Inherent Value of life (secular)

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

Here’s something to prompt some thought: Two people with no inherrent value. But they have relative value. One is trapped inside a burning car. The other, being an empathetic person and naturally tending to reciprocal altruism, decides that the woman in the car has value and wants to save her. If I need to break the window to save her, how do I view that rock on the floor? An invaluable lump of sandstone or a mans to save a life?

It “prompted” some thought, alright.

What it implies is that the woman trapped in the car has no real value unless the individual outside happens to be an “empathetic” person and decides she has value. Absent that, the woman in the car has no real value according to you because the person outside of the car can decide how much value she is to have.

The woman in the car may have value to herself, but since she is about to be burned alive, it seems her value will vanish like a wisp of smoke in the fire. The person outside the car might conclude: Well she would have had value, if I had decided she did, but since I didn’t, she doesn’t. He then shrugs it off and goes his merry way.

And if someone else comes along, they may decide to shoot the unempathetic person because they have subsequently decided against being empathetic and impute no value on the victim.

Real value, then, seems very tenuous. Hardly the stuff of a robust moral system, since individuals can decide based upon their empathy or lack of it the value to impute to others.

You’ve got it exactly right, Harry. As you said, and as I agreed, there have been some people, in some times, where they valued a person’s life as no more than a facet of entertainment. Think the Romans and the Christians and happy snaps of the whole family attending a lynching or My Lai. That’s the way the world works. Kinda ugly and depressing on all too many ocassions. There’s no denying it.

And I must say, if you are right and I am wrong, it seems not to have made much of adifference, does it.

But just because some people lack empathy, or ignore it - it happens a lot in war, doesn’t mean that it is right. That is what we have to decide. Reciprocal altruism comes in handy then. Do unto others etc. It’s a really handy rule. I heartily recommend it.

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

If I were the last person on earth I would have no value. Well, except to me.

A la, Euthyphro:

Do you value yourself because you are valuable?

Or…

Are you valuable because you value yourself?

I believe other people to be valuable because of empathy. I can undertsand what they would feel like to be killed for fun for example. And that wouldn’t work unless I had a sense of self preservation myself. Every creature, consciously or unconsciously values it’s own life.

Evolution took care of that. Anything that didn’t have a sense of self preservation didn’t live long enough to pass on those self-destructive genes.

Bradskii:

If I were the last person on earth I would have no value. Well, except to me.

Bradskii, take it up with Bradskii.

You might assert it. But you’d need to do more than that for it to be accepted. 'Cos I could just assert: 'No, you are wrong. '. Which I will do until you develop your assertion a little more.

I disagreed with your assertion. What you posted doesn’t contradict anything I have posted. You may have to expand on it.

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

Here’s something to prompt some thought: Two people with no inherrent value. But they have relative value. One is trapped inside a burning car. The other, being an empathetic person and naturally tending to reciprocal altruism, decides that the woman in the car has value and wants to save her. If I need to break the window to save her, how do I view that rock on the floor? An invaluable lump of sandstone or a means to save a life?

In your example, the persons have inherent value because by nature, in the least, each person has valued his/her life. On the other hand, the rock does not secularly have inherent value because the rock cannot naturally value itself.

I value my life. Some people, unfortunately, think their lives have no value. But it’s a matter of semantics. If you want to describe the value we put on our own life as being inherent, then so be it. I assumed that the point being made was that an individual’s value is one granted by God. Not by the individual.

If that’s the line you would prefer to pursue…then OK.

Bradskii:

Some people actually think like that. They lack empathy and ignore the feeling of reciprocal altruism. It leads to awful acts.

Awful to you, but if value is merely imputed by some person or other, then the real value of any person is contingent on others valuing them.

And what is awful or valuable depends upon someone valuing it or not.

Unless valuing is an obligatory moral act, no one need feel any compulsion to value others.

There can be no obligation to value others, unless the valuing of others is valuable in itself and not merely pegged to someone’s “decision” to value or not.

Someone could claim, “Valuing others is okay for saps and simpletons, but I am deciding only to value myself and getting all the pleasure I can.”

Since “value” is, according to you, a decision individuals make for themselves, there can be no moral obligation in your ethical system to call such a person immoral. They just value things differently than you.

Everything you said is correct. Except the part about morals. There is nothing at all to stop you declaring that the morality of a Hitler is worse that that of a Gandhi. Why are you confusing someone’s individual valuation with a compulsion to accept it.

Just because a ma is lynched because no-one valued his life, does that mean we have to accept that they can do whatever they’d like? Nonsense. And I don’t know why that is so monstrously difficult to get across.

