Intelligence in God, an appeal to Professional Philosophers

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I phrased that poorly. I should have said that what Thomas meant isn’t certain. So we would have to backtrack to see if we could pin it down with greater certainty. Sort of like Fr. John A Weisheipl disseceted his work, he left nothing to chance.

And if we consider that every being has a final end, there is no reason why we cannot consider man’s intellect as the mover of his will. Thus man is a self-moved mover and the first in respect to his person.

And if this argument harkens back to A’s celestial spheres, I don’t recall A as saying they were intelligent. Did he say they were intelligent? If they were moved by desire for God, it would seem they would have to be. But I don’t recall how A explained this. An argument against this is that Thomas was not all that certain that A was correct about his theory about the way the spheres were moved.

And one has to be aware that Thomas tends to give A perhaps more credit than he deserves at times. Here I have in mind the proof that he gives from efficient causality. I remember reading Thomas’ reference to A on this point and to me it seemed that A was speaking only about changes in the " imperfect world, " not celestial spheres. A was convinced in an eternal world and if I remember right he rejected creation as a cause of anything ( just going from memory). So that would bring that proof into question as far as being from Aristotle.

P.S. I paid $140 for Weisheipl’s Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages. Got it out of the Neitherlands.

P.P.S. I have to read your comments above.

Linus2nd
If you go to C.G. III, 22 and 23, you will see that St. Thomas seems to take the “heavenly bodies” seriously. Moreover, he seems to say that they may be moved by having an intellectual soul. Yet, he also appears willing to say that they merely are moved by an ultimate intellectual agent, namely, God.

Considering the limits of knowledge of astronomical bodies then in existence, I would say that St. Thomas hedges his bets very well. Again, the main argument seems to be that you cannot have an infinite regress among moved movers, and, even if some movers are self-moved through intellective appetite, there remains a need for an ultimate intellectual agent to order the motion of all lesser movers, namely, God. I still would maintain that Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, speaks of there being 47 or 55 possible first self-moving movers, which would be the heavenly bodies that initiate the movement of all lower orders of motion. I am not so sure that St. Thomas accepts that scenario, since in this part of the C.G. he allows a disjunction wherein celestial bodies might either be intellectual substances or not, and if the latter, are moved by God as a first intellectual principle of all motion. See C.G. III, 23.12.
 
If you go to C.G. III, 22 and 23, you will see that St. Thomas seems to take the “heavenly bodies” seriously. Moreover, he seems to say that they may be moved by having an intellectual soul. Yet, he also appears willing to say that they merely are moved by an ultimate intellectual agent, namely, God.

Considering the limits of knowledge of astronomical bodies then in existence, I would say that St. Thomas hedges his bets very well. Again, the main argument seems to be that you cannot have an infinite regress among moved movers, and, even if some movers are self-moved through intellective appetite, there remains a need for an ultimate intellectual agent to order the motion of all lesser movers, namely, God. I still would maintain that Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, speaks of there being 47 or 55 possible first self-moving movers, which would be the heavenly bodies that initiate the movement of all lower orders of motion. I am not so sure that St. Thomas accepts that scenario, since in this part of the C.G. he allows a disjunction wherein celestial bodies might either be intellectual substances or not, and if the latter, are moved by God as a first intellectual principle of all motion. See C.G. III, 23.12.
Thanks again Dr. B, you have given me a lot to think about. Don’t you think it is simply astounding that Dr. Massey should have included this question in his syllabus? I think it is remarkable since Fr. Rickaby leaves it out entirely in his annotated edition of SCG.

Linus2nd
 
Nothing new, except a couple of thoughts.

In SCG 44.2, we have the “first mover”, which is named “God”:
Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God…
Then, the last sentence is saying that the first mover (God) moves himself:
making the supposition that the first mover moves himself
So God moves himself. But how can this be, if God is unmoved? The only answer I can think of is that he is using the term “motion” in the broad Platonic sense, from 13.10:
According to Plato, however, that which moves itself is not a body. Plato understood by motion any given operation, so that to understand and to judge are a kind of motion.
So, if God moves himself, it can only be in the Platonic sense, meaning that he exercises his understanding, judgement, etc. To put it technically, God actualizes his own active potencies, but not his passive potencies since he doesn’t have any. And thus, we have:
All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.
I.e., God is intelligent because he moves himself (Platonically), and can only move himself intellectually, as described in the rest of 44.2, and therefore must be intelligent.

