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hammiesink
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You mean the unmoved mover is drawn to itself? But wouldn’t that make it a moved mover?
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fred_conty
Guest
Not if it is moved within and not without. The principle of its movement is inside… itself.You mean the unmoved mover is drawn to itself? But wouldn’t that make it a moved mover?
As a comment, what St. Thomas is describing is what the Trinity is, especially between the Father and the Son, the knowing and the thought known…the desirable, who is the thought.
May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
No Fred, that is incorrect. Thomas is discussing the attributes of God, as Godhead simply. Follow the link to Book 1 and you will see.Not if it is moved within and not without. The principle of its movement is inside… itself.
As a comment, what St. Thomas is describing is what the Trinity is, especially between the Father and the Son, the knowing and the thought known…the desirable, who is the thought.
May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.
Linus2nd
H
hammiesink
Guest
Fred,
Thanks for your help! I’m starting to grasp this now, slowly, I think. I’m almost at a breakthrough. What still confuses me is how he starts the passage saying that we have shown how all movable things are reducible to one self moving being. Which would translate to “one self-actualized being.” First, I thought he showed how all movables are reducible to one unmoved mover, not one self-moved mover. Second, the whole point is that God does not have any potentials to actualize, so how could he be self-actualizing? He also talks about parts: the part of the self-mover that is appetitive, and the part that is appetible, are related as moved and unmoved mover. But earlier in #18 it was shown that there is no composition in God.
Thanks for your help! I’m starting to grasp this now, slowly, I think. I’m almost at a breakthrough. What still confuses me is how he starts the passage saying that we have shown how all movable things are reducible to one self moving being. Which would translate to “one self-actualized being.” First, I thought he showed how all movables are reducible to one unmoved mover, not one self-moved mover. Second, the whole point is that God does not have any potentials to actualize, so how could he be self-actualizing? He also talks about parts: the part of the self-mover that is appetitive, and the part that is appetible, are related as moved and unmoved mover. But earlier in #18 it was shown that there is no composition in God.
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
To Linusthe2nd:
I am not sure I qualify as the philosopher you seek, but I did write a book, Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence (Martinus-Nijhoff: The Hague, 1972). That was so long ago, that when I reread it, it sounds to me like someone else wrote it! Recently, I have been much more involved in defending the literal reality of Adam and Eve. (See Homiletic and Pastoral Review online for July 10, 2014.) I did not comment on the cited text in my book, and my present ability to “parse” its content may well be in dispute!
Frankly, the text of St. Thomas you cite is so difficult that I would prefer a much simpler and more evident argument to God’s intelligence. For example, since nothing can give what it does not possess, God, as First Cause, must possess intelligence since certain of His creatures do. Because of the divine simplicity, what God possesses is identified with His very essence. Hence, God is intelligent by His very essence.
But to address the text you cite, it is first well to recall that Aristotle’s argument to a first mover unmoved is an argument in the order of final causes, not efficient ones. Thus, Aristotle’s ultimate inference that God is a “thought thinking itself.”
As to the text you cite itself: “We have shown above that among movers and things moved we cannot proceed to infinity, but must reduce all movable things, as is demonstrable, to one first self-moving being.” I presume you accept the argument of no infinite regress among moved movers (acting hic et nunc), and simply note that it leads, following Aristotle, not to a first mover unmoved, but to a first mover that is itself “self-moving.” Such “self-movement” may be envisioned as in the case of an animal or man where the part moves the whole through appetite, as when an animal is moved to seek water to slake its thirst, and hence, moves its limbs to attain that end. But, Aristotle here aims at the self-moving first movers which are the heavenly bodies which are first movers in each order of motion – some 47 or 55 such beings, depending on how one counts the orders of motion in the ancient cosmography.
“Now, in a motion that takes place through appetite and apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover.” Here, St Thomas makes clear that the first absolutely unmoved mover, God, cannot be itself moved by appetite, or else, it would itself be moved, and hence, not an “unmoved” mover. It can be solely the object of the appetite of the first moved mover (or movers).
