T
thinkandmull
Guest
God is selfmoved and unmoved because He is outside of time. I don’t understand what he means when he says “The mover that is a part of the self-moving being…” though
- Status
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
Don’t worry none of us understand the argument. My own opinion is that the argument is beyond comprehension and the conclusion is certainly wrong.
Linus2nd
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
Regarding point one, people get confused by these “self-moving movers,” which are not God. God is the absolutely unmoved first mover; pure act. Anything with any genuine motion in it is not pure act. It is a composite of potency and act, since motion is the act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency to further act. Self-movers are actually moved by appetite toward some end outside their nature. Creatures have appetite. God does not. God has will which is identical with the divine substance, but which is ordered to no end outside the divine substance. God wills the creation of creatures, but ultimately only as subordinated to the manifestation of the divine glory, which is infinitely realized in God’s own being (whether He creates or not).
Regarding the second point, please note that I offered this merely as an example, not a proof in itself. It is designed solely to help people grasp in a graphic way that in an infinite regress, something is being transmitted through the entire chain which is not explained by the chain itself – and that merely making the chain longer explains nothing. You cannot have tickets delivered when there are no tickets. I, too, reject the Kalam argument, since it is a regression in time. If you look at the last line of my post 53, I said explicitly: “And never forget, don’t go back in time.” You appear to have missed my own disclaimer above where I said: “(Please ignore the fact that this example takes place through time.)”
As to the final point, everyone agrees that you cannot get something from nothing, going all the way back to Parmenides: Nihil dat quod non habet; Nothing can give what is does not possess. But creation is not something coming from absolutely nothing. Creation is the making of something by God ex nihilo et utens nihilo; from nothing and using nothing. But it does not come from absolutely nothing; it comes from God. God does not take some nothing and turn it into something. He simply posits in being some creature that he produces from the exercise of His infinite power. The being which he creates pre-eminently exists within His own essence, since nothing can give what it does have.
I suspect sometimes people think that in creating matter, God is producing something that is not in His nature to begin with, since He is not a material being. But we must realize that matter is not pure perfection. It is a kind of being that exists within the limitations of time and space – constraining its mode of existence. That is why material existents are subject to decomposition and destruction. The positive perfection comes from the power of God; the inherent limitations are on the side of non-being, and, as such, do not need a positive cause.
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
Those “self-moving movers” certainly do confuse people, don’t they!
As I understand it, there are diverse kinds of “self-moving movers.” There are living organisms, such as animals and men, in which we are moved by sense appetite alone (in the case of animals) or by both sense and intellectual appetite (in our case). This is called “self-moving” because one part (the appetite or will) moves the rest of the organism to act. Yet, such “self-movers” do not move themselves absolutely because they are themselves moved through final causality to an end which is outside themselves, such as a deer is moved to seek water or a man to rob a bank.
There are also “self-movers” which are angelic in nature, in which their wills (which are really distinct from their natures) move their natures to ends that are other than their natures themselves.
Then we have these mysterious “self-moving first movers” mentioned by Aristotle, which appear to be non-material substances that move the various orders of heavenly motion in the cosmos. He calculates these as being either 47 or 55 in number, depending on how you count the kinds of motion. St. Thomas may be considering these orders of motion in addition to angels. I do not know. Clearly, they have no real place in our current cosmology.
Still, in offering the argument to God as First Mover Unmoved, St. Thomas includes consideration of various types of “self-moving movers” as a logical step in leading the mind to its ultimate conclusion. The central thrust of the argument, though, remains the same. Nothing in motion can move itself absolutely. Therefore, everything in motion requires some extrinsic mover here and now moving it. You cannot regress to infinity in the taking of prior moved movers here and now acting. Hence, you must come, ultimately, to a First Mover Absolutely Unmoved which is Pure Act, which is what all men call God. (Nominal definition). At a later point, St. Thomas “fills out” this nominal definition to show that that Absolutely First Mover is God.
