Is God a contingent being?

[SeekingCatholic]

According to classical theism, God is absolutely simple. What this means is that there is absolutely no composition in God; His essence is identical **in substance **to His knowledge, His will, His justice, His mercy, and all of His other attributes and powers.

Now, imagine other possible worlds with a different set of contingent beings (or no contingent beings). These could only occur because God willed them so. But since God’s will is different in these worlds, that means His essence is also different, which means it is a different being, a different God, in these worlds. Which means that the God in this world is not a necessary being, but a contingent one, since the same God does not exist in all possible worlds.

Or, alternatively, one could posit (although contrary to classical theism, which posits God’s freedom in creation) that this world is the only possible one. This would save God being a necessary being, but at the cost of every other being also being a necessary being.

 

[cpayne]

Perhaps not. One of the meanings of contingent is “dependent upon something else for its existence.”

So let’s say that perhaps God’s will would have been different in creation for any possibly existing world; however, this world is the only one that “actually” exists, not “possibly” exists. Does that fact in itself make everything in this world “necessary”? I don’t think so, since all the objects of this world would still be dependent upon something else for their existence.

Wouldn’t this still hold true even if this world were the only manifested expression of God’s will in creation?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Perhaps not. One of the meanings of contingent is “dependent upon something else for its existence.”

But that’s not the relevant meaning of “contingent” here - in modal logic, a “contingent” being means one which may or may not exist - it does not exist in all possible worlds, but only in some. The opposite of this is a “necessary” being - one which must exist and therefore exists in all possible worlds. If this is the only possible world, all beings in it are necessary. Of course, if a necessary being is dependent on something else for its existence, that something else must also be a necessary being.

So let’s say that perhaps God’s will would have been different in creation for any possibly existing world; however, this world is the only one that “actually” exists, not “possibly” exists. Does that fact in itself make everything in this world “necessary”?

No, not in itself. However, either God is contingent or everything in this world is necessary. Note that saying “God’s will would perhaps have been different” is exactly the same thing as saying “God would perhaps have been different” since God’s will and God are identical, according to simplicity.

I don’t think so, since all the objects of this world would still be dependent upon something else for their existence.

Wouldn’t this still hold true even if this world were the only manifested expression of God’s will in creation?

Again, this isn’t the right definition of “necessary being”. If a is logically necessary, and a entails b, then b is also logically necessary, even though b depends on a.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Now, imagine other possible worlds with a different set of contingent beings (or no contingent beings). These could only occur because God willed them so.

When you say “occur” do you mean they could only be actual if God willed them so?

Does your problem hinge upon the actual reality of possible worlds? Or are you taking that as a given?

Where’s David Lewis when you need him?

VC

 

[Genesis315]

This is probably why St. Thomas posited the unity of the universe–there is One God and one created universe. Similarly, in each person there is one soul governing one body or there is one Church governed by one Supreme Pastor, etc.

 

[tobias]

According to classical theism, God is absolutely simple. What this means is that there is absolutely no composition in God; His essence is identical **in substance **to His knowledge, His will, His justice, His mercy, and all of His other attributes and powers.

Now, imagine other possible worlds with a different set of contingent beings (or no contingent beings). These could only occur because God willed them so. But since God’s will is different in these worlds, that means His essence is also different, which means it is a different being, a different God, in these worlds. Which means that the God in this world is not a necessary being, but a contingent one, since the same God does not exist in all possible worlds.

Or, alternatively, one could posit (although contrary to classical theism, which posits God’s freedom in creation) that this world is the only possible one. This would save God being a necessary being, but at the cost of every other being also being a necessary being.

I'm confused as to why your preoccupation with the possible mekes the actual disconserting to you.In what way does the possible negate the actual in what is known? Can this be demonstrated?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

When you say “occur” do you mean they could only be actual if God willed them so?

Yes, under the hypothesis God as necessary being, all other contingent beings exist because He wills them to, in every possible world.

Does your problem hinge upon the actual reality of possible worlds?

No.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

This is probably why St. Thomas posited the unity of the universe–there is One God and one created universe. Similarly, in each person there is one soul governing one body or there is one Church governed by one Supreme Pastor, etc.

This isn’t really much help here. If I am a contingent being, there is a possible world in which I don’t exist. The trouble is, the God that exists in this world wouldn’t exist in that one. There is therefore a possible world in which God doesn’t exist, which makes His existence contingent as well. (“A” God may exist in the other world, but not “The” God that exists in this one.)