It helps here to recall that every agent in acting toward an end, acts toward that which does not yet exist in the ontological order. Since it cannot “act toward” that which is not in any sense, the only other order in which the end may exist is in the intentional order, meaning that the intellectual agent must act toward an end intellectually apprehended if it is to act at all. Recall also, that the good is that which all things desire, and hence, seeking a good is of the very notion of appetitive activity.
Here, St. Thomas argues that, since sense appetite seeks only particular goods or ends, it is logically posterior to the appetite which seeks goods or ends in a universal manner, that is, the intellectual appetite or will. (The will seeks not only “this hamburger”, but “hamburgers in general.”)
To be continued in next post.
I am not sure I qualify as the philosopher you seek, but I did write a book, Aquinas’ Proofs for God’s Existence (Martinus-Nijhoff: The Hague, 1972). That was so long ago, that when I reread it, it sounds to me like someone else wrote it! Recently, I have been much more involved in defending the literal reality of Adam and Eve. (See Homiletic and Pastoral Review online for July 10, 2014.) I did not comment on the cited text in my book, and my present ability to “parse” its content may well be in dispute!
Frankly, the text of St. Thomas you cite is so difficult that I would prefer a much simpler and more evident argument to God’s intelligence. For example, since nothing can give what it does not possess, God, as First Cause, must possess intelligence since certain of His creatures do. Because of the divine simplicity, what God possesses is identified with His very essence. Hence, God is intelligent by His very essence.
But to address the text you cite, it is first well to recall that Aristotle’s argument to a first mover unmoved is an argument in the order of final causes, not efficient ones. Thus, Aristotle’s ultimate inference that God is a “thought thinking itself.”
As to the text you cite itself: “We have shown above that among movers and things moved we cannot proceed to infinity, but must reduce all movable things, as is demonstrable, to one first self-moving being.” I presume you accept the argument of no infinite regress among moved movers (acting hic et nunc), and simply note that it leads, following Aristotle, not to a first mover unmoved, but to a first mover that is itself “self-moving.” Such “self-movement” may be envisioned as in the case of an animal or man where the part moves the whole through appetite, as when an animal is moved to seek water to slake its thirst, and hence, moves its limbs to attain that end. But, Aristotle here aims at the self-moving first movers which are the heavenly bodies which are first movers in each order of motion – some 47 or 55 such beings, depending on how one counts the orders of motion in the ancient cosmography.
“Now, in a motion that takes place through appetite and apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover.” Here, St Thomas makes clear that the first absolutely unmoved mover, God, cannot be itself moved by appetite, or else, it would itself be moved, and hence, not an “unmoved” mover. It can be solely the object of the appetite of the first moved mover (or movers).
It helps here to recall that every agent in acting toward an end, acts toward that which does not yet exist in the ontological order. Since it cannot “act toward” that which is not in any sense, the only other order in which the end may exist is in the intentional order, meaning that the intellectual agent must act toward an end intellectually apprehended if it is to act at all. Recall also, that the good is that which all things desire, and hence, seeking a good is of the very notion of appetitive activity.
Here, St. Thomas argues that, since sense appetite seeks only particular goods or ends, it is logically posterior to the appetite which seeks goods or ends in a universal manner, that is, the intellectual appetite or will. (The will seeks not only “this hamburger”, but “hamburgers in general.”)
To be continued in next post.
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
To Linusthe2nd… continued.
“The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent.” Here, St. Thomas argues that, since the first mover unmoved moves all things, including intellectual agents or movers, the first self-moving mover(s) must seek God as intelligent agents.
