Is God a contingent being?

[bogeydogg]

Then please don’t talk about oranges.

That’s not what “contingent” means in modal logic. We can agree every possible world has an uncaused being. The question is whether it is the same uncaused being.

Yes, but the question is whether that position is logically coherent.

This is the **philosophy **sub-forum and the words I am using also have a **philosophical **understanding. I am using the terms “contingent” and “necessary” as they are used in modal logic.

You’re assuming, without proof, that the first cause must be identical in all possible worlds; and your last sentence is incorrect, because the first cause, by definition, doesn’t have cause.

I know this is the philosophy forum, I am arguing about definition.

How is my last sentence incorrect?

If we do agree that all being must have a first cause, and we agree that said cause is by definition uncaused, then we have progressed at least to deism.

However, these other existences when you posit to question the reality of God, or the logic of the belief in God, I think demands that you present some sort of reason as to why we should believe that these other existences exist. I posit that the existence of God is reality, you say maybe not because of other possible existences, I say, what evidence do you have of other existences?

It is not enough to argue that such things may exist because we can conceive of them, no matter what modal logic argues. I can conceive of unicorns and square circles but I have no reason whatsoever to believe that they exist and therefore any logical posit which demands that they may exist will be met with extreme skepticism.

So why should I believe that that these different existences exist and why should I believe that they demand a different first cause from this one. Especially given that the Church and theologians throughout history have demanded that our being exists quite apart from the Creator in that He is higher than us and outside of our space time experience altogether. It is only when He condescends to come to us that we experience Him, so we must never make His being a part of our existence.

 

[cpayne]

Whoa—I’m back. I just had a thought. Someone who knows classical and CC philosophy better than I do, please answer: Is it actually the case that all things that exist are the direct result of God’s willing their existence? CCC 296 affirms that creation is not any sort of “necessary emanation” from God; on the other hand, CCC 304 reads, “And so we see the Holy Spirit, the principal author of Sacred Scripture, often attributing actions to God without mentioning any secondary causes. This is not a ‘primitive mode of speech,’ but a profound way of recalling God’s primacy and absolute Lordship over history and the world,”

However, contingency also seems evident in many cases. For example, Jesus taught us to pray that God’s will would be done on earth as in heaven. Does not that imply that not everything that occurs or exists IS necessarily the result of God’s direct willing of it?

To apply this to the current discussion: God in W1 wills that all things existing or occurring in W1 exist contingently, and He permits their existence even if not directly willing it; God in W2 wills the exact same thing for W2.

In this case, wouldn’t God be the same being with the same will, even in worlds with different outcomes? He permits contingency, and the fact of that contingency could result in a “garden of forking paths” in various possible worlds.

All right, this time I really am leaving. Good night, all.

 

[cpayne]

QUOTE=bogeydogg;4121526]I How is my last sentence incorrect?

Because you said “any existence that is must have a first cause” and that doesn’t apply to God.

** I posit that the existence of God is reality, you say maybe not because of other possible existences, I say, what evidence do you have of other existences?**

This isn’t quite SeekingCatholic’s position; he is saying that if God is a necessary being (which Christians typically believe), His existence should be exactly the same in any possible world. He is not saying God does not exist, but that some classical attributes of God could be troublesome.

**It is not enough to argue that such things may exist because we can conceive of them, no matter what modal logic argues. I can conceive of unicorns and square circles but I have no reason whatsoever to believe that they exist and therefore any logical posit which demands that they may exist will be met with extreme skepticism. **

Unicorns, at least, could exist in another possible world. I don’t know about square circles.

So why should I believe that that these different existences exist and why should I believe that they demand a different first cause from this one. Especially given that the Church and theologians throughout history have demanded that our being exists quite apart from the Creator in that He is higher than us and outside of our space time experience altogether. It is only when He condescends to come to us that we experience Him, so we must never make His being a part of our existence.

Well, God is not a part of our existence in the sense of being a part of creation. By “world” SeeCath means “anything and everything which exists.”

