Intelligence in God, an appeal to Professional Philosophers

[hammiesink]

Thinkandmull,

1. Thomas Aquinas says in the Summa Theologica that we can’t know from reason that the world isn’t eternal, and yet in his Contra Summa Gentiles he says that there can’t be infinite intermediate movers. How do we reconcile this.

I can answer this one.

What he is talking about is an infinite chain of hierarchical movers, stretching “down” in the present, not necessarily back into the past. The key is to understand the difference between an accidentally ordered series and an essentially ordered series.

In an accidental series, each member of the causal chain has its own power to generate an effect. Example: a man has a son, the son grows up and has his own son, who grows up and has his own son, etc. Each person in the chain has the causal power to generate a new offspring.

In an essential series, only one member of the chain has the causal power to generate an effect. The rest of the members of the chain can only pass along the effect, but cannot generate it. You might label them “primary cause” and “secondary cause.” Example: the motor in a clock has the power to turn gears and so is the primary cause, but the rest of the gears in the clock only have the power to pass that effect along; they cannot generate it originally.

When Thomas argues against an infinite regress, what he is talking about is an essentially ordered series, not an accidental one. He is saying that if everything is a secondary cause, then there is no primary cause, and if there is no primary cause, there is no effect for the secondary causes to pass along; but the secondary causes are passing along an effect, therefore not everything is a secondary cause.

 

[fred_conty]

I have a question.

If St. Thomas in the beginning states that all self-movers must be able to know and desire, dosen’t that right there say the first self-mover is intelligent? Right there would be enough to show God is intelligent. Is it just to explain how and not just the fact?

There is a distinction between the intellectual and sensible knowledge, but other than that, why all this logic?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I have a question.

If St. Thomas in the beginning states that all self-movers must be able to know and desire, dosen’t that right there say the first self-mover is intelligent? Right there would be enough to show God is intelligent. Is it just to explain how and not just the fact?

There is a distinction between the intellectual and sensible knowledge, but other than that, why all this logic?

It would only be true if it was established that God created the intelligent self-mover. But this is a question Thomas doesn’t discuss until Book II. Further, even if the intelligent self-mover desires God as a good, that alone does not establish that God is intelligent - at least not as far as I’m concerned.

Linus2nd

 

[hammiesink]

Fred,

What you just said seems to be the very argument I’m trying to understand, and you seem to understand it. Can you tell me why God is a SELF mover in this argument, though? I thought he was UNmoved. Moved not by another OR himself. That’s where I seem to be getting stuck. All the pieces make send to me, but the big picture does not. Can you word it for me how you understand it? I’m still determined to understand this particular argument.

 

[hammiesink]

Fred,

Wait. You already answered this above. Sorry.

I guess I’m still confused how all the pieces fit together.

Ok, so God, the prime mover, desires himself, which rouses him to action to move all other things. In a single act, of course.

Is that right?

 

[fred_conty]

Fred,

Wait. You already answered this above. Sorry.

I guess I’m still confused how all the pieces fit together.

Ok, so God, the prime mover, desires himself, which rouses him to action to move all other things. In a single act, of course.

Is that right?

St. Thomas just outright just states that the first mover is a self-mover from the very beginning.

However at the very end he does say “…making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended…” ---------------
So he assumes this statement.

I just would like to make an observation. Truth is one, wherever it is found. Philosophy presents it, and theology presents it. Using one can help to understand the other. Now since we are talking about God, whether in philosophy or theology, God is the same, and operates the same. And one knowledge can help the other.

So below is theology of the Trinity. And even tho this thread is not about theology as such, still it can give us an overall headstart in our understanding of God having a dynamic life within himself. So below are these concepts that helps me to understand this. So the Father is the subject and the Son is the object which is the source of this life and movement. This helps to fit the pieces together and I believe this is what St. Thomas is reflecting in his thoughts as he explains the first self-mover.

The Father sees himself, which image/thought is his Son.
They are distinct in person.
The Son loves the Father and the Father loves the Son.
There is life activity within, meaning the motion of knowing and loving.<========
The motion comes from the love/knowledge between them (one being, distinct persons).
This happens in one consubstantial act.

This is an overview of the unmoved mover’s self movement. This is not an exact parallel but it helps.

 

[hammiesink]

Thanks.