Now here is the difficult step: “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.” The “first appetible” is God. The self-moving first mover is the one who desires God. It is said to be “intelligent in act” in the very act of knowing God. The self-moving mover is caused to be intelligent in act in virtue of God causing it to be intelligent in act. This becomes, in essence, the same argument I gave at the beginning, namely, that God is able to create intelligent creatures because He is Himself intelligent. As the absolutely first mover unmoved in the order of putting the self-moving first mover(s) into the act of intellectual knowing, God must possess in act that same power and actuality that He is giving to his self-moving creatures. Hence, God must be intelligent in act in order to render His creatures intelligent in act.
Hence, St. Thomas concludes: “Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent." Of course, God does not “move” Himself, strictly speaking, since Pure Act cannot be in motion, which is the act of a being in act insofar as it is yet in potency.
I hope this is of some help.
“The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent.” Here, St. Thomas argues that, since the first mover unmoved moves all things, including intellectual agents or movers, the first self-moving mover(s) must seek God as intelligent agents.
Now here is the difficult step: “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.” The “first appetible” is God. The self-moving first mover is the one who desires God. It is said to be “intelligent in act” in the very act of knowing God. The self-moving mover is caused to be intelligent in act in virtue of God causing it to be intelligent in act. This becomes, in essence, the same argument I gave at the beginning, namely, that God is able to create intelligent creatures because He is Himself intelligent. As the absolutely first mover unmoved in the order of putting the self-moving first mover(s) into the act of intellectual knowing, God must possess in act that same power and actuality that He is giving to his self-moving creatures. Hence, God must be intelligent in act in order to render His creatures intelligent in act.
Hence, St. Thomas concludes: “Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent." Of course, God does not “move” Himself, strictly speaking, since Pure Act cannot be in motion, which is the act of a being in act insofar as it is yet in potency.
I hope this is of some help.
H
hammiesink
Guest
Thanks Dr Bonnette.
It is indeed that sentence that I’m finding difficult. I’m still confused about what he means by “first self-mover.” He says that all movable beings are reduced to one self-moving being, as he “argued above.” But he didn’t argue that at all. He argued that all movable beings are reducible to one UNmoving being, in chapter 13. He never mentioned a SELF-moving being until just now, in chapter 44.
Secondly, are you sure that he is arguing from the principle of proportionate causality here? He argues God’s intelligence in that way in part 44.6. I would be surprsied if he offered the same argument twice.
I also have the user on Reddit, whom I believe to be a professional in the field, telling me that the first appetible is intelligent because it is an idea, and ideas can only exist in a mind, per Scholastic realism contra Platonic realism.
So I still feel confused about some things. It don’t understand it in act, yet, as it were.
It is indeed that sentence that I’m finding difficult. I’m still confused about what he means by “first self-mover.” He says that all movable beings are reduced to one self-moving being, as he “argued above.” But he didn’t argue that at all. He argued that all movable beings are reducible to one UNmoving being, in chapter 13. He never mentioned a SELF-moving being until just now, in chapter 44.
Secondly, are you sure that he is arguing from the principle of proportionate causality here? He argues God’s intelligence in that way in part 44.6. I would be surprsied if he offered the same argument twice.
I also have the user on Reddit, whom I believe to be a professional in the field, telling me that the first appetible is intelligent because it is an idea, and ideas can only exist in a mind, per Scholastic realism contra Platonic realism.
So I still feel confused about some things. It don’t understand it in act, yet, as it were.
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
To Linusthe2nd:
One further clarification:
The first appetible must be intelligent, because “the one desiring it (God) is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.” Since in the act of knowing the knower becomes the thing known, rendering the self-moving first mover(s) “intelligent in act” means making them to be one with the object known, that is, God. This is the same reality as rendering God intelligible as an object of desire.
The mode of causality here may seem to be in the order of efficient causality, not finality, when we talk about “rendering,” but we must recall that Aristotle’s argument to a first mover unmoved is in the order of finality. Hence, it is legitimate to say that God, the Ultimate Final Cause, moves the self-moving mover(s) to be “intelligent in act” in the same act in which He renders Himself “intelligible” to them.