By the way, no one in this thread believes that these possible worlds actually exist; the logical problem is based purely on their POSSIBLE existence.

I am not buying SeekingCatholic’s argument, but it does seem to be a good argument, and one I’ll think about. Tomorrow, that is.

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

According to modal logic, it seems that the word ‘contingent’ means:
‘not necessarily true, and not necessarily false.’
That means that there is no valid logical proof of either truth or falsehood.

All arguments as to whether G_d is in this World, or whether ALL Worlds are an emmanation of G_d are irrelevant to this argument.

That there exists no valid logical proof of the existence or nonexistence of G_d is the basis of Faith.

So in the terns of usage by Modal Logicians, then G_d is a Contingent being.

This says nothing about G_d, only about our state of knowledge.

 

[jkatpc]

Interesting thread. Please correct me if I’m wrong. I follow the logic presented that in order for God to be a necessary being, everything in this (the actual) world must also be necessary beings. So, God could only have willed what is of this world. However, I can imagine a world without green lizards. Have I imagined something God cannot do? A world without green lizards would be a logical impossibility with a necessary being God.

or

God is a contingent being, such that the God in a hypothetical world different from this is a different God. Props to the Mormons here.

or

God is not simple, which was an initial assumption.

 

[cpayne]

When I got up this morning I was actually thinking something similar to that last comment: “God is not a simple being.”

I myself think He is, but many Christians don’t. I’m thinking in particular of divine-command ethicists, who do not regard God’s will as identical with His essence.

So at least they would have an answer, I think, to SeekingCatholic’s argument: they would say that God’s will COULD vary in possible worlds without affecting God’s essence, since they do not necessarily accept the idea of divine simplicity.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I know this is the philosophy forum, I am arguing about definition.

Why?

How is my last sentence incorrect?

If we do agree that all being must have a first cause, and we agree that said cause is by definition uncaused, then we have progressed at least to deism.

This is self-contradictory. The being of God doesn’t have a first cause.

However, these other existences when you posit to question the reality of God, or the logic of the belief in God, I think demands that you present some sort of reason as to why we should believe that these other existences exist. I posit that the existence of God is reality, you say maybe not because of other possible existences, I say, what evidence do you have of other existences?

No, it’s that these other existences are possible, not that they are actual.

It is not enough to argue that such things may exist because we can conceive of them, no matter what modal logic argues. I can conceive of unicorns and square circles but I have no reason whatsoever to believe that they exist and therefore any logical posit which demands that they may exist will be met with extreme skepticism.

This is not what modal logic argues. Epistemic possibility is not the same as ontologic possibility. It may be that this is the only possible world. In which case, we are necessary beings too.

So why should I believe that that these different existences exist and why should I believe that they demand a different first cause from this one.

If this existences were possible, they would demand a different first cause due to divine simplicity.

Especially given that the Church and theologians throughout history have demanded that our being exists quite apart from the Creator in that He is higher than us and outside of our space time experience altogether. It is only when He condescends to come to us that we experience Him, so we must never make His being a part of our existence.

Off topic and irrelevant.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Whoa—I’m back. I just had a thought. Someone who knows classical and CC philosophy better than I do, please answer: Is it actually the case that all things that exist are the direct result of God’s willing their existence?

Yes.

However, contingency also seems evident in many cases. For example, Jesus taught us to pray that God’s will would be done on earth as in heaven. Does not that imply that not everything that occurs or exists IS necessarily the result of God’s direct willing of it?

No; the classical theologians would say that our prayer is the secondary cause, but God’s will is still the first cause, as it, in fact, causes our prayer in the first place.

To apply this to the current discussion: God in W1 wills that all things existing or occurring in W1 exist contingently, and He permits their existence even if not directly willing it; God in W2 wills the exact same thing for W2.

Your terminology is a little bit confusing, but I see what you are saying. (The logicians would say W1 with a unicorn is a different world from the W1 without a unicorn.)

In this case, wouldn’t God be the same being with the same will, even in worlds with different outcomes? He permits contingency, and the fact of that contingency could result in a “garden of forking paths” in various possible worlds.