I value my kids more than you. Does that mean I can accept you being beaten and killed? A ridiculous position to take.

 

[Elf01]

I value my kids more than you. Does that mean I can accept you being beaten and killed? A ridiculous position to take.

Seems consistint with your logic though.

 

[jochoa]

I value my life. Some people, unfortunately, think their lives have no value. But it’s a matter of semantics. If you want to describe the value we put on our own life as being inherent, then so be it. I assumed that the point being made was that an individual’s value is one granted by God. Not by the individual. .

Naturally, whether consciously or not, each person values living. Through the course of living through hardships, some unnaturally choose not to value life. Therefore, some people unnaturally devaluing their life does not cancel out the inherent value of their life.

In addition to each person being inherently valuable secularly, every life is guaranteed to be inherently valuable because God values every life. However, the OP was seeking secular points to consider.

 

[HarryStotle]

You’ve got it exactly right, Harry. As you said, and as I agreed, there have been some people, in some times, where they valued a person’s life as no more than a facet of entertainment.

Except that you aren’t merely claiming that is the way the world is, you are proposing that the way it is is what OUGHT to be the prevalent moral view BECAUSE that IS the way it is. You are attempting to circumvent the entire is-ought fallacy by ignoring it completely.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

Bradskii:

If I were the last person on earth I would have no value. Well, except to me.

A la, Euthyphro:

Do you value yourself because you are valuable?

Or…

Are you valuable because you value yourself?

I believe other people to be valuable because of empathy.

That is nothing more than stating: I believe other people to be of value because I value them.

The assertion is trivial and meaningless.

It also implies that their actual value is pegged to you valuing them and nothing more. They have no value in themselves just what you impart. So their value is pegged to your emotional state about them, and nothing about them independently of your sentiments.

Seems just a bit empty in terms of providing grounds for a robust moral system.

You steer clear of claiming human beings have any value, objectively speaking, but that human beings just happen to value stuff, and that valuing isn’t tied to anything objective about what is valued, but to the mere feelings of valuing (empathy) alone.

Again, your ethical system – if we can call it that – seems hollow and empty since there are no grounds for valuing being presented, nothing except the sheer act of valuing itself.

 

[HarryStotle]

Everything you said is correct. Except the part about morals. There is nothing at all to stop you declaring that the morality of a Hitler is worse that that of a Gandhi. Why are you confusing someone’s individual valuation with a compulsion to accept it.

Except that I never accept the valuation of someone, anyone, based upon a “compulsion to accept it.”

If that is the grounds upon which you base your acceptance of what is valued or not, then, I submit, your ethical system is one based upon compulsion and nothing more. Even if that compulsion comes at the mercy of feelings of empathy. [By the way, you ought to read what CS Lewis writes about mercy and sympathy.]

It seems to me that we have a number of very good grounds to value people and objects in the world, and compulsion isn’t one of those grounds. At least not for me.

For you, perhaps?

 

[TheLittleLady]

I’d do some research at:

https://www.secularprolife.org/

and

https://www.feministsforlife.org/

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

You’ve got it exactly right, Harry. As you said, and as I agreed, there have been some people, in some times, where they valued a person’s life as no more than a facet of entertainment.

Except that you aren’t merely claiming that is the way the world is, you are proposing that the way it is is what OUGHT to be the prevalent moral view BECAUSE that IS the way it is. You are attempting to circumvent the entire is-ought fallacy by ignoring it completely.

If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.

My car is red. Does it make any sense to say that it aught to be red? Aught I be six feet tall? Aught I be Australian?

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

HarryStotle:

Bradskii:

If I were the last person on earth I would have no value. Well, except to me.

A la, Euthyphro:

Do you value yourself because you are valuable?

Or…

Are you valuable because you value yourself?

I believe other people to be valuable because of empathy.

That is nothing more than stating: I believe other people to be of value because I value them.

The assertion is trivial and meaningless.

It also implies that their actual value is pegged to you valuing them and nothing more. They have no value in themselves just what you impart. So their value is pegged to your emotional state about them, and nothing about them independently of your sentiments.

Seems just a bit empty in terms of providing grounds for a robust moral system.

You steer clear of claiming human beings have any value, objectively speaking, but that human beings just happen to value stuff, and that valuing isn’t tied to anything objective about what is valued, but to the mere feelings of valuing (empathy) alone.

Again, your ethical system – if we can call it that – seems hollow and empty since there are no grounds for valuing being presented, nothing except the sheer act of valuing itself.