But, contra this, per my interlocutor on reddit, the unmoved mover is an intelligible appetible. And an intelligible can only be in act if it is a thought and not just an idea, and therefore if the first appetible (the U.M.) is intelligible but also actual, it cannot be just an idea (or Platonic Form), but must be thought itself. And indeed, check out 51.6:
The intelligible in act is the intellect in act, just as the sensible in act is the sense in act. According as the intelligible is distinguished from the intellect, both are in potency, as likewise appears in the case of the sense. For neither the sight is seeing in act, nor is the visible object seen in act, except when the sight is informed by the species of the visible object, so that thereby from the sight and the object something one results
 
Nothing new, except a couple of thoughts.

In SCG 44.2, we have the “first mover”, which is named “God”:

Then, the last sentence is saying that the first mover (God) moves himself:

So God moves himself. But how can this be, if God is unmoved? The only answer I can think of is that he is using the term “motion” in the broad Platonic sense, from 13.10:

So, if God moves himself, it can only be in the Platonic sense, meaning that he exercises his understanding, judgement, etc. To put it technically, God actualizes his own active potencies, but not his passive potencies since he doesn’t have any. And thus, we have:

I.e., God is intelligent because he moves himself (Platonically), and can only move himself intellectually, as described in the rest of 44.2, and therefore must be intelligent.

But, contra this, per my interlocutor on reddit, the unmoved mover is an intelligible appetible. And an intelligible can only be in act if it is a thought and not just an idea, and therefore if the first appetible (the U.M.) is intelligible but also actual, it cannot be just an idea (or Platonic Form), but must be thought itself. And indeed, check out 51.6:
I think you are on the wrong track. Take a look at SCG, ch 37, esp. the following:

" [3] Again, it was shown above that there is a certain first unmoved mover, namely, God’s This mover moves as a completely unmoved mover, which is as something desired. Therefore, since God is the first unmoved mover, He is the first desired. But something is desired in two ways, namely, either because it is good or because it appears to be good. The first desired is what is good, since the apparent good does not move through itself but according as it has a certain appearance of the good, whereas the good moves through itself. The first desired, therefore, God, is truly good.

[4] Furthermore, “the good is that which all things desire.” The Philosopher introduces this remark as a “felicitous saying” in Ethics I [1]. But all things, each according to its mode, desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact that each thing according to its nature resists corruption. To be in act, therefore, constitutes the nature of the good. Hence it is that evil, which is opposed to the good, follows when potency is deprived of act, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics IX [9]. But, as we have shown, God is being in act without potency. Therefore, He is truly good.

[5] Moreover,.the communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. This is evident from the very nature and definition of the good. By nature, the good of each thing is its act and perfection. Now, each thing acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of a being’s perfection that it “can produce its like,” as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteorologica IV [3]. Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the end, which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that the good is diffusive of itself and of being. But this diffusion befits God because, as we have shown above, being through Himself the necessary being, God is the cause of being for other things. God is, therefore, truly good. "

Quite a similar argument isn’t it. By back tracking the references I think we may learn something. Also, when Thomas says " …as we have shown above…," he means all the way back to Chapter 1, or at least we must assume that. No I think we have a way to go yet.

As I said before, Thomas gives many good proofs for God’s intelligence. But it is this particular one which is troublesome.

Linus2nd
 
And then we have these interesting comments from SCG, para 13.