What you are really getting at is, God’s will wouldn’t be different in the different worlds if His will were not the causal factor determining whether the unicorn exists or not; a unicorn could just “pop into existence” as it were. But this, of course, denies the classical notion of God as first cause, and with it, the notion of God as necessary being.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

When I got up this morning I was actually thinking something similar to that last comment: “God is not a simple being.”

I myself think He is, but many Christians don’t. I’m thinking in particular of divine-command ethicists, who do not regard God’s will as identical with His essence.

So at least they would have an answer, I think, to SeekingCatholic’s argument: they would say that God’s will COULD vary in possible worlds without affecting God’s essence, since they do not necessarily accept the idea of divine simplicity.

Sure, you can always get out of the conundrum by denying one of the classical attributes of God. But it can be jumping from the frying pan into the fire. If you do it this way, then the Euthyphro dilemma presents itself: Is something good merely because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?

 

[cpayne]

Sure, you can always get out of the conundrum by denying one of the classical attributes of God. But it can be jumping from the frying pan into the fire. If you do it this way, then the Euthyphro dilemma presents itself: Is something good merely because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?

Actually, I agree; I myself am not a divine-command ethicist. However, at this point I’m wondering if it’s not the lesser of two problems—just to bite the bullet and say (like Philip Quinn, for example): “Yes, right and wrong are dependent upon God’s will.”

However, I am so convinced of the rightness of natural-law ethics that I can’t say that. So I’m still thinking.

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

Sure, you can always get out of the conundrum by denying one of the classical attributes of God. But it can be jumping from the frying pan into the fire. If you do it this way, then the Euthyphro dilemma presents itself: Is something good merely because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?

G_d does not exist IN worlds.
Worlds exist in G_d, or if you prefer, in G_d’s domain.
Only aspects of G_d exist in worlds, and aspects do not represent the completeness.
The sun shines in my window, and lights the room.
The sun is not in my room.

 

[fhansen]

According to classical theism, God is absolutely simple. What this means is that there is absolutely no composition in God; His essence is identical **in substance **to His knowledge, His will, His justice, His mercy, and all of His other attributes and powers.

Now, imagine other possible worlds with a different set of contingent beings (or no contingent beings). These could only occur because God willed them so. But since God’s will is different in these worlds, that means His essence is also different, which means it is a different being, a different God, in these worlds. Which means that the God in this world is not a necessary being, but a contingent one, since the same God does not exist in all possible worlds.

Or, alternatively, one could posit (although contrary to classical theism, which posits God’s freedom in creation) that this world is the only possible one. This would save God being a necessary being, but at the cost of every other being also being a necessary being.

I’m confused by the use of the term “world”. If by world we mean “all that is”, including God, then there simply can be no other worlds. But if God is said to be* part *of the world, then how does it make sense to say that He actualizes or creates it? OTOH, to say that He could actualize any world but does, in fact, actualize this one simply tells us of His nature in the same way our actions tell of ours. IOW, what He does is who He is.

 

[cpayne]

I’m confused by the use of the term “world”. If by world we mean “all that is”, including God, then there simply can be no other worlds. But if God is said to be* part *of the world, then how does it make sense to say that He actualizes or creates it? OTOH, to say that He could actualize any world but does, in fact, actualize this one simply tells us of His nature in the same way our actions tell of ours. IOW, what He does is who He is.

God is part of the “world” (the totality of existence), but actualizes or creates the “universe” (the totality of creation).

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

God is part of the “world” (the totality of existence), but actualizes or creates the “universe” (the totality of creation).

NO!
G_d is NOT part of the World.
The World is the creation of G_d.
The totality of creation, by definition does NOT include the Uncreated Creator
G_d exists behind a higher world, and behind ALL Worlds.
The emanations of G_d shine in the Worlds, and can be different, as they are not the completeness of G_d.

G_d is higher than, and behind the highest world, and the highest heaven.
Your logic is not applicable, save to the emanations.
And the emanations are only seen through a glass darkly.