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
You understand I am not questioning Thomas’ Five Ways or the argument from existence of imperfect beings to he who is prure existnece. My argument is that if the Unmoved Mover moves through the attraction of Love, which seems to be the argument in Chapter 44, then the argument falls flat. Furthermore, it has to be demonstrated that the self-moved mover ( man ) desires God. It futher has to be established that the fact that the self-moved mover is intellgent means that the Unmoved Mover is intelligent. And we do not have proof of these things. Now Thomas may have proof in other places, I just haven’t seen it or have seen it and it didn’t register. Personally, I think this is probably one of the most difficult passages in all that I have read of Thomas.
Linus
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
Anyone who has worked extensively with St. Thomas knows that he is not infallible. We all know he could not get the Immaculate Conception right.
Also, he has an argument where he raises the question, “What if Eve alone had sinned? Would Original Sin have been transmitted to us?” He answers in the negative, but listen to his reasoning:
Since the active principle in any causality determines the effect, and since the male is the active principle in procreation, had Eve alone sinned, the effect would not have been transmitted to her progeny.
Well, there is no doubt that the first general metaphysical principle is correct. But, clearly the second practical premise is defective for evident biological reasons. Is the conclusion true? Well, yes, but not for the reasons educed in this clearly flawed argument. The form of the argument is valid, but the second premise (the matter) is defective. Hence, if the argument postulates a true conclusion, it is only by pure chance!
I believe you can show that for St. Thomas man desires God, since the light of natural reason leads to knowledge of a First Cause, and since we desire to know the causes of things, not merely as causes of their effects, but in themselves – which is impossible for man in this life. Read the first 53 chapters of Book III of the C.G. As to the part of the argument about intelligent agents desiring God proving God is intelligent, I really cannot add more than I have stated earlier.
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
As you know Aristotle’s God moved the universe through Love, all things sought their end in him. Now if this is the way Thomas is arguing here then he is in trouble. The problem is that he is assuming the reader knows exactly what he is talking about and that it has all been demonstrated, piece by piece, in other works. Or we could say that his secretaries nodded a little when he was dictating this part - and missed something.
Linus2nd
C
Charlemagne_III
Guest
I’d question whether a PhD would have the requirement to track this any better than you would.
On the day he dictated this, had Aquinas imbibed a little too much wine?
Or we could speculate that his secretaries were bombed.
Or his translator.
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
Well, God knows now that we are looking for a clear exposition of the argument. If he thinks it is important, he will give it to us. If not, we won’t get one.I’d question whether a PhD would have the requirement to track this any better than you would.
On the day he dictated this, had Aquinas imbibed a little too much wine?
Or we could speculate that his secretaries were bombed.
Or his translator.
Linus2d
C
Charlemagne_III
Guest
I’m thinking we won’t get one and that is why Joseph Rickaby deleted that paragraph from his translation.
But you never know!
H
hammiesink
Guest
Guys, I think I figured it out. Fred is correct. Not that I didn’t believe him, but I just feel the need to be confident about it and to understand it in act. Ha! But you know, that moment when you finally understand something and it clicks.
You will want to read SCG I.13, the proofs for the unmoved mover first. All of it. In detail. I’m working on a re-write of it myself. This is what I get for jumping around, because T’s later reasoning depends upon earlier arguments.
If you read 13.10, you will find him talking about Plato’s definition of “motion” being broader and including operations like understanding. The critical paragraph is here:
For Aristotle understood motion strictly, according as it is the act of what exists in potency inasmuch as it is such. So understood, motion belongs only to divisible bodies, as it is proved in the Physics [VI, 4]. According to Plato, however, that which moves itself is not a body. Plato understood by motion any given operation, so that to understand and to judge are a kind of motion. Aristotle likewise touches upon this manner of speaking in the De anima [III, 7]. Plato accordingly said that the first mover moves himself because he knows himself and wills or loves himself. In a way, this is not opposed to the reasons of Aristotle. **There is no difference between reaching a first being that moves himself, as understood by Plato, and reaching a first being that is absolutely unmoved, as understood by Aristotle. **
Couple that with 44.2, and you have pretty much exactly what Fred said: that the first mover moves itself (in the Platonic sense, not in the sense of the actualization of a potency) by thinking about itself.
Woo hoo!
You will want to read SCG I.13, the proofs for the unmoved mover first. All of it. In detail. I’m working on a re-write of it myself. This is what I get for jumping around, because T’s later reasoning depends upon earlier arguments.