" 25] It is further evident that, according to the position of Aristotle, some self-moved being must be everlasting. For if, as Aristotle supposes, motion is everlasting, the generation of self-moving beings (this means beings that are generable and corruptible) must be endless. But the cause of this endlessness cannot be one of the self-moving beings, since it does not always exist. Nor can the cause be all the self-moving beings together, both because they would be infinite and because they would not be simultaneous. There must therefore be some endlessly self-moving being, causing the endlessness of generation among these sublunary self-movers. Thus, the mover of the self-moving being is not moved, either through itself or by accident. "

And, "
[28] Now, God is not part of any self-moving mover. In his Metaphysics [XII, 7], therefore, Aristotle goes on from the mover who is a part of the self-moved mover to seek another mover—God—who is absolutely separate. For, since everything moving itself is moved through appetite, the mover who is part of the self-moving being moves because of the appetite of some appetible object. This object is higher, in the order of motion, than the mover desiring it; for the one desiring is in a manner a moved mover, whereas an appetible object is an absolutely unmoved mover. There must, therefore, be an absolutely unmoved separate first mover. This is God. "

And, " 33] In Metaphysics II [Ia, 2] Aristotle also uses another argument to show that there is no infinite regress in efficient causes and that we must reach one first cause—God. This way is as follows. In all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, whether one or many, and this is the cause of the last cause. But, when you suppress a cause, you suppress its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the first cause, the intermediate cause cannot be a cause. Now, if there were an infinite regress among efficient causes, no cause would be first. Therefore, all the other causes, which are intermediate, will be suppressed. But this is manifestly false. We must, therefore, posit that there exists a first efficient cause. This is God. "

In regard to the last, one has to question whether Aristotle ever used effecient causality to prove the existence of God. I may be wrong but I think this is one of those cases where Thomas is giving credit to Aristotle for something he did not say.

Linus2nd
 
And then we have these interesting comments from SCG, para 13.

" 25] It is further evident that, according to the position of Aristotle, some self-moved being must be everlasting. For if, as Aristotle supposes, motion is everlasting, the generation of self-moving beings (this means beings that are generable and corruptible) must be endless. But the cause of this endlessness cannot be one of the self-moving beings, since it does not always exist. Nor can the cause be all the self-moving beings together, both because they would be infinite and because they would not be simultaneous. There must therefore be some endlessly self-moving being, causing the endlessness of generation among these sublunary self-movers. Thus, the mover of the self-moving being is not moved, either through itself or by accident. "

And, "
[28] Now, God is not part of any self-moving mover. In his Metaphysics [XII, 7], therefore, Aristotle goes on from the mover who is a part of the self-moved mover to seek another mover—God—who is absolutely separate. For, since everything moving itself is moved through appetite, the mover who is part of the self-moving being moves because of the appetite of some appetible object. This object is higher, in the order of motion, than the mover desiring it; for the one desiring is in a manner a moved mover, whereas an appetible object is an absolutely unmoved mover. There must, therefore, be an absolutely unmoved separate first mover. This is God. "

And, " 33] In Metaphysics II [Ia, 2] Aristotle also uses another argument to show that there is no infinite regress in efficient causes and that we must reach one first cause—God. This way is as follows. In all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, whether one or many, and this is the cause of the last cause. But, when you suppress a cause, you suppress its effect. Therefore, if you suppress the first cause, the intermediate cause cannot be a cause. Now, if there were an infinite regress among efficient causes, no cause would be first. Therefore, all the other causes, which are intermediate, will be suppressed. But this is manifestly false. We must, therefore, posit that there exists a first efficient cause. This is God. "

In regard to the last, one has to question whether Aristotle ever used effecient causality to prove the existence of God. I may be wrong but I think this is one of those cases where Thomas is giving credit to Aristotle for something he did not say.

Linus2nd
An excellent article by Dr. Ryan Brady of Ave Marie University will help us understand why St. Thomas employs efficient causality in proving God’s existence and, moreover, ascribes this argument to Aristotle’s Metaphysics – and also why so many find it difficult to understand this point.

See: academia.edu/7024866/Efficient_Causality_of_God_in_Aristotle_and_Aquinas
 
An excellent article by Dr. Ryan Brady of Ave Marie University will help us understand why St. Thomas employs efficient causality in proving God’s existence and, moreover, ascribes this argument to Aristotle’s Metaphysics – and also why so many find it difficult to understand this point.

See: academia.edu/7024866/Efficient_Causality_of_God_in_Aristotle_and_Aquinas
Do you have to " sing up? " I tried and it wouldn’t let me. And I was unable to down load the paper.