Even in the order of finality, the principle that nothing can give that which it does not possess (Nihil dat quod non habet.) applies in this case – since it is a principle of universal being which transcends all the modes of causality, including finality. Hence, in rendering the creature “intelligent in act,” God does so in virtue of His own intelligence – and does so in the order of finality.
One further clarification:
The first appetible must be intelligent, because “the one desiring it (God) is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.” Since in the act of knowing the knower becomes the thing known, rendering the self-moving first mover(s) “intelligent in act” means making them to be one with the object known, that is, God. This is the same reality as rendering God intelligible as an object of desire.
The mode of causality here may seem to be in the order of efficient causality, not finality, when we talk about “rendering,” but we must recall that Aristotle’s argument to a first mover unmoved is in the order of finality. Hence, it is legitimate to say that God, the Ultimate Final Cause, moves the self-moving mover(s) to be “intelligent in act” in the same act in which He renders Himself “intelligible” to them.
Even in the order of finality, the principle that nothing can give that which it does not possess (Nihil dat quod non habet.) applies in this case – since it is a principle of universal being which transcends all the modes of causality, including finality. Hence, in rendering the creature “intelligent in act,” God does so in virtue of His own intelligence – and does so in the order of finality.
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
Thank you, Hammiesink.Thanks Dr Bonnette.
It is indeed that sentence that I’m finding difficult. I’m still confused about what he means by “first self-mover.” He says that all movable beings are reduced to one self-moving being, as he “argued above.” But he didn’t argue that at all. He argued that all movable beings are reducible to one UNmoving being, in chapter 13. He never mentioned a SELF-moving being until just now, in chapter 44.
Secondly, are you sure that he is arguing from the principle of proportionate causality here? He argues God’s intelligence in that way in part 44.6. I would be surprsied if he offered the same argument twice.
I also have the user on Reddit, whom I believe to be a professional in the field, telling me that the first appetible is intelligent because it is an idea, and ideas can only exist in a mind, per Scholastic realism contra Platonic realism.
So I still feel confused about some things. It don’t understand it in act, yet, as it were.
When it comes to textual analysis, sometimes it is difficult to be certain of exact meanings unless we check the Latin itself – which I presently no longer have access to. Also, St. Thomas does sometimes use very similar arguments repetitively – illuminating a diverse aspect of nearly the same theme.
If you check back to C.G. I, 13, you will seen in paragraph 21 ff the references to self-moving first movers.
While it is true that ideas can exist only in a mind, we abstract ideas from all sorts of finite objects, most of which are neither God nor intelligent.
P
polytropos
Guest
I agree. I tried working through that argument and could not quite understand it.Frankly, the text of St. Thomas you cite is so difficult that I would prefer a much simpler and more evident argument to God’s intelligence.
But this argument does not quite work either. Certain creatures are blue, so God, as First Cause, must possess blueness.For example, since nothing can give what it does not possess, God, as First Cause, must possess intelligence since certain of His creatures do. Because of the divine simplicity, what God possesses is identified with His very essence. Hence, God is intelligent by His very essence.
This result isn’t a problem because God only must possess blueness eminently or virtually. But it is a problem for the proposed argument because it means that God might possess intelligence only eminently or virtually.
Instead we can say that God must possess the forms of created substances eminently or virtually, and that is the essence of intelligence (albeit God is, analogically, Intellect Itself). To “be all things” is what our own intellects can do. God possesses all things in a way consonant with divine simplicity.
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
Good points, Polytropos. That is what I get for trying to make the argument too succinct. It still works when you unpack the triplex via and recognize the analogical character of intellect as an essential attribute of intellectual creatures in the manner in which you express it.I agree. I tried working through that argument and could not quite understand it.
But this argument does not quite work either. Certain creatures are blue, so God, as First Cause, must possess blueness.
This result isn’t a problem because God only must possess blueness eminently or virtually. But it is a problem for the proposed argument because it means that God might possess intelligence only eminently or virtually.