Yes, I understand T’s model of the Trinity. And it also helps to keep in mind that the U.M. lacks all passive potencies, but is replete with active potencies. When I present this to people, I sometimes opt out of the technical terminology by just using the word “unchangeable,” to which my interlocutor will state that an unchangeable being can not act on anything. Which is not strictly correct, but is an understandable reaction. So by explaining that the unmoved mover lacks passive potencies but has active potencies, it is easier to understand then how it can move itself.

OK, then, so now that I’m getting a handle on the 44.2 argument for God’s intelligence, I need to start figuring out how to re-word it in modern language and possibly formalize it as well.

Linus, are you feeling more satisfied with the discussion now?

 

[fred_conty]

It would only be true if it was established that God created the intelligent self-mover. But this is a question Thomas doesn’t discuss until Book II. Further, even if the intelligent self-mover desires God as a good, that alone does not establish that God is intelligent - at least not as far as I’m concerned.

Linus2nd

originally by Linusthe2nd.
It would only be true if it was established that God created the intelligent self-mover. But this is a question Thomas doesn’t discuss until Book II.

But Thomas says, “The self-moving being moves itself only by appetite and knowledge…”. And again he says, “The moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending.”

By these statements he has established that the first self-moving being is intellengent…that is by apprehending or in knowledge.

Further, even if the intelligent self-mover desires God as a good, that alone does not establish that God is intelligent - at least not as far as I’m concerned.

I’m not sure where you are at on this one.

But I think…that the first mover(Son) must be appetible(loved) as an object of intellect(of the Father).The first appetible(loved Son) is intelligent by being joined to an intelligible(Father), since the one(Father), desiring it(Son), is intelligent in act.

The above is rephrased and reordered from below to make it more understandable.

“The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent. All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible”

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

This is one of the things I can’t see: " , “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible,” which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” Granted that God is an Intelligible, just how is He joined to the " intellect in act, " the one who desires Him.? And how does this imply efficient causality?

And given the fact that Thomas offers perhaps a dozen different and understandable arguments to prove this point, why did he include something so obturse and criptic?

I could ask a dozen questions on this particular part of chapter 44. Do you know of anyone who has tackeled it or who would be willing to?

Linus2nd

It is probably just a typo on your part, but your citation from me is not complete. It should read: "I concede, therefore, that there is no word in the sentence, “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible,” which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” "

Note please that I said that there is "no word in the sentence … which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” Thus my inference that there is efficient causality at work here is just that – an inference.

God’s essence is not directly known by any creature in its natural state, but it can be known as the Cause of finite effects. The intelligent in act self-moving mover is united with God as an object of natural knowledge, which object elicits an act of desiring that object, God, who is naturally known through His effects. Because it is an act of desiring the object known, it exhibits final causality. But because that will act is caused in the self-moving mover by God, efficient causality is also at work both in God as causing the motion of the creature and in the creature whose act of desiring entails both efficient and final causality. Since God acts as the efficient cause of that self-moving mover to be intelligent in act, He, God, must be intelligent so as to account for the intelligence manifested by the self-moving mover.

Yet, you noted that St. Thomas does not say that God creates the intelligent self-movers until Book II of the C.G. The problem is that we are no longer so sure that the S.T. was written after all of the C.G. – so it is possible that St. Thomas is borrowing knowledge he has from another source than the C.G. itself.

What makes this object, God, unique in this case is that He is the “first appetible,” unlike any other being in existence. This entails that the entire order of lower causes are subordinated to Him as to their last end, and this means that the entire order of intelligent agents are subordinated, in their causality toward ends, to God as the last end of all intermediate ends, the Supreme Good.

So, perhaps, what St. Thomas has in mind here is that the very intelligibility of an order of intelligent agents acting for an intelligible end makes no sense unless the end were of the same order as, and even more perfect, than themselves, that is, intelligent.

Otherwise, the subordination of the lower to the higher would be violated.

That is really about the most sense I can make of this text in trying to parse its meaning. You are correct in saying this sentence remains obscure as to its exact meaning. Unfortunately, St. Thomas does not unfold its meaning to the reader in greater detail in this context.

Perhaps some other Thomist can illumine its meaning for you more fully, but off hand I cannot recommend anyone whom I know personally. Nor do I know anyone available who can help with this entire section of St. Thomas’ writings.