 

[cpayne]

NO!
G_d is NOT part of the World.
The World is the creation of G_d.
The totality of creation, by definition does NOT include the Uncreated Creator
G_d exists behind a higher world, and behind ALL Worlds.
The emanations of G_d shine in the Worlds, and can be different, as they are not the completeness of G_d.

G_d is higher than, and behind the highest world, and the highest heaven.
Your logic is not applicable, save to the emanations.
And the emanations are only seen through a glass darkly.

Sorry, but you pers_st in us_ng the term “w_rld” in a way incons_stent w_th the rest of the thre_d.

As the OP is using the term, “world” just means “all that exists.” It does not mean “creation.”

 

[Voco_proTatiano]

Sorry, but you pers_st in us_ng the term “w_rld” in a way incons_stent w_th the rest of the thre_d.

As the OP is using the term, “world” just means “all that exists.” It does not mean “creation.”

OK, Try this then:
G_d is the origin of all existence, but not part of any existence.
This probably looks like a paradox, but consider the following:

All sets have subsets, of which, one set is the identity set.
But what of the empty set?
If it has a subset empty set, then it is not empty.

Therefore, the empty set is a special case:
Though it is a member of all sets, it, itself, has no members.

When you dabble in abstruse logic, you must expect special cases to exist.

All that exists is created by G_d:
Credo in unum Deum,
Patrem omnipotentem, factorem caeli et terrae,
visibilium omnium et invisibilium.
This quite clearly means everything which exists.
It clearly though excludes G_d.

The logicians are only capable of discussing worlds which are part of “caeli et terrae, visibilium omnium et invisibilium”.
The essence behind this creation is beyond the logic of these logicians.

Hence G_d is not part of any world, or existence as defined by these logicians.

 

[fhansen]

According to classical theism, God is absolutely simple. What this means is that there is absolutely no composition in God; His essence is identical **in substance **to His knowledge, His will, His justice, His mercy, and all of His other attributes and powers.

Now, imagine other possible worlds with a different set of contingent beings (or no contingent beings). These could only occur because God willed them so. But since God’s will is different in these worlds, that means His essence is also different, which means it is a different being, a different God, in these worlds. Which means that the God in this world is not a necessary being, but a contingent one, since the same God does not exist in all possible worlds.

Or, alternatively, one could posit (although contrary to classical theism, which posits God’s freedom in creation) that this world is the only possible one. This would save God being a necessary being, but at the cost of every other being also being a necessary being.

It might be said that to actualize any world other than this one would be contrary to Gods nature and to His will even though He’s perfectly capable of creating other worlds. Similar to this would be Gods’ inability to sin even though He’s free to do so.

 

[bogeydogg]

If this existences were possible, they would demand a different first cause due to divine simplicity.

If this is true then you have divorced the notion of first cause from the Church’s understanding of God entirely by a word trick of modal logic. However that doesn’t mean that your assertion is true. That is why I was arguing definition, because I want to understand why you phrase the argument the way you did. Are you seeking to disprove the notion of God? Because if you are, you cannot do it by changing the definition of what words mean and declaring you are using different form of logic so it is OK.

Even in a philosophy forum, if you are arguing about things pertaining to theism, it is necessary to explain why you wish to redefine terms from their classical understanding.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

It might be said that to actualize any world other than this one would be contrary to Gods nature and to His will even though He’s perfectly capable of creating other worlds. Similar to this would be Gods’ inability to sin even though He’s free to do so.

It doesn’t make sense to say this under the doctrine of divine simplicity, since what God is “capable” of doing and what He does are, ontologically, one and the same thing.

 

[Pro_Domina]

Get your vocabulary straight. Contingency is not what you mean to say.

The world of possibilities that exist in God’s mind are infinite.

Yet remember that His Will and Action are the same.

And He has willed since all eternity.

Since all eternity He willed you existed.

John Domandastrana He did not, so He exists only in the possibities. Nothing changed in God. We just happen to see His Will in action cronologically and view a possibility as something that might have been as rather than something that could have been but was eternally unwilled.