Is Freewill compatible with Determinism?

[MindOverMatter2]

I don’t believe in absolute metaphysical or physical determinism. The idea that physical events absolutely determines our choices destroys any meaningful sense of freewill and thus also the idea that a choice is being made since all your actions our merely the inevitable and direct result of previous non-rational causes. It seems to me that any attempt at making the two compatible will inevitably result in rendering the idea of freewill meaningless.

Freewill = the idea that one is not forced to make any particular choice if and when a series of possibilities is presented.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

It is my position that freewill is limited. For example we have to make a choice. It impossible not to make a choice, and any choice we do make will necessarily be what we think is good or the best. Thus we are determined, to an extent, to various ends according what we think is good. A Christian would have to say that we are forced to act for the good. However, we do have the freedom to “reason” about what is the greatest good and it is possible for us to make sacrifices. For example chilling back and relaxing is a good; and we choose because it is a good in itself; but if we see a that our chilling back means that somebody will suffer as a result; we are free to reason that it would be good to sacrifice chilling back.

 

[Perplexity]

I don’t believe in absolute metaphysical or physical determinism. The idea that physical events absolutely determines our choices destroys any meaningful sense of freewill and thus also the idea that a choice is being made since all your actions our merely the inevitable and direct result of previous non-rational causes. It seems to me that any attempt at making the two compatible will inevitably result in rendering the idea of freewill meaningless.

Freewill = the idea that one is not forced to make any particular choice if and when a series of possibilities is presented.

Chances are, the compatibilist will agree that the understanding of free-will you’re advocating couldn’t survive if determinism is true, or that determinism would render it meaningless. But, they’d also argue your understanding of free-will doesn’t represent the free-will we actually have, and they’d go on to propose their compatibilist understanding. etc.

Interestingly though, the description of free-will you give above doesn’t say possibilities are ever actually presented. So, the compatibilist could say we’re never forced to make a choice** when a series of possibilities is presented**, and are therefore free on your understanding, even though we’re forced to make choices.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Chances are, the compatibilist will agree that the understanding of free-will you’re advocating couldn’t survive if determinism is true, or that determinism would render it meaningless. But, they’d also argue your understanding of free-will doesn’t represent the free-will we actually have, and they’d go on to propose their compatibilist understanding. etc.

I dare say this is so; but they would still have to give a meaningful definition of freewill. “Free”-will necessarily implies that your choice is not determined by prior physical events. In other-words there is a non-mechanistic component to choice itself. For example it would be meaningless to say that a cogwheel is free since it is being moved by other cogwheels. If we what to speak of freewill meaningfully then a free choice cannot be express in the same sense as cogwheel. freewill in that context is meaningless.

I haven’t really seen a compatibilist argument that can really escape from the mechanistic sense of determinism. It seems that they would have to redefine physical determinism in to something that doesn’t correspond with the original usage.

Interestingly though, the description of free-will you give above doesn’t say possibilities are ever actually presented. So, the compatibilist could say we’re never forced to make a choice** when a series of possibilities is presented**, and are therefore free on your understanding, even though we’re forced to make choices.

But if we are forced to make choices according to preceding physical actions and reactions, then why would that not be true in the event of being given a series of possibilities? The fact that you would choose any possibility would still be the result of prior physical reactions and not the chooser; there would be no free reasoning involved. In fact its meaningless to even speak of a chooser; its just an action because reason and freedom are mute concepts given determinism. The action is not occurring because you reasoned it to be the better choice; its occurring because prior physical events determined you to that end.

 

[Bobber90]

If free will is the ability to reason about possible courses of action, and end up doing something that you could have avoided doing for no cause other than if you willed otherwise, how is the process of reasoning itself free? How do you see it as being free?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

If free will is the ability to reason about possible courses of action, and end up doing something that you could have avoided doing for no cause other than if you willed otherwise, how is the process of reasoning itself free? How do you see it as being free?

Its free from prior physical causes because its the fact of reasoning that something is good that compels you to act, rather than prior non-rational causes that knows nothing of the good. Reasoning is the absolute source of the action itself. If you have to reason that something is better than another thing, while you are not free to not act, you are free to reason between various possibilities that may or may not be better than another thing. By making intellect the sole source of a choice you can avoid absolute mechanistic determinism because reasoning between possibilities is a free act, even though it is not the same thing as absolute freedom. You have to be free to some extent in you ability to reason in-order to achieve the possibility of knowing truth or knowing that some action is better than another. Otherwise the act of a truly rational discussion (seeking true knowledge) cannot truly take place.

This version of freewill (rational-freedom) sits in-between the two extremes of determinism and indeterminism.

 

[Bobber90]

Its free from prior physical causes because its the fact of reasoning that something is good that compels you to act. Reasoning is the absolute source of the action itself. If you have to reason that something is better than another thing, while you are not free to not act, you are free to reason between various possibilities that may or may not be better than another thing. By making intellect the sole source of a choice you can avoid absolute mechanistic determinism because reasoning between possibilities is a free act, even though it is not the same thing as absolute freedom. You have to be free to some extent in you ability to reason in-order to achieve the possibility knowing truth or knowing that some action is better than another.

What is it that initiates the reasoning? I think there is circularity there. We might say that free will is the fact of reasoning (which in this case always happens to discover the good), but we might also say that we can choose to reason or to reason well. Perhaps there are other factors that influence choosing to reason, like patience/education/mood/recent occurrences in the physical realm… and these are all things outside our control which affect our ultimate choice.

If we automatically reasoned by our nature (removing physical causes of the act), and if there was an objective order that reasoning applied to, we would do away with choice because reason would bite onto truth as solidly as cog onto cog. Surely?