As I have said, my own interests in recent years have been in another direction. For example, see this: hprweb.com/2014/07/time-to-abandon-the-genesis-story/

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thanks.

Yes, I understand T’s model of the Trinity. And it also helps to keep in mind that the U.M. lacks all passive potencies, but is replete with active potencies. When I present this to people, I sometimes opt out of the technical terminology by just using the word “unchangeable,” to which my interlocutor will state that an unchangeable being can not act on anything. Which is not strictly correct, but is an understandable reaction. So by explaining that the unmoved mover lacks passive potencies but has active potencies, it is easier to understand then how it can move itself.

OK, then, so now that I’m getting a handle on the 44.2 argument for God’s intelligence, I need to start figuring out how to re-word it in modern language and possibly formalize it as well.

Linus, are you feeling more satisfied with the discussion now?

No, Thomas is not talking about the Trinity.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

But Thomas says, “The self-moving being moves itself only by appetite and knowledge…”. And again he says, “The moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending.”

By these statements he has established that the first self-moving being is intellengent…that is by apprehending or in knowledge.

I’m not sure where you are at on this one.

But I think…that the first mover(Son) must be appetible(loved) as an object of intellect(of the Father).The first appetible(loved Son) is intelligent by being joined to an intelligible(Father), since the one(Father), desiring it(Son), is intelligent in act.

The above is rephrased and reordered from below to make it more understandable.

“The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent. All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible”

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.

Thanks for your response. I can’t agree with it however. I need to give more time to the question before going forward.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It is probably just a typo on your part, but your citation from me is not complete. It should read: "I concede, therefore, that there is no word in the sentence, “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible,” which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” "

Note please that I said that there is "no word in the sentence … which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” Thus my inference that there is efficient causality at work here is just that – an inference.

God’s essence is not directly known by any creature in its natural state, but it can be known as the Cause of finite effects. The intelligent in act self-moving mover is united with God as an object of natural knowledge, which object elicits an act of desiring that object, God, who is naturally known through His effects. Because it is an act of desiring the object known, it exhibits final causality. But because that will act is caused in the self-moving mover by God, efficient causality is also at work both in God as causing the motion of the creature and in the creature whose act of desiring entails both efficient and final causality. Since God acts as the efficient cause of that self-moving mover to be intelligent in act, He, God, must be intelligent so as to account for the intelligence manifested by the self-moving mover.

Yet, you noted that St. Thomas does not say that God creates the intelligent self-movers until Book II of the C.G. The problem is that we are no longer so sure that the S.T. was written after all of the C.G. – so it is possible that St. Thomas is borrowing knowledge he has from another source than the C.G. itself.

What makes this object, God, unique in this case is that He is the “first appetible,” unlike any other being in existence. This entails that the entire order of lower causes are subordinated to Him as to their last end, and this means that the entire order of intelligent agents are subordinated, in their causality toward ends, to God as the last end of all intermediate ends, the Supreme Good.

So, perhaps, what St. Thomas has in mind here is that the very intelligibility of an order of intelligent agents acting for an intelligible end makes no sense unless the end were of the same order as, and even more perfect, than themselves, that is, intelligent.

Otherwise, the subordination of the lower to the higher would be violated.

That is really about the most sense I can make of this text in trying to parse its meaning. You are correct in saying this sentence remains obscure as to its exact meaning. Unfortunately, St. Thomas does not unfold its meaning to the reader in greater detail in this context.

Perhaps some other Thomist can illumine its meaning for you more fully, but off hand I cannot recommend anyone whom I know personally. Nor do I know anyone available who can help with this entire section of St. Thomas’ writings.

As I have said, my own interests in recent years have been in another direction. For example, see this: hprweb.com/2014/07/time-to-abandon-the-genesis-story/

Thank you for taking the time to help sort this out. I still don’t agree but I admit I could be wrong. If you bump into one of your fellow philosophers we would appreciate it if you would ask them if they knew of anyone who might have researched this question. I did notice that in anotated versions of the SCG that this argument was dropped. So it is clear that there is a problem with it that others have recognized.

Linus2nd

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

Thinkandmull,

I can answer this one.