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I’m confused as to why your preoccupation with the possible mekes the actual disconserting to you.In what way does the possible negate the actual in what is known? Can this be demonstrated?

Yes.

The God that exists in this world exists necessarily (by the traditional definition of God).

Therefore, if it is possible for God not to exist, then He does not exist (trivial to prove in modal logic: “it is possible for God not to exist” means there is at least one possible world in which He does not exist; that contradicts “God exists necessarily” which means He exists in all possible worlds).

There are possible worlds where I do not exist (by definition assuming I am a contingent being as hypothesis).

There are therefore possible worlds where God does not exist (proven above - there may be a creator in these worlds but it is not the same God as exists in this one - because His will to create me is different - which means the “Gods” existing in the different worlds are different beings)

Which means it is possible for God not to exist, which means He does not exist. Put another way, “God” does not exist necessarily, but only contingently.

The logic is airtight. The only way out is to deny that there are possible worlds where I do not exist. Which means, I am not a contingent, but rather a necessary, being.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

SC,

Can you help me out a bit more? If God wills these contingent beings in other possible worlds, wouldn’t they in fact exist?

Do you believe that other possible worlds actually have being (i.e. like David Lewis)? Or do you think that “our world” has ontological distinction from other possible worlds?

VC

 

[cpayne]

Yes.

The God that exists in this world exists necessarily (by the traditional definition of God).

Therefore, if it is possible for God not to exist, then He does not exist (trivial to prove in modal logic: “it is possible for God not to exist” means there is at least one possible world in which He does not exist; that contradicts “God exists necessarily” which means He exists in all possible worlds).

There are possible worlds where I do not exist (by definition assuming I am a contingent being as hypothesis).

There are therefore possible worlds where God does not exist (proven above - there may be a creator in these worlds but it is not the same God as exists in this one - because His will to create me is different - which means the “Gods” existing in the different worlds are different beings)

Which means it is possible for God not to exist, which means He does not exist. Put another way, “God” does not exist necessarily, but only contingently.

The logic is airtight. The only way out is to deny that there are possible worlds where I do not exist. Which means, I am not a contingent, but rather a necessary, being.

Let’s see if this is a way out of the problem as posed: It seems that “possible worlds” has very close to the same meaning as “contingent” worlds, in the sense you are using the term.

In that case, every possible world is a contingent world, whether or not it actually exists; every contingent world still requires the necessarily existing cause, or Cause.

So let’s say in another contingent world, which does not actually exist, I do not exist either. But God’s essence would not necessarily change in that possible world, since God still wills my contingent existence, along with the existence of everything else that exists in this present world. The only difference is that my contingent existence does not take place in that world.

In other words, God wills my existence in this world; the difference is not in God, but in my existence. In that contingent world, I (contingently) do not exist, as a result of God’s unchanging will or essence; in this contingent world, I (contingently) do exist, again as a result of the same unchanging will or essence.

I see and acknowledge your previous point, that saying “God’s will would perhaps have been different” is the same as saying “God perhaps would have been different.” So I am trying not to say that in this response; in fact, I am saying the opposite: Of necessity, I possess a contingent existence in THIS world because that is God’s will for me in ANY possible world in which God exists.

Of course, I’m using the term “world” here, as I assume you are as well, as meaning all reality, not just the physical universe. God wouldn’t exist “in” this physical universe, at least not in a spatial sense. If He exists “in” this universe in a causal sense, then I am saying that His will for me to exist in this universe would be the same no matter what possible worlds He may also inhabit. Anywhere and always, He causes my existence here.

I think it’s bedtime for Bonzo; see you tomorrow, God willing.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

SC,

Can you help me out a bit more? If God wills these contingent beings in other possible worlds, wouldn’t they in fact exist?

Do you believe that other possible worlds actually have being (i.e. like David Lewis)? Or do you think that “our world” has ontological distinction from other possible worlds?

VC

No. “Possible worlds” is a mere hypothetical construct, about what might have been or might be. But if you imagine a hypothetical world in which I don’t exist, the “God” who exists in that hypothetical world is a different being than the one who exists in ours.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Let’s see if this is a way out of the problem as posed: It seems that “possible worlds” has very close to the same meaning as “contingent” worlds, in the sense you are using the term.

Not quite, but it isn’t relevant to the discussion. “Contingent” is normally applied to beings, not worlds.