If you read 13.10, you will find him talking about Plato’s definition of “motion” being broader and including operations like understanding. The critical paragraph is here:
For Aristotle understood motion strictly, according as it is the act of what exists in potency inasmuch as it is such. So understood, motion belongs only to divisible bodies, as it is proved in the Physics [VI, 4]. According to Plato, however, that which moves itself is not a body. Plato understood by motion any given operation, so that to understand and to judge are a kind of motion. Aristotle likewise touches upon this manner of speaking in the De anima [III, 7]. Plato accordingly said that the first mover moves himself because he knows himself and wills or loves himself. In a way, this is not opposed to the reasons of Aristotle. **There is no difference between reaching a first being that moves himself, as understood by Plato, and reaching a first being that is absolutely unmoved, as understood by Aristotle. **
Couple that with 44.2, and you have pretty much exactly what Fred said: that the first mover moves itself (in the Platonic sense, not in the sense of the actualization of a potency) by thinking about itself.
Woo hoo!
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
I hate to get in the role of advocatus diaboli here, but if you look at 44.2, you will find a problem:
“Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God, is an absolutely unmoved mover, He must be related to the mover that is a part of the self-moving being as the appetible is to the one who has the appetite.”
This clearly shows that God as the appetible object of the “self-moving being” is a distinct being from the “self-moving being.” Hence, although the text you cite from 13.10 is absolutely fascinating, and does show that there is a Platonic way in which to think of God as self-moving, that is not the point of St. Thomas’ meaning in 44.2.
While the Contra gentiles is a theological work, it does not take up specifically theological themes until the last book, and the method, especially in the first three books, is philosophical in essence. That is, he gives a philosophical argument, and then shows that its conclusion comports to that of some authority, often a theological one. Clearly, the Trinity is not presupposed in any way by 44.2 – not even as the basis of an argument by analogy. Moreover, the subject of the Trinity itself is very tricky metaphysics and a subject that takes up a large section of the Summa theologiae. Not a safe basis for analogy here.
In any case, the argument in book one, 13 clearly introduces the notion of a first self-moving being that is not God. See 13.26. “The first self-moving being, therefore, is moved by a mover who is himself moved neither through himself not by accident.” This distinguishes the “first self-moving being” from a mover that is moved by nothing at all, namely, God.
In 13.28, St. Thomas addresses the self-moving movers of Aristotle and again distinguishes those self-movers from God: “Now, God is not part of any self-moving mover.”
St. Thomas tells us that the only self-movers actually known to us are animals. See 13.24. He considers the heavenly bodies hypothesized by Aristotle, which would also be animated, but hints at his own skepticism of them in 13.31.
He concludes, following the disjunction of Aristotle, that if there is a mover which moves itself, then an absolutely unmoved separate first mover must ultimately be moving it. See 13.31 and 32.
What is very clear is that St. Thomas takes up the subject of self-moving movers in chapter 13 as a logical intermediate step between simple moved movers and the absolutely unmoved first mover which is God.
While the Platonic notion of motion is interesting, we must keep in mind that the term “active potency” can be easily misunderstood and that any act in God is identical with the divine substance itself and is eternally unchangeable. It is best to keep in mind that the proper expression for God in the context of the First Way is simply “Pure Act” – the First Mover Unmoved Who moves all things both as efficient cause of their motion and final cause of their created natures (thus ordering all their actions ultimately to Him as last end).
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
Touche’ Dr. B.
As I see it here are the primary points after we have accepted man as a first self-moving mover and as one who is moved by a mover is as follows.
( Why? )
3.God is appetible absolutely and is prior to that which is appetible and apprehended by the senses and is appetible and apprehended as a universal.
( And what does " …and is prior to that which is appetible and apprehended by the senses …" mean? And why is that important to the argument? And what makes it a universal I took the liberty of identifying appetible as a universal because it is an object of the intellect] ?)
5.All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.
( And I don’t think God’s intelligence can be inferred from the fact that the one desiring him is intelligent. And " being joined to it as an intelligible " means nothing. I can apprehend and possess many things in my intellect which do not actually exist. So I may have a concept of a god that does not exist. )
Thomas’ problem here is that Aristotle did not prove God’s existence as a First Efficient Cause in the SCG, if he did I missed it. And Thomas seems to have accepted ( with certain reservations ) Aristotle’s argument which was based only on Final Causality. He did not imploy efficient causality.
