manner and with forethought and malice’. But they both mean exactly the same and whichever way you say it, it is an act relative to those conditions.

How on earth you can say that to ‘kill an innocent human being purely for gain or convenience’ is an objective statement is completely beyond me. The phrase ‘being purely for gain or convenience’ are the conditions upon which you have decided the killing is immoral.

 

[Bradskii]

Every moral act – in fact every act by any human or moral agent – is necessarily relative to circumstances, intention and its outcome.

What Bradskii is attempting to do is ambiguate on the word relative, as if moral acts being relative to circumstances, intentions or outcomes makes them not absolutely binding on all human moral agents. That is a logical misstep on his part.

OK, so you do accept that all moral acts are relative. I’m not sure exactly what you have been arguing against these past few posts.

And I have SPECIFICALLY said that all acts being so have no bearing on whether we accept them as moral or not. That is a separate discussion. Now that we have agreed that morality is not absolute (i.e. moral acts are not right or wrong in themselves) now we can discuss how we actually determine if certain acts are moral or not.

 

[HarryStotle]

You are arguing my point and then denying it is valid. Colour me confused.

‘Killing is wrong’ is an objective statement. It isn’t conditional upon anything. If you make it conditional to anything then it becomes, obviously, an act relative to those conditions.

Killing is wrong, like all moral statements, is conditional because there are three dimensions to every human act. The circumstances within which it is committed, the motives that operated to move the agent, and the outcome sought by the agent. Therefore, every moral act is conditional precisely because every human act is.

If every human act is conditional, then a fortiori, every morally important act is.

That is not sufficient to make morality “relative” in the sense you appear to want to insist that it is. You jump from “relative” to circumstances, motives and outcomes, to “relative” meaning subjectively determined or as determined by the subject. That is an unwarranted logical leap.

That is the problem I am having with your position. You state…

Morality is subjective.

Yet, you claim it is objective. Fine.

The problem is you haven’t distinguished which aspects of morality are objective and which are subjective, and the extent to which the wrongness of moral acts imposes a moral obligation or burden on the subject.

If morality does that, then morality isn’t subjective in the sense of “left entirely to the subject to determine their own morality.”

 

[Bradskii]

Kacor:

Indeed. So to say that an “act” is intrinsically evil is nonsense.

No it isn’t.

One possible definition of “intrinsically evil” is an act , the carrying out of which, no circumstances or motives could possibly justify.

Torturing and killing an innocent child for the sheer hedonistic pleasure of doing so would be intrinsically evil, because there is no logical justification for doing so, nor any possible mitigating circumstances.

Is ‘harming a child’ an intrinsically immoral act? Obviously not. It’s not objectively wrong because we need to know the conditions. If the conditions relate to a life saving procedure which will cause short term harm but result in a life saved then it is justified. If it is for pure pleasure then it would be wrong. We need to know what the act relates to. The relative conditions. As you said earlier, all acts are relative.

So we cannot say that we can claim that harming a child is objectively wrong. We need to know the conditions and then make a decision. And note that simply because all people would agree with an act does not make it morally good or bad because of that fact.

To find out why we state that torturing children is bad I suggest you consider the Golder Rule.

 

[Bradskii]

Kacor:

HarryStotle:

Torturing and killing an innocent child for the sheer hedonistic pleasure of doing so would be intrinsically evil, because there is no logical justification for doing so, nor any possible mitigating circumstances.

Except that is not a simple act, it is a qualified act. Killing would be the act. Torturing would be an act.

There is, then, no such thing as “killing,” simpliciter. It is an abstraction. Every act of killing involves motives, circumstances and outcomes.

It’s not an abstraction. It is an act. Why would you say any different. But it could be a good act or a bad one. If you don’t agree, then answer this:

I just killed Spot.

Was that a good act or a bad act? To make that decision you would have to know who or what Spot is, how I killed him, why I killed him and whether it was justified.

 

[HarryStotle]

OK, so you do accept that all moral acts are relative. I’m not sure exactly what you have been arguing against these past few posts.

And I have SPECIFICALLY said that all acts being so have no bearing on whether we accept them as moral or not. That is a separate discussion. Now that we have agreed that morality is not absolute (i.e. moral acts are not right or wrong in themselves) now we can discuss how we actually determine if certain acts are moral or not.

What I have been arguing against is your unwarranted jump from

1. all moral acts are relative
   to
2. we have agreed that morality is not absolute (i.e. moral acts are not right or wrong in themselves

Several issues, to spell them out clearly:

A. That moral acts are “relative” in the sense of dependent upon circumstances, motives and outcomes does not imply they are “not absolute” because there may be acts with very limited possibilities in terms of motives, outcomes and circumstances such that they are absolutely, i.e., always, wrong.

B. Moral acts could still be right or wrong “in themselves” if the “in themselves” of moral acts means including circumstances, motives and outcomes. As I pointed out in an earlier post to @Kacor, a moral act, by definition, always involves circumstances, motives and outcomes by the fact that every human act involves those. Those dimensions are what make moral acts, human moral acts in the first place. Moral acts are not random perturbations of atoms. They are deliberate, in a particular time and space, and aimed at some result or other. Circumstances, motives and outcomes are, themselves, intrinsic to moral acts, therefore moral acts are right or wrong in themselves BECAUSE moral acts include circumstances, motives and outcomes.

C. That moral acts are “relative” to circumstances, motives and outcomes, does not mean the determinations of the rightness or wrongness of those acts is subjective in the sense you seem to imply, i.e., always relative to the subject’s determination as to their rightness or wrongness.