You nailed it. Except the bit about no grounds for valuing. You got that wrong. I already used the examples of children and rocks. Extrapolate from there.

And for heaven’s sake, don’t now suggest that ‘hey, if you value your kids then I have no value’. You do. Entertainment value at the moment. But I would use the rock to save you from immolation. Trust me.

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

Everything you said is correct. Except the part about morals. There is nothing at all to stop you declaring that the morality of a Hitler is worse that that of a Gandhi. Why are you confusing someone’s individual valuation with a compulsion to accept it.

Except that I never accept the valuation of someone, anyone, based upon a “compulsion to accept it.”

Apologies. A misunderstanding. I should have been clearer. When I said ‘Why are you confusing someone’s individual valuation with a compulsion to accept it.’ The ‘it’ referred to the previous comment about morality. Not to the valuation.

So again…it appears that some people think that my position is that if a person says that someone has no value then we must accept that and all moral acts he might make on that valuation. We obviously shouldn’t - and don’t. Value and morality are loosely connected but one is not dependent on the other.

 

[HarryStotle]

If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.

Clearly you don’t understand why the is-ought fallacy is considered a fallacy.

The fact that some individuals, in fact, believe some moral perspective is correct (true), is insufficient to demonstrate that that moral perspective ought to be morally held or is morally correct (true.)

That fact that moral belief X is held to be a correct (true) moral principle, is insufficient to demonstrate that it is, in fact, a correct (true) moral principle.

Neither is it “nonsensical” to say that just because some individuals claim moral belief X IS true, does not show that moral belief X “AUGHT to be true.”

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.

Clearly you don’t understand why the is-ought fallacy is considered a fallacy.

The fact that some individuals, in fact, believe some moral perspective is correct (true), is insufficient to demonstrate that that moral perspective ought to be morally held or is morally correct (true.)

That fact that moral belief X is held to be a correct (true) moral principle, is insufficient to demonstrate that it is, in fact, a correct (true) moral principle.

Neither is it “nonsensical” to say that just because some individuals claim moral belief X IS true, does not show that moral belief X “AUGHT to be true.”

Of course it’s a fallacy. In fact, someone pointed that out earlier:

‘If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.’

Ah, it was me.

 

[HarryStotle]

Of course it’s a fallacy. In fact, someone pointed that out earlier:

‘If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.’

Ah, it was me.

I see. So your comment was to be taken seriously, and not with a touch of sarcasm.

I thought you meant:

‘If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical [as in nonsensically redundant] to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.’

 

[HarryStotle]

If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.

My car is red. Does it make any sense to say that it aught to be red? Aught I be six feet tall? Aught I be Australian?

On re-read, your comment still isn’t applicable, nor correct.

“My car is red, it ought to be red,” does make no sense.

However, someone might say “Abortion is legal, and it ought to be legal.” Or conversely, “Abortion is illegal, and it ought to be illegal.” Those both make perfect sense. As would, “Abortion is legal, but it ought to be illegal.”

As would, “Abortion is immoral [as far as I am concerned], and it ought to be immoral [as far as everyone is concerned].”

Ergo, “Abortion is immoral, and it ought to be immoral,” makes perfect sense. That is because the word immoral isn’t understood in precisely the same way by every person, and there is acknowledged dispute over which acts are or are not moral/immoral.

 

[o_mlly]

St. Augustine’s comparison of the goodness of a mouse and of a pearl helps us to understand the goodness commensurate with being. If asked, “Which would you prefer to have?” Augustine thinks the answer should be a pearl, for it is a more valuable possession than a mouse. That is certainly true of its exchange value, and it is likely to be true of its use value and its enjoyability. However, if asked, “Which would you rather be?” he thinks the opposite answer should be given, for a living organism has more being, more potentialities for development, more power to act, than an inert stone, however attractively coated.
(“Six Great Ideas”; Mortimer Adler)

Augustine’s and Adler’s underlying principle is that value or goodness of a creature varies directly with that creature’s level of existence. All life has greater existence (being) than non-life and, therefore, greater value.

As to the inherent value of an unborn human life, we can return to the same principle: since the embryo has "more potentialities for development, more power to act" than either a pearl or a mouse then the embryo has inherent value greater than either one.

Only one who chooses to see no value in pearls or mice or anything that exists can deny the argument that concludes unborn life has inherent value.

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii:

If something just IS true, then it’s nonsensical to suggest that it also AUGHT to be true.

My car is red. Does it make any sense to say that it aught to be red? Aught I be six feet tall? Aught I be Australian?