Although, as you know, Thomas defended eternal creation ( eternal effecient causality in the case of an eternal universe ). We can assume his arguments allow for that and it is hard to see how the First Way can survive without doing so. But then we have to ask, why didn’t Thomas make it specific in his arguments? And if he was considering it then why go to the trouble of constructing the argument we have been discussing?
Linus2nd
As I see it here are the primary points after we have accepted man as a first self-moving mover and as one who is moved by a mover is as follows.
- The moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending. Now, in a motion that takes place through appetite and apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover.
( Why? )
3.God is appetible absolutely and is prior to that which is appetible and apprehended by the senses and is appetible and apprehended as a universal.
( And what does " …and is prior to that which is appetible and apprehended by the senses …" mean? And why is that important to the argument? And what makes it a universal I took the liberty of identifying appetible as a universal because it is an object of the intellect] ?)
- The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent.
5.All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.
( And I don’t think God’s intelligence can be inferred from the fact that the one desiring him is intelligent. And " being joined to it as an intelligible " means nothing. I can apprehend and possess many things in my intellect which do not actually exist. So I may have a concept of a god that does not exist. )
- Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent. "
Thomas’ problem here is that Aristotle did not prove God’s existence as a First Efficient Cause in the SCG, if he did I missed it. And Thomas seems to have accepted ( with certain reservations ) Aristotle’s argument which was based only on Final Causality. He did not imploy efficient causality.
Although, as you know, Thomas defended eternal creation ( eternal effecient causality in the case of an eternal universe ). We can assume his arguments allow for that and it is hard to see how the First Way can survive without doing so. But then we have to ask, why didn’t Thomas make it specific in his arguments? And if he was considering it then why go to the trouble of constructing the argument we have been discussing?
Linus2nd
H
hammiesink
Guest
Dangit.
Well, I still think the key lies in understanding 13. I’m going to go through it with a fine toothed comb, in it’s entirety, and read the Aristotle sections he references. Then I’ll re write it. Then see where I’m at.
Well, I still think the key lies in understanding 13. I’m going to go through it with a fine toothed comb, in it’s entirety, and read the Aristotle sections he references. Then I’ll re write it. Then see where I’m at.
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
You have forced me to reread the whole of C.G. I, 13, even though I wrote on it in a book over forty years ago. First, note that in the beginning St. Thomas tells us that he is going to set forth the arguments by which Aristotle proves that God exists (not necessarily St. Thomas himself). Second, I find nothing in it that says that “man” is a “first” self-moving mover. He may be a self-mover, but that does not make him a “first” self-mover. In fact, St. Thomas tells us that the only self-moving mover that we know is an animal While man is an animal, there are other lower animals. Moreover, St. Thomas later entertains what Aristotle refers to as “heavenly bodies” which move by appetition and apprehension. I suspect that any hypothetical “first” self-moving movers would be of this sort.
Recall that St. Thomas is following Aristotle’s arguments here. Aristotle is conceiving the argument from motion in terms of final causality, and hence, St. Thomas follows this line of reasoning in terms of finality, which entails appetition. Following Aristotle is why the mention of “heavenly bodies” is also included. In other contexts, St. Thomas presents the proof from motion using examples that clearly manifest efficient causality, for example, in the Compendium theologiae I, 3, n. 4, he uses the example of a chest or bed being built with a saw or hatchet, and in the S.T.I, 2, 3, the prima via itself, he uses the example of the staff being moved by the hand. Of interest is the fact that the Compendium theologiae also mentions that the elements are moved by the heavenly bodies.
I am not sure how to comment on this, since I would not put it all quite that way. God is apprehended by the intellect as a necessary cause for observable effects. The senses in both man and beast apprehend only the particular sense goods, while man apprehends good in a universal manner. Still, God is known by reason as a singular First Cause, not as a universal.