Linus2nd
 
O.K., got it. He makes a strong argument, but I still say that Thomas is reading a lot into Aristotle that isn’t there. First, Aristotle believed in an eternal universe; secondly, he seemd to reject the creation of things out of nothing. Given these two positions, efficient cause, for Aristotle could only be the " generation and corruption " of the things in the " imperfect " earthly world by the heavenly bodies ( and their spheres ) and their efficient causation of change and local motion in the things of the earthly world.

His strongest statement is " in Metaphysics 2, where he says: Now every thing through which a common quality is communicated to other things is itself of all those things in the highest degree possessed of that quality (e.g. fire is hottest, because it is the cause of heat in everything else); hence that also is most true which causes all subsequent things to be true. Therefore in every case the first principles of things must necessarily be true above everything else — since they are not merely sometimes true, nor is anything the cause of their existence, but they are the cause of the existence of other things, — and so as each thing is in respect of existence, so it is in respect of truth. "

But did Aristotle actually say that? And the translation Thomas uses is not the one I find in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House, New York, 1968, Editor and translator, Richard Mckeon.

His translation: " …Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well ( e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that that which causes derivative truths to be true is the most true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be always most true ( for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things, so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect fo truth. "

What needs to be pointed out here is that Aristotle has identified the " celestial spheres " as eternal and being themselves guided by spiritual, eternal beings, and he has given over the governance and change of the sublunar sphere to the higher spheres, and especially to the highest. And these " eternal spheres " are not caused in their being but cause the being of other things ( the creatures of the sublunar sphere ). He makes no mention of God in this context. It should also be noted that, in the Physics, the Prime Mover, could well be one of these spheres, as I read him. The Prime Mover would not necessarily have to be God, given his understanding of heavenly spheres and their spirits as being eternal, immaterial, uncaused, etc. etc. But I may be wrong, I am still looking into the question.

I will have more to say later on, perhaps this evening, I have found some interesting things in the Summa Theologiae.

I wonder if Thomas wasn’t " white washing " Aristotle so he would pass the censorship of the day?

Linus2nd
 
O.K., got it. He makes a strong argument, but I still say that Thomas is reading a lot into Aristotle that isn’t there. First, Aristotle believed in an eternal universe; secondly, he seemd to reject the creation of things out of nothing. Given these two positions, efficient cause, for Aristotle could only be the " generation and corruption " of the things in the " imperfect " earthly world by the heavenly bodies ( and their spheres ) and their efficient causation of change and local motion in the things of the earthly world.

His strongest statement is " in Metaphysics 2, where he says: Now every thing through which a common quality is communicated to other things is itself of all those things in the highest degree possessed of that quality (e.g. fire is hottest, because it is the cause of heat in everything else); hence that also is most true which causes all subsequent things to be true. Therefore in every case the first principles of things must necessarily be true above everything else — since they are not merely sometimes true, nor is anything the cause of their existence, but they are the cause of the existence of other things, — and so as each thing is in respect of existence, so it is in respect of truth. "
But did Aristotle actually say that? And the translation Thomas uses is not the one I find in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Random House, New York, 1968, Editor and translator, Richard Mckeon.
This statement by myself is incorrect as the following quote clearly indicates. Don’t know what I was thinking of. Sorry if I mislead anyone. But is Aristotle arguing for God being the efficient cause of things? It is hard to see how we can come to any other conclusion. Yet Aristotle argues emphatically that the Celestial Spheres desire to imitate God as their final end. And that they themselves are immortal, eternal, and uncaused. How are these notions to be reconciled with a God which causes the existence of all beneath him?
His translation: " …Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well ( e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that that which causes derivative truths to be true is the most true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be always most true ( for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things, so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect fo truth. "
What needs to be pointed out here is that Aristotle has identified the " celestial spheres " as eternal and being themselves guided by spiritual, eternal beings, and he has given over the governance and change of the sublunar sphere to the higher spheres, and especially to the highest. And these " eternal spheres " are not caused in their being but cause the being of other things ( the creatures of the sublunar sphere ). He makes no mention of God in this context. It should also be noted that, in the Physics, the Prime Mover, could well be one of these spheres, as I read him. The Prime Mover would not necessarily have to be God, given his understanding of heavenly spheres and their spirits as being eternal, immaterial, uncaused, etc. etc. But I may be wrong, I am still looking into the question.
I will have more to say later on, perhaps this evening, I have found some interesting things in the Summa Theologiae.
 
