The answer is no, for He has also to know which beings are really actualized, which differ between the possible worlds.Aha! This is what I’ve been trying to say.(Also, I assume “word” is a typo for “world.”)
The exercise of God’s will is not itself God’s essence. God’s essence is unchanging. God’s actions with regard to creation are contingent and free. God’s freedom of choice is itself an aspect of that absolutely simple essence.
SC,
Yes, it is, if God is absolutely simple. There is no ontological distinction between the two, only an epistemic distinction. God can have no “attribute”. He is identical to His will.
A contradiction, as we’ve seen.
An absolutely simple essence can have no ontological “aspects”. You should say rather, God’s freedom of choice is identical to that essence. But then, so is how He uses that freedom.
A possible world is what might have existed - e.g. the beings are hypothetically actualized in that world.
No, because hypothetical world W2 contains a different set of actualized beings than does W1 - by definition, otherwise, it’s the same world. Therefore, hypothetically, if world W2 exists instead of W1, there is a different knowledge set.
Again, in a different possible world, the actual beings are different - by definition.
Imagine a world where I do not exist. Hypothetically, the God in that world knows something different than the God in this one. Please let me know if you still don’t understand. I’ll do what I can to make it clearer.
I think this is just over my head. I’m not being falsely humble about it, because most things I read are not over my head----but this might be.
Thank you, I will.
Let’s give it one more try.
But He would also know that world W2, rather than W1, is the actual world, unlike the God in this world, who knows W1 is the real world. Right? Thus His knowledge is different.
Yes, that’s what I’m saying. It’s not that God “could have decided” to actualize either W2 or W1. The God actualizing W2 is a different God from the one actualizing W1.
That is not a way around it. That God’s existence is not exactly like ours has already been assumed for purposes of the discussion. But that is no excuse for all of a sudden redefining the concept or meaning of the word “existence”. It renders the phrase “God exists” meaningless.
In what sense?
But there’s a huge difference between positing “A God must exist” and “The God must exist”. If a different God exists in every different possible (not merely conceivable) reality then The God, a necessary being, does not exist.
Because they know what world is actualized, and it’s a different world in each case.
Okay, how about this (I’m not terribly up on modal logic, so tell me if this is even possible): It seems a mistake even to speak of W1, W2, etc., as different worlds. If W1 is the “world,” as we’ve been using the term, then W2, W3, W4, and so on, would only be possible within the context of W1; that is, they would be subsumed within W1. To say that W2 is possible would change the very definition of W1 as the “world,” wouldn’t it?
No, that’s not how it works. Just think of a hypothetical world, one without a creature that now exists, or one with a creature that now does not. If that world had come to pass, then ours would not have.
No, if our actual world is only contingent, then that implies - by definition, another is possible (and that without our world needing to be actual).
Sure,
OK, please allow me to change, and clarify.
This should read
Correct, from the definition of necessary being.
5a. So either God is contingent, or:
Yes.
No, in W2 God knows of my actual non-existence.
God would know of the possibility of my existence or non-existence in every world. It’s my actual existence which is different between the worlds.
Yes, if God in W1 knows my actual existence, and God in W2 knows my actual non-existence.
I’m using the term hypothetically, as to what **would **be actual were another possible world actualized. Let’s say, if hypothetically W2 were actualized rather than W1, then Bob Jones would exist (and be actual) rather than not. Thus, hypothetically, God’s knowledge (and will) would not be the same in the two worlds.
I hold to the first view, but it doesn’t really matter.
I would mean your hypothetical non-existence in a possible world. But in that world, your non-existence is actual. That is to say, if that world were the one actualized, you would not exist.
No, the argument doesn’t derive its validity from the definition of “world”. I could exist in W1 and W2. The argument is that God could not; the “God” who exists in W1 is a different being than the “God” who exists in W2.
Correct up to this point.
No, we can imagine all these worlds including the same creating God but different creatures. The point is this is impossible due to the simplicity of God; it wouldn’t be the same creating God but a different one.
Yes, if God’s existence is not to be contingent, then we must be necessary; for this must be the only possible world.
By “aspect” I meant “an aspect as perceived by us” a la Aquinas. I used the word “aspect” precisely because it implies something seen by us rather than something that has a distinct existence within God.
SC,