In that case, every possible world is a contingent world, whether or not it actually exists; every contingent world still requires the necessarily existing cause, or Cause.

Every contingent world would hypothetically require the necessarily existing being, assuming one exists, yes.

So let’s say in another contingent world, which does not actually exist, I do not exist either. But God’s essence would not necessarily change in that possible world, since God still wills my contingent existence, along with the existence of everything else that exists in this present world. The only difference is that my contingent existence does not take place in that world.

How can God will your contingent existence, and yet your contingent existence not take place? He does not will your existence in that world.

In other words, God wills my existence in this world; the difference is not in God, but in my existence. In that contingent world, I (contingently) do not exist, as a result of God’s unchanging will or essence; in this contingent world, I (contingently) do exist, again as a result of the same unchanging will or essence.

But the will or essence is different in the two contingent worlds.

I see and acknowledge your previous point, that saying “God’s will would perhaps have been different” is the same as saying “God perhaps would have been different.” So I am trying not to say that in this response; in fact, I am saying the opposite: Of necessity, I possess a contingent existence in THIS world because that is God’s will for me in ANY possible world in which God exists.

If you are saying that it is necessarily God’s will that you exist in any possible world in which God exists, then you are saying that you are also a necessary being.

Of course, I’m using the term “world” here, as I assume you are as well, as meaning all reality, not just the physical universe.

Correct.

 

[rwoehmke]

Isn’t it the essence of being hypothetical to not have existence, except as a mental construct, therefore neither you or God could exist, except as a mental construct, in a hypothetical world.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

No. “Possible worlds” is a mere hypothetical construct, about what might have been or might be.

Ok, thank you. I just wanted to be clear on what you held, because although in general “possible world” denotes a hypothetical construct, my understanding is that is not the *exclusive *view among theorists of modality.

But if you imagine a hypothetical world in which I don’t exist, the “God” who exists in that hypothetical world is a different being than the one who exists in ours.

Wouldn’t that depend on whether or not God has some sort of knowledge of all contingent beings, including those that are hypothetical (i.e. in possible worlds)? Could His knowledge of both actualized and hypothetical beings be the same no matter what possible (or actual) word you looked at?

Anyway, thank you for the clarification on what you were getting at. I suspect, however, that this topic (although certainly in the right sub-forum!) would be more fruitfully engaged in academic circles. Good luck though.

VC

 

[FrankSchnabel]

The process philosopher Duane Voskuil, following his mentor Charles Hartshorne, sez that Deity is the unique being who is both necessary and contingent. God necessarily exists in that He must be actualized one way or anudder. However, He is contingent in that the particular way He is actualized or concretized could have been udderwise.

This is at odds with classic Christian theism, but I always thought it makes sense.

cordially

Frank

 

[cpayne]

But the will or essence is different in the two contingent worlds.

Perhaps I’m not stating myself clearly; I mean that God’s will or essence regarding my existence in THIS world would be the same in any possible world in which God exists, whether or not I exist in THAT particular world.

 

[cpayne]

Wouldn’t that depend on whether or not God has some sort of knowledge of all contingent beings, including those that are hypothetical (i.e. in possible worlds)? Could His knowledge of both actualized and hypothetical beings be the same no matter what possible (or actual) word you looked at?

Aha! This is what I’ve been trying to say. (Also, I assume “word” is a typo for “world.”)

 

[tobias]

The God that exists in this world exists necessarily (by the traditional definition of God).

Therefore, if it is possible for God not to exist, then He does not exist (trivial to prove in modal logic: “it is possible for God not to exist” means there is at least one possible world in which He does not exist; that contradicts “God exists necessarily” which means He exists in all possible worlds).

 i.e.  'The water that exists in this world exists necessarily. Therefore, if it is possible for water not to exist, then water does not exist.   The only difference in the 2 is that one is tangible, but the logic is consistent, so I find no validity to your deduction.

seekingcatholic:

There are possible worlds where I do not exist (by definition assuming I am a contingent being as hypothesis).

There are therefore possible worlds where God does not exist (proven above - there may be a creator in these worlds but it is not the same God as exists in this one - because His will to create me is different - which means the “Gods” existing in the different worlds are different beings)

 The possibility of another 'world' does not of neccessity change the nature of the one who creates. How can having al possiblilities concievable limit the ability to create, or change the nature of the creator? Your merely throughing out a circular argument. And your reasoning does not factor in that their may be many other 'worlds' so far as we know, and yes you may not be part of any of them. The possibility of other existences does not demonstrably alter our own

seekingcatholic:

Which means it is possible for God not to exist, which means He does not exist. Put another way, “God” does not exist necessarily, but only contingently.