So where are we to this point?
  1. We are certain that the self-moving moved movers that Thomas speaks of are the Celestial Spheres which Aristotle says move everything under them. The lowest spheres, that of the sun and our planets cause the generation and corruption and the changes we see in our world, which Aristotle calls the " imperfect " sublunar world. But it is important to note that this does not include creation because, though imperfect, the world is eternal in his view.
The highest heaven is moved directly by the Unmoved Mover. Concerning this mover, Thomas says in his commentary on Book 12, Chapter 7 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ( verse 1067 of the commentary ) : " 1067. Now the first mover causes motion as something intelligible and something appetible; for these alone cause motion without being moved…For we desire a thing because it seems good rather than consider it good because we desire it; for understanding is the principle of desire. And the intellect is moved by an intelligible object. "
  1. Therefore, " the moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending. Now, in a motion that takes place through appetite and apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover. Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God ( from the body of 44, 2 of SCG given in post #1 above ). " And we should add, it is intelligent as well since it understands or reflects on " intelligibles. "
This is perfectly Aristotelian because Aristotle taught, and Thomas concurres in many places, that the first self-moving being ( the highest sphere and indeed the lower spheres as well ) are composed of a moved and a moving part, which he calls a soul, which moves the sphere. But the soul of this sphere is appetitive and apprehending. It apprehends the perfection of the Unmoved Mover and wills ( desires ) to imitate the Unmoved Mover by making itself more perfect.

At this point there is a question. Exactly how does the soul of the first self mover apprehend the Unmoved Mover? I confess that Thomas’ explanation in the remainder of Book 12 doesn’t seem intelligible to me. I think the closest we can come to understanding this is Thomas’ explanation of how Angels have a natural knowledge of God, which you can read in S.T., 1, ques. 56. According to Thomas’ explanation an Angel’s apprehension of God is primarily through a reflection upon the goodness of his own nature, since it is not given to any creature to see the essence of God. An Angel of course would recognize, since he existed that he did not cause his own existnece, and that he did not cause his own intellictual perfection, but that his own existence was caused by One who had perfect existence and by the One who was perfectly intelligent. But an Angel’s apprehension of the Divine Power and Intelligence is much greater and more certain than our own.

So we must assume that Aristotle’s first self-moved mover is something similar to an Angelic being. For he says ( through Thomas ) that: " Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God, is an absolutely unmoved mover, He must be related to the mover that is a part of the self-moving being as the appetible is to the one who has the appetite. Not, however, as something appetible by sensible appetite, since sensible appetite is not of that which is good absolutely but of this particular good, since the apprehension of the sense is likewise particular; whereas that which is good and appetible absolutely is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent. All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible. Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent. "

So the first self-moving being does not comprehend God directly but indirectly, as Angels do and as men do. The angelic like nature of the first-self moving being would be absolutely convinced, through self reflection and through his knowledge of the lower spheres and the sublunar spheres that the Unmoved Mover existed. He would be futher convinced of his own intellectual perfection but that it was not absolute perfection and his desire for absolute perfection meant that there was One who was absolutely perfect. And since he recognized his own intellectual perfection then the one he wished to imitate must also be intellectual, but absolutely so.

I would caution that the idea of creation does not enter into Thomas’ explanation. When he says " that which is good and appetible absolutely is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now…," he is not referring to creation, although it can have that meaning. First he explains in book 12 ( I think ) that it can mean something like a logical order of goodness or aptness, that which is best is prior to that which is less good. Secondly, Thomas is arguing with the understanding ( for the sake of argument ) that the universe is eternal. Thirdly, Aristotle said there was no such act as creation.

A lot of questions can be raised about SCG 44, 2 and a lot of questions can be raised about my own analysis. My conclusion is that Thomas’ conclusion is correct but not as convincing as it might have been had he given more elaboration. But I may be wrong. If any Professional Philosophers out there whould like to jump in, please do so, because I am far from certain of my own analysis. I have sent my questions to a number of professional sources but so far none have responded. My thanks to Dr. Bonnette for his kind contributions.

