Ah… and so, it appears, we meet again…
tonyrey;8861556:
How can truth exist in a universe that exists for no reason?
hmm, that depends on what you think truth is. I mean, let’s just take a basic theory of correspondence that says something like: Truth is the relationship of ‘accurate description’ obtaining between a proposition and what it describes.
That might be one definition of
propositional truth, sure, but not of truth
per se, in general. The clarification isn’t trivial.
Then, all we need to have ‘truth’ is (i) propositions, (ii) the things these propositions describe, and (iii) the relationship of accurate description obtaining between (i) and (ii).
Plus, maybe, (iv) all that’s entailed by and/or necessary for the instantiation of (i), (ii), & (iii). No?
Whether the universe is explicable is irrelevant to this, and so forth for the theories of truth I’m aware of.
That seems overly bold as well as a little hasty. The explicability of the universe would likely be related to the (potential for the) truth of some propositionally-given explanation of it, which is obviously connected to your (i)-(iii) above. In other words, explicability arguably requires the possibility of propositional truth, since an explanation of any fact would probably (have to) be, on
some level, of a basically propositional structure.
If one doesn’t choose what to believe or not to believe one is irrational…
It seems to me the consensus in philosophy is that belief is involuntary, so much so that Schellenberg was able to make this one of his assumptions in his celebrated Divine Hiddenness. You don’t do that unless it’d be uber strange for someone to object to it.
I see your
J.L. Schellenberg and raise you one
Carl Ginet. Now, I clearly have you beat here, as your boy Schellenberg – get this –
doesn’t even have his own dedicated Wikipedia page. Psh. Ha. Haha.
Seriously, though,
doxastic voluntarism (“DV”) is still a legitimate question for epistemologists, and I don’t think any respectable philosopher can or should simply take its truth as having been indisputably established, as if a matter of academic consensus. I definitely would never willfully assent to doxastic involuntarism.
Be that as it may, here’s one line of reasoning for agreeing:
(1) If we could decide to believe things, we would know that we chose the beliefs we chose.
(2) If we knew that we chose a belief, we would know that it was determined by our choice, not by how things are.
(3) If we knew that a belief was determined by our choice, not by how things are, we would not believe it.
(4) Therefore, belief is involuntary.
Ad (1): Rejection. Choice does not necessarily entail conscious knowledge. [Counter-example: S, a married man, takes Ambien one night and subsequently sleeps with another woman, Q (not his wife, T). Understandably, T is upset by S’s unfaithful behavior, despite his lack of conscious awareness at or since the time of his involvement, because she suspects he still made a free choice to cheat, as, e.g., the superficial beauty of Q had always, and not discreetly, caught his eye before, etc.]
Ad (2): Rejection. Why not both? The choice may just be with an aim of conformity to “how things are”. That is, one could viably choose in favor of what, from his limited subjective perspective, probably/seemingly most accurately describes how things are objectively; especially in the case he considers objective fact as determining the accuracy of any potential subjective description.
Ad (3): I’ll likely need more re: specific usage/meaning of “determined”.
empther;8862633:
We choose to seek knowledge. When we find the truth as we understand it we believe, but we chose to go looking for the truth.
This is precisely what I’m suggesting.
Belief is involuntary, but our acquaintance with information can certainly be voluntary. This is why some are said to be intellectually dishonest: they deliberately choose not to consider evidence against their position, lest their belief waver.
If I understand you correctly now, you’re only really opposed to direct, positive DV, though not indirect, positive/negative, DV. Does that sound right?
In my opinion, belief should perhaps not be called an “action” at all. And, hence, it should by itself probably be deemed neither voluntary nor involuntary, because voluntariness can only meaningfully be ascribed to
actions – viz., actions under the (direct or indirect) control of an agent’s free, volitional, intellectually-compelling/coercive activity of the will. Belief seems to me more like the
effect/
result of other/prior causal action(s).
