Let us now explore some possible consequences of the above to consider their plausibility.
From 1, 2, & 3, we must assume that it is not possible for God to err, to be surprised, to be disappointed, or to be angry (for all would require either a lack of foreknowledge (2), current knowledge (1), or perfection (3).
Would this not then suggest that no fair test for mankind could have been possible given that God would have predicted the outcome prior to the first creative act? If no fair test, how might mankind have deserved punishment for the Fall?
In spite of 5, God appears unlikely to ever change his mind {for such a change would be foreseen (1 & 2) and be less than perfect (3)}. Further, if God exists in a realm in which time passes (4), is it not necessarily the case that he has foreseen all of his future actions? If so, how might God differentiate between exercising his Free Will (5) and merely following a preordained script? Assuming the script is preordained by God, himself, would this mean that all of his free choices were decided in an infinite past and no longer exercisable in a temporal now (1, 2, & 3)?
Further, if God foresees and retains infinite knowledge of an infinite future and past, would God ever be able to know himself perfectly? Or would God currently lack self-knowledge, but foresee a time in an infinite future in which such self-knowledge might come about (thereby knowing of the knowledge before it arrives in his possession)?
Finally, if God were to have Free Will (5), would he be able to choose to do evil? If so, would this not seemingly defy Perfection (3)? If not, would he truly have Perfect (3) Free Will (5)?
This is a lot of new considerations from your end. A lot of suppositions and conclusions, and it comes a bit too quick for me. Let’s slow it down, if possible.
I have responses for everything, but I want to check on some of what I’d answer with before approaching those particulars. Also, perhaps we should start categorizing two different sets of axioms. For example: Axioms proposed by Laramie, and Axioms proposed by Jelrak.
For now, though, I will break up your latest response into sections, for clarity:
Section 1
Let us now explore some possible consequences of the above to consider their plausibility.
From 1, 2, & 3, we must assume that it is not possible for God to err, to be surprised, to be disappointed, or to be angry (for all would require either a lack of foreknowledge (2), current knowledge (1), or perfection (3).
Would this not then suggest that no fair test for mankind could have been possible given that God would have predicted the outcome prior to the first creative act? If no fair test, how might mankind have deserved punishment for the Fall?
Section 2
In spite of 5, God appears unlikely to ever change his mind {for such a change would be foreseen (1 & 2) and be less than perfect (3)}. Further, if God exists in a realm in which time passes (4), is it not necessarily the case that he has foreseen all of his future actions? If so, how might God differentiate between exercising his Free Will (5) and merely following a preordained script? Assuming the script is preordained by God, himself, would this mean that all of his free choices were decided in an infinite past and no longer exercisable in a temporal now (1, 2, & 3)?
Section 3
Further, if God foresees and retains infinite knowledge of an infinite future and past, would God ever be able to know himself perfectly? Or would God currently lack self-knowledge, but foresee a time in an infinite future in which such self-knowledge might come about (thereby knowing of the knowledge before it arrives in his possession)?
Section 4
Finally, if God were to have Free Will (5), would he be able to choose to do evil? If so, would this not seemingly defy Perfection (3)? If not, would he truly have Perfect (3) Free Will (5)
At the moment, I have time to address
Section 4.
A. If God were to have Free Will, would he be able to choose to do evil?
- No. Evil is the opposite of His will. Perhaps, if He were to be inconsistent, we were
to consider His actions evil.
B. [If He were to be “evil”/inconsistent,] would this not seemingly defy Perfection?
- A Perfect Being can choose to be inconsistent, while still retaining Perfection. The
consistency of His plan would be imperfect, though.
The answers to A. and B. break apart your third question, C.
C. [If this action did not defy Perfection], would He truly have Perfect free will?
- Yes. But again, your third question is based on the previous two suppositions, which
alter how question C. is perceived. If God were to choose to be inconsistent with
His policies in the cosmos, He would still be a perfect being, and He could make
such a choice using His free will.
Again, let’s try to hone down to less tangents. If this conversation turns into a three-dozen headed hydra, it would be very difficult to respond, follow, and observe.
But I’ll get to
Sections 1-3, nevertheless. Also, I’ll propose a 6th Axiom later this evening.