Linus2nd
 
My interest in SCG 44.2 is less a need to have a “good argument” for God’s intelligence, and more a need to understand the development of the argument from motion from Plato to Aristotle. I now believe that Thomas gives a pretty good analysis of these two arguments.

Where I stand right now is that when people ask why the uncaused cause must be intelligent, and I wish to use Plato’s version, I say that the uncaused cause must be a self-mover, that self-movers move by appetite, and that the most fundamental form of appetite is an appetite for intelligble things, not sensory things, therefore the self-mover must be intelligent.

That is Plato’s version, not Thomas’ analysis of Aristotle’s version.

However, I still think this is key: “making the assumption that the first mover move himself.”

I’m still convinced that the proper interpretation of SCG 44.2 is that the unmoved mover is the self-mover of Plato, and that he moves because of appetite, and that appetite is intelligible appetite.

I.e., SCG 44.2 is an explanation for why God exercises his active potencies rather than not, which is because of self-awareness.
 
My interest in SCG 44.2 is less a need to have a “good argument” for God’s intelligence, and more a need to understand the development of the argument from motion from Plato to Aristotle. I now believe that Thomas gives a pretty good analysis of these two arguments.

Where I stand right now is that when people ask why the uncaused cause must be intelligent, and I wish to use Plato’s version, I say that the uncaused cause must be a self-mover, that self-movers move by appetite, and that the most fundamental form of appetite is an appetite for intelligble things, not sensory things, therefore the self-mover must be intelligent.

That is Plato’s version, not Thomas’ analysis of Aristotle’s version.

However, I still think this is key: “making the assumption that the first mover move himself.”

I’m still convinced that the proper interpretation of SCG 44.2 is that the unmoved mover is the self-mover of Plato, and that he moves because of appetite, and that appetite is intelligible appetite.

I.e., SCG 44.2 is an explanation for why God exercises his active potencies rather than not, which is because of self-awareness.
If that is the case then you are not using the argument in SCG 44, 2. For the first self-moving mover Thomas speaks of is the sphere of the highest heaven which apprehends and desires to imitate the Unmoved Mover, who moves himself. The first self-moving mover, by apprehending the Unmoved Mover, holds it as on object of knowedge, an intelligible.which is perfect and worthy of love. Exactly how the first self-moving mover understands this Thomas does not explain but it must be some sort of self reflection on its own intelligence, it knows that since it is an intellect in act, the Unmoved Mover must also be an Intellect in Act, otherwise it would not be worthy of love. For what is less perfect than its own nature would not be worthy of love. Thus if the Unmoved Mover were not Intelligent, it would not be worthy of love. .

But Aristotle makes it clear the the Unmoved Mover does not move the first self-moving mover through some sort of interaction, for the Unmoved Mover does nothing but reflect on its own perfection and thus being an object of love for the highest sphere.

Even so there are many questions that need to be answered. If Thomas intendes the argument to stand as is, it fails. The only way to save it is to substitute the hierarchy of angels for the moving spheres. And even then one would have to allow, contrary to Aristotle, that the Unmoved Mover also moves though creation and efficient causality and not only as a final cause.

Because of these and other questions I think 44,2 would be an excellent Dissertation topic and even worthy of a scholarly book.

Linus2nd
 
For the first self-moving mover Thomas speaks of is the sphere of the highest heaven which apprehends and desires to imitate the Unmoved Mover, who moves himself.
But note the language in 44.2:

“Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God…”

So the first-mover is God. Then, at the end of 44.2:

“…making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent.”

Since the “first mover” is God, then God moves himself. Which can only mean “motion” in the Platonic sense. Which can only mean that God exercises his active potencies. To drive home this point, look at 13.10:

“Plato accordingly said that the first mover moves himself because he knows himself and wills or loves himself.”

I’m still strongly leaning towards 44.2 being, essentially, this sentence that I just quoted.
 
But note the language in 44.2:

“Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God…”

So the first-mover is God. Then, at the end of 44.2:

“…making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent.”

Since the “first mover” is God, then God moves himself. Which can only mean “motion” in the Platonic sense. Which can only mean that God exercises his active potencies. To drive home this point, look at 13.10:

“Plato accordingly said that the first mover moves himself because he knows himself and wills or loves himself.”