What he is talking about is an infinite chain of hierarchical movers, stretching “down” in the present, not necessarily back into the past. The key is to understand the difference between an accidentally ordered series and an essentially ordered series.

In an accidental series, each member of the causal chain has its own power to generate an effect. Example: a man has a son, the son grows up and has his own son, who grows up and has his own son, etc. Each person in the chain has the causal power to generate a new offspring.

In an essential series, only one member of the chain has the causal power to generate an effect. The rest of the members of the chain can only pass along the effect, but cannot generate it. You might label them “primary cause” and “secondary cause.” Example: the motor in a clock has the power to turn gears and so is the primary cause, but the rest of the gears in the clock only have the power to pass that effect along; they cannot generate it originally.

When Thomas argues against an infinite regress, what he is talking about is an essentially ordered series, not an accidental one. He is saying that if everything is a secondary cause, then there is no primary cause, and if there is no primary cause, there is no effect for the secondary causes to pass along; but the secondary causes are passing along an effect, therefore not everything is a secondary cause.

That is an excellent answer, Hammiesink.

Believe it or not, my first book, Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence (Martinus-Nijhoff: The Hague, 1972) was essentially a defense of the principle that there can be no infinite regress among essentially ordered intermediate causes.

Many people get confused by this issue. Without getting into all the distinctions which are in my book, some of which you explain in your post, let me just say a couple things people need to keep in mind.

First, this is not about a regression of causes in time. All the causes involved exist and operate simultaneously. It is a “here and now” chain we consider. In fact a proper cause is always simultaneous with its effect. (That is another story.)

Second, prescinding from fancy philosophical arguments, perhaps the simplest kind of example can make the point. Imagine you are buying tickets for a movie theater. If you have six people buy six tickets and walk to the ticket taker (They used to have them.), the last person in the line could be holding the tickets. If each person in the six says the person behind him has the tickets, all is well, since the last person hands the six tickets to the ticket taker. But what happens if you have an infinitely long chain of people, each one saying that the fellow behind him has the tickets? There are no tickets! So, the theater gets overfilled and goes bankrupt. Some ultimate person has to have the tickets, or else, the scheme simply does not work. (Please ignore the fact that this example takes place through time.)

Third, perhaps the simplest actual philosophical argument is this: If you look at an intermediate cause, what you have is a cause that contributes something to the final effect, but also fails to explain something that it is passing through to another intermediate cause, but which it does not itself originate or explain. Thus, an intermediate cause is a partial reason for its effect, but never a complete sufficient reason. Thus, if you have an infinite multitude of such intermediate causes, each one of them contributes something to the final effect, but if you look at each of them individually you will never find the total sufficient reason for the final effect. There is always something that they don’t explain. Hence, if you have an infinite multitude of such intermediate causes, looking backward through them for the sufficient reason for the final effect, you will never quite find it. The final effect in an infinite regress of intermediate causes is ultimately lacking a sufficient reason for itself. The point is that intermediate causes, as a class, constitute an ontological welfare case.

Fourth, imagine an infinite regress of intermediate causes as a chain of causes with a thread of causation running through it which no particular intermediate cause explains fully. Same argument, only here you wind up with a “causal thread” which every intermediate “passes on” (simultaneously), but which none of the intermediates actually explains. Thus each intermediate contributes some change or aspect to the causal chain’s final effect, but none of them explains the thread of causality which runs through and connects them all as a chain. Again, a final effect with no “sufficient” reason.

There are more complicated ways to explain all this, but you would have to buy my book, which is now selling on Amazon as a “print on demand” for something like $123!! Or, find a copy in a library if you can. It is easier merely to ponder the above simplistic examples.

And never forget, don’t go back in time.

 

[Aloysium]

. . . . hprweb.com/2014/07/time-to-abandon-the-genesis-story/

As an aside: a very interesting article. Thanks.

“Still, some may yet doubt that natural science will ever clearly account for present genetic diversity arising from a single pair of first true humans.”

I doubt that science will ever clearly account for the multiplication of the loaves and fishes either.

 

[hammiesink]

Dr Bonnette,

Ah yes. The usual story of excellent-sounding philosophy books that are, for some reason, now over $100 on Amazon. No offense, but I can’t imagine the demand for your book is THAT high.

Ugh. So annoying. Similar problem I encountered the Rediscovery of Wisdom, by David Conway. Now up to $217 I see.