On re-read, your comment still isn’t applicable, nor correct.

“My car is red, it ought to be red,” does make no sense.

However, someone might say “Abortion is legal, and it ought to be legal.” Or conversely, “Abortion is illegal, and it ought to be illegal.” Those both make perfect sense. As would, “Abortion is legal, but it ought to be illegal.”

As would, “Abortion is immoral [as far as I am concerned], and it ought to be immoral [as far as everyone is concerned].”

Ergo, “Abortion is immoral, and it ought to be immoral,” makes perfect sense. That is because the word immoral isn’t understood in precisely the same way by every person, and there is acknowledged dispute over which acts are or are not moral/immoral.

It appears that there are, as you said, people who do not understand is-ought.

It doesn’t contradict the fallacy if one makes a statement that something is true and then says AND it is true (my car is red and it is red) - although somewhat redundant. But it makes nonsense to say that you believe something IS true and therefore it OUGHT be true (my car is red and it ought to be red).

But we are, in any case, in both examples, making an objective statement (my car is red - absolutely and uniquivocably undeniable). But you are using a relative statement (abortion is immoral) which is a matter of personal opinion and THEN stating that OUGHT to be immoral as an objective fact.

Paaaarp. Can’t do that.

 

[HarryStotle]

I confess, I am not getting your point.

But it makes nonsense to say that you believe something IS true and therefore it OUGHT be true (my car is red and it ought to be red).

It is no more nonsense to say that than to say, “My car is red, but it ought to be blue,” if someone is expressing their preference for colour by using the “ought.” I.e., The car is, as a matter of fact, red; but it ought, as a matter of preference, be blue.
Similarly, someone could – if the colour of the car were under discussion – say, “The car is, as a matter of fact, red; and it ought, as a matter of my preference, be red.”
Not nonsense, under certain circumstances.

But we are, in any case, in both examples, making an objective statement (my car is red - absolutely and uniquivocably undeniable). But you are using a relative statement (abortion is immoral) which is a matter of personal opinion and THEN stating that OUGHT to be immoral as an objective fact.

Paaaarp. Can’t do that.

Why not? Sounds like you want to disallow that moral “ought” statements can be objective statements, but insist – as an objective fact – that moral statements are merely matters of personal opinion, and [you further imply but don’t come right out and state] they ought to be matters of personal opinion.

In effect, you are doing precisely what you say should not be done. You are insisting that moral statements are, as a matter of fact, statements of personal opinion, and [implying under your breath] that moral statements also ought to be statements of personal opinion.

So, why do you respond with “Paaaarp. Can’t do that,” when I do it, but you permit yourself to do “that” very same thing in the opposite direction, though by squirrelling in the insistence?

 

[Bradskii]

I confess, I am not getting your point.

Bradskii:

But it makes nonsense to say that you believe something IS true and therefore it OUGHT be true (my car is red and it ought to be red).

It is no more nonsense to say that than to say, “My car is red, but it ought to be blue,” if someone is expressing their preference for colour by using the “ought.” I.e., The car is, as a matter of fact, red; but it ought, as a matter of preference, be blue.
Similarly, someone could – if the colour of the car were under discussion – say, “The car is, as a matter of fact, red; and it ought, as a matter of my preference, be red.”
Not nonsense, under certain circumstances.

But we are, in any case, in both examples, making an objective statement (my car is red - absolutely and uniquivocably undeniable). But you are using a relative statement (abortion is immoral) which is a matter of personal opinion and THEN stating that OUGHT to be immoral as an objective fact.

Paaaarp. Can’t do that.

Why not? Sounds like you want to disallow that moral “ought” statements can be objective statements, but insist – as an objective fact – that moral statements are merely matters of personal opinion, and [you further imply but don’t come right out and state] they ought to be matters of personal opinion.

In effect, you are doing precisely what you say should not be done. You are insisting that moral statements are, as a matter of fact, statements of personal opinion, and [implying under your breath] that moral statements also ought to be statements of personal opinion.

Is-ought refers always to one idea: Murder is wrong - it ought to be wrong. My car is red - it ought to be blue doesn’t relate at all to the idea. That’s like saying murder is wrong - it ought to be illegal. There’s no problem with that.

And morality IS relative. Always. And that obviously doesn’t prevent me making objective statements. My car is red. Morality is subjective. It is nonsense to say my car ought to be red - it is a fact. And it is nonsense to say that morality ought to be subjective. That is also a fact (one with which you are nevertheless free to disagree).