I’m still strongly leaning towards 44.2 being, essentially, this sentence that I just quoted.
But that is not the argument. The arguments is; " The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent. All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible. Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent. "

The argument is that the first mover is intelligent because it is appetible by an intelligent being that apprehends and desires it. So, if it were not intelligent and appetible, the first self-moving intelligent being would not desire it as something appetible. So the fact that the first self-moving being desires it is offered as proof that the first mover, God, is intelligent. And that is an awful lot to swallow.

This is Thomas’ argument not Aristotle’s. Thomas believed that in every good we seek, we were seeking God, even if we are unaware of it. God is the perfect unchanging good. And that is really what we seek, because only God can satisfy all our desires perfectly, and these do not exist in the particular and fleeting goods of this world.

Aristotle explains his reasons for saying the first mover, God, is intelligent in Book 12, chapter 7 of Metaphysics. He says the first mover, because it exists by necessity is the best of all beings. And the best of all must be the best good and the highest good is thinking, which is the definition of an intelligent being. And the only thingl Aristotle’s God does is reflect upon his own intelligence and being, which Aristotle describes as " thinking upon thinking. " He does not think about the universe outside of himself, because, from his perspective, he has no contact with that universe and visa versa.

This is my understanding of course and I may be wrong. But it looks to me like Thomas is " scrubbing up " Aristotle to make him say something he did not say.

Linus2nd
 
I’m looking for help parsing S.C.G., Book 1, chaper 44 where Thomas presents " proofs " that God is intelligent. Specfically I would like a thorough parsing of the following:

" [1] From what has been said we can show that God is intelligent.

[2] We have shown above that among movers and things moved we cannot proceed to infinity, but must reduce all movable things, as is demonstrable, to one first self-moving being. The self-moving being moves itself only by appetite and knowledge, for only such beings are found to move themselves, because to be moved and not moved lies in their power. The moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending. Now, in a motion that takes place through appetite and apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover. Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God, is an absolutely unmoved mover, He must be related to the mover that is a part of the self-moving being as the appetible is to the one who has the appetite. Not, however, as something appetible by sensible appetite, since sensible appetite is not of that which is good absolutely but of this particular good, since the apprehension of the sense is likewise particular; whereas that which is good and appetible absolutely is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent. All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible. Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent. "

The conclusion seems invalid to me but I realize I do not understand the argument. I have done a lot of background research on this, backtracking the reasoning but still cannot understand it.

If you don’t have a PhD in philosophy, I don’t think there is much use in responding because the argument is quite complex, much more so than it appears at first glance.

Linus2nd
I finally got a reply to my e-mail from a local Dominican who was baffled by this translation. His only comment was that Pegis, being a Frenchman, seemed to be garbling his French syntax with the Latin syntax.

That may be so, but I think the reason Rickaby deleted this entire paragraph from his 1905 translation was that it was untranslatable. Rickaby noted in the preface of his translation that he had left certain passages untranslated and he he believed Aquinas would have approved of Horace’s precept saep stylum vertus (often make erasures).
 
I finally got a reply to my e-mail from a local Dominican who was baffled by this translation. His only comment was that Pegis, being a Frenchman, seemed to be garbling his French syntax with the Latin syntax.

That may be so, but I think the reason Rickaby deleted this entire paragraph from his 1905 translation was that it was untranslatable. Rickaby noted in the preface of his translation that he had left certain passages untranslated and he he believed Aquinas would have approved of Horace’s precept saep stylum vertus (often make erasures).
With all respect to your Dominican friend, Peges was a noted and highly respected translator o f Thomas and a noted philosopher in his own right. Etienne Gilson was his Phd advisor. So I doubt his translation is faulty. Did your friend say anything else? I still have heard nothing from my e-mails.

Linus2nd
 
Did your friend say anything else? I still have heard nothing from my e-mails.

Linus2nd
Nothing else except to inquire why I was so concerned about that particular passage.

I told him about our discussion at Catholic Answers.
 
Thomas has an interesting discussion on " how separate substances know " in SCG, Book 1, chapters 97-98 which helps a little.

Linus2nd
 
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