I don’t get why that happens.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

Dr Bonnette,

Ah yes. The usual story of excellent-sounding philosophy books that are, for some reason, now over $100 on Amazon. No offense, but I can’t imagine the demand for your book is THAT high.

Ugh. So annoying. Similar problem I encountered the Rediscovery of Wisdom, by David Conway. Now up to $217 I see.

I don’t get why that happens.

This may come as a real shock, but in the last two years recorded at that absurd price my book on Aquinas’ Proofs has not sold a single copy. I cannot imagine why!

I asked a librarian once how they could sell anything at those prices. He explained that if a library had a copy and lost it, it might replace it at even those prices, since the libraries have a fund for purchases which does not come out of the pocket of the person making the purchases! That book originally sold for about $13 back in 1972.

My Origin of the Human Species second edition sold for $16.95, but is now out of print. In the used Amazon market some have been priced at nearly $500! Again, I cannot imagine any actual sales. The new third edition goes for $29.95, but is not up on Amazon yet, even though it was published in May 2014.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think these prices are due to the fact that these books are no longer in print. That is why I have sought these books in librarys before deciding to buy. I bought three books last year at inflated prices after having read them in a library. One consolation, you can always resell these books through the major book sellers and recoup some of your cost.

Linus2nd

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

I think these prices are due to the fact that these books are no longer in print. That is why I have sought these books in librarys before deciding to buy. I bought three books last year at inflated prices after having read them in a library. One consolation, you can always resell these books through the major book sellers and recoup some of your cost.

Linus2nd

I don’t know where you are located, but you likely can find a copy of Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence in some nearby Catholic college library. If you want a pile of Thomistic analysis and citations both from classical and modern Thomistic commentators, that book contains them. No need to buy it. It did get pretty solid reviews at the time. Now if only I could remember what I wrote in it!

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t know where you are located, but you likely can find a copy of Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence in some nearby Catholic college library. If you want a pile of Thomistic analysis and citations both from classical and modern Thomistic commentators, that book contains them. No need to buy it. It did get pretty solid reviews at the time. Now if only I could remember what I wrote in it!

You will be happy to know that it is available in many University libraries. Locally, only Rochurst library has it, so I would have to read it in the library since I don’t have a card.
Better Books has it for $136.00.

To revive your memory, World Cat sumerizes the contents as:

Part I: Domains other than that of creature-God. I. The domain of accident-substance ; II. The domain of change ; III. The domain of knowledge –
Part II: The domain of creature-God. Introduction: The cause of per accidens being ; I. The way of the De ente et essentia ; II. Apropos of the quinque viae in general ; III. The prima via ; IV. The secunda via ; V, The tertia via ; VI. The quarta via ; VII. The quinta via –
Conclusion.

That’s a big load for 208 pages!

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

“1) The self-moving being moves itself only by appetite and knowledge…”. “The moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending.” ** I thought Thomas doesn’t believe God has appetite.**

1. Dr. Bonnette said: “Second, prescinding from fancy philosophical arguments, perhaps the simplest kind of example can make the point. Imagine you are buying tickets for a movie theater. If you have six people buy six tickets and walk to the ticket taker (They used to have them.), the last person in the line could be holding the tickets. If each person in the six says the person behind him has the tickets, all is well, since the last person hands the six tickets to the ticket taker. But what happens if you have an infinitely long chain of people, each one saying that the fellow behind him has the tickets? There are no tickets! So, the theater gets overfilled and goes bankrupt. Some ultimate person has to have the tickets, or else, the scheme simply does not work. (Please ignore the fact that this example takes place through time.)” THAT’ts the kalam cosmological argument, rejected by Aquinas in the Summa. I think the Kalam argument fails because time could have initially been instantaneous, and matter, measured by it, eternal. Nothing simple needs to be assumed. If the first mover IS simple, then it necessarily follows that it is intelligent. The ultimate question is whether there can be matter without time.
2. I disagree with other arguments on here because if God can take nothing, and without emanating anything from His nature, create matter, then why cannot non-intelligence create intelligence, or life come from non life. Non-life comes from life, something coming out of something with it having nothing in common with it; perhaps intelligence can be born of non-intelligence, which has the components of intellect unified within it.