Instead we can say that God must possess the forms of created substances eminently or virtually, and that is the essence of intelligence (albeit God is, analogically, Intellect Itself). To “be all things” is what our own intellects can do. God possesses all things in a way consonant with divine simplicity.
If you take a look at my present web site at drbonnette.com, you will see that my preoccupation has not been metaphysics for some time now.
H
hammiesink
Guest
Thanks again Dr Bonette. That is extremely helpful.
On the current line of discussion, the principle of proportionate causality, I have a question. Fire could be in the chemical composition of a cigarette lighter, and thus in the cause virtually or preeminently. But it is not in the cause as an abstract. The cigarette lighter does not have the abstract form of fire in it. That is the objection someone raised to me once. How would you answer?
On the current line of discussion, the principle of proportionate causality, I have a question. Fire could be in the chemical composition of a cigarette lighter, and thus in the cause virtually or preeminently. But it is not in the cause as an abstract. The cigarette lighter does not have the abstract form of fire in it. That is the objection someone raised to me once. How would you answer?
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
I want to thank you for your kind and thoughtful response, I’m still trying to digest it. I was aware that the argument began with A’s celestial mechanics and that that has to be bypassed somehow for the argument to have any hope of success. Another major problem is that Thomas did not appeal directly to efficient causality. And I am wondering if your inclusion of it as something understood as a necessary condition, though unstated, of final causality, is valid? For, unless we can say that God is the efficient cause of the " intellect in act, " I don’t see how the argument can work, it would certainly be unconvincing.To Linusthe2nd:
One further clarification:
The first appetible must be intelligent, because “the one desiring it (God) is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible.” Since in the act of knowing the knower becomes the thing known, rendering the self-moving first mover(s) “intelligent in act” means making them to be one with the object known, that is, God. This is the same reality as rendering God intelligible as an object of desire.
The mode of causality here may seem to be in the order of efficient causality, not finality, when we talk about “rendering,” but we must recall that Aristotle’s argument to a first mover unmoved is in the order of finality. Hence, it is legitimate to say that God, the Ultimate Final Cause, moves the self-moving mover(s) to be “intelligent in act” in the same act in which He renders Himself “intelligible” to them.
Even in the order of finality, the principle that nothing can give that which it does not possess (Nihil dat quod non habet.) applies in this case – since it is a principle of universal being which transcends all the modes of causality, including finality. Hence, in rendering the creature “intelligent in act,” God does so in virtue of His own intelligence – and does so in the order of finality.
If the argument is to depend solely on Thomas’ conviction that the intellect desires its ultimate good, whether or not it is aware of it, that is a lot to swallow. And that this entails that what the intellect desires must be an intelligent being needs to be explained more fully.
I wonder if you would consider doing a more in depth treatment of this obscure and criptic argument for your blog? Or perhaps you know of a fellow philosopher who might do this? It occurs to me that this might be a good topic for a PhD thesis or even a book.
Anyway, don’t be a stranger here, we need some professionals to contribute. And I will check out your blog.
H.P.R. is a great magazine. I subscribed for a long time.
Linus2nd
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
Sometimes we have to be careful not to let the terminology overwhelm our understanding of what is actually going on in terms of being. The real problem here is that the form of fire is not actually present in the chemicals in the lighter – only potentially. What we are really talking about is the properties of being manifest when rapid oxidation takes place. I have written an article that touches this problem, but it was published back about 1982 and is not available on the internet. Fundamentally, it entails what becomes a variation on the Prima Via of St. Thomas. We say that the chemical elements are potential to the exothermic properties of their reaction, but that simply means that the properties of fire could exist, but do not yet.Thanks again Dr Bonette. That is extremely helpful.
On the current line of discussion, the principle of proportionate causality, I have a question. Fire could be in the chemical composition of a cigarette lighter, and thus in the cause virtually or preeminently. But it is not in the cause as an abstract. The cigarette lighter does not have the abstract form of fire in it. That is the objection someone raised to me once. How would you answer?