Every agent seeks an end and a good. Lower agents do so by necessity of nature. Intellectual agents do so by intellectual appetite or will. Men (and every other finite intellectual agent) naturally seek God as their last end, since reason seeks a First Cause. But knowing God merely as a Cause does not satisfy man’s intellect which seeks to know things in their essence. No man can know God in his essence in this life, and so the last end for man is attainable only in the next life. See C.G. III, 1-63. At least read the successive chapter headings. Although this analysis comes later in the C.G., that does not mean St. Thomas was not cognizant of its content in writing I, 44.2.
To be continued:
T
thinkandmull
Guest
It is heresy to claim that matter “doesn’t come from nothing, but from God”. Emanatism was condemned by Vatican I. I don’t see how your statements are any different from that heresy.
I also don’t think the big bang theory is a good argument from God. The world could have come out of a different dimension, more understandable then saying it came from nothing out of God’s great power.
Life leads to death. Can death lead to life? Indian philosophy would say so. Life has nothing in common with death, but “creates” death. It is less likely that death would create life? It is easier to imagine something disappearing with a cause into nothing than it is to understand something coming from nothing.** But which is harder, understanding that something come out of nothing from God’s infinite power, or something going to nothing without a cause?** Hard questions. In the Summa, First part XLVI reply 3 he says “Aristotle proves that 'heaven is ungenerated” because it has no ***contrary ***from which to be generated". So suppose I believe in the Force: can the death of non-reason lead to reason in creatures?
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
Emanationism was condemned by Vatican I, since it teaches that creation proceeds by emanation (outflowing) from the Divine Substance. This teaching contradicts the absolute simplicity of God. Vatican I rejected it along with pantheism. (Denz. 1804.)
I stand by my original statement: " But creation is not something coming from absolutely nothing. Creation is the making of something by God ex nihilo et utens nihilo; from nothing and using nothing. But it does not come from absolutely nothing; it comes from God. God does not take some nothing and turn it into something. He simply posits in being some creature that he produces from the exercise of His infinite power. The being which he creates pre-eminently exists within His own essence, since nothing can give what it does have."
I would hope that you can see, from my statement, that I am not saying that creation comes “from God” as if one took a part of God and made it into the world. There is a distinction between saying that something comes “from God,” as if you took a part of Him to make it, and saying, that something comes from the power of God. God is the First Cause. He is distinguished from creation as a cause is distinct from its effect. A cause is an extrinsic sufficient reason for that which is intrinsically lacking in the being of an effect. This is basic metaphysics. I am not a pantheist!
As to the Big Bang theory, I have never used that as a proof for God’s existence. Recall, as I pointed out in an earlier post, the proofs for God’s existence do not entail a causal chain that regresses back in time. That is a fundamental misunderstanding of the arguments. The causal regress is among per se causes operating hic et nunc (here and now). The scale is, so to speak, vertical, not horizontal into the past. Again, this is basic Thomistic metaphysics.
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
That was a liberty on my part because if this argument is based on A’s concept of a " first self moved mover, " then the argument fails before it gets out of the box. I don’t see why man cannot be regarded as a " first self moved mover " in his own line of individual activity. Thus my intellect is the " first self moved mover " for my intellectual activity - my thoughts, desires, judgment. So I am the moved mover whose untellect apprehends the good, the intellegible ( God ) which is appetible and apprehended - by me ( which has to be proven philosophically)…
I would prefer to " improve " the argument by elimination of its strict dependence on A.
Right.
Agreed.
Thomas certainly was cognizant of this but he would not allow this knowledge to prejudice his argument here, which is purely philosophical. So it would have to be established philosophically that the good the philosophical man sought was a Divine Good. I think Thomas was trying to do this but I don’t think he succeeded.
I did find something interesting in the Introduction to Book II by James F. Anderson ( pg 13, bottom). " Now, since God is pure Being, containing in Himself the total perfection of being, it is His proper function to give the being - *dare esse. but being is absolutely prior to any perfection of determination thereof…" This substantiates your comment that " whereas that which is good and appetible absolutely is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now…," refers to God’s efficient causality.