The logic is airtight. The only way out is to deny that there are possible worlds where I do not exist. Which means, I am not a contingent, but rather a necessary, being.

 I think you've started off on the wrong foot. You're attempting to disprove traditional concepts of God, but by slightly altering the traditional understanding. Placing God 'in' this world and not also beyond it is not traditional Catholicism in any way. The very train of logic you've used suggest that He is not 'part' of the world, yet in your reasoning god becomes restricted by his creative action. 
 If I think of an idea, but could have thought an entirely different idea, does this change the nature of my mind, what could have been thought?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

i.e. 'The water that exists in this world exists necessarily. Therefore, if it is possible for water not to exist, then water does not exist. The only difference in the 2 is that one is tangible, but the logic is consistent, so I find no validity to your deduction.

Either you do not understand the argument at all, or else you are resorting to a thoroughly dishonest straw man because you know you can’t refute it. It is not the only difference, and in fact not even a relevant difference, between water and God that water is tangible. The important difference is that it is not the definition of water, or of the essence of water, to exist necessarily. If it were, and it were possible for water not to exist, then water would, indeed, not exist. It is absolutely true that if it is possible for a necessary being not to exist, then it does not exist. This is an absolutely valid deduction, and it does not matter one iota whether you “find” it to be so or not.

The possibility of another 'world' does not of neccessity change the nature of the one who creates.

Well, yes it does, according to classical theism, if the nature of the one who creates is that of an absolutely simple necessary being.

If another world were actual, the nature of the creator would of necessity be different than it is in ours, for His will would need to be different, which is the same thing as saying He would be a different being (His essence would be different). This premise is ironclad in classical theism, which says God’s will and His essence are identical.

Then, classical theism also demands that this world is not the only possible world; that this world contains contingent beings, which might not exist in another possible world. Classical theism posits God did not create this world out of necessity. (If He did, then all creatures in this world would be necessary beings).

Therefore, the God who exists in this world is not the same God who exists in another possible world. Which to say, His existence is not necessary but contingent.

How can having al possiblilities concievable limit the ability to create, or change the nature of the creator? Your merely throughing out a circular argument.

You have not demonstrated my argument to be circular at all. The conclusion is nowhere implied in the premises, and you haven’t shown that it is.

If you conceive of the creator somehow existing metaphysically prior to his decision to create, then you have a changed creator. You have his will changing from the decision not to create to the decision to create, which, again, means His essence has changed; but classical theism demands God’s nature be immutable. Thus, to say that God has “all possibilities” means that there is an infinite multitude of possible Gods. But each God only has one possibility. It is a different God who decides to create me vs. one who does not.

And your reasoning does not factor in that their may be many other ‘worlds’ so far as we know, and yes you may not be part of any of them. The possibility of other existences does not demonstrably alter our own

The definition of ‘world’ here is ‘all that exists’ so yes, I am part of that ‘world’ by definition.

I think you've started off on the wrong foot. You're attempting to disprove traditional concepts of God, but by slightly altering the traditional understanding.

No, I have disproved the traditional concept of God by **using **the traditional understanding and highlighting an inherent contradiction. You have to show precisely where I have “altered” the traditional understanding.

Placing God ‘in’ this world and not also beyond it is not traditional Catholicism in any way. The very train of logic you’ve used suggest that He is not ‘part’ of the world, yet in your reasoning god becomes restricted by his creative action.

In the first place, you’re either dishonestly equivocating on the use of ‘world’, or you don’t have a basic understanding of modal logic, where ‘world’ means ‘all that exists’, which includes God by definition, if He exists. ‘World’ does not here mean ‘the physical universe’.

And it’s not “my” reasoning that God “becomes” (we should say “is”, God cannot “become”) restricted by creative action. God cannot change His will. That is an essential premise of classical theism; the immutability of God.

 If I think of an idea, but could have thought an entirely different idea, does this change the nature of my mind, what could have been thought?

Not for you. But it does for God, if He actually thought different than He does, He would be a different God. He wouldn’t be the same God Who thinks differently. That is impossible according to classical theism.