Unlike Plato, we do not have a world of pure forms in which the pure form of “fire” exists. But God does exist, and in Him is preeminently contained the existential perfection of what we call fire. The ultimate truth is that God Himself sustains the entire cosmos in which new forms of reality are constantly being realized – new to us, but already existing in the divine being.
Thus, when the fire appears, it is conditioned by the prior principles (the lighter, the reducing agents, the oxidizing agents) from which it comes-to-be, but its unique actuality which newly appears is caused by God Himself – and without the divine causality, constantly supplying the “newness” of this created world, all newness, progression, evolution, and coming-to-be would cease.
This is just a hint of what I am getting at. You will have to do some pondering yourself, since there is no way here to reproduce the entire argument.
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
D
Dr.Bonnette
Guest
You make excellent points here. I confess that my own work on the Quinque Viae was focused heavily on the Prima Via and Secunda Via.I want to thank you for your kind and thoughtful response, I’m still trying to digest it. I was aware that the argument began with A’s celestial mechanics and that that has to be bypassed somehow for the argument to have any hope of success. Another major problem is that Thomas did not appeal directly to efficient causality. And I am wondering if your inclusion of it as something understood as a necessary condition, though unstated, of final causality, is valid? For, unless we can say that God is the efficient cause of the " intellect in act, " I don’t see how the argument can work, it would certainly be unconvincing.
If the argument is to depend solely on Thomas’ conviction that the intellect desires its ultimate good, whether or not it is aware of it, that is a lot to swallow. And that this entails that what the intellect desires must be an intelligent being needs to be explained more fully.
I wonder if you would consider doing a more in depth treatment of this obscure and criptic argument for your blog? Or perhaps you know of a fellow philosopher who might do this? It occurs to me that this might be a good topic for a PhD thesis or even a book.
Anyway, don’t be a stranger here, we need some professionals to contribute. And I will check out your blog.
H.P.R. is a great magazine. I subscribed for a long time.
Linus2nd
But we should bear in mind that efficient and final causality work together. It would be quite impossible to have beings that existed and operated on final causality alone! Thus, in the Fifth Way, arguing from governance, St. Thomas views God as the efficient cause of order among all inferior things which are ordered to an end by some exterior cause. Hence, Gilson suggests that the intent of the Quinta Via places it in the same category as the other four ways in respect to the principle that it is not possible to proceed to infinity among intermediate causes.
Just as an efficient cause cannot function without finality to orient it toward its end, neither can finality be exercised without efficiency to move it at all. Thus the archer is the efficient cause of the ordering of the arrow to its end, the target.
Indeed, it is this co-action of efficiency and finality that makes most readers of the Prima Via read it in terms of movers which are efficient causes of coming-to-be, whereas Aristotle himself understood that same argument in terms of final causes of coming-to-be.
I concede, therefore, that there is no word in the sentence, “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible,” which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” Still, the existential condition of the self-moving mover is such that it de facto must receive its orientation to an end, its condition as “intelligent in act,” from God who makes it to be and to be oriented toward Him as end. That is why intelligence must pre-exist in God.
I confess that not all Thomists will read this text the way I do, since we apply various Thomistic insights and principles as we understand them in order to interpret St. Thomas’ meaning in his writings. Infallibility belongs to the Holy Father, not Thomists who are trying to understand everything St. Thomas wrote, especially as found in its historical context. Were that not the case, we would not have Thomistic scholars debating various philosophical issues in all our professional journals. That does not mean that we do not concur on the basic principles and major conclusions which mark the eternal truths of the work of the Angelic Doctor. Moreover, recall that there are also the Twenty Four theses which the Church delineates as common to all those who claim to be Thomistic scholars.