Also on " intelligible, " Edmund Hill O.P., in his Glossary to Volume 13 of the Blackfriars translation of the S.T., comments that " …There ares also realities, effects, truths which are in themselves immaterial, or separate from matter, and to some sort of understanding of them the mind is lead by its understanding of material effects and realities: God, angels, the human soul and its activities and values. Intelligible truth, or meaning, is indeed embodied in the material physical world, but not totally so…"
Linus2nd*
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
DR. B, thought you might appreciate this syllabus by Dr. Gerald J Massey ( pitt, edu ) on this very topic. " Chap. 44. That God is a Knower (intelligens)
[2] Unpack the proof from motion of God’s existence that Aquinas sketches here. What does it add to the First Way? Is anything missing? Aquinas infers that God, the absolutely unmoved mover, must be a knower from three facts or assumptions: the absolutely unmoved mover moves by way of appetite and apprehension; the first moved being is a self-moving entity related to the absolutely unmoved mover (God) as one with appetite (desire) is related to the appetible (desirable) as an object of intellect; and the entity desiring God becomes a knower in act by being joined to God as an intelligible thing. Explain how Aquinas moves from these facts and assumptions to the conclusion that the first appetible must be a knower. Why does Aquinas think that the first self-moving being must desire the absolutely unmoved mover as an intellectual rather than as sensual object?
[4] Aquinas claims that nowhere is a thing that moves through thought the instrument of a thing that moves without thought; but that movers of the latter kind are always instruments of movers of the former kind. How does he then move to the conclusion that God is a knower?
[5] Aquinas appeals to the theory of abstraction that says that forms become intelligible universals when abstracted from matter (which is the principle of individuation), and to the theory of cognition which holds that the intellect knows by becoming one with the thing known. How does it then follow from the immateriality of God that He is a knower?
[6] What does it mean to say that mind (intellect) is in a way all things or has in itself all perfections? Why does Aquinas say that having a mind (being a knower) is the greatest perfection of all?
[7] Unpack the proof of God’s existence from the governance of things that Aquinas sketches here. What does it add to the Fifth Way? Is anything missing? Why does Aquinas think that the fact that natural things always (semper) or for the most part (in pluribus) pursue what is naturally useful to them shows that they do not act by chance?
[8] Explain what it means to say that the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, just as act is naturally prior to potency. Why does Aquinas think that the forms found in particular things are imperfect? Why must such forms come from forms that are perfect and not particular? In what manner must these latter forms exist? If they subsist, are they knowers? "
pitt.edu/~gmas/1080/medievalphil.html
[2] Unpack the proof from motion of God’s existence that Aquinas sketches here. What does it add to the First Way? Is anything missing? Aquinas infers that God, the absolutely unmoved mover, must be a knower from three facts or assumptions: the absolutely unmoved mover moves by way of appetite and apprehension; the first moved being is a self-moving entity related to the absolutely unmoved mover (God) as one with appetite (desire) is related to the appetible (desirable) as an object of intellect; and the entity desiring God becomes a knower in act by being joined to God as an intelligible thing. Explain how Aquinas moves from these facts and assumptions to the conclusion that the first appetible must be a knower. Why does Aquinas think that the first self-moving being must desire the absolutely unmoved mover as an intellectual rather than as sensual object?
[4] Aquinas claims that nowhere is a thing that moves through thought the instrument of a thing that moves without thought; but that movers of the latter kind are always instruments of movers of the former kind. How does he then move to the conclusion that God is a knower?
[5] Aquinas appeals to the theory of abstraction that says that forms become intelligible universals when abstracted from matter (which is the principle of individuation), and to the theory of cognition which holds that the intellect knows by becoming one with the thing known. How does it then follow from the immateriality of God that He is a knower?
[6] What does it mean to say that mind (intellect) is in a way all things or has in itself all perfections? Why does Aquinas say that having a mind (being a knower) is the greatest perfection of all?
[7] Unpack the proof of God’s existence from the governance of things that Aquinas sketches here. What does it add to the Fifth Way? Is anything missing? Why does Aquinas think that the fact that natural things always (semper) or for the most part (in pluribus) pursue what is naturally useful to them shows that they do not act by chance?
[8] Explain what it means to say that the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, just as act is naturally prior to potency. Why does Aquinas think that the forms found in particular things are imperfect? Why must such forms come from forms that are perfect and not particular? In what manner must these latter forms exist? If they subsist, are they knowers? "
pitt.edu/~gmas/1080/medievalphil.html
- Status