 

[Lisa44]

It is my position that freewill is limited. For example we have to make a choice. It impossible not to make a choice, and any choice we do make will necessarily be what we think is good or the best. Thus we are determined, to an extent, to various ends according what we think is good. A Christian would have to say that we are forced to act for the good. However, we do have the freedom to “reason” about what is the greatest good and it is possible for us to make sacrifices. For example chilling back and relaxing is a good; and we choose because it is a good in itself; but if we see a that our chilling back means that somebody will suffer as a result; we are free to reason that it would be good to sacrifice chilling back.

Question: “what we think is good or the best” for what?

 

[Lisa44]

Its free from prior physical causes because its the fact of reasoning that something is good that compels you to act, rather than prior non-rational causes that knows nothing of the good. Reasoning is the absolute source of the action itself. If you have to reason that something is better than another thing, while you are not free to not act, you are free to reason between various possibilities that may or may not be better than another thing. By making intellect the sole source of a choice you can avoid absolute mechanistic determinism because reasoning between possibilities is a free act, even though it is not the same thing as absolute freedom. You have to be free to some extent in you ability to reason in-order to achieve the possibility of knowing truth or knowing that some action is better than another. Otherwise the act of a truly rational discussion (seeking true knowledge) cannot truly take place.

This version of freewill (rational-freedom) sits in-between the two extremes of determinism and indeterminism.

Please give me an object for what is good - good for what?

If the wheels job is to make the car move forward, it is good for making the car move forward so what it is good for is not independent of its cause.

So, your reasoning is good for what?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Question: “what we think is good or the best” for what?

What do you think? Have you never made a choice based on what you rationalise to be the best choice given a particular situation?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

If the wheels job is to make the car move forward,

Its not the wheels intrinsic “job”; it just happens to be practically beneficial for us to give it that Job in so as we have discovered it be so, or reasoned it to be so based upon conceptual/rational inferences. In applied sciences and engineering, they often make mathematical/conceptual hypothesis and test them in the real world. They try to reason to the best models; have you not noticed that?

So, your reasoning is good for what?

We create cars because we “reason” they are good for some kind of practical need. The question “what is reason good for” is irrelevant. It enough for me to show that we reason to the best possible circumstance in any given context relative to what we are trying to achieve.

Lisa44 Score = 0

M.O.M Score = 2

Cheers:thumbsup:

 

[tonyrey]

Please give me an object for what is good - good for what?

If the wheels job is to make the car move forward, it is good for making the car move forward so what it is good for is not independent of its cause.

So, your reasoning is good for what?

You! (Or anyone else…)

 

[Lisa44]

What do you think? Have you never made a choice based on what you rationalise to be the best choice given a particular situation?

Our physical person. Which I am not sure can be separated from the “physical” conditions which you spoke of as “determined”.

 

[Lisa44]

Its not the wheels intrinsic “job”; it just happens to be practically beneficial for us to give it that Job in so as we have discovered it be so, or reasoned it to be so based upon conceptual/rational inferences. In applied sciences and engineering, they often make mathematical/conceptual hypothesis and test them in the real world. They try to reason to the best models; have you not noticed that?

We create cars because we “reason” they are good for some kind of practical need. The question “what is reason good for” is irrelevant. It enough for me to show that we reason to the best possible circumstance in any given context relative to what we are trying to achieve.

Lisa44 Score = 0

M.O.M Score = 2

Cheers:thumbsup:

Not irrelevant. You put your “choice” down to the reasoning faculties of the mind. And I am saying that those faculties are not separate from “you”. And who are “we”? Flesh. And what purpose do our minds serve? Our flesh.

Now explain how the flesh has free will?

 

[Al_Moritz]

Excellent reasoning here, MindOverMatter. I also like your post # 2 about limited freewill.

What strikes me as interesting is that atheists who pride themselves of being so ‘rational’ display rather peculiar opinions about what constitutes rationality.

I haven’t really seen a compatibilist argument that can really escape from the mechanistic sense of determinism. It seems that they would have to redefine physical determinism in to something that doesn’t correspond with the original usage.

Precisely.

 

[Al_Moritz]

By the way, MindOverMatter,

you might like my article:

home.earthlink.net/~almoritz/naturalism_is_true.htm

 

[MindOverMatter2]

By the way, MindOverMatter,

you might like my article:

home.earthlink.net/~almoritz/naturalism_is_true.htm

Thanks:thumbsup:

 

[Lisa44]

Not irrelevant. You put your “choice” down to the reasoning faculties of the mind. And I am saying that those faculties are not separate from “you”. And who are “we”? Flesh. And what purpose do our minds serve? Our flesh.

Now explain how the flesh has free will?

Does anyone know how the flesh is made free?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Does anyone know how the flesh is made free?

Particular physical forms move and operate in relation to other physical forms and change only in respect of the whole physical reality of which it is an intrinsic part. Thus Physical Forms cannot be free obviously; but the prior does not a-prior preclude the posibility that they can be moved by a free agent. However, it does preclude the possibility that any particular “physical form”, physical reality by itself, can be free in any meaningful sense.

 

[Lisa44]

Particular physical forms move and operate in relation to other physical forms and change only in respect of the whole physical reality of which it is an intrinsic part. Thus Physical Forms cannot be free obviously; but the prior does not a-prior preclude the posibility that they can be moved by a free agent. However, it does preclude the possibility that any particular “physical form”, physical reality by itself, can be free in any meaningful sense.

Yes.

Explain what the “free agent” is.