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
This is one of the things I can’t see: " , “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible,” which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” Granted that God is an Intelligible, just how is He joined to the " intellect in act, " the one who desires Him.? And how does this imply efficient causality?You make excellent points here. I confess that my own work on the Quinque Viae was focused heavily on the Prima Via and Secunda Via.
But we should bear in mind that efficient and final causality work together. It would be quite impossible to have beings that existed and operated on final causality alone! Thus, in the Fifth Way, arguing from governance, St. Thomas views God as the efficient cause of order among all inferior things which are ordered to an end by some exterior cause. Hence, Gilson suggests that the intent of the Quinta Via places it in the same category as the other four ways in respect to the principle that it is not possible to proceed to infinity among intermediate causes.
Just as an efficient cause cannot function without finality to orient it toward its end, neither can finality be exercised without efficiency to move it at all. Thus the archer is the efficient cause of the ordering of the arrow to its end, the target.
Indeed, it is this co-action of efficiency and finality that makes most readers of the Prima Via read it in terms of movers which are efficient causes of coming-to-be, whereas Aristotle himself understood that same argument in terms of final causes of coming-to-be.
I concede, therefore, that there is no word in the sentence, “All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible,” which explicitly says “efficient causality at work.” Still, the existential condition of the self-moving mover is such that it de facto must receive its orientation to an end, its condition as “intelligent in act,” from God who makes it to be and to be oriented toward Him as end. That is why intelligence must pre-exist in God.
I confess that not all Thomists will read this text the way I do, since we apply various Thomistic insights and principles as we understand them in order to interpret St. Thomas’ meaning in his writings. Infallibility belongs to the Holy Father, not Thomists who are trying to understand everything St. Thomas wrote, especially as found in its historical context. Were that not the case, we would not have Thomistic scholars debating various philosophical issues in all our professional journals. That does not mean that we do not concur on the basic principles and major conclusions which mark the eternal truths of the work of the Angelic Doctor. Moreover, recall that there are also the Twenty Four theses which the Church delineates as common to all those who claim to be Thomistic scholars.
And given the fact that Thomas offers perhaps a dozen different and understandable arguments to prove this point, why did he include something so obturse and criptic?
I could ask a dozen questions on this particular part of chapter 44. Do you know of anyone who has tackeled it or who would be willing to?
Linus2nd
T
thinkandmull
Guest
I have some questions here:
- how do we know souls haven’t existed from all eternity? That would undercut a need for an intelligent creator
- how do we know that there isn’t a first impersonal unmoved mover who has all the elements of intelligence, but not unified together into actual intelligence. He could thus give us unified thought without thinking
- Thomas Aquinas says in the Summa Theologica that we can’t know from reason that the world isn’t eternal, and yet in his Contra Summa Gentiles he says that there can’t be infinite intermediate movers. How do we reconcile this.
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Linusthe2nd
Guest
Here is a very interesting article which relates somewhat to our search. At least it may throw some light on it.
icucourses.com/pages/016-02-the-natural-desire-to-see-god-solution
By the way the International Catholic University has a lot of excellent information.
Linus2nd
icucourses.com/pages/016-02-the-natural-desire-to-see-god-solution
By the way the International Catholic University has a lot of excellent information.
Linus2nd
L
Linusthe2nd
Guest
Off topic, but it is done by God’s eternal act of creation. Even in an eternal world you cannot escape God’s creative act. See my thread, Eternal Creation Ex Nihilo vs Modern Cosmology, page 3 of this forum.I have some questions here:
- how do we know souls haven’t existed from all eternity? That would undercut a need for an intelligent creator
- how do we know that there isn’t a first impersonal unmoved mover who has all the elements of intelligence, but not unified together into actual intelligence. He could thus give us unified thought without thinking
- Thomas Aquinas says in the Summa Theologica that we can’t know from reason that the world isn’t eternal, and yet in his Contra Summa Gentiles he says that there can’t be infinite intermediate movers. How do we reconcile this.
Linus2nd
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