Ahā¦ and so, it appears, we meet againā¦
Hello In Spiration.
That might be one definition of propositional truth, sure, but not of truth per se, in general. The clarification isnāt trivial.
This is a fair point. But, if tonyreyās claim was that
no truth would exist in an inexplicable universe, then my claim that propositional truth would, seems an appropriate rebuttal.
Plus, maybe, (iv) all thatās entailed by and/or necessary for the instantiation of (i), (ii), & (iii). No?
Thatās another fair point, weāll have to throw (iv) in there as well.
That seems overly bold as well as a little hasty. The explicability of the universe would likely be related to the (potential for the) truth of some propositionally-given explanation of it, which is obviously connected to your (i)-(iii) above. In other words, explicability arguably requires the possibility of propositional truth, since an explanation of any fact would probably (have to) be, on some level, of a basically propositional structure.
I think this should be granted as well. And actually, that point should settle this whole issue: in order for the universe to be explicable or inexplicable there must be some kind of ātruthā related to explanation (Iām with propositional truth).
I see your J.L. Schellenberg and raise you one Carl Ginet. Now, I clearly have you beat here, as your boy Schellenberg ā get this ā doesnāt even have his own dedicated Wikipedia page. Psh. Ha. Haha.
Carl who? jk
Seriously, though, doxastic voluntarism (āDVā) is still a legitimate question for epistemologists, and I donāt think any respectable philosopher can or should simply take its truth as having been indisputably established, as if a matter of academic consensus.
Even the article you cite says: āOn this issue [DV], philosophers are divided.
Many argue that it is not, but
some argue that it is.ā hah!
But, if Iāve understood the above remarks correctly, Iāll say in response that Iād buy into the position Iām advocating because of its arguments, not the consensus Iām appealing to. But, when there is such agreement, itās notable as that kind of thing rarely happens in philosophy.
I definitely would never willfully assent to doxastic involuntarism.
If doxastic involuntarism were true, no one would willfully assent to it
Ad (1): Rejection. Choice does not necessarily entail conscious knowledge. [Counter-example: S, a married man, takes Ambien one night and subsequently sleeps with another woman, Q (not his wife, T). Understandably, T is upset by Sās unfaithful behavior, despite his lack of conscious awareness at or since the time of his involvement, because she suspects he still made a free choice to cheat, as, e.g., the superficial beauty of Q had always, and not discreetly, caught his eye before, etc.]
I agree that choice does not necessarily entail conscious knowledge, and that your counter-example illustrates this. But, I donāt think this is an objection to (1). Its consequent seems to specify that the choice would be conscious. If thatās ambiguous though, Iāll just stipulate that itās to be understood like that.
Ad (2): Rejection. Why not both? The choice may just be with an aim of conformity to āhow things areā. That is, one could viably choose in favor of what, from his limited subjective perspective, probably/seemingly most accurately describes how things are objectively; especially in the case he considers objective fact as determining the accuracy of any potential subjective description
.
Because if belief is directly voluntary, you couldnāt ājustā believe that x is āhow things areā, youād have to even choose that. On this, if you believed that truth meant p, you believe that simply because you chose to. Itāll all reduce back to your choice
tout court.
Ad (3): Iāll likely need more re: specific usage/meaning of ādeterminedā.
By ādeterminedā I mean āproduced byā.
If I understand you correctly now, youāre only really opposed to direct, positive DV, though not indirect, positive/negative, DV. Does that sound right?
Yeah, sorry for the confusion.
In my opinion, belief should perhaps not be called an āactionā at all. And, hence, it should by itself probably be deemed neither voluntary nor involuntary, because voluntariness can only meaningfully be ascribed to actions ā viz., actions under the (direct or indirect) control of an agentās free, volitional, intellectually-compelling/coercive activity of the will. Belief seems to me more like the effect/result of other/prior causal action(s).
I like this idea, and wouldnāt even be necessarily opposed to it. The most important thing Iām interested in establishing is that belief isnāt directly volitional. It seems more like an effect as well to me.
